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VABSTRACT
Critical Intelligence and Its Development
September 1977
Jon Nordby, B. A., St. Olaf College
M. A., University of Massachusetts
Ph.D., University of Massachusetts
How can critical intelligence or critical thinking be
taught? A clear, detailed answer to this question is
important to professional educators. Philosophers, for
example, have some interest in teaching critical thinking
and in encouraging its exercise by students of philosophy.
This exercise involves the critical evaluation of philo-
sophical arguments. However, the educational importance of
critical intelligence goes well beyond the critical
evaluation of philosophical arguments. Educators in the
social sciences, the natural sciences, the humanities, as
well as in professional schools attempt to encourage the
development of critical intelligence. For example, students
are asked critically to evaluate theories, to support
certain conclusions with relevant evidence, and to organize
and to write critical essays and term papers. Nor is
developing critical intelligence simply confined to class-
room activities. Educators often hope that their students
VI
will evaluate sales pitches, political arguments, and pro
posed explanations through critical deliberation, not
simply in an arbitrary, emotional manner.
Given these and other motives, educators, educational
psychologists, and philosophers of education have offered
numerous answers to this question. To answer this question,
they attempt to provide what they consider to be successful
teaching methods or to develop what they consider to be
successful curricula for this purpose. However, such
attempted answers do not answer three obvious prior
questions. To answer this question, one must first answer
a prior question "Can critical intelligence be taught?" To
answer this question, one must first answer two other prior
philosophical questions: "What is critical intelligence?"
and "What is teaching?" The failure to address these prior
questions is one reason why these attempted answers are
neither sufficiently clear, nor sufficiently detailed.
The original question, therefore, is really the fourth of
four questions:
1. What is critical intelligence or critical thinking?
2. What is teaching?
3. Can critical intelligence or critical thinking be
taught?
4. How can critical intelligence or critical thinking
be taught?
Some educators, educational psychologists and philosophers
of education have attempted to answer question 1 and others
have attempted to answer question 2. To answer these
questions, most have attempted to provide definitions of the
terms: definitions of 'critical intelligence' and
definitions of 'teaching'. Yet there is an urgent difficulty
involving such definitions and the attempt to answer
questions 3 and 4 . In debates among sponsors of alterna-
tive answers to questions 3 and 4, we must not assume that
the terms 'critical intelligence' or 'teaching' are used
univocally. Thus, it is not always clear that educators,
educational psychologists or philosophers of education are
attempting to answer the same question. To evaluate these
answers, we must clarify and evaluate the definitions they
offer for these terms.
Those writing in the field of education often write as if
there were no philosophical problems or issues involved in
providing such definitions. While offering a solution to
the philosophical problems of definition is beyond the
scope of this dissertation, I do clarify and evaluate pro-
posed definitions of 'critical thinking' in order to reach
a clear and defensible understanding of the concept of
critical intelligence and thereby answer question 1 in
Chapter I. I then clarify and evaluate proposed definitions
of 'teaching' in order to reach a clear and defensible
understanding of this concept and thereby answer question 2
in Chapter II. Given a clear understanding of these con-
cepts, I then answer question 3 in Chapter III, and
finally answer the original question, question 4, in Chapter
IV. In the Appendix, I present an instructional model for
the development of critical intelligence.
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INTRODUCTION
['Begin at the beginning", the King said very gravely,and go on till you come to the end: then stop."
Lewis Carroll, from
Alice in Wonderland
In this dissertation, I provide a clarification of two con-
cepts, critical intelligence in terms of critical thinking,
and teaching, in order to answer two questions in the
philosophy of education: "Can critical intelligence be
taught?
,
and if so, "How can critical intelligence be
taught? The clarification of these two concepts involves
appealing to concepts that raise important questions in meta
physics, epistemology, philosophy of science, logic, and
philosophy of action. For example, critical thinking seems
to involve part of reasoning, some mental activity, some
dispositions and both deductive and inductive logic.
Teaching seems to involve some intentional action, the con-
cepts of knowledge and belief, and specifically knowledge
or beliefs about other minds. In this dissertation, however
I do not, in turn, provide an answer to the important
questions raised by central concepts in metaphysics,
epistemology, philosophy of science, logic, or philosophy of
action. Answering such important questions may involve many
dissertations
.
xiii
The mam focus of this dissertation is a clarification of
these two concepts sufficient to answer these two questions in
m the Philosophy of education. Indeed both critical
thinking (as part of reasoning) and teaching are two
central concepts in education, so their clarification is an
important task for philosophers of education. Furthermore,
the tv/o questions "Can critical intelligence be taught?,"
and if so, "How can critical intelligence be taught?" are
two central questions in the philosophy of education. They
bear a close relation to the question of teaching virtue
raised by Plato in the Meno
. While many educators worry
about how to teach critical thinking, or how to develop
critical intelligence, no philosopher of education had
considered these two questions with sufficient clarity to
provide a definitive answer. This is the task of my
dissertation
.
In Chapter I, I clarify 'critical thinking' and 'critical
intelligence' by providing a definition of what it is to be
engaged in critical thinking, D.10, a definition of what it
is to be engaged in correct critical thinking, D.ll, and
a definition of what it is to be critically intelligent
to a particular degree, D.12. In Chapter II, I clarify
'teaching' by distinguishing teaching how and teaching
that, and by providing definitions of what it is to be en-
gaged in teaching that, D.20, what it is to be engaged in
XIV
teaching how, D.21, and what it is to be engaged in
teaching, D.22. With these two concepts clarified, we are
in a clearer position to answer these two questions.
In Chapter III, I answer the question "Can critical
intelligence be taught?" affirmatively, and provide
necessary and sufficient conditions for successfully
teaching critical intelligence. I argue that determining
the success of the teaching is a contingent matter that, in
turn, involves arguing that the conditions of D.ll are, as
a matter of empirical fact, met. In Chapter IV, I answer
the question "How can critical intelligence be taught?" by
providing a curriculum such that successfully teaching
it is sufficient successfully to teach correct critical
thinking. I then consider the question of method, and argue
that any method for successfully teaching correct critical
thinking must be such that the second disjunct of D.20
is satisfied, and the second disjunct of D.21 is satisfied.
I then show that the choice of a method is based on at least
five contingent factors.
In the Appendix, I present an instructional model which
serves to show how critical intelligence can be taught
successfully. I clearly present a curriculum the
successful teaching of which is sufficient successfully to
teach correct critical thinking. It is an example of the
XV
application of D.12, D.22, and my answers to these two
questions in the philosophy of education to a particular
curriculum. lhis example of the application of D.12, D.22
and my answers to these two questions has both a theoretical
and a practical importance.
There are at least three features of this model that are
theoretically important. First, the model specifically
shows the kind of activity that must be taught successfully
to teach correct critical thinking and to develop critical
intelligence. The depth of treatment has been shown to
vary given different curricula and different educational
contexts. Secondly, the model shows that correct critical
thinking is not applying philosophy to other fields."
Critical thinking, as part of reasoning, is central to many
disciplines and professions, as well as to the everyday
concerns of rational persons. Critical thinking is not
by any means the exclusive concern of philosophy. Thirdly,
the model shows what might pre-analytically be called a
specific interdisciplinary activity. It, therefore, may
help philosophers of education begin to work out a clear
concept of an interdisciplinary activity.
There are at least five features of this model that are
practically important. First, the model serves as a manual
for instructors such that the instructor, for practical
XVI
purposes, needs no special background or training to follow
it, or to teach from it. Secondly, the model shows how, in
fact, successfully to teach critical intelligence to a
particular degree in a college level curriculum. Thirdly,
the model serves as a blueprint for a college level program
in critical thinking. Fourthly, the model shows that
perhaps some philosophers are, in fact, better prepared to
teach critical thinking than those in other disciplines,
although there is no necessity that this be so. Fifthly,
the model provides practical insight into the teaching
of clear, tightly organized writing, provided we grant that
clear writing proceeds from clearer thinking.
1CHAPTER I
WHAT IS CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE AND
WHAT IS CRITICAL THINKING?
Those who claim to have an objective, scientific test to
measure the ability to engage in critical thinking often
construe the test as providing an operational definition of
'critical intelligence' in terms of specific critical
thinking abilities. The Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking
Appraisal is perhaps the most well known and widely used
test of critical thinking. As such, it is easily constru-
able as providing an operational definition of 'critical
intelligence' in terms of specific critical thinking
abilities. In the attempt to provide a definition of
'critical intelligence', I shall examine and evaluate the
attempt to define 'critical intelligence' in terms of the
Watson-Glaser critical thinking appraisal.
The Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal is a test
consisting of five subtests.''’ The subtests are entitled
by the general critical thinking ability they are designed
1
G. B. Watson and E. M. Glaser, Watson-Glaser Critical
Thinking Appraisal (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World,
1964), p. 2. Other tests of critical thinking, subject to
the same basic construal
,
are the Ace Test of Critical
Thinking and the Principles of Critical Thinking Test,
prepared by the Illinois Curriculum Project.
2to measure. The subtest, the number of questions in each
subtest, and the specific behaviors in terms of specific
critical thinking abilities in
as follows
:
Column A Column B
Sub Test Questions
1. Inference 20
2. Recognition of 16
Assumptions
3. Deduction 25
4. Interpretation 24
5. Evaluation of 15
Arguments
the test may be summarized
Column C
Specific Ability
"Samples ability to discrimi-
nate among degrees of truth
or falsity of inferences drawn
from given data."
"Samples ability to recognize
unstated assumptions."
"Samples ability to reason
deductively from given state-
ments, to recognize the
relation of implication
between propositions to de-
termine if what appears to be
an implication or a necessary
inference from given premises
is such.
"
"Samples ability to weigh
evidence, to distinguish be-
tween a) generalizations
from data not warranted be-
yond reasonable doubt, and
b) generalizations not
necessary but warranted be-
yond reasonable doubt."
"Samples ability to distin-
guish between strong arguments
relevant to a particular
question at issue."
A definition of 'critical intelligence' in terms of the
specific critical thinking abilities listed in Column C and
3the general critical thinking abilities listed in Column A
can be specified in terms of some numerical test score N.
Given these five sub tests, said to test the specific
abilities listed in Column C, someone scoring correctly on
N out of 100 questions (Column B) is said to have the
ability to engage in critical thinking. 2 We might, there-
fore, consider a definition of 'critical thinking' as
follows
:
D. x is critically intelligent iff x scores N on the
Wat son-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal.
However, D as it stands will not do as a definition of
critical intelligence'
. We can think of cases in which x
has critical intelligence yet x does not score N on the
Wat son-G laser test. For example, x might have taken the
test while sick with the flu, or stricken with grief, or in
a mischievous mood; or x might be critically intelligent
yet never take the test and, therefore, never score at all;
or x might be a critically intelligent native Frenchman who
reads and speaks no English, and, therefore, cannot under-
stand the test. Therefore, D, as it stands, does not
I shall ignore the complex scoring of the test. If
the test does measure critical thinking ability, then if
someone scores N out of 100, I shall grant that that some-
one is said to be able to engage in critical thinking
according to the test results and that, therefore, the score
N is sufficient to measure critical intelligence. This is
sufficient for my purposes.
4successfully provide both necessary and sufficient con-
ditions for critical intelligence.
We may consider modifying D to remedy this defect:
0,1 * 1S cr 1'tically intelligent iff if x takes the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal in x ' s nativelanguage and x is healthy, unemotional and serious,then x scores N on the test.
However, D.l also will not do as a definition of 'critical
intelligence'
. The problem not only concerns specific
problems with the Watson-Gla ser test of critical thinking,
but also concerns a more basic problem with any such tests
consti ued as definitions. Given the five sub tests (Column
A) and the specific abilities (Column C) thought to be both
jointly necessary and singly sufficient for critical
thinking, there are cases in which x scores N on the test
and x is not critically intelligent. In terms of D.l, this
is to argue that there is an instance of x such that if x
takes the Watson-Glaser test in x's native language, and x
is healthy, unemotional and serious, then x scores N on the
test and x is not critically intelligent. There are also
cases in which x is critically intelligent and x does not
score N on the test. In terms of D.l, this is to argue
that there is an instance of X such that x is critically
intelligent and if x takes the Watson-Glaser test in x's
5native language, and x is healthy, unemotional and serious
then x does not score N on the test.^
Many arguments of this
literature about this test,
of the Wat son
-Glaser Critical
of Education Research, No. 52
sort are offered
See Robert Ennis,
Thinking Appraisa
(Dec
. 1958), pp
.
in the
"An Appraisal
1
,
" Journal
155-158":
Consider as an example sub test 1. m this sub test the
conclu^n
t0 rGad a Para<?raph from which a specific
direct ihe IL inst^ctions for this section
anoM thl evaluate this conclusion by choosing
Tr
“g following responses: "a. True; b. Probablvue, c. Insufficient Data; d. Probably False; e. False "
One such paragraph reads, in part: "Students from high in-come groups took part in many more of the extracurricularchool activities which cost money than did students from
•
W h°mas -" The conclusion drawn from this paragraph
f
' any students from low income homes felt they couldn'ta °rd t0 Partlcipate in extracurricular activities which
st money. The answer key indicates that the correctanswer is "b. Probably True."
Clearly, the conclusion does not follow deductively from
-he paragraph (taken to be composed of true statements)
.
Yet is the conclusion probably true, given the paragraph?
^-uppose the testee exercises critical thinking when facingthis question
. The testee considers the possibility that
e mcome fac t°r does not explain participation or lack ofparticipation m extracurricular school activities which
cost money. Suppose that high income students also tookpart in many more of the free extracurricular activitiesthan did students from low income homes, a possibilitygiven the paragraph. Then the correct answer concerning
the conclusion seems to be "c. Insufficient Data," sincethere is not enough information about the relation of income
to participation.
Therefore, one taking the test may engage in critical
fhi^iking and be marked wrong on the test. Therefore, one
may actually be critically intelligent and while taking the
test in one's native language, in good health, unemotionally
and seriously, may not score N on the test.
Given the answer key to the test, it is also possible that
one may take the test under the appropriate conditions,
score N, and not be critically intelligent. If one is a
6But aside from these specific problems with the Watson-
Glaser test, there is a more basic problem with construing
any such test as a definition, even granting that the test
successfully measures critical intelligence. Even if a test
correctly measures some ability according to other abilities,
the test cannot intelligibly be construed as offering a
definition of the ability measured. Consider the following
example. Suppose we construct a test composed of performing
different (x, y, z) movements on a machine to measure the
abilities thought to be jointly necessary and singly
sufficient to have the ability to swim. Yet it is not
necessary that 'movements x, y, z on a machine' have the
same meaning as 'swimming'
. The test, therefore, does not
define 'swimming' because it does not give the meaninq of
the term, even though we may assume that the test correctly
measures the ability to swim.
This charge equally applies to tests of critical thinking
like the Watson-Glaser Critical Thinking Appraisal. Even
granting for the sake of argument that the test correctly
measures the ability to engage in critical thinking
according to the abilities of Column C, and thereby granting
pathological doubter, and consistently answers "d." or "e.",
because of the answer key he will score very highly on the
test. Therefore, there are instances of x such that x takes
the test under the appropriate conditions, scores N, yet is
not critically intelligent.
7that the test correctly measures critical intelligence, the
test cannot intelligibly be construed as offering a defini-
tion of 'critical intelligence'. it is not necessary that
'score N on the Watson-Glaser test' has the same meaning as
'critical intelligence' even though we may assume that the
test correctly measures critical intelligence. We must,
therefore, reject this kind of definition and seek another
kind of definition for 'critical intelligence'.
We can easily offer another kind of definition for 'critical
intelligence' :
D.2 x is critically intelligent iff x has the ability to
engage in critical thinking.
However
, there are several problems with D.2 as it stands.
Like other kinds of intelligence, it seems to make sense that
different people may possess different degrees of critical
intelligence. We might also expect different people to en-
gage in critical thinking with different degrees of
proficiency. But D.2 attempts to define 'critical intelli-
gence' by giving both necessary and sufficient conditions
for its presence. It is, therefore, not concerned to
discriminate among different degrees of critical intelli-
gence, but simply to identify its presence.
8However
,
D.2 faces another serious problem. It attempts to
define an unclear term, 'critical intelligence', in terms
of an equally unclear term, 'critical thinking'. Therefore,
as a definition attempting to provide both a necessary and
a sufficient condition for 'critical intelligence', D.2 is
little help as it stands. We must also seek a clear
definition of 'critical thinking' in order clearly to under-
stand D.2. Such a definition of 'critical thinking', to be
acceptable, must provide both necessary and sufficient
conditions for 'critical thinking'.
Educators, educational psychologists and philosophers of
education have provided numerous descriptions of critical
thinking. D. H. Russell notes that one of his doctoral
candidates discovered thirty-five descriptions of critical
thinking from various educational journals.^ However, from
these many descriptions of critical thinking, two basic
groups emerge. The first group of definitions are attempts
to define 'critical thinking' in terms of some other general
notion or notions. The second group of definitions are
attempts to define 'critical thinking' in terms of specific
behaviors, in turn specifiable in terms of specific
abilities. In each group, many of the suggested definitions
4
D. H. Russell, "The Prerequisite: Knowing How to
Read Critically," Elementary English
,
No. 40 (Oct. 1963),
pp. 579-580.
9are very similar. Rather than consider every definition
offered, I shall consider a representative sample from each
group m an attempt to formulate a satisfactory definition
of 'critical thinking'. 5
more
Other authors offering definitions similar to one
of the definitions I consider in group one are:
or
FO Dressel
, "Critical Thinking," Education Digest,(Dec. 1955), pp . 16-17. —~
No. 21
P. F. Kavett, "An Activity Approach to Critical Thinking,"The Instructor
,
No. 73 (Nov. 1963), p. 116.
F. H. Ferrell, "Critical Thinking," The Education Diqest,
No. 14 (Jan. 1949) pp . 14-16.
C. C. Kemp, "Improvement of Critical Thinking in Relation
to Open-Closed Belief Systems," Journal of Experimental
Education
,
No. 31 (March 1963) pp. 321-323.
~ “
H. A. Anderson, "Critical Thinking Through Instruction in
English," The English Journal
,
No. 36 (Feb. 1947) pp . 75-76.
Other authors offering definitions similar to one or more of
the definitions I consider in group two are:
D. H. Russell, "Higher Mental Processes," ed . C. W. Harris,
Encyclopedia of Educational Research (New York: The
MacMillan Co., 1960), p. 651.
D. H. Russell, "Critical Thinking in Childhood and Youth,"
The School
,
No. 31 (May 1943), p. 76.
D. H. Russell, "Education for Critical Thinking,"
The School
,
No. 30 (Nov. 1941), p. 188.
R. Karlin, "Critical Reading is Critical Thinking,"
Education
,
No. 84 (Sept. 1963) pp . 8-11.
R. Ellsworth, "Critical Thinking," The National Elementary
Principal
,
No. 42 (May 1963) pp. 24-29.
N • D. Herber
,
An Inquiry Into the Effect of Instruction in
Critical Thinking Upon Students in Grades 10, 11, and 12
,(Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation
,
Boston University, 1959)
.
10
Definitions of 'Critical Thinking': Group One
H. A. Pulling describes critical thinking in terms of "the
stimulation of original thought." 6 Pulling argues that
teachers and librarians need to encourage the stimulation
of original thought in order to encourage critical
thinking. He then supplies a brief account of how this
might be done. The educational purpose of stimulating
original thought, according to Pulling, is "to develop
a sense of wonder in children which will lead them to
make informed guesses and to develop hypotheses." He
also argues that teachers and librarians need to encourage
Lhe development of this sense of wonder in children in order
to lead them to make informed guesses and to develop
hypotheses in order to encourage critical thinking.
M. Usery, "Critical Thinking Through Children's Literature "
Elementary English
,
No. 43 (Feb. 1966), p. 116
B. D'Angelo, The Teaching of Critical Thinking (BGR,
Amsterdam, 1971) .
~
R. Ennis, ’’The Concept of Critical Thinking," Harvard
Education Review
,
Mo. 32 (Winter 1962)
, pp . 81-111
.
T. W. Organ, The Art of Critical Thinking (Houghton-Mif f lin
Co., Boston, 1965).
6
H. A. Pulling, "Teacher and Librarian in Develop-
ment of Critical Thinking , " California Journal of Secondary
Education
,
No. 34 (Dec. 1959), p. 459.
11
then supplies a brief account of how this might be done.
In both cases, the concern is to develop critical thinking.
We may, therefore, suppose that Pulling might consider
stimulating original thought, making informed guesses, and
developing hypotheses as necessary components of critical
thinking, since he claims that we need to develop them in
order to develop critical thinking. We might also suppose
that they are sufficient, and propose the following
definition of 'critical thinking' on Pulling's behalf:
D.3 x is engaged in critical thinking iff x is engaged in
a process of stimulating original thought, or makinginformed guesses, or developing hypotheses.
Like all other definitions in group one, D.3 is hopelessly
unclear. The first problem is that "stimulating original
thought" is unclear, i.e., what is included in 'stimulating'
and what are considered 'original thoughts'? Suppose
someone drinks a quart of wine laced with LSD and then pro-
duces a rambling, confused, but original poem. According
to D.3, this case of engaging in the process of drinking a
quart of wine laced with LSD is a case of engaging in
critical thinking, since this process stimulated original
thought. Yet this is not what we mean when we say that
someone is engaged in critical thought.
12
The second problem is that "making informed guesses" is
unclear, i.e., what is an 'informed guess'? Suppose a
bookie gets a tip that Silver Blaze will win in the fifth,
and then bets on Silver Blaze to win in the fifth.
According to D.2, this case of a bookie engaging in making
an informed guess is a case of engaging in critical thinking,
/et intuitively this is not what we mean when we say that
someone is engaged in critical thinking.
The third problem is that "developing hypotheses" seems to
involve what we may preanalytically call creative thinking,
but does not necessarily involve critical thinking. We may
develop hypotheses by intuition, lucky guess, accident,
native genius, or informed guess. None of these methods
necessarily involve what we call 'critical thinking'.
Pulling, like many others offering descriptions of critical
thinking, seems to confuse critical thinking with creative
thinking. Given these problems, it is clear that D.3 does
not provide necessary and sufficient conditions for critical
thinking. Therefore, it is not a useful definition of
'critical thinking.'
C. De Zufra, Jr. describes critical thinking in terms of
"the control of emotions, the curbing of impulsiveness; it
is recognition of cause and effects; it is creative; it is
13
problem solving;
. . . criti
choices."^ A definition of
to De Zufra's account is:
cal thinking is the making of
critical thinking' according
D
. 4 x is engaged in critical thinking iff x is engaged
controlling emotions, or curbing impulses, or
recognizing cause and effect relations, or solvingproblems, or making choices.
in
D.4 can also be shown not to provide successfully both
necessary and sufficient conditions for critical thinking.
Again, the major problem is that the definiens is unclear.
Suppose a four year old child falls while learning to
rollerskate. Suppose the child is self-conscious about
crying in front of peers, so he holds back the tears.
According to D.4, this child is engaged in critical
thinking. However, he is not engaged in critical thinking.
Therefore, controlling emotions is not a sufficient con-
dition for engaging in critical thinking.
Suppose a member of Weight Watchers wires his jaws to con-
trol his impulse to overeat. In having this jaws wired,
according to D.4, he is engaging in critical thinking.
He may claim that this is a creative method of curbing the
impulse to overeat, and that this involves creative
^ C. De Zaffra, Jr., "Teaching for Critical Thinking,
Clearing House
,
No. 31 (April 1957), p. 231.
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thinking, but does not involve critical thinking. Therefore,
simply curbing impulses is not a sufficient condition for
engaging in critical thinking.
Suppose someone witnesses a hit-and-run accident. This
someone sees a car strike a pedestrian, causing serious
injury, and then speed away. According to D.4, in
witnessing this accident, one is engaging in critical
thinking. Yet our intuitions tell us that this does not
involve critical thinking. Therefore, simply recognizing
cause and effect relations is not a sufficient condition for
engaging in critical thinking.
Suppose a Mafia leader has a problem. A witness' testimony
will send him to prison for life. He elects to solve the
problem by having the witness murdered. According to D.4,
engaging in having the witness murdered is engaging in
critical thinking. This, like wiring one's jaws to curb the
impulse to overeat, may involve creative thinking, but it
does not involve critical thinking. Therefore, simply
solving problems is not a sufficient condition for engaging
in critical thinking.
Suppose I choose to have strawberry topping on my ice cream.
According to D.4, in choosing strawberry topping I am en-
gaging in critical thinking. Yet our intuitions tell us
15
that this is false. Therefore, simply making choices is not
a sufficient condition for engaging in critical thinking.
Therefore, D.4 does not provide both necessary and suf-
ficient conditions for critical thinking.
However, might these conditions be jointly sufficient? We
may reformulate D.4 as follows:
D.5 x is engaged in critical thinking iff x is engaged in
controlling emotions, and curbing impulses and
recognizing cause and effect relations, and solving
problems, and making choices.
However, even granting that these may be jointly sufficient,
they are clearly not necessary. Suppose a stranger says to
me "I believe there are men from Mars, therefore, there are
men from Mars." Suppose I point out to him that while I
have no reason to doubt that he believes that there are men
from Mars, it does not follow from his belief that there are
men from Mars. I also point out and explain that this error
in reasoning involves appealing to a false principle.
Intuitively we want to be able to say that in making this
reply, I am engaging in critical thinking. In making this
reply, I feel no emotions to control; neither hatred nor
fear, nor anger nor love. I also feel no impulses to curb;
neither to hit him, nor to kick him, nor to tell him that
he is stupid. There are no cause and effect relations here
16
to recognize, and no choices to be made, unless we include
as making a choice" the decision to reply at all. There-
fore, neither D.4 nor D.5 provide necessary conditions for
engaging in critical thinking. At most, D.5 provides a
jointly sufficient condition. Therefore, neither D.4 nor
D.5 is a useful definition of 'critical thinking'; neither
provides both necessary and sufficient conditions for en-
gaging in critical thinking.
K. 0. Budmen describes critical thinking in terms of "sub-
jective judgments." He argues that teachers unfortunately
confuse critical thinking with what he calls "the scientific
method." Unlike "the scientific method," which he claims
is objective and provides conclusions based upon verifiable
evidence, critical thinking is based upon "emotive premises
and rooted in value constructs." These value constructs and
emotions differ among individuals. He argues that while
what he calls the scientific method allows us objectively
and mechanically to determine that a conclusion is true,
what he calls critical thinking does not allow us objectively
and mechanically to determine that a conclusion is true.
Budman ' s account seems to be based on the observation that
there is universal agreement about the conclusions reached
in science, but no universal agreement about the conclusions
g
K . 0. Budmen, "What Do You Think, Teacher?", Peabody
Journal of Education, No. 45 (July 1967), p. 3.
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reached in ethics, or other fields that Budmen claims rely
on critical thinking rather than on the scientific method
to verify conclusions. Critical thinking, therefore,
according to Budmen, involves subjective and individual
rather than objective and universal judgments.
Although Budmen never gives an account of what the scien-
tific method might be or how it is objective and universal,
his account of critical thinking is intended to capture the
subjective, individual elements which he thinks explain the
lack of agreement concerning conclusions verified by
critical thinking. We may, therefore, suppose that Budmen
considers engaging in making these subjective judgments,
by appeal to these individual values and emotions, engaging
in critical thinking.
D.6 x is engaged in critical thinking iff x is engaged in
making subjective judgments by appealing to individual
values and emotive feelings toward premises.
Many educators, like Budmen, mistakenly believe that criti-
cal thinking is relative only to individual values and
emotions. They seem mistakenly to infer that because criti-
cal thinking is done by individuals, it, therefore, can be
understood only as an individual activity which is different
for different individuals, varying with individual values
and emotions. But because all judgments are made by
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individuals, we need not suppose that no judgment made by an
individual can be based on universally specifiable rules, or
objective evidence. Indeed, even the objective universal
j udgments made according to the scientific method are made
by individuals and are subjective in that very uninteresting
sense
.
We can make a judgment and support it by appealing to such
specifiable rules or objective evidence and not appeal to
individual values and emotive feelings toward premises at
all. For example, one may make the judgment that "if P
then Q; Q, therefore, P" is an invalid argument form with-
out appealing to individual values and emotions (assuming
we understand what these are and how such appeals work)
.
In this case, one may appeal to the rules of valid in-
ference, or simply take a lucky guess in making the
judgment
.
D.6 implies that critical thinking is concerned only with
judgments based on individual values and emotions. Yet,
judging the above argument form to be invalid may involve
critical thinking, yet does not involve making a judgment
based on individual values and emotions. Furthermore,
making such judgments does not necessarily seem to involve
engaging in critical thinking. Therefore, D.6 is not a good
definition of 'critical thinking'.
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Definitions of 'Critical Thinking': Group Two
Because general definitions like D.3, D.4, D.5 and D.6 are
hopelessly unclear, they can easily be shown to fail in the
attempt to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for
critical thinking. Several educators have attempted to
overcome these difficulties with proposed definitions of
'critical thinking' by providing definitions of 'critical
thinking in turn specifiable in terms of specific skills
and specific abilities. Such a definition, if it can be
shown to be successful, has two obvious advantages. First,
the presence of such specific skills and specific abilities
is presumed to be empirically testable, and, therefore, we
may construct tests to measure critical thinking. Secondly,
once We determine what teaching is, we need only examine
the specific skills and abilities composing the definition
and determine if they can be taught to determine whether
critical thinking can be taught. With these advantages in
mind, we must carefully examine such definitions and de-
termine if one is successful.
R. E. Pingry suggests a basic guideline for such definitions
of 'critical thinking' based on a desire to secure these
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two obvious advantages. He argues that:
and
Critical thinking has a great number of aspects
means many different things to different people.
r ?
S a de
^
cr iptive phrase
,
critical thinking isf little use by itself to describe outcomes oflearning it is necessary and important that criticalhinkmg be defined or supplemented by specific out-comes of learning in terms of actual behavior charac-teristics and skills desired. "9
Elliot W. Eisner attempts to follow this guideline and to
define 'critical thinking' in terms of specific skills and
abilities, evidenced by specific behavior. He argues that
"Terms such as 'critical thinking'
. . . can be found in
almost any education journal but the specification of the
particular behaviors that constitute it is another
matter
. . . 'critical thinking' is often so broadly con-
ceived as to make (the term) functionally meaningless ."
Therefore, his concern is to provide a definition of
critical thinking' that will allow us clearly to delineate
"specific behaviors that contribute to or consitute
. . .
critical thinking. "H
g
R. E. Pingry, "Critical Thinking: What Is It?,"
The Mathematics Teacher
,
No. 44 (Nov. 1951) pp. 466-470.
^ E. W. Eisner, "Critical Thinking: Some Cognitive
Components," Teachers College Record
,
No. 66 (April 1965),
pp. 624-634 .
E. W. Eisner,
Components," p. 626.
Critical Thinking: Some Cognitive
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Eisner characterizes ‘critical thinking' in terms of what
ne calls "four cognitive components 12 The first component
he calls "questing." Questing, according to Eisner, in-
volves asking questions of a specific kind. One is not
questioning if one is merely asking questions of clarifi-
cation like "Miss Jones, did you say page 237 or 238?" One
is questing if one is asking questions like "Why didn't the
Black Muslims become Black Buddhists?" He asserts that such
questing questions may be distinguished from other sorts of
non-questing questions in that questing-questions "are
catalytic to further inquiry." Critical thinking,
therefore, in Eisner's view, begins with questing.
The second component he calls "speculation." Speculation,
according to Eisner, is "the ability to generate models or
theories to explicate phenomena." 13 The third component
13 He does not claim to provide an exhaustive analysis,
but it is useful to evaluate his suggestion as a definition
to begin to see what such a definition is like.
I OJ We can see, that each of these components is very
unclear. However, this unclarity seems to trap Eisner in
his own account of speculation. He states that "If the
students feel anxious or if they feel inadequate, if they
feel their remarks will suffer critical evaluation, they
tend to be less able to give free rein to those processes
which make this behavior possible." He also points out
that Osborn (in Applied Imagination: Principles and
Procedures of Creative Thinking
,
N.Y. Scribners, 1953) has
a standing rule prohibiting critical evaluation or critical
comments during such speculation. I shall, however, assume
that such speculations are not immune to the evaluation he
mentions as the third component of critical thinking.
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he calls evaluation." Evaluation, according to Eisner,
involves three distinct operations; first, evaluating the
logic of propositions; secondly, evaluating the evidence
supporting a claim; and thirdly, evaluating "the way in
which language is organized, types of words selected, and
the emphasis on certain words." The fourth component he
calls "constructing." Constructing, according to Eisner,
is the production of relationships between seemingly un-
related concepts; the perception of elements as part of a
larger whole."
Given Eisner's account, we might, therefore, expect that to
say that someone is engaged in questing, speculating,
evaluating and constructing is to say that that someone is
engaged in critical thinking. Apparently these four com-
ponents are meant conjunctively to describe or define
'critical thinking' since no component alone is sufficient
to describe or define critical thinking, although he claims
that each one is a necessary component.
Suppose someone asks "Why does grandmother dye her hair?",
yet fails to suggest any reason why. This question appears
to accord with Eisner's vague notion of a questing question.
If we construe questing as a sufficient condition for
critical thinking, asking this question is engaging in
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cr
-^ica l thinking. Yet nnr> -»„+. < . .our intuitions tell us that simply
asking this question is not a sufficient condition for
engaging in critical thinking.
One may generate models or theories yet fail inC£> » i to engage in
thinking. Suppose someone speculates that the
Earth is round because God loves circles. We may claim that
speculating in this sense is a sufficient condition for en-
gaging in creative thinking, but not au u suilicient condition
for engaging in critical thinking.
We may grant that engaging in some suitably clarified notion
of evaluation is sufficient for engaging in critical
thinking, yet one may engage in what Eisner calls "con-
structing," producing relationships between seemingly un-
related concepts, and not engage in critical thinking.
Suppose Stan claims that he is thinking of grandmothers and
tuna fish.
A relationship between seemingly unrelated concepts like
grandmothers and tuna fish, in this case is "grandmothers
and tuna fish are both thought of by Stan." Yet we would
not want to claim that in thinking of grandmothers and tuna
fish, Stan is engaging in critical thinking. Therefore,
producing these relationships is not a sufficient condition
for engaging in critical thinking. To rule out the
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anticipated failure of these "components of critical
thinking" to provide sufficient conditions for critical
thinking, we might consider these components as jointly
sufficient conditions for critical thinking. Therefore, a
definition of ’critical thinking' in terms of these specific
components evidencing specific behavior is as follows:
D.7 x is engaged in critical
questing and speculating
constructing
.
thinking iff x is engaged in
and evaluating and
Assuming that these four components are clear, the first
problem with Eisner's account and, consequently, with D.7,
is that it is not exhaustive. There may be other components
of critical thinking that are also jointly sufficient
conditions for critical thinking. To provide this type of
definition for 'critical thinking' is to attempt to provide
l4
an exhaustive account.
Secondly, the notions of "questing, speculating, evaluating,
and constructing" are sufficiently vague to include almost
any thinking activity. Consequently, these notions do not
^ He does not claim that his account is exhaustive,
since he does not directly propose a definition, so criti-
cism at this point is decidedly unfair. However, he does
claim that these four cognitive components and their
resulting behaviors "are considered important necessary
aspects of critical thinking" but he adds "it is recognized
that others may have made other selections."
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usefully distinguish critical thinking from any other kind
of thinking. These notions may, under certain circum-
stances, provide a jointly sufficient condition for the
presence of what we preanalyt ically call critical thinking,
but this does not help us to provide a definition of
critical thinking'
. These notions, under certain circum-
stances, provide a jointly conjunctively sufficient con-
dition for critical thinking the same way that a bullet in
the chest, under certain circumstances, provides a suf-
ficient condition for death. ' However, these notions,
under no circumstances, provide a conjunctively necessary
condition for critical thinking, the same way that a bullet
in the chest, under no circumstances, provides a necessary
condition for death.
To see that these four notions are not jointly necessary
conditions for critical thinking, we must see that Eisner
has not provided four correct necessary components of
critical thinking.
-*-5 Consider a case in which x is engaged in questing,
speculating, evaluating and constructing, each at different
times and each about something different. We do not want
to say, without reservation, that x is engaged in critical
thinking. Therefore, we must carefully formulate the case
in question. It is sufficient for my point, however, to
grant that such a case may be successfully formulated.
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Consider 'questing." Certainly such questing questions may
be catalytic to further inquiry, and the further inquiry may
involve critical thinking. But it need not. There are many
oases of what we want to call critical thinking that do not
Involve questing in Eisner's sense. Consider the following
example
.
Suppose that a knowledgable logician faces an argument with
the following argument form: if P then Q; Q, therefore P.
He need ask no questing questions to reply that this argu-
ment is invalid because it is an instance of an invalid
argument form. He is sufficiently familiar with such simple
argument forms to be able to evaluate them without asking
"What could be wrong with this argument?/’ or "Why is this
argument invalid?/’ or some other general question, con-
strued as a questing question, catalytic to further inquiry.
Yet, because the logician has a high degree of familiarity
with such simple arguments, and is able to evaluate them
without asking a questing question, we do not want to say
that he is not engaged in critical thinking. This would
amount to claiming that at some degree N of familiarity with
certain critical thinking operations, the operations cease
to be critical thinking operations and become something
else. Yet, we will want to be able to claim that someone
is engaged in critical thinking, no matter what degree N of
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familiarity that that someone has with some critical
thinking operation. Therefore, questing, as it now stands
m Eisner’s account, is not a necessary component of
critical thinking.
Consider "speculation." Certainly engaging in speculation
may engage one in critical thinking, but speculation is not
a necessary component of critical thinking. Models or
theories can be produced by insight, imagination, intuition,
or methodical invention. As such, speculation is a kind of
thinking, but it is mistaken to assume that every form of
thinking is a form of critical thinking. There are cases of
what we want to call critical thinking that do not involve
speculation. Consider the following example. Suppose an
environmentalist encounters the following argument:
1. If the reactor is built, then the river is polluted.
2. The river is polluted.
3. Therefore, the reactor is built.
He need not engage in speculation to think critically about
this argument and to determine that it is invalid. To
engage in critical thinking, the environmentalist need not
engage in generating models or theories to explicate
phenomena. Therefore, speculation is not a necessary com-
ponent of critical thinking.
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Consider "constructing
.
» Certainly engaging in constructing
may engage one in speculation and speculation may, in turn,
engage one in critical thinking, but it need not.
Constructing is not a necessary component of critical
thinking. Relationships between seemingly unrelated con-
cepts and between parts and wholes can be produced by
accident, lucky guesses, intuitions or methodical invention.
As such, constructing may be a form of thinking, but it is
mistaken to assume that every form of thinking is a form of
critical thinking. There are cases of what we want to call
critical thinking that do not involve constructing.
Consider the above example of the environmentalist. He need
not engage in constructing to think critically about the
argument and determine that it is invalid. To engage in
critical thinking, the environmentalist need not engage in
producing relationships between seemingly unrelated
concepts, or between parts and wholes. Therefore, con-
structing is not a necessary component of critical thinking.
At most, what Eisner calls these four components of critical
thinking provide, under certain circumstances, a conjunc-
tively sufficient condition for the presence of our pre-
analytic notion of critical thinking. Yet at least three
of these components do not appear to be necessary components
of critical thinking at all, nor do these four components
provide a jointly necessary condition for the presence of
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critical thinking. For these reasons, D.7 does not appear
to be a promising definition of 'critical thinking'.
However, we may conclude that some notion of "evaluation"
may be important in the attempt to define 'critical
thinking' in terms of specific abilities, evidenced by
specific behavior.
Robert Ennis also attempts to define ’critical thinking' in
terms of abilities evidenced by specific behavior. 16 He
adopts and revises a definition of ’critical thinking’
suggested by B. 0. Smith: "Now if we set about to find out
what
. .
. (a) .
. . statement means and to determine
whether to accept it or reject it, we would be engaged in
17
critical thinking." Smith defines 'critical thinking' as
"the assessing of statements." Ennis points out that Smith
does not say "the correct assessing of statements" and that
this allows Smith to talk about correct and incorrect
critical thinking. Ennis, however, as a first step toward
a definition of 'critical thinking', claims that 'critical
thinking' should be defined such that one does not in-
correctly engage in critical thinking. Rather, one simply
R. Ennis, "A Definition of Critical Thinking",
The Reading Teacher
,
No. 17 (March 1964 ), pp . 599-612.
^ B. 0. Smith, "The Improvement of Critical Thinking",
Progressive Education
,
No. 30 (Ptorch 1953), pp. 129-134.
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fails to engage in critical thinking. Ennis, therefore,
proposes the following definition:
D • 8 x is engaged in critical thinking iff x is engaged inthe correct assessment of statements.
Ennis does not seem to be aware that D.8 as it stands will
not do as a definition of ’critical thinking’. However, he
points out that: a) "there are various kinds of state-
ments," b) "There are various relations between statements
and their support," and c) "there are various kinds of
assessment." Yet he does not reformulate his definition,
or clearly spell out the implications of a, b and c for
D.8. He simply lists what he calls "nine major aspects of
critical thinking based on the definition." We must now
consider an objection to D.8 and then see how we can re-
formulate D.8 according to Ennis’ suggestions in an attempt
to form a workable definition of 'critical thinking'.
Consider the following counterexample, designed to expose
the weakness of D.8. Suppose we program a computer to scan
job applications for a large company, and to sort them into
groups according to a statement of job description. The
computer is in some sense engaged in the correct assessment
of statements. It is correctly scanning the statement of
job description and feeding the applications into the
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appropriate group. Yet we would not want to claim that the
computer is engaged in critical thinking. D.8, therefore,
does not provide a necessary and sufficient condition for
critical thinking.
The obvious problem with D.8 is that it is too vague. We
may reconstruct D.8 by appealing to Ennis' discussion of
what he calls "nine major aspects of critical thinking."
Ihe nine major behavioral aspects of critical thinking,
according to Ennis, are:
1. Judging whether a statement follows from the premisesl. Judging whether a statement is an assumption.
3. Judging whether an observation statement is reliable.
4. Judging whether a simple generalization is warranted.
5. Judging whether a hypothesis is warranted.
6. Judging whether a theory is warranted.
7. Judging whether an argument depends on an ambiguity.
8. Judging whether a statement is vague or overspecif ic
.
9. Judging whether an alleged authority is reliable.
We may begin our attempt to reformulate D.8 by eliminating
the unnecessary reduplication among these nine aspects of
critical thinking. First, 1 may be clarified to involve
judging statements that follow from inductive arguments,
statements that follow from deductive arguments, and state-
ments that follow from neither inductive nor deductive
arguments. With this clarification, 2, 4 and 5 can be
included in this revision of 1. As it stands, 2 is
^ i f ^ icul t to understand. An assumption may be simply a
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statement which is taken to be self-evident, a statement
which is generally believed to be true, or a statement which
is offered without support. In any case, whatever an
assumption is, this reformulation of 1 can include such
statements, no matter how this vague term is construed;
judging whether a statement is an assumption involves
judging whether a statement, in fact, follows from neither
inductive or deductive arguments, since no such arguments
1
8
are presented. Four is simply a case of judging whether
a statement of a generalization follows inductively from
some statement or set of statements as premises, and 5 is
simply a case of judging whether there is any inductive or
deductive support for the statement of a hypothesis. Three,
7
,
8 and 9 involve judging whether a statement or a set of
statements is an instance of an informal fallacy. Since
these statements are somewhat unclear, some instances may be
captured by a reformulation of 1. But we may also combine
them under one heading and broaden that heading to include
all forms of informal fallacies. This revised list of
1 R
I shall assume here that any statement can be shown
to follow deductively, even what have been called as-
sumptions, since we may trivially provide a deductively
valid argument with the assumption as the conclusion.
(Assume that the roof will not fall. The deductive argument
is that if Nixon was President, then the roof will not fall.
Nixon was President. Therefore, the roof will not fall.)
The point here, however, is recognizing that no such argu-
ment is, in fact, provided. This requirement can be built
into any clarification of 1.
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behavioral aspects of critical thinking mentioned by
Ennis, therefore, is:
1* fudging whether a statement does or does not follow in-ductively from a presented statement or set of state-
ments, or does or does not follow deductively from apresented statement or set of statements, or does notfollow inductively or deductively from any presented
statement or set of statements.
2 . Judging whether a statement or a theory can be supportedby sound arguments.
3. Judging whether a statement or set of statements commits
an informal fallacy.
Each of these behavioral aspects involves, in turn, a set of
abilities which presumably can be clearly enumerated.
Therefore, we may consider adding these three behavioral
aspects to Ennis' proposed definition in an attempt to
reformulate D.8.
D.9 x is engaged in critical thinking iff x is engaged in
correctly
:
(1) judging whether a statement does or does not
follow inductively from a presented statement or
set of statements, or does or does not follow
deductively from a presented statement or set of
statements, or does not follow inductively or
deductively from any presented statement or set of
statements, or
(2) judging whether a statement of a theory can be
supported by sound arguments, or
(3) judging whether a statement or set of statements
commits an informal fallacy, or
any combination of doing (1) , (2) and (3)
.
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D * 9 as a definition of ’critical thinking’, is not immune to
serious objection. The first objection to D.9 is that it
seems to ignore an important aspect of critical thinking.
One of the most important aspects of critical thinking is
the ability to reformulate or clarify a term or a statement
that may be unclear as it stands. If a term or a statement
is unclear, then it may have a number of possible
interpretations. The task, then, is to clarify the term or
the statement in such a way that the interpretation selected
makes explicit what the user of the term or the author of
the statement could be reasonably construed to intend. This
often involves applying what has been called the principle
of charity.
D.9, for example, requires that we suppose in (2) that the
statement of a theory is clear. However, one of the most
important tasks of critical thinking is to provide a clear
statement of a theory that is initially unclearly stated.
This often involves explicating certain concepts used in the
statement or clarifying the statement itself. The expla-
nation of concepts and the clarification of statements can
be loosely specified in terms of specific abilities. Thus,
D.9 omits this important behavioral aspect of critical
thinking. At most, D.9 provides, under certain
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circumstances sufficient conditions for critical thinking,
but not both necessary and sufficient conditions .
^
There is a second objection to D.9 to support this claim.
Ennis argued that unlike Smith's definition of 'critical
thinking', his definition of 'critical thinking' involved
"c orrectly a ssessing statements," not simply "assessing
statements." This implies that one cannot incorrectly en-
gage in critical thinking, but that one simply fails to
engage in critical thinking. This view, however, seems
counterintuitive. For example, consider a philosopher
laboring over a theory who publishes his defense of the
theory in the Journal of Philosophy
. Suppose that he is
accused by a second philosopher, who publishes this attack
on this defense of the theory in the next issue of the
Journal of Philosophy
,
of supporting the theory with an
unsound and an invalid argument. Suppose this second
philosopher is correct. One complex argument is unsound,
another complex argument is invalid. We might want to
claim that the first philosopher failed correctly to support
the theory, and consequently, engaged in incorrect critical
thinking when reviewing his work, but we would not want to
claim that in laboring over his theory and reviewing his
1
9
This assumes that we can describe a case where
statements, terms, etc. are clear, and that the case
described avoids the other problems with D.9.
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work, he failed to engage in critical thinking. Therefore,
D.9 rules out instances of critical thinking that pre-
analytically need to be ruled in.
A satisfactory definition of 'critical thinking' must
succeed in ruling out activities which are obviously not
instances of critical thinking, yet rule in activities which
our intuitions strongly suggest are instances of critical
thinking, even though they involve incorrect critical
thinking. A satisfactory definition should rule in
instances like the above philosopher reviewing his own work.
If you are engaged in flying an airplane, but do it badly
and crash, we cannot reasonably argue that you were never
engaged in flying the airplane without distorting our
intuitions. It is clearer to argue that you were engaged in
flying the airplane badly.
There is a third objection to D.9 which can be seen by
considering the following counterexample. Suppose in
judging whether a statement of a theory can be supported by
sound arguments (2)
,
we lay a Coke bottle on its side and
spin it. If the top points East, then the theory can be
supported by sound arguments. If the top points West, then
the theory cannot be supported by sound arguments. If the
top points North, South, or anywhere in between, we spin
the bottle again. Now suppose, in a particular case of a
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particular theory, the top points East, and we are correct.
The theory in question can indeed be supported by sound
arguments. Therefore, according to D.9, engaging in
spinning the Coke bottle to make this judgment is engaging
in critical thinking since D.9 does not specify how one must
make a particular judgment like (2)
,
or how the judgment
made is to be supported. Making such a judgment by
spinning a Code bottle, of course, is not what we want to
call engaging in critical thinking. Therefore, D.9 is not
a good definition of 'critical thinking'.
We can attempt to reconstruct D.9 to avoid these objections
so that it might successfully provide both necessary and
sufficient conditions for critical thinking. To attempt to
avoid the third objection, we might distinguish what has, in
the philosophy of science, been called the "context of
discovery" from what has been called the "context of
justification." The intuition here is that in considering
necessary and sufficient conditions for critical thinking,
we are not interested in the context of discovery, but only
in the context of justification. Considerations of the con-
text of discovery may more reasonably belong in discussions
of what might constitute creative thinking.
The Coke bottle counterexample is addressed to the notion in
D.9 of "correctly judging whether ..." The effect seems
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to be that we may discover the correct judgment by accident,
by lucky guess, by intuition, or by spinning a Coke bottle.
This involves the context of discovery. None of these
methods of discovering the correct judgment necessarily
involve critical thinking. Discovery may involve creative
thinking but that is of no concern here. The role of
critical thinking, once such a discovery is made by what-
ever mysterious means, is, in this example, to support the
judgment with reasoned arguments, applying the skills which
are supposed to make up (1) , (2) and (3)
.
We must, there-
fore, state some conditions for justifying judgements like
(1)
, (2)
,
and (3) in a definition of 'critical thinking'
such that these conditions avoid involving methods of
discovering correct judgments and such that these con-
ditions involve methods of justifying the judgment made
which intuitively involve critical thinking abilities.
To attempt to avoid the second objection, we might simply
eliminate 'correct' from the definition, since we want a
definition which does not rule out all instances of critical
thinking which turn out to be incorrect. To attempt to
avoid the first objection, we might first introduce two
other behavioral aspects of critical thinking and modify
(2)
. We might introduce the following:
(4) judging whether a term or a statement is unclear
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and requires explication or clarification.
(5) judging whether the proposed explicatum or the
proposed clarification selected explicates or
clarifies what the user of the term or the author
of the statement can reasonably be construed to
intend
.
And modify (2) to read:
(6) judging whether a clear statement of a theory can
or cannot be supported by sound arguments.
Therefore, we may consider applying these suggestions in an
attempt to reformulate D.9 and avoid these three objections:
D.10 x is engaged in critical thinking iff x is engaged in:
(1) a) judging whether a statement does or does not
follow inductively from a presented statement
or set of statements, or does or does not
follow deductively from a presented statement
or set of statements, or does not follow in-
ductively or deductively from any presented
statement or set of statements, and
b) x has the ability to produce an appeal to in-
ductive or deductive rules of inference from
which x believes the statement follows, or x
has the ability to produce an appeal to in-
ductive or deductive rules of inference that
x believes are violated in concluding the
statement, or x has the ability to provide an
explanation that x believes explains why the
statement does not follow inductively or
deductively to support the judgment, or
There is an objection to (2) related to the Coke
bottle counterexample which might be avoided by stating
some conditions for justifying judgments like (1), (2) and
(3)
.
The objection is does (2) require just deciding
whether a theory can be supported by sound arguments, or
actually supporting the theory with sound arguments?
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(2) a) judging whether a term or a statement is
unclear and requires explication or
clarification, and
b) if x has the ability to produce what x believes
to be more than one plausible construal of the
meaning of the term or the meaning of the
statement to support the judgment, or
(3) a) judging whether the proposed explicatum or the
proposed clarification selected explicates or
clarifies what the user of the term or the
author of the statement can reasonably be
construed to intend, and
b) x has the ability to produce an appeal to what
x believes to be reasons for supposing that the
proposed explicatum is, in fact, an explicatum
(by appeal to what an explication is) or an
appeal to what x believes to be reasons for
supposing that the proposed clarification is,
in fact, a clarification (by appeal to (2)) to
support the judgment, or
(4) a) judging whether a clear statement of a theory
can or cannot be supported by sound arguments,
and
b) x has the ability to produce either what x
believes to be a valid, sound deductive argu-
ment or what x believes to be a strong in-
ductive argument to support the theory, or
produce either what x believes to be a valid,
sound deductive argument or what x believes to
be a strong inductive argument to support its
denial, to support the judgment, or
(5) a) judging whether a statement or a set of state-
ments is an instance of an informal fallacy,
and
b) x has the ability to produce the rule which x
believes the fallacy in question is an instance
of,
or any combination of doing (1)
, (2) , (3) , (4)
and ( 5 ) .
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D.io is a definition of engaging in critical thinking in
terms of engaging in certain mental activities, as stated in
(1) through (5) a)
, and in terms of having certain dispo-
sitions which may not be actualized, in terms of (1) through
(5) b)
. As we have seen, just engaging in certain mental
activities such as judging (in (1) through (5) a)) is not
sufficient to define engaging in critical thinking. For
example, we may engage in judging by lucky guess and not be
engaged in critical thinking. Nor is just having certain
dispositions which may not be actualized sufficient to de-
fine engaging in critical thinking. For example, we may
have such dispositions while sleeping and not be engaged in
critical thinking. However, defining engaging in critical
thinking in terms of both engaging in certain mental
activities and having certain dispositions which may not be
actualized avoids these problems.
Consider (1) through (5). in each, a) simply requires a
judgment, which may be arrived at even by spinning a Coke
bottle. Therefore, a) alone does not rule out the possi-
bility of a lucky guess, which does not involve engaging in
critical thinking. However, (1) through (5) b) functions as
a requirement which is meant to rule out such lucky guesses
which do not involve engaging in critical thinking. These
((1) through (5) b) ) require that x have the ability to
produce a specific kind of justification that x believes to
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be adequate to support the judgments. Note that b) does not
require certain behavior of x, but simply requires that x
have certain dispositions to behave. These dispositions to
behave are what serve to distinguish judging by lucky guess
from judging by critical thinking.
For example, suppose that x judges that a statement does not
follow deductively from a presented set of statements
(d) a)). Suppose that I, in fact, ask x to justify this
judgment and he tells me to go to hell ((1) b) )
.
In this
case, suppose that x is simply busy, and thinks of me as a
conceptual troublemaker, even though he, in fact, has the
ability to justify the judgment by an appeal to the appro-
priate deductive rule of inference. According to D.10, in
making this judgement, x is engaged in critical thinking
since he still has the ability to justify the judgment, even
though he has, in fact, told me to go to hell. In another
case, suppose that x again tells me to go to hell; however,
suppose that x does not, in fact, have the ability to
justify the judgment by an appeal to the appropriate de-
ductive rule of inference. According to D.10, x is not
engaged in critical thinking since he does not have the dis-
position to justify the judgment by an appeal to the
appropriate deductive rule of inference.
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In another case, suppose that x makes this judgment, yet x
is very drunk. Suppose x is
,
in fact, asked to justify this
judgment, and x simply reaches into his pocket and pulls out
a slip of paper on which is written "P • % p" and says "it
follows from this." According to D.10, x is engaged in
critical thinking provided that x believes the given
statement follows from the presented statement, or set of
statements, according to this rule. If x simply reaches
for this slip of paper out of habit and has no belief that
the given statement follows from the presented statement or
set of statements according to this rule, then according to
D.10, x is not engaged in critical thinking.
However, D.10 rules in as instances of engaging in critical
thinking certain instances that nay involve incorrect
critical thinking. For a definition of 'critical thinking',
it seems intuitively virtuous to be able to understand that
one is engaged in critical thinking, yet be able to decide
independently that one is doing it badly. We can see this
by seeing that (1) through (5) b) do not require that x
have the ability to justify such judgments correctly. It
seems intuitively clear that even if one were incorrectly
to justify such a judgment, for example by appeal to an in-
correct deductive rule of inference, in making the attempt,
one would be engaged in critical thinking, even though
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incorrectly. in such a case, one would not clearly be en-
gaged in any other activity, given the dispositional
- equirement stated in (1) through (5) b)
D ’10, therefore, provides a general definition of what it is
to engage in both correct and incorrect critical thinking,
lowever
,
given an interest in eventually answering the
question "Can critical thinking be taught?," we are less
concerned with particular mental activities like judging
D.10, (1) through (5) a), than with the question of whether
by teaching we might instill the sort of dispositions and
abilities required to justify such judgments, D.10 (1)
through (5) b)
,
by whatever means the original judgment is,
in fact, made. Further fore, such a concern is not a concern
for the actual dispositions that some person x happens to
have when engaging in critical thinking, but rather a much
more limited concern for the abilities that are necessary
and sufficient for some person correctly to engage in
critical thinking.
Having specified these specific disposition in terms of (1)
through (5) b)
,
we are now in a position to formulate a list
of specific abilities which are necessary and sufficient for
engaging correctly in critical thinking. This list will be
useful for at least three purposes: first, to reformulate
D.2 and provide a satisfactory definition of 'critical
45
intelligence' in terms of the ability to engage correctly
m critical thinking; secondly, to help determine if, or to
what extent correct critical thinking, and thereby, critical
intelligence, can be taught; and thirdly, to help guide the
formulation of a curriculum for attempts to teach critical
intelligence, if it is decided that it can be taught.
Given D . 1 0 , we may provide the following definition of the
ability to engage correctly in critical thinking.
Paralleling D.10,
D.ll x has the ability to engage correctly in critical
thinking to degree N (for N > 0) iff x has the ability
correctly to
:
(1) perform deductive operations according to the
rules of some deductive logical system that is
both consistent and truth preserving, or perform
inductive operations according to some rules of
inductive support,^ 1 and x believes that the
conclusions follow from the premises according to
these rules to degree nl
,
or
(2) formulate plausible interpretations of a given
statement or set of statements in which terms from
the given statement or set of statements differ in
meaning in the plausible interpretations, or a
statement differs in meaning or truth value in the
plausible interpretations, to degree n2, or
2
1
While there are not, as yet, clearly justified
principles of inductive support, there are clear cases of
inductive support for which we do not, as yet, know the
correct justified principles. It is beyond the scope of
this work to provide such justified principles of inductive
support, yet we can talk intelligibly about an ability to
worx correctly with some notion of inductive support, or
evidence
.
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(3)
(4)
etermme that a proposed explicatum of a termused by an author or speaker, or a proposed
elarif roation of a statement presented by an
?
r JPeakef
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in fact, an explicatum oris, m fact, a clarification to degree n3, or
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luate deductive support (according
rul-es
_
of some deductive logical system that
s both consistent and truth preserving) for givenstatements not necessarily translated into thelanguage of that system, or to provide and evalu-
ate inductive support (according to some rules ofinductive support) for given statements; to degree
n4
,
or
(5) recognize (psychologically persuasive) errors ininformal reasoning that employs natural language,
to degree n5,
or an combination of (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5),
and
(6) N = nl + n2 + n3 + n 4 + n5
5
I shall now consider the abilities stated in D.ll. I shall
explain what it is to have these abilities, (1) through (5),
to a certain degree n and how having these abilities to a
certain degree n allows us to determine the degree N, (6)
,
to which someone has the ability to engage correctly in
critical thinking for N > 0.
The first disjunct of (1) is meant to capture the ability to
perform deductive operations to evaluate given arguments by
testing their validity with deductive systems of varying
degrees of formality and sophistication, from simple
syllogisms to the lower predicate calculus and quantified
4 7
modal systems. The degree nl to which one has the ability
to perform these deductive operations is a function of the
power of the system(s) known as well as the speed, relia-
bility and economy with which one correctly performs these
deductive operations.
The second disjunct of (1) is meant to capture the ability
to discriminate among strong and weak inductive arguments by
appeal to inductive rules; to determine by appeal to in-
ductive rules if a presented statement requires more
evidence to be judged highly probable or to determine by
appeal to inductive rules if a presented statement is
improbable, given the evidence offered to support it. The
degree nl to which one has this ability is a function of the
speed, reliability and economy with which one correctly per-
forms these inductive operations
.
Disjunct (2) is meant to capture the ability to determine
if a term or a statement is unclear in a given context by
considering the logical and factual relationships among
presented statements to, in turn, produce more than one
plausible construal of the meaning or the term or the
meaning or the truth value of the statement. The degree n2
to which one has this ability is a function of the speed,
reliability and economy with which one correctly makes this
determination
.
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Disjunct (3) is meant to capture the ability to evaluate
a proposed explication of a term or a proposed clarification
of a statement by determining (by appeal to the rules of
explication) that the explicatum is, in fact, an explicatum
or by determining (by appeal to (2)
)
that the proposed
clarification is, in fact, a clarification of the statement.
The degree n3 to which one has this ability is a function of
the speed, reliability and economy with which one correctly
makes this determination.
Disjunct (4) is meant to capture the ability to evaluate
a clear statement of a theory by performing deductive
operations on statements of the theory or providing de-
ductive arguments to support the theory or to refute the
theory, translating statements into a formal language to
prove that the theory is consistent or to show that it is
inconsistent, or to prove that the arguments supporting the
theory are valid or to show that they are invalid, or by
performing inductive operations to support the theory or to
refute the theory, or providing inductive arguments to
support the theory or to refute the theory. The degree n4
to which one has this ability is a function of the speed,
reliability and economy with which one correctly evaluates
such statements.
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Disjunct (5) is meant to capture the ability to recognize
informal fallacies in reasoning that employs natural language
by citing the error in reasoning that the fallacy commits.
The degree n5 to which one has this ability is a function of
the speed, reliability and economy with which one correctly
recognizes such fallacies.
Disjunct (6) is meant to account for degrees of ability to
engage correctly in critical thinking. According to (6),
the degree N to which x has the ability to engage correctly
m critical thinking is the average of the sum of the
degrees nl through n5 to which x has the ability correctly
to engage in (1) and (2) and (3) and (4) and (5)
.
Since we
have no clear reason to suppose that one of these dis-
positions is more important for critical thinking than any
other, all are weighted equally for determining the degree
N of the ability to engage correctly in critical thinking.
In this way, then, D.ll allows us to talk of one improving
one's ability to engage correctly in critical thinking, or
of having the ability to a greater or lesser degree than
someone else who also has the ability.
According to D.ll (1) , x may be said to have an ability to
perform deductive operations if x knows some simple rules of
syllogism and takes hours to evaluate the validity of simple
deductive arguments. However, x is said to have this
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ability to a lower degree nl than someone else who can per-
form the operations quickly, reliably and economically.
Similar considerations apply to (2), (3), (4) and (5).
One who can only do (1), even to a fairly high degree nl,
who cannot do (2), (3), (4) or (5), is said to have the
ability to engage correctly in critical thinking since in
0-11, (1) is a sufficient condition for such an ability.
Yet according to D.ll (6), he may be said to have the
ability to a very low degree N.
Given D.ll, we may now reconsider D.2 as a definition of
critical intelligence'. D.2 was unacceptable because
critical thinking' was as unclear a term as 'critical
intelligence'. Now, however, we have a definition of
'critical thinking' in terms of D.10. Yet as it stands,
D.2 is still unacceptable because critical intelligence
seems to admit of degrees, yet D.2 does not allow us to
account for degrees of critical intelligence. D.2 is also
unacceptable because according to D.10, one may engage in
critical thinking, yet do so incorrectly. It is not
satisfactory to say that someone is critically intelligent
when that someone engages incorrectly in critical thinking.
However, given D.ll as a definition of the ability to engage
correctly in critical thinking to degree N, we may
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reformulate D.2 to avoid these objections and to provide an
acceptable definition of 'critical intelligence':
D.12 x is critically intelligent to degree N (for N > 0) iff
x has the ability to engage correctly in critical
thinking to degree N (for N > 0) (as defined by D.ll).
D.12 allows us to account for the degree N of critical in-
telligence in terms of the degree N of the ability to engage
correctly in critical thinking as specified in D.ll. This
degree N is, in turn, accounted for in D.ll by determining
and considering the degrees n to which one has the ability
to engage correctly in (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5). D.10
allows us to understand what it is to engage in critical
thinking, either correctly or incorrectly.
With these notions clarified in answer to question 1, we are
now in a clearer position both to determine if or to what
extent critical intelligence, as defined by D.12, can be
taught in answer to question 3 and to formulate a curriculum
for attempts to teach critical intelligence if it is decided
that it can be taught, in answer to question 4. First,
however, we must attempt to understand the notion of
teaching and answer question 2, "What is teaching?"
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CHAPTER II
WHAT IS TEACHING?
Kany educators, educational psychologists and philosophers
of education have provided descriptions of teaching which
may, in turn, be reformulated as defintions of ’teaching’.
However, these many descriptions seem to fall into at least
four distinct groups when reformulated as definitions of
2 2teaching'. The first group of definitions are attempts
to define 'teaching' in terms of some method or methods.
The second group of definitions are attempts to define
'teaching' in terms of some specific action or sets of
actions. The third group of definitions are attempts to
define teaching' in terms of directing learning, while the
fourth group of definitions attempt to define 'teaching' as
a kind of intentional performance. In each group, many of
the suggested definitions are very similar. Rather than
consider every definition offered, I shall consider
Each definition among the groups of definitions that
I consider critically make some reference to the notion of
learning, so distinguishing a group of definitions of
'teaching' that make reference to learning does not usefully
individuate any such definitions. I shall later point out
that taking 'learning' as a primitive term in the definiens
of a definition of 'teaching' is not useful for my purpose
here because then to ask "Can critical intelligence be
taught?" is to ask in some form "Can critical intelligence
be learned?", and without a thorough explication of
'learning', we simply substituted one obscure question for
another
.
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a representative sample from each of the four groups in an
attempt to formulate a satisfactory definition of 'teaching'
Definitions of 'Teaching': Group One
In his account of teaching, B. F. Skinner specifies the goal
of teaching in terms of learning; "Teaching is the
expediting of learning; a person who is taught learns more
quickly than one who is not." 23 Ye t clearly, according to
Skinner, teaching is not a necessary condition of learning:
Teaching is simply the arrangement of contingencies
of reinforcement. Left to himself in a given environ-
ment, a student will learn, but he will not necessarilyhave been taught. The school of experience is not
school at all, not because no one learns in it, butbecause no one teaches." 2 ^
Skinner specifies what he takes to be the most significant
aspect of teaching. "A student is taught in the sense that
he is induced to engage in new forms of behavior and in
specific forms upon specific occasions." 23 Yet not
just any form of behavior will do in Skinner's account.
23
B. F. Skinner, The Technology of Teaching, (N.Y.,
Appleton-Century-Crof ts
, 1965), p. 5.
O A
B. F. Skinner, The Technology of Teaching
,
p. 5.
25
B. F. Skinner, The Technology of Teaching
,
p. 33.
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Inducing a student to behave in a given way is not
4- u* 26teaching." Skinner is concerned to limit what he takes
to be the most significant aspect of teaching to include
learning behavior, since in his view, teaching involves the
expediting of learning.
To explain what he takes to be the most significant aspect
of teaching and the relationship of teaching to learning,
Skinner applies his notion of operant conditioning. He
claims that:
"The application of operant conditioning to education
is simple and direct. Teaching is the arrangement of
contingencies of reinforcement under which students
learn. They learn without teaching in their natural
environments, but teachers arrange special contingen-
cies which expedite learning, hastening the appearance
of behavior which would otherwise be acquired slowly
or making sure of the appearance of behavior which
might otherwise never occur.
Skinner, therefore, explains the relationship of teaching
and learning by claiming that teaching is a sufficient
condition for learning, although teaching is not a necessary
condition for learning.
2 6
B. F. Skinner, The Technology of Teaching , p. 223.
27
B. F. Skinner, The Technology of Teaching , pp . 65-65.
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Given Skinner's specification of the goal of teaching, his
account of what he takes to be the most significant aspect
of teaching, and his explanation of the relation of teaching
and learning, we may formulate the following definition of
'teaching' on Skinner's behalf:
0,13 x en9aged in teaching y 0 iff x is engaged ininducing y's learning 0 by arranging contingencies
of reinforcement to expedite y's learning 0 .
Like most definitions of 'teaching' in group one, D.13
confuses the way in which teaching is or can be performed
with a definition of 'teaching'. Consider the following
counterexample. Suppose that PBS broadcasts a lecture by
a noted horticulturist on the process of organically raising
tomatoes. The television lecture does not contain the con-
tingencies of reinforcement. He simply explains the process
of organically raising tomatoes. Yet we intuitively
would like to be able to claim that the horticulturist is
engaged in teaching the process of organically raising
tomatoes to the TV audience. For example, when one walks
into a room and asks one viewing the broadcast "What is that
man doing?," one would like to be able to reply "Teaching
us the process of organically raising tomatoes." Therefore,
inducing learning by arranging contingencies of reinforce-
ment to expedite learning is not a necessary condition for
engaging in teaching.
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We may grant that in some cases inducing learning by
arranging contingencies of reinforcement to expedite
learning is engaging in teaching, but only by trading the
unclarity of 'teaching' for the unclarity of 'learning'.
D.13 rules out cases of arranging contingencies of rein-
forcement for y's that cannot learn. But this assumes that
we can make a clear distinction between y's that can learn
and y s that cannot learn in order to distinguish those y's
one can engage in teaching from those y's that one cannot
engage in teaching. One may arrange contingencies of rein-
forcement to modify a worm's behavior, but is that to say
that worms can learn? Are we, thereby, engaged in teaching
worms? The answer seems to depend on an account of
learning
.
Consider a case in which y is a person who can learn.
Suppose an expert in torture is engaged in inducing y's
learning that he must cooperate with his captors by
arranging tortures to expedite y's learning that he must
cooperate with his captors. Is engaging in torturing y
engaging in teaching y? One might reply no, since y cannot
be truly said to learn in such a case, or one might reply
yes, torturing is teaching since y learned some 0 , namely
that he must cooperate with his captors. Yet answering
this question involves appealing to some definition of
'learning'. D.13, in this case, simply trades the unclarity
of teaching' for the unclarity of 'learning' and is not a
successful definition of 'teaching'.
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John Brubacher presents what he calls a definition of
’teaching' that also can be construed as an attempt to
2 8
define teaching in terms of some method. Brubacher
argues that to teach means to "arrange and manipulate a
situation in which there are gaps or obstructions which
an individual will seek to overcome and from which he will
29
learn in the course of doing so." To explain his
definition he appeals to his discussion of the relation be-
tween problem solving and learning. He argues that if one
seeks to solve a problem, then one learns both by seeking
30
and by solving.
In Brubacher ' s view, therefore, teaching is a sufficient
condition for learning, since teaching is defined in terms
of setting up such problem solving situations which an
individual will seek to solve. However, he also claims that
28
J. Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education
(N.Y.
:
29
McGraw Hill, 1939).
J. Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education
p. 108 .
30 J
.
Brubacher, Modern Philosophies of Education
p. 105.
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learning may occur without teaching. In Brubacher
' s view,
therefore, teaching is not a necessary condition for
learning
.
Given Brubacher
' s account of teaching and its relation to
learning, one may formulate the following definition on
Brubacher' s behalf:
D • 14 x is engaged in teaching y 0 iff x is engaged in
arranging and manipulating problem situations such that
y will seek to solve the problem, and in so doing, y
learns 0 .
D.14, however, provides neither a necessary nor a sufficient
condition for teaching and, therefore, also fails as a
definition of 'teaching'. Suppose that x is engaged in
teaching y how to tune an antique auto engine . Now x may
choose to do so by arranging and manipulating problem
situations, but x need not choose this method to teach y how
to tune his engine. Instead, x may simply explain the
physical laws governing the operation of any internal
combustion engine, the mechanical principles of such engines,
and the engineering decisions applying these laws and
principles in x's antique engine. Then x may simply
explain the procedure for maintaining the most efficient
operation of these laws and principles given these specific
engineering decisions. In this case, x can be said to be
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engaged in teaching y how to tune his auto engine. Yet, x
cannot be said to be engaged in arranging and manipulating
problem situations for y to overcome so that y will learn to
tune his antique auto engine. X has simply been engaged in
explaining physical laws, mechanical principles, and
specific engineering decisions. Therefore, D.14 does not
provide a necessary condition for teaching.
Now suppose that y is driving an antique auto down a lonely
stretch of highway to deliver it to a man who will pay him
only if he can deliver it before 5:00. The auto sputters
to a halt. Furthermore, y allowed 30 minutes to make the
20-minute trip so that y has 10 minutes to solve the problem,
to arrive before 5:00, and to make the sale. In carefully
examining the engine, y learns that there is no gas in the
carburetor and traces the problem back to a dirty fuel
filter. He removes and cleans the filter, and motors on to
make the sale.
Only in an odd and metaphorical sense could one claim that
the antique auto taught y that its fuel filter was dirty
since ordinarily cars are not the kinds of things that
engage in teaching, nor do they arrange and manipulate
situations. First, suppose that it was y who desired to
sell the auto and gave himself the time limit, failed
earlier to inspect the fuel filter, and thereby arranged and
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manipulated (even if unknowingly) the problem situation he
sought to solve. Yet it is also odd that y taught himself
that the antique auto engine's fuel filter was dirty.
Brubacher has argued that one may learn without being taught
and this seems to be such a case; y learned that the antique
auto engine's fuel filter was dirty, although no one taught
him that it was dirty.
Secondly, suppose it was x, the car’s owner, who hired y to
deliver the car. Then x desired to sell the auto, gave y
the time limit, failed earlier to inspect the fuel filter
and thereby arranged and manipulated (even if unknowingly)
the problem situation y sought to solve. Yet it is also odd
to say that x taught y that the antique auto engine's fuel
filter was dirty. Therefore, x may be engaged in arranging
and manipulating problem situations such that y will seek to
solve the problem, and, in so doing, learn 0, and yet x may
not be engaged in teaching. Therefore, D.14 does not pro-
vide a sufficient condition for teaching. Therefore, D.14
fails as a definition of 'teaching'.
Definitions of 'Teaching': Group Two
B. Othanel Smith argues that not only can one learn without
being taught, but also that:
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earning does not necessarily issue from teaching;
that teaching is one thing and learning is quite
another is significant for pedagogical research. it
enables us to analyze the concept of teaching withoutbecoming entangled in the web of arguments about theprocesses and conditions of learning. In short, to
carry on investigations of teaching in its own right.
"
3 ^"
Smith then carries out his own investigation of teaching and
offers his own account. He argues that "teaching is a
system of actions directed to pupils." 32 He claims that
these actions are varied in form and content and they are
related to the behavior of pupils whose actions are, in
turn, related to those of the teacher."
Smith then distinguishes a teacher's verbal and a teacher's
non-verbal actions, and claims that these actions are
necessary conditions for teacher-induced learning, yet not
sufficient conditions for teacher-induced learning. Nor,
he claims, are they necessary or sufficient conditions for
any non-teacher induced learning. Yet these actions may be
construed, according to Smith, as necessary and sufficient
34
conditions for engaging in teaching.
B. 0. Smith, "A Concept of Teaching," Teacher '
s
College Record
,
Vol . 61, No. 5 (Feb. 1960), p. 233.
32
B. O. Smith, "A Concept of Teaching," p. 233.
33
B. 0. Smith, "A Concept of Teaching," p. 233.
34
B. 0. Smith, "A Concept of Teaching," pp . 233, 236.
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Smith lists these verbal actions as defining, classifying,
explaining, conditional inferring, comparing and contrasting
valuating
, designating, correcting performance errors,
directing, and admonishing. Smith lists these non-verbal
actions as showing or expressing non-verbal signs of
approval or disapproval. 35
Given his account of teaching and its relation to learning,
we may formulate the following definition of 'teaching' on
Smith's behalf:
D.15 x is engaged in teaching y 0 iff x is engaged in
performing the actions necessary for y to learn 0 ,
which is for x to engage in performing
(1) verbal actions such as defining, classifying,
explaining, conditional inferring, comparing and
contrasting, valuating, designating, correcting
performance errors, directing, demonstrating, or
(2) non-verbal actions such as showing or expressing
non-verbal signs of approval or disapproval
for y to learn 0 .
According to D.15, one is engaged in teaching if and only if
one is engaged in performing the actions Smith claims are
necessary conditions for teacher-induced learning. Thus,
according to D.15, performing these actions is a necessary
and a sufficient condition for engaging in teaching.
35
B. 0. Smith, "A Concept of Teaching," pp. 237-240.
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One may grant that these actions are disjunctively necessary
conditions for teacher-induced learning, yet they avoid
counterexamples only because they are sufficiently vague to
do so. One may, therefore, grant that because of their
vagueness, these actions provide disjunctively necessary
conditions for engaging in teaching. However, because of
their vagueness, engaging in these actions is not a
sufficient condition for engaging in teaching. Therefore,
D.15 fails as a definition of 'teaching'
.
Consider the verbal action (1) in D.15. Suppose that a
lexicographer writes the definition of 'spelunker'. Suppose
that he writes the dictionary simply to make money and that
his is the only dictionary to include 'spelunker'. Ten
years later, a student looks up 'spelunker' and learns its
meaning. Clearly the lexicogrpaher was engaged in per-
forming the actions necessary for the student to learn the
definition of 'spelunker'. However, in performing those
actions, the lexicographer was not engaged in teaching the
student the meaning of 'spelunker'; he was simply engaged in
writing a dictionary to earn money. Therefore, engaging
in the action of defining for y to learn 0 is not sufficient
condition for engaging in teaching y 0 . Suppose that a
medical officer at a draft physical examines a prospective
inductee, and finding that he has no left leg, classifies
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him 4-F
. Engaging in classifying the prospective inductee
4-F is not engaging in teaching, even if the prospective
inductee learns that he is classified 4-F. Therefore,
engaging in the action of classifying for y to learn 0
is not sufficient condition for engaging in teaching y 0.
Suppose that a clerk at a clothing store explains to a
customer that he owes another $13.00 to cover alterations
on a pair of $80.00 slacks. Engaging in explaining to a
customer that he owes another $13.00 is not engaging in
teaching, even if the customer learns that he owes another
$13.00. Therefore, engaging in the action of explaining
for y to learn 0 is not a sufficient condition for engaging
m teaching y 0. Suppose that Gerald Ford, in a speech
to the leaders of AIM, conditionally infers "If the Moon
is green cheese, then I am not an Indian." Engaging in
conditionally inferring "I am not an Indian" from "the
Moon is green cheese" is not engaging in teaching, even
if the leaders of AIM learn that Ford is not an Indian.
Therefore, engaging in the action of conditionally in-
ferring for y to learn 0 is not a sufficient condition for
engaging in teaching y 0 . Suppose that a car salesman is
comparing, contrasting, and valuating two different used
cars ior a prospective customer. Engaging in comparing,
contrasting and valuating two used cars is not engaging
in teaching, even if the prospective customer learns
that one car is a better buy than the other. Therefore,
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engaging m the actions of comparing, contrasting or
valuating is not a sufficient condition for engaging in
teaching y 0 . Suppose that Bart Starr designates Bill Cooke
as a starring offensive tackle. Engaging in designating
Bill Cooke a starting offensive tackle is not engaging in
teaching, even if Bill Cooke learns that he is a starting
offensive tackle. Therefore, engaging in designating is
not a sufficient condition for engaging in teaching.
Suppose that David Pearson's Mercury is running roughly on a
rest lap before the Daytona 500, and he drives into the pits
to let the Wood brothers correct the performance error.
Engaging in correcting the performance error in David
Pearson's Mercury is not engaging in teaching, even if
Pearson learns that the carburetor restrictor plate was
dirty, causing the rough running. Therefore, engaging in
correcting performance errors is not a sufficient condition
for engaging in teaching y 0 . Suppose that a traffic cop
is directing traffic around the scene of a rush-hour
accident. Engaging in directing traffic is not engaging in
teaching, even if groups of motorists learn when to stop
and when to proceed. Therefore, engaging in directing is
not a sufficient condition for engaging in teaching y 0 .
Suppose that a group of Washington secretaries are demon-
strating their secretarial skills before the House Ethics
Committee. Engaging in demonstrating secretarial skills is
not engaging in teaching, even if the Congressmen learn
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that no Washington secretaries can type. Therefore, demon-
strating is not a sufficient condition for teaching y 0 .
Consider the non-verbal actions (2) in D.15. Suppose that
Grandpa Larkin is arrested for exposing himself to a group
of Girl Scouts. Engaging in showing is not engaging in
teaching, even though the Girl Scouts learn something about
geriatric biology. Therefore, showing is not a sufficient
condition for teaching y 0. Suppose that Rick Reichardt
strikes out and the Kansas City fans express non-verbal
signs of disapproval by silently standing and extending
their middle fingers. Engaging in expressing non-verbal
signs of disapproval is not engaging in teaching, even if
Reichardt learns that he should retire from baseball.
Therefore, expressing non-verbal signs of approval or dis-
approval is not a sufficient condition for teaching y 0.
Therefore, D.15 fails as a definition of 'teaching'
.
Paul Komisar is concerned to provide a definition of
teaching in terms of what he calls teaching acts. In doing
so, he is concerned to rule out "indoctrinating, training,
propagandizing, preaching, insinuating, deceiving, coun—
3 6seling, and moralizing" as teaching acts. In an attempt
36 „ TP. Komisar, "Teaching: Acts and Enterprise,"
Studies in Philosophy and Education
,
No. 6 168-193,
(Spring 1968)
,
p. 179
.
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to define 'teaching' and to rule out the above, he distin-
guishes, among teaching acts, what he calls learning-donor
acts, learner-enhancing acts and intellectual acts. He
spells out learning-donor acts as "acts intended to con-
tribute rather directly and pointedly to the production of
learning, such as prompting, cueing, reinforcing, drilling,
censuring or censoring, showing, etc." 37 Learning-donor
acts, therefore, have this specific goal. Learner-enhancing
acts are "acts intending to put or maintain the learner in a
fit state to receive instruction ... to reduce anxiety,
alleviate perceptual dif f iciencies
,
arouse interest, focus
attention, and other ego-strengthening acts." 38 Learner-
enhancing acts, therefore, have this specific goal.
Intellectual acts, according to Komisar, are acts such as
introducing, demonstrating, citing, reporting, hypothe-
sizing, conjecturing, confirming, contrasting, explaining,
providing, characterizing, justifying, explaining, defining,
rating, appraising, amplifying, vindicating, interpreting,
indicating, instancing, elaborating, identifying, desig-
• 39natmg, and comparing."
pp. 180-181
39
Komisar
,
Komisar
"Teaching
:
"Teaching
Acts and Enterprise," p. 180
Acts and Enterprise,"
P. Komisar, Teaching Acts and Enterprise, p. 181
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Given his account of teaching acts, in terms of learning-
donor acts, learner-enhancing acts and intellectual acts,
we may formulate the following definition of teaching on
Komisar's behalf:
D * i6 X engaged in teaching y 0 iff x is engaged inperforming actions intended to:
(U contribute directly and pointedly to the production
°.y s learning 0 such as prompting, cueing,
reinforcing, drilling, censuring or censoring,
approving or showing, or other learning-donor acts
and '
(2) put or maintain the learner y in a fit state to
receive instruction for 0 , such as reducing
anxiety, alleviating perceptual deficiencies,
arousing interest, focusing attention, or other
ego-strengthening learner-enhancing acts, and
(3) introduce, demonstrate, cite, report, hypothesize,
conjecture about, confirm, contrast, explain,
prove, characterize, justify, define, rate,
appraise, amplify, vindicate, interpret, indicate,instance, elaborate, identify, designate, or
compare 0 for y.
However, Komisar's attempt to distinguish three kinds of
teaching acts to rule out indoctrination, training, propa-
gandizing, preaching, insinuating, deceiving, counseling,
moralizing, etc., and to rule in teaching, is unsuccessful.
To reflect Komisar's attempt to rule out these non-teaching
actions and to rule in only teaching actions, (1), (2) and
(3) are conjunctive elements in D.16. However, consider the
following counterexample.
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Suppose that an Insane individual, whose ml nd has been
destroyed by drugs, performs acts intended to contribute
rather directly and pointedly to the production of his nurse
learning first order logic and performing actions intended
to put or maintain the nurse in a fit state to receive in-
struction, and performing actions intended to introduce,
demonstrate, cite, report, hypothesize, conjecture about,
contract, explain, prove, characterize. Justify,
define, rate, appraise, amplify, vindicate, interpret,
indicate, instance, elaborate, Identify, designate, or com-
pare iirst order logic for the nurse. However, while having
these intentions, this insane individual actually engages
physically assaulting the nurse, while screaming obsceni-
ties at her. According to D.l6, having these goals in mind
(having the above intentions for his actions) 40 requires us
to say that this insane individual is engaged in teaching
his nurse first order logic. However, he is engaged in
Physically assaulting the nurse, while screaming obscenities
at her, and is not engaged in teaching her first order logic.
Therefore, D
. 16 fails to provide a sufficient condition for
'teaching' and, therefore, fails as a definition. Having
such intentions may be necessary for engaging in teaching,
but it is certainly not sufficient.
1] 0
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Definitions of ’Teaching’: Group Three
In his influential book, How We Think
. John Dewey presents
his views on the nature of teaching and its relationship to
learning. Dewey describes the teacher as a leader, and
teaching as a kind of leading.
In reality, the teacher is the intellectual leader
s°cial group. He is a leader, not in virtue ofoliicial position, but because of wider and deeperknowledge and matured experience .
"
4 1
As an intellectual leader, the teacher, according to Dewey,
"determines the educational purpose to be carried out." 142
To be an intellectual leader, or a teacher, one must satisfy
certain conditions. According to Dewey, one needs abundant
knowledge, abundant to the point of overflow. It must be
wider than the ground laid out in the textbook, or in any
fixed plan for teaching a session."^ one must also,
41 John Dewey, How We Think (Revised Edition, N.Y.:
Heath
,
1934 ) , P. 273i-76
42 John Dewey
,
How We Think
,
P • 275.
43
John Dewey How We Think P. 275.
44 John Dewey How We Think p. 275.
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according to Dewey, "have his mind free to observe the
mental responses and movements of the student members of
the recitation group. The problem of the pupils (learning)
Is found In the subject matter; the problem of the teachers
(teaching) Is what the minds of the pupils are doing with
this subject matter." 44 Dewey also requires technical or
professional knowledge. Including a basic knowledge of human
psychology and "educational methods found helpful by others
teaching various subjects." 45 However, Dewey adds that
"unfortunately this professional knowledge is sometimes
treated not as a guide and tool in personal observation and
judgment
.
. . but as a set of fixed rules of procedure in
action .
"
46
"Finally, the teacher, in order to be a leader (andthereby be a teacher ) , must make special preparationfor particular lessons. Otherwise, the only alterna-
tives will be either aimless drift or else sticking
literally to the text. The teacher must ask before-
hand: what do the minds of the pupils bring to the
topic from their previous experience and study? How
can I help them make connections? What need, even
if unrecognized by them, will furnish a leverage by
which to move their minds in the desired direction?
What uses and applications will clarify the subject
and fix it in their minds? How can the topic be
individualized? "47
45 John Dewey
,
How We Think
,
P- 27 6 .
46 John Dewey How We Think P- 276 .
47 J ohn Dewey How We Think P- 277.
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Dewey also recognizes that learning and teaching are
distinct concepts, yet he is concerned to relate them
one
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Again, in Dewey’s view, teaching is not necessary for
learning. Yet if one is engaged in teaching, then the one
taught must learn. In Dewey's account, teaching is a suf-
ficient condition for learning, and learning is a necessary
condition for teaching.
Given Dewey's account of teaching as intellectual leading
and his account of the relation of teaching and learning, we
may formulate the following definition of ’teaching’ on
Dewey's behalf.
D.17 x is engaged in teaching y 0 iff x is engaged in
intellectually leading y such that x directs y’s
^ John Dewey, How We Think
, pp . 35-6.
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makes special preparations forlessons leading y to 0.
D.17 Is an Interesting definition in that it attempts to
provide an account which takes seriously the relation of
teaching and learning. However, D.17 fails adequately to
account for the relation of teaching and learning by failing
adequately to account for teaching as an intentional
activity. However, before considering this definition, a
brief discussion of intentional action is in order.
Providing a clear account of the notion of an intentional
action is a notoriously difficult philosophical task.
However, for the discussion of teaching as an intentional
activity which is to follow, it is sufficient to point out
that intuitively, intentional activities are activities
undertaken with some purpose or goal in mind for doing the
activity. An action performed without some purpose or goal
in mind for doing the action is not an intentional action.
Therefore, if x is an action, then one may be said to do x
intentionally only if one does x with some definitely formu-
lated purpose or goal in mind for doing x. Note that while
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this is a necessary condition for intentional actions, it is
not a sufficient condition. Nor does doing x intentionally
mean that one actually accomplishes what one intended in
doing x. While this is by no means a complete account of
the notion of an intentional action, noting the above
necessary condition will clarify what I shall mean by an
intentional action in this discussion of teaching. 4 9 We
must now consider D .17 and see how it fails adequately to
account for teaching as an intentional activity.
Suppose that a swimming instructor is working with a class
of beginning swimmers. The class has been meeting daily for
three weeks and still no one in the class has learned to
swim. According to D.17, the instructor is not engaged in
teaching the class. A proponent of D.17 may defend the con-
clusion that the instructor is not engaged in teaching the
class by arguing that instead he is engaged in failing to
teaching the class.
However, to advance such an argument in defense of D.17 is
to miss an important distinction between intentionally and
unintentionally failing to teach. Suppose that the
4 9 This notion gets very complex very quickly. For a
definitive discussion of intentional action, see Reason
and Action
,
a manuscript by Bruce Aune
,
to be published by
the Rydell Press. See, especially, revised "Chapter Two:
The Springs of Action", p. 6l-126-17a, p. 65-76a, and
p. 106-115.
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instructor were engaged in failing to teach the class how
to swim. If his supervisor came to him and asked "What are
you doing?", we should expect him to answer "Trying to teach
them to swim but failing." We should not expect him to
answer "Trying to fail to teach them to swim. " with the
first reply, the instructor has a better chance of keeping
his job than with the second. Clearly the instructor re-
peals an acceptable goal to the supervisor in the first
r.-piy, but reveals an unacceptable goal to the supervisor
in the second reply.
To use Dewey's example, the two senses of engaging in
failing to teach may be compared to two senses of engaging
in failing to sell. If one is actually engaged in failing
to sell, one may do so intentionally or unintentionally.
Suppose that a salesman does not intend to sell a valuable
rug because he intends to buy it himself. When would-be
customers arrive, we may say that the salesman is engaged in
trying to fail to sell the rug. However, this is quite
different from engaging in trying to sell the rug, but
failing
.
Being engaged in trying to fail to teach is distinct from
being engaged in trying to teach but failing, much like
being engaged in trying to fail to sell is distinct from
being engaged in trying to sell, but failing. We must be
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sure that when we claim that the swimming instructor is not
engaged in teaching, but rather engaged in failing to teach,
that we carefully consider the instructor's intentions; the
definitely formulated purpose or goal he has in mind for
uomg his teaching. Simply being actually engaged in
failing to teach is not a clear activity, given a concern
for teaching as an intentional activity.
To say that someone is simply engaged in teaching seems to
be to say that someone is either engaged in trying to teach,
or engaged in succeeding to teach. It is not to say that
someone is engaged in trying to fail to teach, since this is
a distinct activity. Yet D.17 fails adequately to dis-
tinguish these activities by failing adequately to consider
the question of intentions in the relations of teaching and
learning. Consider the following counterexample. Suppose
that a bureau chief in a government bureaucracy is charged
by a superior with teaching an efficiency expert the inner
workings of his bureau. The bureau chief is insecure, fears
losing his job, and also fears that the efficiency expert
wixl discover that his job is eliminable. The chief
must appear cooperative, yet intends to try to fail to
teach the efficiency expert the inner workings of his
bureau in order to save his job. Yet the efficiency ex-
pert is smart and insightful, and although unintentionally,
the bureau chief directs the expert's learning the inner
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workings of his bureau, and the expert learns them. The
bureau chief has a more abundant knowlege of survival in
bureaucracies, which includes a knowledge of the inner
workings of his bureau, than does the efficiency expert; he
is free to observe the expert's mental responses and move-
ments, he has a knowledge of psychology and past successful
educational methods, and applies this knowledge as a guide
and tool in personal observations and judgment of the expert
in his attempt to try to fail to teach the expert, and he
makes special preparations for particular lessons, reviewed
by his superior, leading the expert to learn the inner
workings of his bureau, although he does not intend that he
learn them.
Clearly
,
the bureau chief is engaged in trying to fail to
teach the efficiency expert the inner workings of his
bureau, and not simply engaged in teaching. Nor is failing
to fail to teach the same intentional activity as succeeding
to teach. Yet, according to D.17, the bureau chief is en-
gaged in teaching the efficiency expert the inner workings
of his bureau. Therefore, D.17 fails to account for the
role of intentions in the relation between teaching and
learning. The efficiency expert learned the inner workings
of the bureau in spite of the bureau chief. Therefore, D.17
is not an adequate definition of 'teaching'. One must more
carefully consider intentions in such a definition.
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Definitions of 'Teaching': Group Four
Israel Scheffler attempts carefully to consider intentions
m proposing an account of 'teaching'. m "Philosophical
Models of Teaching, "50 Scheffler gives a brief characfceri _
zatron of teaching which is amplified in his book The
language of Education
.
51 in the article he briefly chacter-
izes teaching as follows:
Teaching may be characterized as an activity aimed atthe achievement of learning and practiced in such amanner as to respect the student's intellectual integrityand capacity for independent judgment. Such a charac-terization is important for at least two reasons:irst, it brings out the intentional nature of teaching,tbe fact that teaching is a distinctive goal-oriented
a
?
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i
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-
rather than a distinctively patterned sequence
of behavioral steps executed by the teacher. Secondly,it differentiates the activity of teaching from such
other activities as propaganda, conditioning, suggestion,
and indoctrination, which are aimed at modifying the
person but strive at all costs to avoid a genuine-
engagement of his judgment on underlying issues.
The Language of Education
,
Scheffler distinguishes what
he calls the success use from the intentional use of
Israel Scheffler, "Philosophical Models of Teaching",
Harvard Educational Review
,
No. 35 (Spring 1965)
.
51
I. Scheffler, The Language of Education. (Charles C.
Thomas, Springfield, IL", I960).
52
I. Scheffler,
p. 131.
Philosophical Models of Teaching",
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'to teach'. "The success use refers to more than just doing
something; it refers to the successful outcome of what one
is doing. For example, "To have taught someone how to swim
is more than to have been occupied in teaching someone to
swim; it is also to have succeeded." 53 Scheffler provides
the intentional use to account for those cases that we want
to call cases of teaching where learning has not as yet
occurred. For example, a case in which someone attends a
series of classes to learn to swim, we want to be able to
say that the teacher is engaged in teaching swimming, even
though the student cannot as yet swim.
In this intentional use of 'to teach' Scheffler associates
teaching with trying. He states that "the goal of an
activity may lie beyond the boundaries of the activity or
some segment of it or may lack temporal conditions
altogether, nevertheless engaging in the activity involves
55trying, generally.
Scheffler, of course, recognizes that one may learn without
being taught. In the success use, if the teacher is engaged
in teaching, then the pupil is engaged in learning.
53
I
.
Scheffler
,
The Language of Education
,
PP . 60-1
54
I. Scheffler The Language of Education P- 62 .
55
I Scheffler The Language of Education P. 63.
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Therefore, in the success use, teaching is a sufficient con-
dition for learning and learning is a necessary condition for
teaching. However, in the intentional use, if the teacher
is engaged in teaching, then the pupil is not necessarily en-
gaged in learning. In this sense, according to Scheffler,
teaching involves an effort to achieve learning, but teaching
is not a sufficient condition for learning, nor is learning a
necessary condition for teaching. Scheffler then provides an
intentional account of 'to teach'.
In providing such an account, he argues that "teaching in-
volves trying as well as doing - trying to get someone to
learn something." 56 Yet he is clearly not concerned to give
a definition of 'learning'. He states that "what this
learning consists in, how it may be exhibited are important
but separate questions
. . . irrelevant to our present
purposes." He also argues that attempts to provide such
ai account in extreme behavioristic terms; for example, in
terms of rules of behaviors to follow; are misguided. Such
behavioristic "rules of teaching may at best improve
ceaching in the sense of rendering it more effective; they
S ftcannot exhaustively rule out failure." They rule out
56
I
.
Scheffler
,
The Language of Education
,
P- 63
57
I Scheffler The Lanugage of Education P- 78 .
58
I Scheffler The Language of Education P- 78 .
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neither failure to succeed in teaching (success use) nor
failure to engage in teaching (intentional use)
.
Scheffler is also concerned to distinguish what he calls the
intentional sense of 'to teach' from 'to propagandize', 'to
condition', 'to suggest', and 'to indoctrinate', which may
also be construed as somehow involving trying to get someone
to learn something. He attempts to do so by requiring that
the pupil, or the person that is the object of the teaching
activity, "is not systematically prevented from asking the
teacher 'how' or 'why' or 'on what grounds'." 59 He argues
that in the other activities, one is systematically prevented
from asking such questions and that, therefore, this require-
ment for the activity of teaching distinguishes teaching from
tnese other intentional activities that also involve trying
to get someone to learn something.
Scheffler argues that to see if someone is engaged in
teaching (the intentional sense) "we must see if that some-
one is engaged in trying to get someone to learn something,
but with appropriate qualifications." 60 Given Scheffler 's
brief characterization of teaching and his amplification and
i. Scheffler, The Language of Education
,
p. 68.
60 I. Scheffler, The Language of Education, p. 68.
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clarification of the concept, we may formulate the following
definition of 'teaching' in what Scheffler calls the in-
tentional sense of 'to teach':
' 18 L engaged in teaching y 0 iff x is engaged in tryingto achieve the goal of initiating y's learning suet/
how' F hn? fc systematically prevented from asking xhow
,
w y
,
or on what grounds'.
Intuitively, one wants to be able to say with a general
definition of 'teaching' that one engaged in teaching is
either engaged in teaching 0 and actually failing to teach 0 ,
or engaged in teaching 0 and actually succeeding in teaching
0 . In providing a definition of what he calls the in-
tentional sense of 'teaching', Scheffler has attempted to
capture the first of these intuitions. However, Scheffler
has unclearly made a distinction between what he misleadingly
calls the intentional sense" and what he calls the "success
sense" of teaching.
Teaching is a goal-oriented activity, according to Scheffler.
From the fact that one does some action intentionally, it
does not follow that one actually accomplishes the goal one
had for doing the action. Nor does it follow from the fact
that one does some action intentionally that one fails
actually to accomplish the goal one had for doing the action,
in this sense, then, teaching and actually failing to realize
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the goal of teaching, and teaching and actually succeeding
in realizing the goal of teaching are both intentional
activities. Teaching, as an intentional activity, allows for
both actually failing and actually succeeding in realizing
the goal. For this reason, it is misleading to distinguish
an "intentional sense" from a "success sense" of teaching,
since properly speaking, teaching is an intentional activity
regardless of success or failure in attaining the goal of the
activity. Therefore, I shall abandon Scheffler's terms for
the distinction and simply distinguish the activity of en-
gaging in teaching which fails to realize its goal, and the
activity of engaging in teaching which succeeds in realizing
its goal.
D.18 is an interesting definition in that it attempts to
provide an account which takes seriously this intentional
nature of teaching. However, D.18 fails adequately to
account for the complexity of the intentional nature of
teaching, and thereby fails to distinguish teaching from
other actions. Consider the following counterexample.
Suppose that another insane individual, whose mind has also
been destroyed by drugs, is engaged in trying to achieve the
goal of initiating her nurse's learning the basic principles
of Marxist economics. They are seated across from one
another at a table and the nurse is not systematically
prevented from asking her 'how', 'why', or 'on what grounds'
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(In fact, this nurse has just completed a philosophy course
m night school and is constantly asking everyone 'how',
'why', or 'on what grounds' in her own attempt to help her
patients regain their reason.) Suppose that while trying to
achieve this goal, this insane individual is moaning,
drooling, and shaking her head at the ceiling while the nurse
asks her 'how', 'why', or 'on what grounds'.
The problem here is failing to distinguish between engaging
in teaching Marxist economics but failing to initiate the
nurse's learning Marxist economics, and trying to engage in
teaching Marxist economics but failing to engage in teaching.
In this case, while we may grant that she is trying to en-
gage in teaching Marxist economics, she has failed to engage
in teaching. But, according to D.18, this insane individual
is engaged in teaching her nurse the basic principles of
Marxist economics, even though the nurse may fail to learn
them. However, our intuitions tell us that she is merely
engaged in moaning, drooling and shaking her head at the
ceiling, and that she is not engaged in teaching, even
though she may be engaged in trying to reach. Therefore,
D.18 fails to capture the notion of engaging in teaching
which fails to realize its goal.
It will not do to modify a definition like D.18 by simply
adding that the trying be done successfully to capture the
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notion of engaging in teaching which succeeds in realizing
Its goal. Surely we must be able to distinguish successfully
trying to teach from successful teaching; otherwise anything
could be successfully taught simply by succeeding in trying
to teach it.
We might modify D.18 in an attempt to provide a definition of
teaching' which captures the notion of engaging in teaching
which succeeds in realizing its goal as follows:
D-19 x is engaged in teaching y 0 iff x is engaged in
achieving the goal of initiating y's learning 0
such that y is not systematically prevented from
asking x 'how'
,
'why'
,
or 'on what grounds' with
respect to 0 .
Given D.19, one might expect to derive the notion of engaging
in teaching which fails to realize its goal simply by in-
serting "or x is engaged in trying to achieve the goal of
initiating y's learning 0 " and thereby defining 'teaching'
such that one is able to say that one engaged in teaching
is either engaged in teaching and failing to realize the
goal of teaching, or engaged in teaching and succeeding in
realizing the goal of teaching.
However, D.18 failed to capture the former sense of
'teaching' and D.19 fails to capture the latter sense of
teaching. Consider the following counterexample. Suppose
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that a bright five-year-old girl is attending an advanced
school, where on Tuesday she will successfully learn the
Pythagorean theorem. Tuesday morning her mother walks her
to school. As her mother drops her off at the door to her
classroom, her mother asks her
-Do you have any questions
about geometry?", and the child answers "No, Mommy." in this
case the mother engaged in successfully walking her child to
school and is engaged in achieving the goal of initiating her
daughter's learning the Pythagorean theorem. Certainly the
child is not systematically prevented from asking her mother
'how', 'why', or 'on what grounds' with respect to the
Pythagorean theorem since the mother asks her if she has any
questions about geometry. Therefore, according to D.19, this
mother is engaged in successfully teaching her child the
Pythagorean theorem. However, the mother is enqaged in
successfully walking her child to school, not engaged in
successfully teaching her child the Pythagroean theorem.
Therefore, D.19 fails to capture the notion of engaging in
teaching which succeeds in realizing its goal.
Both D.18 and D.19 have at least two other significant
defects that it is useful to consider and avoid in attempting
to provide a workable definition of 'teaching' for my
purposes here. First, in both definitions, the term
'learning' is used in defining 'teaching'. Given such a
definition of 'teaching' in terms of learning, to ask if
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critical intelligence can be taught is simply to ask if
critical intelligence can be learned. Instead of providing a
clear definition of 'teaching' in order decisively to answer
the original question, such a definition merely trades the
original obscure question for another equally obscure
question. Therefore, for my purposes here, it is desirable
to provide a definition of ’teaching' that avoids appeal to
'learning' as a primitive term. Secondly, given this desire
to avoid 'learning' as a primitive term in a definition of
teaching
,
one must distinguish among the kinds of
activities preanalytically assumed to teaching activities.
Among the activities preanalytically assumed to be teaching
activities, one may distinguish the activity of 'teaching
how' from the activity of 'teaching that'. Given this
distinction, a definition of engaging in teaching must allow
for the activities of engaging in teaching how and failing
to achieve learning, engaging in teaching that and failing
to achieve learning, engaging in teaching how and succeeding
in achieving learning, and engaging in teaching that and
succeeding in achieving learning. By making the distinction
between the activity of teaching how and the activity of
teaching that, and by defining what it is to do each such
that the definition allows for both failing to achieve
learning and succeeding in achieving learning, one may, in
turn, offer a clear and complete definition of 'teaching'.
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several philosophers have attempted to distinguish among the
activities intuitively included as teaching activites. Many
have distinguished teaching to, teaching to be, teaching
when to, and teaching the difference between, as well as
teaching how and teaching that
.
61
However, these dis-
among activities intuitively thought to be teaching
activities, upon analysis, reduce to either 'teaching that'
'teaching how', or reduce to some other intentional
activity like inculcating, conditioning, imploring,
admonishing, etc., depending upon the situation. Consider
the activity 'teaching to'. One may engage in teaching
someone to sew, to swim, or to speak French. But it is
difficult to see the philosophical difference between
teaching someone to sew, or how to sew; to swim, or how to
swim; to speak French, or how to speak French. it seems,
therefore, that 'teaching to' is simply shorthand for
teaching how to', and that, therefore, the teaching activity
called 'teaching to' is simply the teaching activity called
'teaching how'
.
Consider the activity of 'teaching to be'. Presumably one
may be said to engage in teaching someone to be thrifty, to
be patriotic, or to be honest. Yet our intuitions tell us
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that one may teach thrift, patriotism or honesty by advancing
certain arguments, stating certain propositions, or stating
certain rules to follow in order to be thrifty, to be
patriotic, or to be honest. This may involve the activity of
'teaching that' or the activity of 'teaching how', yet one
may successfully be taught certain arguments, propositions,
and rules about thrift, patriotism, or honesty and still not
be thrifty, patriotic, or honest. What has been called
teaching to be' seems to involve other intentional
activities which are not teaching activities. For example,
one may inculcate, condition, implore or admonish someone to
be thrifty, patriotic, or honest. Yet these activities are
not teaching activities. Therefore, engaging in 'teaching
to be' may be said to be teaching only insofar as it is
engaged in 'teaching that' or 'teaching how'. It is not a
cistinct. teaching activity; it involves other intentional
activities that are not teaching activities.
Consider the activity of 'teaching when to'
.
Presumably one
may be said to engage in teaching someone when to call a
pass play, when to sacrifice a rook, or when to frost a cake.
However, it is difficult to see that engaging in this
activity differs from engaging in teaching someone how to
call a football game, how to play defensive chess, or how to
bake a cake. Therefore, the activity of 'teaching when to'
simply reduces to the activity of 'teaching how'.
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Consider the activity of 'teaching the difference between'.
Presumably one may be said to engage in teaching someone the
difference between the propositional calculus and the
predicate calculus, the difference between truth and
validity, or the difference between Hume's view and Kant's
view of consciousness. However, it is difficult to see that
engaging in this activity differs from engaging in teaching
someone that the propositional calculus deals with the logic
of propositions and that the predicate calculus deals with
the logic of predicates and quantification; that truth is a
property of propositions and that validity is a property of
arguments; or that Hume's view can be understood with
difficulty and that Kant's view cannot be understood.
Therefore, the activity of 'teaching the difference between'
simply reduces to the activity of 'teaching that'.
Therefore, 'teaching that' and 'teaching how' exhaust the
kinds of activities that are teaching activities. We must
now consider the distinction of 'teaching that' and 'teaching
how
' .
Indeed, the basic question of the greatest importance to one
attempting to provide a definition of 'teaching' is whether
teaching that is ultimately distinguishable from teaching
how. What is at stake in answering this basic question is
the distinction commonly made between the requirements for
teaching informtion and the requirements for teaching skills.
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being taught that Sussex is an English county, the boy is
participating in the relationship of knowing or believing
between himself and the proposition. In being taught how to
play chess, one is participating in the relationship of
knowing between oneself and such skills. Knowing how and
knowing or believing that are distinct since knowing how
admits of degrees in a way that knowing or believing that
does not admit of degrees.
Similarly, one engaged in teaching the boy that Sussex is an
English county is concerned with applying methods that will
most likely insure that the boy is successfully taught that
Sussex is an English county. These methods will ultimately
depend for their success upon their success in establishing
the relationship of knowing or believing between pupils and
such propositions. In this way, teaching that involves
knowing that or believing that.
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One engaged in teaching the boy how to play chess is con-
cerned with applying methods that will most likely insure
that the bo^ is successfully taught how to play chess.
These methods will ultimately depend for their success upon
their success in establishing the relationship of knowing
between pupils and such skills. In this way, teaching how
involves knowing how.
Teaching that and being taught that, therefore, involves
knowing that or believing that, since one may be taught
propositions that are false. Teaching how and being taught
how, therefore, involves knowing how, since these skills are
not the kinds of things that can be false. One may, of
course, teach someone how to play chess incorrectly, but
that involves teaching some skill other than chess. The
process still involves knowing how, although the one being
taught may still not know how to play chess, but know how to
engage in some other activity.
The distinction between the activity of teaching that and
the activity of teaching how is, therefore, based upon the
distinct requirements of knowing that or believing that for
teaching and being taught that, and knowing how for teaching
and being taught how. However, many philosophers have argued
that knowing that is not distinct from knowing how . 63 If
knowing that simply reduces to knowing how, and they are not
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distinct, then these are not dinstinct requirements upon
which to base the distinction between teaching that and
teaching how. Before adopting this distinction for a
definition of 'teaching', we must first consider the argu-
ments purporting to show that knowing that and knowing how
are indistinct.
The most common argument offered to support the claim that
knowing that is indistinct from knowing how is the argument
attempting to show that knowing that simply reduces to
knowing how. John Ilartland-Swann argues that in Ryle's
example
,
the boy's knowing that Sussex is an English county
is simply a version of his knowing correctly how to reply to
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a question. He argues that:
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John Ilartland-Swann offers such an argument, and hisis taken by many to be the most influential for the field ofeducation
.
M
ln Bar tland-Swann
,
"The Logical Status of 'KnowingThat
' Analysis (1956). He also considers whether knowingis a dispositional or an episodic verb. He argues that itis dispositional, and that since Ryle also argues that it isdispositional, Ryle ought to give up the distinction betweenknowing how and knowing that. The nature of Ryle's view ofknowing and Hart land-Swann
' s arguments with Ryle on this
issue are not within the scope of present interest.
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Either he knows this fact or he does not know it'must surely be translated 'either he is able (knows
(doL
t0 fr th; COrreCt~r , - he ifnot ( aSi:( oes not know how) to give the correct answer’."^ 6
Given this means of translating 'knowing that' statements
into 'knowing how' statements, in being taught that Sussex
is an English county, the boy is participating in the
relationship of knowing between himself and the skill of
giving the correct answer to a question, not between himself
and some proposition. Similarly, one engaged in teaching
the boy that Sussex is an English county is concerned with
applying methods to insure that the boy successfully gives
the correct answer to the question "Is Sussex an English
county?," not to insure the establishment of the relation-
ship of knowing between the boy and the proposition.
If Hart land.-Swann
' s translation is correct, a distinction
between teaching how and teaching that based on a distinction
between knowing how and knowing that is useless for the
attempt to provide a clear definition of 'teaching'
. The
usual distinction between the requirements for teaching in-
formation and the requirements for teaching skills simply
collapses. Hartland-Swann concludes that:
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That'," Analysis
, (1956) p. 113.
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Hartland Swann's attempts and similar attempts to reduce
knowing that to knowing how are, however, unsuccessful.
Hart land-Swann adopts a dispositional view of knowing in an
attempt to explain all knowing exclusively in terms of
dispositions to behave. According to Hartland-Swann
,
the
disposition to behave involved in every case of knowing that
is the disposition to "state correctly what is the case."
However, this reduction of 'knowing that' to 'knowing how'
produces an indefensible account of 'knowing that
'
.
^
Hartland Swann argues that someone who knows that P would be
disposed to state that P when asked. Thus, his dispositional
account of knowing that involves a counter factual
. This can
John Hartland-Swann, "The Logical Status of 'Knowinq
That'," Analysis
, (1956) p. 114.
68 mu- uThis has been argued by others, including Robert
Amrnerman, "A Note on 'Knowing That'," Analysis
,
(Dec. 1956),
p. 30-2. Airanerman attacks the unclarity of 'correctly',
and argues that the reduction is "either inadequate to the
essential features of knowing that, or circular." (p. 32).
His arguments are weak or no good at all.
be seen by presenting the following definition of 'knowing
that' on Hartland-Swann
' s behalf:
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K.l x knows that P iff if x
able to state correctly
proposition)
.
were asked, then x would be
that P (where P is a true
Intuitively, knowing, believing, as well as thinking have
a certain dispositional character, part of which may be
captured by such counter factual conditionals
.
69
However,
K.l clearly does not provide a sufficient condition for
knowing that P, and, therefore, fails as a definition
designed to reduce knowing that to knowing how.
Suppose that some authority tells x that Paris is the capital
of France. Suppose that x mildly distrusts this authority,
yet x has no other inclinations concerning the proposition
expressed by the statement "Paris is the capital of France,"
and when asked, x would answer that Paris is the capital of
France since x has no other available response on the topic.
Since the definiens is a counter factual
,
it does not require
specific behavior, but simply requries a specific disposition
69
Again, I shall ignore the problem of providing truth
conditions for such counter factuals and consider the matter
on an intuitive level. Certainly to grant that knowing,
believing, and thinking have a dispositional character is
not to grant that they may be given an adequate account
simply in dispositional terms.
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to behave: being able to state correctly that Paris is the
capital of France. Suppose that we attempt to determine,
according to K.l, that x knows that Paris is the capital of
France. Clearly, if x were asked, then x would be able to
Suate correctly that Paris is the capital of France.
Therefore, according to K.l, x knows that Paris is the
capital of France. However, in this case, x cannot properly
be said to know that Paris is the capital of France; x has
no evidence to justify the statement, only the unsupported
Lestimony of a mildly distrusted authority. Therefore, K.l
fails to provide a sufficient condition for knowing that.
One problem, therefore, with K.l seems to be that nothing in
the definition requires the justification of the statement P.
Intuitively, some sort of judgment of justification is
required to support a claim that x knows that P. However,
we may not attempt to repair this difficulty with K.l on
Hartland-Swann
' s behalf by any appeal to some mental
activity such as judging a proposed justification, since he
is attempting to show that we may dispense with such appeals
to mental activities in favor of a purely dispositional
account. Therefore, we may repair this defect only at the
expense of Hartland-Swann ' s proposed reduction. Nor will it
help to attempt to repair K.l by eliminating the counter-
factual in favor of a material conditional; then x knows that
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P whenever x is not asked, since a material
true whenever the antecedent is false.
conditional is
Therefore
, Hartland-Swann has not shown that knowing that
and knowing how are indistinct. it seems, then, that the
intuitive distinction between knowing that (information) and
knowing how (skills) holds against such arguments, and that
our intuitions may be reflected in distinct requirements for
each. Therefore, the distinction between the activities of
teaching that or being taught that and the activity of
teaching how or being taught how, based upon the distinct
requirements of knowing or believing that and knowing how,
is not affected by Hartland-Swann
' s arguments.
From examining D.18, we saw that an adequate definition of
teaching must include both the activities of engaging in
teaching which fails to realize its goal, and engaging in
teaching which succeeds in realizing its goal. We must now
attempt to provide a definition of 'teaching that' in terms
of knowing or believing that, such that it captures both
failing to and succeeding in realizing its goal. We must
then attempt to provide a definition of 'teaching how' in
terms of knowing how, such that it captures both failing to
and succeeding in realizing its goal. We will then be in a
position to combine these definitions and to define
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'teaching' in
and 'teaching
definition of
terms of these definitions of 'teaching that'
how'. Therefore, consider the following
'teaching that', based on believing that:
D . 2 0 x is engaged in teaching y 0 at t iff:
(1) y does not believe that 0 at t-1 or x does not
believe that y does believe that 0 at t-1, and
(2) x is trying to bring it about that y believes
that 0 at t+1, or if x is acting in place of z,
then x's activity, designated by z to bring it
about that y believes that 0 at t+1, involves
what z believes to be z's justification for
believing 0, and
(3) y comes to believe that x believes that 0 at t,
and
(4) y comes to believe that x believes that x is
justified in believing that 0 at t , or
(5) y does not believe that 0 at t-1, or x does not
believe that y does believe that 0 at t-1, and
(6) x is trying to bring it about that y believes
that 0 at t+1, or if x is acting in place of z,
then x's activity, designed by z to bring it
about that y believes that 0 at t+1, involves
what z believes to be z's justification for
believing 0, and
(7) y comes to believe that x believes that 0 at t
and y comes to believe that 0 at t+1, and
(8) y comes to believe that x believes that x is
justified in believing that 0 at t and y comes
to believe that y is justified in believing that
0 at t+1.
D . 2
0
defines 'teaching that' as an intentional activity.
Therefore, D.20 rules out teaching machines as engaging in
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teaching that, since teaching machines are not the kinds of
things that have intentions, goals, or beliefs. One might
argue that teaching machines might more properly be called
' learning machines
' ,
since learning may occur without
teaching. D.20 also avoids using 'learning' as a primitive
term, and thereby avoids the charge of defining an unclear
educational activity in terms of an equally unclear
educational activity.
The definiens of D.20 is a disjunction. The first disjunct
captures the activity of engaging in teaching that, which
may fail to realize its goal, while the second disjunct
captures the activity of engaging in teaching that which
succeeds in realizing its goal. In both senses of teaching
that, our definition must allow for the possibility of
teaching something that is false. Therefore, we need to use
the weaker belief requirement rather than the stronger
knowledge requirement in both disjuncts. D.20, therefore,
allows that x may both teach and fail or teach and succeed
in teaching something that either x believes to be false, or
that x believes to be true but is, in fact, false.
The definition also allows that x may teach and fail, or
teach and succeed in teaching y something that y may already
believe. The case of failing is clear. The case of
succeeding requires that y come to believe that y is
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justified in the belief. The definition also allows for the
following kind of case. 70 Suppose that Miss Lowell Qf^
designs an intermediate logic course for early morning
educational television. However, the producer realizes that
she is far too ugly to appear on television. She, there-
fore, hires Mr. Forrester, a non-method actor, who dresses
like a teacher, and who memorizes Miss Lowell’s lines. We
tune in the T.V. and ask "What is Mr. Forrester doing?" and
reply "He is teaching the axiom of choice." However,
Mr. Forrester is an ignorant slob who reads comics, and
cannot understand a word he has memorized. D.20 allows us
to say that Mr. Forrester is engaged in teaching that, in
either sense that fits a particular situation, since
Mr. Forrester is acting .in place of Miss Lowell and his
activity, designed to bring it about that someone in the
audience believes that 0 at t+1 , involves what Miss Lowell
believes to be her justification for believing J0 (provided,
of course, that the other conjuncts of the relevant disjunct
of D.20 are satisfied). If, for example, an actor colleague
of Forrester's (y) tunes in the program, knows Forrester is
an actor and an ignorant slob who cannot understand a word
he has memorized and, therefore, does not believe that
70 This is a proposed counterexample to Scheffler's
account of what he misleadingly calls the intentional sense
of 'to teach' proposed by James McClellan, "A Review of
Scheffler's Language of Education," Journal of Philosophy,
No. 58 (1961)', p. 415-20.
'
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Forrester believes the axiom of choice, then conditions (3)
and (4) or conditions (7) and (8) are violated. In this
case, Forrester cannot be said to be engaged in teaching his
actor colleague according to D.20. He may simply be
said to be engaged in acting. Therefore, D.20 is also
designed to legislate cases for which our intuitions may
be uncertain.
D.20 also allows one to distinguish both senses of teaching
that from other intentional activities. Consider the case
of a CIA agent torturing a prisoner, thereby intending to
convince him that he should cooperate. D.20 does not
specify how y comes to believe anything, so D.20 may at
first be thought to allow torturing to be teaching.
However, there are problems with this case. The first
problem is that 'that he should cooperate' is not straight-
forwardly a proposition, but rather seems to have the
character of an imperative, or a moral principle, 71 unlike
'that Columbus discovered America'. Therefore, according to
D.20, torturing may not be a case of 'teaching that' at all,
but a case of what has been called 'teaching to'; the agent
is simply thought to be engaged in teaching the prisoner to
cooperate. However, I have argued that 'teaching to' is
7 1 As such it may be true or false or it may not.
Either case requires some argument. The point, however, is
that the issue needs to be addressed in this case.
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neither 'teaching that' nor 'teaching how'. in fact, the
way teaching to' is used, it is not 'teaching' at all. For
example, one may teach someone either how to be thrifty, or
that thrift is economically useful; one may successfully
teach either without having the one taught be thrifty.
Teaching someone to be thrifty is not teaching, but involves
indoctrinating, conditioning, and other activities. 72
Therefore, if 'that he should cooperate' really means 'to
cooperate', the case is not applicable to D.20, and D.20
allows us to distinguish teaching that from activities like
torturing, indoctrinating, and conditioning.
Suppose that we modify this torturing case slightly to
accommodate this problem. Suppose that the CIA agent is
torturing a prisoner, attempting to convince him of the
truth of the proposition that 'cooperation with the CIA is
politically useful'. There have been studies on the effects
of torture on individual beliefs, but the problem with this
case involves (4) , (7) and (8) . Consider the first dis-
junct of D.20. Such a case of torture may satisfy (1) and
(2) and (3) of D.20, but such a case does not unproblem-
atically satisfy (4). It is not clear that torturing is the
72 As John P. Powell points out in "Philosophical
Models of Teaching," Harvard Educational Review, Vol. 35,
(1965), p. 494-96, indoctrination and conditioning certainly
have their place in education. My point, however, is that
they are distinguishable from teaching.
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kind of activity which may be said genuinely to affect the
prisoner’s belief about the agent's justification for his
belief. The prisoner may outwardly assent to (1|) under
torture, but it is doubtful he could be said to believe
that the agent believes that he is justified in this belief
Tn fact, he may believe that the agent believes he is un-
justified in his belief, but believes that the agent simply
enjoys torturing prisoners. Torture is not the type of
activity that promotes confidence in, or gives much insight
into justification. Therefore, the notion of justification
in (4) serves to distinguish teaching that from torturing.
Consider the second disjunct of D.20; such a case of torture
may satisfy (5) and (6), but such a case does not unproble-
matically satisfy (7) and (8). Again, it is not clear that
torturing is the kind of activity which may be said to
genuinely affect the prisoner's beliefs. He may come to
believe that he had better say that he believes that
cooperation with the CIA is politically useful (to save
himself from pain) and yet still not believe 'that cooper-
ation with the CIA is politically useful'. Again, torturing
is not the type of activity that promotes confidence in, or
gives much insight into justification. The prisoner may,
in fact, come to believe that he is justified in believing
that he had better say that he believes that cooperation
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With the CIA Is politically useful, but this certainly does
not satisfy D.20 (8). Therefore, D.20 successfully dis-
tinguishes teaching that from activities like torturing.
One may object to D.20 on the grounds that It falls to
distinguish teaching from telling. However, this Is not a
serious objection. Again, D.20 Is designed to legislate
such cases for which our Intuition may be unclear. Suppose
that x comes up to y and says "your house Is on fire."
Clearly this can be made to satisfy either disjunct of D.20,
and, therefore, according to D.20, x is engaged in teaching
y that y's house is on fire. It is claimed that this is
extremely odd, and that really x is simply engaged in
telling y that y's house is on fire, not engaged in teaching
y that y’s house is on fire.
This claim depends on assuming that telling is not teaching
that, and this assumption seems to depend on a certain view
from ordinary language. We ordinarily say that, in such a
case, when asked what x is doing, that x is engaged in
y that y T s house is on fire. However, what is of
interest here is not what ordinary linguistic practice
licenses, but rather what distinction, if any, is to be made
between the necessary and sufficient conditions for engaging
in these activities. In defense of D.20, we can claim that
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the activity of teaching that is the activity of telling
that, since they have the same necessary and sufficient
conditions
.
This is not very surprising. For example, when Moses
descended from Mount Sinai with the Ten Commandments, he was
said to be engaged in teaching the Israelites that the First
Commandment is "Thou shalt have no other Gods before me,"
and so on through the Ten Commandments. However, suppose
that there was only one Commandment, namely the First. We
might imagine
-in this case that Moses was said to be en-
gaged in telling the Israelites that The Commandment is
"Thou shalt have no other Gods before me." The point is,
however, that in either case the same necessary and
sufficient conditions must be satisfied in terms of Moses
doing the teaching that, or telling that, and the
Israelites being taught that, or being told that. The
distinction between teaching that and telling that seems to
be based on linguistic practice and not on any conceptual
differences between the activities
. Therefore, that D.20
7
1
J It may strike native speakers of English oddly to
state that x is engaged in teaching y a proposition that is
specific such as ’that y’s house is on fire' but it may not
strike the same native speaker oddly to state that x is
engaged in teaching y a proposition that is general, such
as ’that houses burn'. Of course, these feelings may vary
given different specific and general propositions.
However, the point to be made here is that this is simply a
matter of linguistic convention.
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fails to distinguish teaching that and telling that Is not
a serious objection to D.20; the activity is the same.
Consider the following definiton of 'teaching how' based on
knowing how:
D.21 x is engaged in teaching y how to 0 at t iff
(1) x believes at t that y does not know how to 0 att-1, and
(2) x is trying to bring it about that y does knowhow to 0 at t+1, or if x is acting in place of z,
then
_x ' s activity is designed by z to bring it
about that y does know how to 0 at t+1, and
(3) y does not know how to 0 at t-1 and if x does
not engage in providing a model between t-1 and
t+1 for y to 0, then y does not know how to 0
at t+1, or
x does not believe that y does know how to 0 at
t-1 and x engages in providing a model between
t-1 and t+1 for y to 0,
where x provides a model for y to 0 iff x intends,
or some z intends that x make evident the
applications of the rules according to which
someone can do 0, or
( *0 x believes at t that y does not know how to
0 at t-1, and
(5) x is trying to bring it about that y does know
how to 0 at t+1, or if x is acting in place of
z, then x’s activity is designed by z to bring
it about that y does know how to 0 at t+1, and
(6) y does not know how to 0 at t-1 and if x does
not engage in providing a model between t-1 and
t+1 for y to 0, then y does not know how to 0
at t+1, and
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(7)
Ld°Ki enfga8e in Providln g a model between t-1and t+1 for y to 0, and
( 8 )
to 0 iff x intends, or some z intends th
make evident the applications of the rul
according to which someone can do 0.
D.21 defines 'teaching how’ as an intentional activity.
Therefore, D.21 also rules out teaching machines as engaging
in teaching how, since teaching machines are not the kinds
of things that can know or believe. D.21, like D.20, avoids
using 'learning' as a primitive term and thereby avoids the
charge of defining an unclear educational activity in terms
of an equally unclear educational activity.
The definiens of D.21 is a disjunction. The first disjunct
captures teaching how and failing to realize the goal of
teaching, while the second disjunct captures teaching how
and succeeding in realizing the goal of teaching. D.21 also
allows for trying to teach someone how to do something he
already knows how to do. It also handles counterexamples
like the aforementioned case of the actor, Mr. Forrester,
teaching someone how to do a proof in a first order natural
deduction system. D.21 allows us to say that Mr. Forrester
is engaged in teaching how, in either sense that fits a
particular situation, since Mr. Forrester is acting in place
of Miss Lowell and his activity is designed by Miss Lowell
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to bring it about that someone does know how to do a proof
in a first order natural deduction system. Suppose, again,
that an actor colleague of Forrester’s tunes in the program
knows Forrester is an actor and an ignorant slob who cannot
understand a word he has memorized. D.21 allows for the
possibility that y does not know how to do a proof in a
first order natural deduction system and that Forrester may
provide a model for y to do such a proof, since Miss Lowell
and the producer intend that Forrester make evident the
applications of the rules according to which someone can do
such a proof, whether Forrester understands what he has
memorized or not. In this way D.21 allows for the
possibility that Forrester may engage in teaching how, in
either sense that fits a particular situation. Therefore,
D.21 is also designed to legislate cases for which our
intuitions are unclear.
D.21 also allows one to distinguish teaching how from other
activities. Suppose that a psychologist is concerned to
treat a patient who cannot regulate his eating habits. The
psychologist sets up a system of rewards for proper eating
habits and punishments for improper eating habits, designed
to reinforce proper eating habits, and to cause the patient
to learn how to regulate his eating habits. Our intentions
tell us that in this case, the psychologist is not engaged
in teaching the patient how to regulate his eating habits,
Ill
but instead is engaged in some other intentional activity
namely conditioning the patient to regulate his eating
habits. This intuition is born out by D.21.
Consider the first disjunct of D. 21 . This case may satisfy
(1) and (2), but it does not satisfy ( 3 ). The psychologist
IS not engaged in providing a model for the patient to
regulate his eating habits; the psychologist does not
simply intend to make evident the applications of the rules
according to which someone can regulate his eating habits.
In this case, the patient may already know how to regulate
his eating habits, but simply lacks the will to, in fact,
do so. The psychologist is attempting to address the latter
problem, rather than the former. One may conceive a case in
which the psychologist may engage in intending to teach a
patient how to regulate his eating habits, but D.21 allows
us to distinguish such a case from the case of engaging in
some other intentional activity like conditioning.
Consider the second disjunct of D.21. This case may also
satisfy (4) and ( 5 ), but it does not satisfy ( 6 ). Again, it
fails to satisfy ( 6 ) since the psychologist cannot be said
to be engaging simply in providing a model for the patient
to regulate his eating habits. When the psychologist is so
engaged, he can be said to be engaged in teaching the
patient how to regulate his eating habits, provided the
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other conditions are satisfied. When the psychologist is
not so engaged, he cannot be said to be engaged in teaching
how, but rather is engaged in some other intentional
activity. In this way, D.21 allows us to distinguish the
activity of teaching how from other intentional activities.
We are now in a position to provide a definition of
'teaching'. I have argued that 'teaching that' and
'teaching how' exhaust the kinds of activities that we may
call 'teaching activities, 71' and that each activity has two
senses; a sense in which the teaching fails to realize its
goal, and a sense in which the teaching succeeds in
realizing its goal. We now have definitions of these
activities; D.20 for ’teaching that’ and D.21 for ’teaching
how’. Given D.20 and D.21, consider the following
definition of ’teaching’
:
D.22 x is engaged in teaching y 0 at t iff
(1) x is engaged in teaching y and 0 at t (D.20), or
(2) x is engaged in teaching y how to 0 at t (D.21)
D.22 provides a definition of ’teaching’ which will
legislate difficult cases in order to distinguish teaching
7 M
' I have argued that the activities preanalytically
thought to be teaching activities either reduce to teaching
how or teaching that, or are, in fact, other intentional
activities
.
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from other intentional activities,
basis of D
. 2 0 and D.21, an account
the question "What is teaching?"
0.22 provides, on the
of teaching in answer to
With the notion of teaching clarified
2 by D.22, we are now in a position to
in answer to question
determine if or to
What extent critical intelligence as defined by D.12 in
Chapter One can be taught, and answer question 3, "Can
critical intelligence be taught?"
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CHAPTER III
CAN CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE BE TAUGHT?
To ask if critical intelligence can be taught is, according
to D . 12
,
to ask if correct critical thinking can be taught.
Attempted answers to the question "Can critical thinking be
taught?" may, for convenience, be divided into two groups.
Philosophers and educational psychologists in the first
group have directly addressed the question "Can critical
thinkirfg be taught?" 75 Their discussions involve both an
appeal to some notion of critical thinking as well as some
view of teaching. Rather than consider each attempted
answer in this first group, I shall critically consider one
representative attempt.
Philosophers in the second group have indirectly addressed
this question by addressing the question "Can virtue be
7 6taught?" Their discussions involve an attempt to provide
an answer to this question by appealing to some view of
teaching and some view of the relation of teaching and
7 S Thomas G. Devine, "Can We Teach Critical Thinking?,"
Elementary English (1964). Edmund L. Pincoffs, "What Can
be Taught?," Monist
,
No. 52 (Jan. 1968), pp . 120-132. I
shall consider Devine's argument.
7 6
I shall consider the question as raised by Plato in
the Meno and the answer as provided by Israel Scheffler inThe Language of Education
. The bibliography on 'virtue' isenormous .
~
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learning
.
this second
Rather than consider each attempted
group, I shall critically consider
answer in
one repre-
sentative attempt and its importance for answer
question "Can critical thinking be taught?" i
provide my own detailed discussion by applying
ing the
shall the
the defi-
n
nation of critical intelligence', D.12, the definition of
'teaching' from Chapter II, thereby directly answering the
question "Can critical intelligence be taught?"
Direct Answer to the Question: Group One
Thomas G. Devine directly answers the question "Can critical
intelligence be taught?" by directly answering the question
"Can critical thinking be taught?" His answer is no;
according to Devine, critical thinking cannot be taught.
He claims that:
how no^
0t teaCh Critical thinking as such. No matter
obTec t i^ve <^°
U
+-h
inten
!" lons • ^ how grandly we phrase our
w
tY
}
e unPlea sant truth remains: we cannotach critical thinking as a process in itself. We
a
f?
ou
1
t critical thinking. We can selectlatles wl}ich seem to be associated with criticalthinking and we can discuss these abilities with ourpupils. But we cannot teach these abilities as such. 77
Thomas G. Devine, "Can We Teach
Elementary English
, Mo. 41 (Feb. 1964)
,
Critical Thinking?,"
pp. 154-55.
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To support this claim that one cannot teach critical
thinking abilities, Devine offers two arguments. First,
Devine argues that critical thinking abilities cannot be
taught because critical thinking abilities are what he calls
only postulated mental constructs." He argues that:
critics which we believe to be involved in the
ences
ln9 Pr°CeSS <such as recognizing infer-
releva nr? gnlZlng 1 aSSUmptions ' distinguishingt from irrelevant evidence etc ) -t- i
constructs." We can only postulate ttelr existence
clnll|n9 promote growth in these abilities. We
^
iSPOVer whether or not growth hasuaxen place. The best we can say, in our presentstate of knowledge, is that critical thinking' seemsto be a composite of as many as forty separateabilities, and that these abilities, so far remainpostulates or mental constructs
.
Devine's first argument seems to be that specific critical
thinking abilities such as the ability to perform deductive
operations according to the rules of some deductive logical
system that is both consistent and truth preserving, or to
perform inductive operations according to some rules of in-
ductive support to degree n ((1) from D.ll) is a "mental
construct” the existence of which is "postulated.” it
seems that in Devine's argument, abilities that are "postu-
lated mental constructs" are by definition artificial
abstract entities that cannot be developed, affected,
Thomas C. Devine,
p. 155.
Can We Teach Critical Thinking,
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and measured for growth by any educational or psychological
means since, as artificial abstract entities, they are de-
tached from persons, or at least unavailable to outside
observers. It, of course, follows from this definition that
the ability to perform deductive operations according to the
rules of some deductive logical system that is both con-
sistent and truth preserving, or to perform inductive
operations according to some rules of inductive support, is
an ability that cannot be developed, affected and measured
/
for growth by any educational or psychological means since,
as a critical thinking ability, it is also a postulated
mental construct.
Devine's first argument can be represented as a deductively
valid argument of the form all A is B; all B is C; there-
fore, all A is C.
1. All specific critical thinking abilities are
postulated mental constructs.
2 . All postulated mental constructs are incapable
of being developed, affected, and measured for
growth
.
:. 3. All specific critical thinking abilities are
incapable of being developed, affected and
measured for growth.
However, Devine's first argument is unsound. There are no
reasons offered to support either premise 1 or premise 2.
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Assuming that premise 2 is true, 79 premise 1 depends on some
view of critical thinking as an individual activity that
occurs unobserved by others and that therefore, others may
only postulate critical thinking abilities in an individual.
This view of critical thinking, however, is mistaken.
Consider the ability to perform deductive operations
according to the rules of some deductive logical system
that is both consistent and truth preserving, or to perform
inductive operations according to some rules of inductive
support (from D.ll) as a critical thinking ability. Suppose
X is engaged m judging whether a statement does or does
not follow deductively from a presented statement or set of
statements, or does not follow inductively or deductively
from any presented statement or set of statements (from
D.10). We cannot observe x making this judgment insofar as
we cannot observe another's mental events but suppose we
suspect that x is simply guessing and has no such critical
thinking ability. We therefore ask x to justify the
judgment. If x replies, "I guessed," then our suspicions
are confirmed. If, however, x produces an appeal to in-
ductive or deductive rules of inference to support the
79 The notion is very unclear. This unclarity
necessitates lengthy reconstructions of the notion which
would ur nece ssar i ly complicate and lengthen the argument.
Therefore, I shall simply assume, for the purpose of the
argument, that premise 2 is true.
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judgment, then m this case (according to D.10) we must say
x is engaged in critical thinking. it seems possible,
then, to measure at least the presence or absence of this
specific ability to engage in critical thinking. if „e may
at least measure the presence or absence of this specific
critical thinking ability, then we may measure x at t and
again at t+1 to determine if this ability is absent at t
and present at t+1. In this way we may begin to measure its
growth. If all postulated mental constructs are incapable
of being developed, affected, and measured for growth, then
premise 1 is unsound; not all specific critical thinking
abilities are what Devine calls postulated mental
constructs. Therefore, Devine's first argument does not
support the conclusion that all specific critical thinking
abilities are incapable of being developed, affected and
measured for growth. Critical thinking abilities are not
postulated mental constructs .^ The first argument,
therefore, is inconclusive for the purpose of determining if
critical thinking can be taught.
Secondly, Devine argues that critical thinking abilities
cannot be taught because one only observes these abilities
in what Devine calls "language contexts." He argues that:
8 0 Again, I shall ignore the issue of whether postu-
lated mental constructs can or cannot be developed, affected
and measured for growth because the notion is hopelessly
unclear. y
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''We can see these abilities at work only in some
WS can
.
only Postulate the existencecritical thinking abilities but we can teach andmeasure a corresponding critical reading or criticallistening ability. For example, the ability to
recognize an inference is a mental construct, butthe ability to recognize a writer's inferences is acritical reading ability we can teach."
Again, this argument depends on the view that specific
critical thinking abilities are what he calls 'postulated
mental constructs
' . Indeed the problem with his second
argument as well as the problem with his first argument, is
a hopelessly inadequate view of the nature of critical
thinking abilities and a hopelessly inadequate account of
what it is to engage in critical thinking.
Devine seems to argue that the only educationally meaning-
ful account of critical thinking abilities and the only
educationally meaningful account of engaging in critical
thinking must be given in terms of some other abilities
which are not themselves critical thinking abilities. In
Devine's view, after all, critical thinking abilities are
mental constructs. Indeed, he claims that "the language
arts teacher can best translate critical thinking abilities
8 2into operational terms." This presumably involves
O I
T. G. Devine, "Can We Teach Critical Thinking?,"
Elementary English
, (1964) p. 155.
T. G. Devine, "Can We Teach Critical Thinking?
p. 155. ^
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translating what he calls "the ability to recognize an
inference," which in his account is a postulated mental
construct, into what he calls "the ability to recognize a
writer's inferences," which in his account he calls a criti-
cal reading ability.
However
,
as I have argued, critical thinking abilities are
not what he cails 'postulated mental constructs'. Devine
provides no further arguments to support his claim that
critical thinking abilities cannot be taught. Both his
arguments depend upon the claim that critical thinking
abilities are postulated mental constructs, and cannot be
taught because postulated mental constructs cannot be
taught. He offers no reasons to distinguish what he calls
critical reading abilities, which he grants can be taught,
from critical thinking abilities, which he claims cannot be
taught, other than his definition of critical thinking
abilities as postulated mental constructs. Therefore,
Devine fails to show that critical thinking abilities cannot
be taught. He therefore fails to provide a determinative
answer to the question "Can critical thinking be taught?"
The general problem with Devine's attempt and similar
attempts directly to answer the question "Can critical
thinking be taught?" is the lack of a clear definition of
what it is to engage in critical thinking, and what it is to
Ihave the ability to engage correctly in critical thinking.
In Chapter I, I have provided both a definition of what it
1& to have the ability to engage correctly in critical
thinking (D.10) and a definition of what it is to have the
ability to engage correctly in critical thinking (D
. 11 ) as
a first step toward directly answering this question.
However
,
we have seen that an account of teaching is also
important for providihg an answer to this question. We
may, therefore, first consider a distinction between two
success senses of 'teaching' which may be construed as pro-
viding an indirect answer to this question "Can critical
thinking be taught?"
Indiiec t Answer to the Question: Group Two
In the Meno
,
83 Plato raises the question "Is virtue
teachable?" At 86d, Socrates asks "Is virtue teachable, or
do men have it as a gift of nature?" This question and
attempted answers to it resemble the question "Is critical
intelligence teachable?" and answers to it. Both questions
raise similar prior questions; the prior question "What is
virtue?", compared with the prior question "What is critical
intelligence?"; and both raise the question "What is
successful teaching?" The latter prior question is the
8 3 The Collected Dialogues of Plato (Huntinqton
Carrens, Edith Hamilton, ed
. ,
NY: Random House, 1961).
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point of interest in the discussion of the question "Can
virtue be taught?" for the discussion of the question "Can
critical thinking be taught?" We may, therefore, consider
a proposed answer to the latter prior question in the
discussion of the question "Can virtue be taught?" and hope
to apply this proposed answer to a discussion of the
question "Can critical thinking be taught?"
Socrates asks at 87b "What attribute of the soul must virtue
be if it is to be teachable, or otherwise?" He then
rhetorically asks ".
. .in the first place, if it is any-
thing else but knowledge, is there a possibility of anyone
teaching it
. .
.?" At 37e he says "Suppose that virtue is
a kind of knowledge. If it is, then it will be teachable;
otherwise it will not."
Israel Scheffler claims that Socrates argues that no one
willingly and knowingly chooses to do evil or to reject
virtue. Scheffler states that, according to Socrates,
If someone knows what the good is, he cannot fail tochoose it Thus virtue can be taught. We need merelyto succeed in teaching people to know what is good,ana virtue is guaranteed. In contradiction to this
view, most philosophers have held that men frequently
PP
84
Israel Scheffler
'
The Language of Educa tion.
84 — 85 . '
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choS^if^ theLafrVV,° be g°°d 3for virtue thafr“^ “ ^
nd knowingly
sufficient
"
required .
"
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Scheffler points out that Socrates' view that virtue is
knowiedge and his claim that one who knows virtue will be
virtuous in action generates a disagreement over the meaning
of 'successfully teaching' virtue, and he argues that this
is not, in fact, a disagreement over whether or not virtue
can be taught. Given that virtue is knowledge, Socrates
argues that virtue is successfully taught iff the pupil is
Virtuous in action, while other philosophers have agreed
that virtue (being knowledge) is successfully taught iff the
pupil knows virtue, but that this knowledge is in no way a
sufficient condition for being virtuous in action, it
appears that defenders of the latter position disagree with
defenders of the former position over whether or not virtue
can oe successfully taught.
However, Scheffler attempts to offer an account of this dis-
agreement over whether or not virtue can be taught by
arguing that what is at stake is really a disagreement over
the meaning of 'successfully teaching' virtue. To do so,
Scheffler provides a distinction between what he calls
"successfully teaching in an active sense" and ''successfully
Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education
, p. 85 -
85
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teaching in a non-active sense " If - h ,
,
' t ls distinction helps
Y and reSOlVe thiS
^tsagreement over whether or not
virtue can be taught, perhaps such a distinction win help
^ 311 3ttemPt t0 anSWer the question "Can critical
intelligence be taught?," since we might anticipate ^
"" "" ° f diSa
-~
- * "—ion of this guestion.
If we view critical intelligence in terms of specific
critical thinking abilities, then critical intelligence canbe viewed as knowledge. Given that critical intelligence
is knowledge, one may either argue (paralleling Socrates)
that critical intelligence is successfully taught iff the
pupil is critically intelligent in action, or argue
(Paralleling other philosophers) that critical intelligence
rs successfully taught iff the pupil knows critical
intelligence, but that this knowledge is in no way a
sufficient condition for being critically intelligent in
Thus, we appear to have a disagreement over whether
not critical intelligence can be successfully taught
much like the disagreement over whether or not virtue can be
successfully taught. if Scheffler can show that such a
greement simply reduces to applying equivocal senses of
'successfully teaching', then we will be in a clearer
position to answer the question and to resolve the
disagreement
.
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In an attempt to clarify ^
-Larif and resolve th-ic a ^nis disagreement andto show that the disagreement „,n •really involves equivocal
senses of
.successfully teaching., Scheffler argues that thesuccess sense of
.teaching, can he given what he calls an
active interpretation Th-io
• according to Scheffler, means
e question 'Can virtue be taught?") that if the
teaching is successful, then the pupil, in fact
, acquires
rtue in his conduct. In the active interpretation, the
oral aquisition of virtue is automatically insured by
the success in teaching it. However, the success sense of
teaching, can also be given what he calls a non-active
interpretation. This, according to Scheffler, means that
the teaching is successful even if the pupil fails to aquire
his own conduct. In the non-active interpretation,
the behavioral acquisition of virtue is independent of the
of teaching it. Scheffler argues that both the
active and the non-active interpretations of the success
sense of 'teaching':
orinnT i
h^ 1T
]
tellectual apprehensp ciples and intellectual avowal
ogether with a rejection of such
conduct, but one view (the activedescribes such a case as a failure
whereas the other (the non-activedescribes it as a failure in will.
86
ion of moral
of them may go
principles in
interpretation)
in teaching
ig£erpretation)
PP. 84-85?
rael Schef£ler
'
The Language of Education
.
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Schef f ler concludes by stating that both the active and the
non-active interpretations of the success sense of
'teaching' "recognize the actual cases recognized by the
other, but describe them differently." 87 Therefore,
according to Schef f ler, there is no real disagreement over
whether or not virtue can be taught; what is at issue is
simply equivocal notions of 'successfully teaching'.
According to Schef f ler, the clarification and resolution of
the disagreement over successfully teaching virtue is the
following: the clarification, given that virtue is know-
ledge, is that virtue is successfully taught (active sense)
iff the pupil is virtuous in action and virtue is success-
fully taught (non-active sense) iff the pupil knows virtue,
even though this knowledge is in no way a sufficient
condition for being virtuous in action. The resolution of
the disagreement is that in disagreeing over whether virtue
can be taught, both sides have appealed to equivocal notions
of successfully teaching'. Provided that we clarify the
notion of successfully teaching' by distinguishing the
active and non-active senses, the disagreement over whether
Oftc is successfully taught virtue even though one is not
virtuous in action becomes a failure in teaching for the
87 Israel Scheffler, The Language of Education
,
p. 86.
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active interpretation and a failure ln wil1 for the non-
active interpretation
;
blit simply account for
Scheffler's account.
both describe the same phenomenon,
It with different terms, according to
Grven Scheffler's account, the disagreement over whether or
not virtue can be taught simply reduces to a disagreement
over the description of the same phenomenon with different
senses of 'successfully teaching'. However, suppose that a
stubborn philosopher named Socrates argues that there is no
such distinction between successfully teaching in the active
and the non-active senses, and argues that one successfully
teaches a pupil virtue iff the pupil is virtuous in action;
otherwise, while one may be engaged in trying to teach, one
IS not engaged in successfully teaching the pupil. There
is, m fact, no "non-active sense" of 'successfully
teaching
. in this case, the disagreement is a disagreement
over the nature of 'successfully teaching' and the disagree-
ment requires further arguments giving an account of
' teaching
'
.
In this case, with the disagreement over the concept of
teaching, we still have a genuine disagreement over whether
or not virtue can be taught, assuming that both parties to
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the disagreement agree that virtue is knowledge.
Therefore, Schef f ler
' s arguments do not show that suoh
disagreements which reduce to disagreements over the nature
successfully teaching' are resolved by distinguishing
what he calls the active from the non-active senses of
'successfully teaching'. A detailed account of teaching
supported by arguments is required to resolve the disagree-
ment over the nature of 'successfully +- u •teaching' and thereby
to answer the cruesf i one n <-< _ .que t s Can virtue be taught?" and "Can
critical intelligence be taught?"
in Chapter II, I have provided arguments designed to support
a clear definition of 'teaching' (D.22) in terms of
'teaching that' (D.20) and 'teaching how' (D.21). No less
than a complete account of 'teaching' is sufficient to
answer the question "Can critical intelligence be taught?"
Anything less, like Scheffler's attempted distinction, fails
to provide a satisfactory answer. We must now apply the
definition of 'critical intelligence' in terms of the
definition of 'critical thinking' in Chapter I to the
definition of 'teaching' in Chapter II to directly determine
the answer to the question "Can critical intelligence be
taught?
"
88
I shall ignore the disagreement over the nature of
^ -P ^ 1 1 #•Knowing, and of knowing how and of knowing that
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A Direct Answer to the Question
Can Critical Intelligence Be Taught?"
The question "Can critical Intelligence be taught?" requires
some preliminary clarification. One point specifically m
need of clarification is the function of 'can- in this
Question. For example, one may attempt to interpret
'can'
in terms of a modal term like 'possible'. m this modal
interpretation, to answer the question "Can critical in-
telligence be taught?" one simply shows that teaching
critical intelligence is not logically impossible, since the
modal term 'possible' includes all propositions except
logically impossible ones. However, this interpretation
of
-can' is disallowed by D.21. For example, given the
second disjunct of D.21 (8), one cannot successfully teach
y how to jump to the Moon, since D.21 (8) requires that y
know how to jump to the Moon at t+1, evidenced by y jumping
to the Moon at t+1. Yet jumping to the Moon is not
logically impossible. Therefore, this modal interpretation
of 'can' will not do.
Nor will it do to attempt to interpret 'can' in terms of
some notion of physical possibility. The notion of physical
possibility is extremely difficult to specify, yet even if
it could be clearly specified, for example in terms of con-
sistency with certain laws of nat ure
,
it is unnecessary to
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do so, glven the seoond dl5junct Qf ^
given D.21 ( 8 ), one oannot SUC e eS sfully teach y how to benchpress 900 pounds unless y does know how to bench press 900pounds at t+1, evidenced by y bench pressing 900 pounds at
t+1. Bench pressing 900 pounds does not violate any
Physical laws, yet does not appear to be clearly
..physically
possible
.
H There f
f
u,. . • ,i ore
, this interpretation of 'can' also
W^H no ^ do. However, given D Pi ('Ri 0 *, feive u.p («) and a particular
form of the question "Can critical intelligence be taught?",
function of
-can’ becomes clear and points toward an
empirical determination of the question.
Oiven D.12 and D.22, the question "Can critical intelligence
be taught?" may take several forms which also must be
clarified in order to determine which question is being
answered. For example, when asking this question, one may
be interpreted as asking "Can one engage in trying to teach
critical intelligence?" Yet this is an unenlightening
version of the question for one interested in developing
successful methods for teaching critical intelligence.
Under this interpretation, for example, one can try to teach
someone how to do almost anything from jumping to the Moon
or bench pressing 900 pounds, to engaging correctly in
critical thinking. The result of asking this question is a
vacuous answer: yes
.
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However, there is a stronger form of the question. When one
asks "Can critical intelligence be taught?", one may be in-
as asking if it is, in fact, ever successfully
taught. To answer this question, one may provide necessary
and sufficient conditions for successfully doing it, and
then argue that these conditions are, in fact, satisfied to
provide an affirmative answer, or argue that these con-
'tions are not, in fact, satisfied to provide a negative
answer. Given D.21 (8) and the specification of these
necessary and sufficient conditions for successfully
teaching critical intelligence, the precise function of
Coin in this form of the question becomes a matter for
empirical determination in the same way that it became a
matter for empirical determination in deciding whether one
can successfully teach y how to jump to the Moon, or in
deciding whether one can successfully teach y how to bench
press 900 pounds; that y does know how to do these things
is evidenced by y doing them. Similarly, critical in-
telligence can be taught if these necessary and sufficient
conditions are, in fact, satisfied. Therefore, the satis-
faction of these necessary and sufficient conditions is a
matter for empirical determination 89
89 This parallels Socrates’ view requiring that in
order to teach virtue successfully, the pupil must, in fact,be virtuous in action. D.21 (8) therefore sides with
Socrates in the dispute with other philosophers. The first
disjunct of D.21 accounts for cases of teaching that are
instances of trying, but failing.
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'Critical intelligence- is defined by D.12 in terms of the
ability to engage correctly in critical thinking. If these
abilities are successfully taught according to D.21 (8),
then y does know how to engage correctly in critical
thinking at t + l, as evidenced by y engaging correctly in
critical thinking at t+l. The success is a matter for
empirical determination. It depends not only on assuming
that the teacher has sufficient training and ability, but
also on assuming that the student has sufficient intelli-
gence and will.
I shall consider this stronger form of the question and
answer it affirmatively by providing the necessary and
sufficient conditions for successfully teaching critical
intelligence, and arguing that determining the success of
the teaching is, as it should be, a contingent matter. I
shall then answer the question "How can critical intelli-
gence be taught?" in Chapter IV by showing how, in fact, to
satisfy these necessary and sufficient conditions for
successfully teaching critical intelligence, given teachers
with sufficient training and ability and students with
sufficient intelligence and will. This, as it should,
places questions about teaching methods and their success in
guaranteeing the successful teaching of critical intelli-
gence in the realm of empirical investigation.
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Given teachers with sufficient training and ability and
students with sufficient intelligence and will, „e may
specify the necessary and sufficient conditions for success-
fully teaching the students how to engage correctly in
critical thinking. 90 x is engaged in successfully teaching
y ow to engage correctly in critical thinking (from D.ll)
if and only if x is engaged in successfully teaching y how
(according to the second disjunct of D.21) to engage
correctly in critical thinking. This can be seen as
follows
:
D.23 x is engaged in successfully teaching y how to engagecorrectly in critical thinking to degree N at t iff
(1) x believes at t that y does not know how to en-
gage correctly in critical thinking to degree N
at t-1
,
and
v2) x intends that y does know how to engage correctly
in critical thinking to degree N at t+1, or
someone intends that x bring it about that y doesknow how to engage correctly in critical thinking
to degree N at t+1, and
(3) y does not know how to engage correctly in
critical thinking to degree N at t-1 and if x
does not engage in providing a model between t-1
and t+1 for y to engage correctly in critical
The notion of the degree N of the ability to engage
in critical thinking, determined in terms of the degree n of
the specific abilities, is meant not only to account for
dif ferences due to training, but also to capture and account
for contingent differences in the intelligence, ability and
will of students as well as the contingent differences in
the intelligence, ability and training of teachers. There-fore, I do not consider these contingent, empirical factors.
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thinking to degree N,
to engage correctly in
degree N at t+1
. and
then y does not know how
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D.23 offers necessary and sufficient conditions for
succeeding in teaching how to engage correctly in critical
thinking. To determine the specific abilities, necessary
and sufficient for having the ability to engage correctly
in critical thinking, we need only refer to D.ll and apply
it to expand D.23. This can be clarified as follows:
D.24 x is engaged in successfully teaching y how to engagecorrectly in critical thinking to degree N at t iff xis engaged in successfully teaching y at t how
correctly to
(1) perform deductive operations according to the
rules of some deductive logical system that is
both consistent and truth preserving, or perform
inductive operations according to some rules of
inductive support; to degree n, or
(2) formulate plausible interpretations of a given
statement or set of statements in which termsfrom the given statement or set of statements
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(3)
(4)
the plausible interpretations; to degree n, or
3 pr°P° sed explicatum of a term usedby un author or speaker, or a proposed clarifi-
speaker°is
a Sta
^
ement Presented by an author or
,
E
. ,
l
' fact, an explicatum or is, in facta clarification; to degree n; or '
?o°the
e
ru?es
e
o?
luate f1uctive support (according
K fu
1 f some deductive logical system thatIS both consistent and truth presLving* for givenstatements not necessarily translated into thl
lnrh^?
e ° f that system or to provide and evaluatei ductive support (according to some rules ofinductive support) for given statements; to degree
(5) recognize (psychologically persuasive) errors informal reasoning that employs natural language,to degree n, or ^
any combination of ( 1 ), ( 2 ), ( 3 ), ( 4 ) and ( 5 ).
D.23 provides the necessary and sufficient conditions for
successfully teaching correct critical thinking. it, there-
fore, according to D.12, provides the necessary and
sufficient conditions for successfully teaching critical
intelligence. D.24 provides a clarification of D.23 in
terms of D.ll by providing the abilities which must be
successfully taught according to the second disjunct of D.21
for correct critical thinking to be successfully taught.
The question "Can critical intelligence be taught?" becomes
a manageable empirical question; can these abilities from
D.ll in D.24 be taught successfully? We know that they can
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given that they, in fact, satisfy the second disj unct of
second disjunct of D.21. This will become, as
It should, a contingent matter of empirical fact.
Consider D.24 ( 1 ) . can (1)91 fae
According to the second disjunct
successfully
of D.21
:
taught?
D
. 25 ^ is engaged in succe
(1) at t iff
ssfully teaching y correctly to
( 1 ) x believes at
to (1) at t-1
k y does not know how correctly
( 2 )
(3)
*+ ?^?
ndS that y does know how correctly to (1)
^jL£+1 ', or s°meone intends that x bring it aboutat y does know how correctly to (1) at t+1
, and
y does not know how correctly to (1) at t-1 and if
engage in providing a model between t-1
know h
°r Y correctly ^ (1), then y does notow correctly to (1) at t+1, and
(4) x does engage in providing a model between t-1t+1 for y correctly to (1)
,
(5) y does know how correctly to (1)by y correctly doing (1) at t+1,
at t+1, evidenced
where x provides a model for y correctly to (1) iffx intends or some z intends that x make evident theapplications of the rules according to which some-
one can correctly do (1)
.
Disjunct (1) can be taught successfully provided that these
conditions in D.25 are, as a matter of empirical fact, met.
For example, we do successfully teach some students
91 mu1 he numbers are the same for D.ll and D.24. I shalluse the numbers as abbreviations for +hooa j., .discussion that follows. conditions m the
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correctly to perform deductive operations according to the
rules of some deductive logical system that is both
consistent and truth preserving in elementary logic courses
We do successfully teach some students correctly to perform
inductive operations according to some rules of inductive
support in elementary science courses. We also test
students to determine whether they can do these things
correctly, and our determination that they can do them to
degree n is based upon their actually doing them to degree n
in a test situation. Therefore (1) is the kind of ability
that can be taught successfully.
Consider D.24 (2). Can (2) be successfully taught?
Disjunct (2) can be taught successfully provided that the
conditions in D.25 are, as a matter of empirical fact, met,
When substituting (2) for (1). it seems that these con-
ditions are, in fact, met. For example, we do successfully
teach some students correctly to formulate plausible inter-
pretations of a given statement or set of statements in which
terms from the given statement or set of statements differ in
meaning in the plausible interpretations, or a statement
differs in meaning or truth value in the plausible interpre-
tations, in elementary philosophy courses. We also test
students to determine whether they can correctly decide if a
term or statement is unclear in a given context, correctly
consider logical and factual relationships among presented
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statements
, and produce alternative construals of the
meaning of terms or the meaning or truth value of the
Statement. Our determination that they oan do this to
degree n is based upon their aotually doing this to degree n
111 3 tSSt SitUati0n
' Therefore
, (2, is the hind of ability
that can be taught successfully.
Consider D.24 ( 3 ) fan r*\ u' * C (3) be successfully taught?
Disjunct (3) can be taught successfully provided that the
conditions in D.25 are, as a matter of empirical fact, met
When substituting (3) for (!)
. it seems that these con-
ditions are, in fact, met. For example, we do successfully
teach some students correctly to determine that a proposed
explicatum of a term used by an author or speaker, or a
proposed clarification of a statement presented by an author
or speaker is, in fact, an explicatum or is, in fact, a
clarification in introductory or intermediate philosophy
courses. We also test students to determine whether they
can evaluate a proposed explication of a term by appeal to
the rules of explication, or a proposed clarification of a
statement by appeal to some rules of clarification. Our
determination that they can do this to degree n is based
upon their actually doing this to degree n in a test
situation. Therefore (3) is the kind of ability that can be
taught successfully.
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Consider D.24 (4). Can (4) be successfully taught?
Disjunct (4) can be taught successfully provided that the
conditions in D.25 are, as a matter of empirical fact, met
when substituting (4) for (1). It seems that these CQn _
ditions are, m fact, met. For example, we do successfully
teach some students correctly to provide and evaluate
deductive support (according to the rules of some deductive
logical system that is both consistent and truth preserving)
for given statements not necessarily translated into the
language of that system, or to provide and evaluate in-
ductive support (according to some rules of inductive
support) for given statements, in logic, philosophy or
science courses. In such courses we also test students to
determine whether they can correctly evaluate a clear state-
ment of a theory by correctly performing deductive
operations on statements of the theory, or correctly provide
deductive arguments to support the theory or refute the
theory; to determine correctly whether they can correctly
translate statements into formal language to prove that a
theory is consistent, or to show that it is inconsistent, or
correctly to prove that the arguments supporting a theory
are valid or to show that they are invalid, or, by
performing inductive operations on statements of the theory,
to support the theory or to refute the theory. Our determi-
nation that they can do this to degree n is based upon their
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actually doing this to degree n in a test situation.
Therefore, (4)
successfully.
is the kind of ability that can be taught
Consider D.24 (5,. Can
,5) be successfully taught?
Disjunct (5) can be taught successfully provided that the
conditions in D.25 are, as a matter of empirical fact, met
when substituting (5) for (!) . it seems that thes0 con _
ditions are, m fact, met. For example, we do successfully
teach some students correctly to recognize psychologically
persuasive errors in formal reasoning that employs natural
language in introductory philosophy and communications
courses. We test students to determine whether they can
correctly recognize informal fallacies by producing the rule
the fallacy in question is an instance of. Our
determination that they can do this to degree n is based
upon their actually doing this to degree n in a test
situation. Therefore (5) is the kind of ability that can
be taught successfully.
Consider, finally, any combination of D.24 (1), (2), ( 3 ),
(4) and (5) . Can doing any combination of (1) , (2) , (3)
,
(4) and (5) be successfully taught? Doing any combination
of these can be taught successfully provided that each of
(1) through (5) can be taught successfully. Since I have
shown that each of (1) through (5) can be taught
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successfully, it follows that doing
can be taught successfully.
any combination of these
Therefore, since each of the abilities to degree n for en-
gaging correctly in critical thinking to degree N can be
taught, the ability to engage correctly in critical thinking
degree N can be taught. Therefore, given D.12, defining
the degree N of critical intelligence in terms of the
degree N of the ability to engage correctly in critical
thinking, critical intelligence can be taught successfully.
With the strong form of the question "Can critical
intelligence be taught?" answered affirmatively, we are now
m a position to provide a clear answer to question
How can critical intelligence be taught?"
4
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CHAPTER iv
HOW CAN CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE BE TAUGHT?
To ask how critical intelligence can be taught is, according
to D.12, to ask how correct critical thinking can be taught.
Yet the question "How can critical thinking be taught?" has
been interpreted in at least two ways by educators
attempting to answer it. First, some educators have in-
terpreted the question as asking for a method for teaching
such that teaching by this method is a sufficient condition
for teaching critical thinking. Many educators have
attempted to answer this interpretation of the question by
proposing methods designed, when teaching is done by them,
to be sufficient conditions for teaching critical thinking.
Secondly, some educators have interpreted the question as
asking for a curriculum to teach such that teaching this
curriculum is a sufficient condition for teaching critical
thinking. Many educators have attempted to answer this
interpretation of the question by proposing curricula
designed, when taught, to be sufficient conditions for
teaching critical thinking.
Educators attempting to answer the question "How can
critical thinking be taught?" can, accordingly, be divided
into two groups. The first group includes those attempting
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to answer the question by providing a method designed, when
teaching is done by it, to be a sufficient condition for
teaching critical thinking. The second group includes those
attempting to answer the question by providing a curriculum
designed, when taught, to be a sufficient condition for
teaching critical thinking. Rather than consider all pro-
posed methods in group one, and all proposed curricula in
group two, I shall critically consider a representative
sample from each group.
^
92 Other authors offering accounts similar to one or
more of the accounts I consider in group one are: M. L.
Marksberry, "Kindergarteners are Not Too Young," Elementary
School Journal, No. 66 (Oct. 1965), pp . 13-17; J. Shotka,
Critical Thinking in the First Grade," Childhood Education
,
No. 36 (May i 960 ), pp . 405-09; J. C. Aldrich, "Developing
Critical Thinking," Social Education
,
No. 12 (March 1948),
pp. 115-18; F. T, Arone, "Developing Critical Thinking in
Junior High School," Clearing House
,
No. 34 (April i 960 ),
pp . 456—61 ; E. Dale, "Teaching Critical Thinking," Education
Digest
,
No. 24 (May 1959), pp . 29-31; K. B. Henderson,
"Teaching of Critical Thinking," Phi Delta Cappan, No. 39,(March 1958), pp . 280-82; A. Milton, "Method for Teaching
Thinking," The English Journal
,
No. 27 (Oct. 1938),
pp . 6
6
0 — 6
6
; B. 0. Smith "Improvement of Critical Thinking,"
Progressive Education
,
No. 30 (March 1953) pp . 129-34.
Other authors offering accounts similar to one or more of
the accounts I consider in group two are: W. S. Howell,
"The Effects of High School Debating on Critical Thinking,"
Speech Monographs
,
No. 10 (1943), p. 100; R. Karlin,
"Critical Reading is Critical Thinking," Education
,
No. 17
(Sept. 1963 ), pp . 9-H; A. 0. Kownslar, "Fact or Fiction in
History: Vehicles for Critical Thinking," Clearing House
,
No. 41 (Sept. 1966), pp . 18-20; G. R. Greutz and K. I. Grezi,
"Developing Critical Thinking in the Current Events Class,"
Journal of Educational Research
,
No. 58 (April 1965)
,
pp . 366 - 67 ; H7 e7 Kelley , "The Thinking Process in Relation
to Arithmetic," Ohio Schools
,
No. 17 (June 1939), p. 28l;
K. B. Henderson and M. P. Fulton, "Critical Thinking:
Geometry Classes Use Radio Programs," Clearing House ,
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I shall argue that the methods offered by educators in the
rirst group are not sufficient conditions for teaching
critical thinking, and that simply teaching by some method
is not a sufficient condition for teaching critical thinking
without a curriculum which, when taught, is a sufficient
condition for teaching critical thinking. I shall then
argue that teaching the curricula offered by educators in
the second group is not a sufficient condition for teaching
critical thinking, yet a curriculum C.3 that is a
sufficient condition for teaching critical thinking can be
provided by an appeal to D.10. I shall argue that if we
interpret the question as asking for a curriculum for
successfully teaching correct critical thinking, then C.4
can be provided in terms of D.20, D.21, and directly by
D.24. I shall then provide a complete, detailed curriculum,
C.4, in answer to this interpretation of the question "How
can critical thinking be taught?"
No. 24 (Nov. 1949)
, pp . 155-58; E. R. Downing "Does
Science Teach Scientific Thinking?," Science Education, No.
17 (April 1933), p. 89; C. M. Dunning, "Developing Critical
Thinking Through Elementary Science," School Science and
Mathematics
,
_
No. 51 (Jan. 1951), pp . 61-63; P. M. Smith, Jr.,
"Critical Thinking and the Science Intangibles," Science
Education
,
No. 47 (Oct. 1963), pp. 405-08. Note also that
all the educators considered in Chapter I, providing
definitions of 'critical thinking' may also be construed as
attempting to provide such curricula.
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Then I shall arque that -t-o ac,i- p9 to ash for some method for how to
teach C.4 is simply to ask for some method such that it
satisfies the second disjunct of D.20 and the second
disjunct of D.21. i shall conclude that the selection of
such a method, given this requirement, is simply a matter of
empirical consideration, depending on contingent factors
such as the personality and individual strengths of the
teacher, the size and length of the class, and the back-
ground and the ability of the students and the degree N to
which critical thinking is taught. I shall then, in the
appendix, provide a detailed model in terms of this complete
detailed curriculum C.4, and in terms of a method that
satisfies the second disjunct of D.20 and the second
disjunct of D.21, for how to teach critical intelligence.
Proposed Teaching Methods : Group One
Bernard Mehl proposes a method for teaching critical
thinking that has two component methods. The first he calls
the creative discovery method" and the second he calls "the
double
-dare -you method." 93 The goal of this method composed
of these two component methods is, according to Mehl, to
B. Mehl, "Motiviation of Critical Thinking,"
Progressive Education
,
No. 33 (Jan. 1956)
, pp . 12-15.
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motivate students to think critically and "
1 1 Ke parrots, robots or Univacs."° 4 This "
claims, is part of the teaching method and
separated from it."^
not to behave
motiviation ,
"
cannot be
he
In the method of creative discovery, the student "is given
a chance to discover relationships by himself. The teacher
sets the stage, so the student will think through con-
clusions to the problem studied by means of his own creative
• Q
experience. lhe teacher then simply presents material
related such that the relations are unstated and allows the
student to discover these relations. Mehl considers the
relation of "being incompatible with" and offers an example.
In his example, the teachers ask for a list of the racial
characteristics of Mongolians, Negros, and Caucasions
.
97
He then asks for a list of the political, religious, and
racial characteristics of various nationalities. He may
then, given the reply, for example, that Americans are
Republicans, Protestant and white, elicit information that
B. Mehl, "Motivation of Critical Thinking," p. 13.
95
B. Mehl, "Motivation of Critical Thinking," p. 14.
9 6
B. Mehl, "Motivation of Critical Thinking," I takeit he means to say "think through problems to the
conclusion, unless he means to say "study the arguments to
see if they are valid and sound."
97
One might modify the example such that a contra-diction results.
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IS incompatible with this reply. The students must then
discover and point out this incompatibility. Mehl claims
that in the method of creative discovery, the teacher "may
direct their attention to the slip, but if the students do
not pick up the cue, he must formulate another scheme by
which the revelation can come from the student. Note that
the teacher does not force the conclusion on the class." 98
Therefore, according to Mehl, in the creative discovery
method, "the teacher brings into the teaching picture
elements which he knows can be spotted as incompatible with
each other by the average student.
In the double
-dare
-you method, the student is challenged to
justify his position on a particular issue. The teacher
then raises a controversial issue, or states a proposition
which he believes at least some students believe is false.
Mehl claims that "when a student can't accept a propo-
sition
. . . and . . . counters with his own notion, the
teacher challenges the student to prove his own contention.
The important thing here is to gauge the challenge so that
it is either within the student's range or just beyond
it." The object of the double-dare-you method, then, is
98
99
B. Mehl, "Motivation of Critical Thinking," p. 15
B. Mehl, "Motivation of Critical Thinking," p. 15.
l0 ° B. Mehl, "Motivation of Critical Thinking," p. 15 .
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to provide a situation in which the student ^
to produce arguments to prove his point. He will also
according to Mehl, be forced to examine his position in
terms of various alternative positions. According to „ehl
,
"'I bet you can't do if (is a phrase)
.
. . used by parents
as they attempt to get their children to clean up the yard,
wash dishes, or perform other distasteful chores. The
teacher who wishes to motivate for critical thinking can
do well to borrow a page out of the parent's manual to
effect participation in a far from distasteful task." 101
This method, composed of these component methods, may be
summarized as follows:
M.l x is engaged in teaching y how tothinking if x is engaged in
engage in critical
(1) presenting y materials related such that somepresented material is incompatible with otherpresented material such that the incompatibilityis unstated and such that y is encouraged by x todiscover and state this incompatibility (creativediscovery component)
,
or
(2) presenting y issues or propositions such that yis challenged to take a stand on the issue, orproduce an alternative proposition, and tojustify this stand or support this alternative
proposition with arguments (double-dare-you
component)
.
101
B. Mehl, "Motivation of Critical Thinking," p. 15 .
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M.l is stated such that both the creative discovery
component and the double-dare-you component are sufficient
conditions for teaching critical thinking. There are,
however, difficulties with M.l. Neither what Mehl calls
creative discovery (M.l (1)) nor what he calls the
double-dare-you component (M.l (2)) are sufficient con-
ditions for teaching critical thinking.
Consider M.l (1). Suppose that x asks for a list of the
racial characteristics of Mongolians, Negroes and
Caucasions
. X then asks for a list of the political,
religious, and racial characteristics of Americans, and
receives the reply "Republican, Protestant and white." m
accord with the creative discovery component, x now asks
for the political, religious and racial characteristics of
Harlem ghetto dwellers and receives the reply "Communist,
Moslem and black." After some prodding and cues by x,
suppose that y raises his hand and states his discovery that
Republican, Protestant and white Americans are incompatible
with Communist, Moslem and black Americans". However, y
has not committed a use-mention confusion since y intends
his statement as an explanation for political, religious
and racial strife, not as a statement intended to point out
the inadequacy of characterizing Americans as Republican,
Protestant and white. M.l (1) is satisfied, yet even
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according to D.10, y is not engaged in critical thinking.
At most, y is engaged in creative thinking. Therefore,
M ' 1 U) 15 n0t a sufficient condition for teaching how to
engage in critical thinking.
Consider M.l (2). Suppose that x states that "blacks are
not inferior to whites." Now suppose that x challenges y to
justify this proposition with arguments, and y replies that
"all men are created equal." We may want to claim that y is
indeed engaged in creative thinking, but y is not engaged in
critical thinking, even according to D.10. In simply pro-
posing this proposition, y does not engage in evaluating any
arguments. M.l (2) also confuses engaging in critical
thinking with engaging in creative thinking. Therefore,
the double
-dare-you component is not a sufficient condition
for teaching how to engage in critical thinking. Therefore,
M.l fails as a method for guaranteeing the teaching of
critical thinking.
Herbert Thelen also proposes a method for teaching
critical thinking that is called "the method of
confrontation
. Thelen states that "inquiry
. . . starts
102
H. Thelen, "Materials That Promote Inquiry and
Thinking," Educational Screen and Audiovisual Guide, No. 44
(Dec
. 1965)
,
p. 26
.
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with the arrest of attention - a confrontation of some
103
He then proposes four ways to arrest the
student's attention with confrontations designed to teach
critical thinking.
The first way is to demonstrate an experiment without
explanation. According to Thelen, this requires the student
to observe carefully and to engage in critical thinking to
answer the teacher's questions. Then, according to Thelen,
I d ask What was my hypothesis, what were my data, and
what have 1 shown?' ... you tell the class too little
and demand that they fill in the gaps in some way, butyou don't tell them how. In genuine inquiry, it doesn't
matter whether speculations are "good" or
"JgcJ" orantisocial; so long as they close the gap
The second way Thelen mentions is to overwhelm students with
different ideas and material. In this way, students confront
these ideas and material and exercise critical thinking to
organize them. According to Thelen, "you require them to
so^t out, categorize, and abstract an idea from the jumble
of impressions." 105 The third way Thelen mentions is to
103
H. Thelen, "Materials That Promote Inquiry and
Thinking
,
" p . 26
.
104
H. Thelen, "Materials That Promote Inquiry and
Thinking ,
" p . 26
105
H. Thelen, "Materials That Promote Inquiry and
Thinking ,
" p . 26
.
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violate the student's expectations.
"You make sure the
class has ... a good idea of what is going happen and
then you arrange it so the opposite happens. "106 This CQn _
fronts them with something that requires explanation, since
it violates the pattern they have come to expect. This
explanation, according to Thelen, requires critical thinking.
The fourth way Thelen mentions is to confront the students
with a problem, and then "ask how can we investigate this
problem?" Thelen claims that "any good problem can be in-
vestigated in a million ways. There is no reason why every-
body should do the same thing, so let them do what is in-
teresting to them. "107 According to Thelen, in generating
alternative methods for investigating this problem, the
students are exercising critical thinking.
The method of confrontation may be summarized as follows:
M.2 x is engaged in teaching y how to engagethinking if x is engaged in arresting y's
confronting y with
in critical
attention by
(1) a demonstration without explanation such that y isrequired to observe the demonstration carefully,
and x asks y "gap filling" questions that y answerssuch as "What has the demonstration shown?, What isthe evidence presented?," etc., or
.
,
106 Thelen
, "Materials That Promote Inquiry andThinking," p. 26.
107
,
h* Thelen, Materials That Promote Inquiry andThinking,", p. 26. T
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(2) overwhelming materials
required to sort outidea from them, or
or ideas such that y
categorize and abstrac
is
t an
( 3 ) a violation
required to
pattern, or
of y's
explain
expectations such that
this violation of the
y is
expected
( 4 ) a problem
method for
such that y is required
solving the problem.
to propose a
M ' 2 iS StatSd SU ° h that Helen's four ways to arrest
student attention by confrontation are each sufficient
conditions for teaching critical thinking. There are,
however, also difficulties with M.2. The methods Theien
groups as the method of confrontation
(2), ( 3 ) and (4), are not sufficient
critical thinking. Consider M.2 (1).
, specified
conditions
Observing
in M.2 (1),
for teaching
a demon-
stration, then answering what Theien calls "gap filling
questions" may involve creative thinking, but it does not
involve critical thinking. Critical thinking, according to
D.10, may occur only after we are given a statement of what
the demonstration has shown. This may then, for example,
be critically evaluated according to D.10 (1). However,
M.2 (1) simply involves creative thinking in terms of dis-
covering what the demonstration has shown, but does not
involve creative thinking. Therefore, M.2 (l) i s not a
sufficient condition for teaching critical thinking.
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Consider M.2 (2,. Sorting out, categorizing and abstracting
an idea from overwhelming materials or ideas may also
require that one discover a pattern, but this discovery re-
quires creative thinking, not critical thinking. Critical
thinking, according to D.lo, may occur only after we are
given a statement of the pattern. This may then, for
example, be critically evaluated according to D.lo ( 4 ).
However, M.2 (2, simply involves creative thinking in terms
of discovering the pattern in data, but not critical
thinking. Therefore, M.2 (2) is not a sufficient condition
for teaching critical thinking.
Consider M.2 (3). Explaining a violation of an expected
pattern also involves creative thinking, but does not involve
critical thinking. Critical thinking, according to D.10,
may occur only after we are given an explanation of this
violation. M.2 (3) simply involves creative thinking in
terms of explaining the violation of expectations, but not
critical thinking. Therefore M.2 (3) is not a sufficient
condition for teaching critical thinking.
Consider M.2 (4). Proposing a method to solve a problem also
requires creative thinking
,
but it does not involve critical
thinking. Critical thinking, according to D.10, may only
occur given a proposed solution to a problem. This may
then, for example, be critically evaluated according to
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(3) or (4). However, M.2 (4) simply involves creative
thinking in terms of proposing a method to solve a problem
but not critical thinking. Therefore, M.2 (4) is not a
sufficient condition for teaching critical thinking.
Like Mehl, Thelen also confused critical thinking with
creative thinking. Therefore, teaching by the method of
confrontation is not a sufficient condition for teaching
critical thinking. M.2 also fails as a method for
guaranteeing the teaching of critical thinking.
Rubin Gotesky also proposes
thinking that can be called
asks :
a method for teaching critical
the lecture method. 108 Gotesky
Can the ordinary classroom lecture be so organized thatit wiil stimuiate the student to ask "do conclusionsfollow directly from the evidence? if they do not, whatsort of evidence is needed? And where the arguments arenot conclusive and differences of opinion exist, what isthe real problem, issue or issues?
'
His answer is yes, the lecture can be used as a method to
teach critical thinking.
R. Gotesky, "The Lecture and Critical Thinking,"
Education Forum
,
No. 30 (Jan. 1966), pp . 179-187.
109
R. Gotesky, "The Lecture and Critical Thinking,"
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Gotesky lists three devices that make
First, the lecturer may present false
according to Gotesky,
up the lecture method,
information or data,
"To determine whether the student can detect theirpresence from true information in his possession Thnemployment of such false information oHata musi beSM ^ T™3 ° f • • • a > degreHf £-
c) irielevance
’ li091Cal con™ction, and
Secondly, the lecturer may present what he calls misleading
data. Misleading data, according to Gotesky,
"Is data that tends to arouse unjustified inferences inthe student. This can be done a) by surrounding suchata with emotion arousing expressions, b) byinsinuating
. conclusions not actually expressed, throuqhover emphasis upon such data, c) by stating such data' inambiguous language, and d) by failing to provide a clearmeaning for technical words or expressions which, leadthe student to derive conflicting conclusions.
Thirdly, the lecturer may present arguments drawing
irrelevant or contradictory conclusions.
However, simply presenting false information, misleading
data or drawing irrelevant or contradictory conclusions in
p.
110
R.
184 .
Gotesky
,
"The Lecture and Critical Thinking ,
"
p.
111
R.
186.
Gotesky "The Lecture and Critical Thinking ,
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a lecture does not insure
Gotesky also states that
teaching critical thinking.
he is doing?
6
He^ust 'kno^ex^M kn°W exactly whatdata, misleading da?a nr ?tly t0 USe false
over ... he must know exactl^how^?
0"0111 ?'10118 * More ~
logically related to his lecture
hls assignments are
exactly where in hiQ -i oo4. • • . he must know
_
rrelevant or implausible^onclusinns~r;rt1r2
It is intuitively clear that lectures embodying false infor-
mation or data, misleading data, or irrelevant or contra-
dictory conclusions may provide subject matter for the
pplication of critical thinking, according to D.10.
However, it is not clear that the lecture method described
Gotesky is a sufficient conditon for teaching critical
thinking. He requires that the teacher "place the student
the position to discover false or misleading information,
or irrelevant or implausible conclusions." 113 Yet such a
requirement is simply a requirement that the teacher teach
the student how to engage in critical thinking. This is
both a requirement for the proper use of the lecture method
and the proposed result of the lecture method. The lecture
112
R * Gotesky, "The Lecture and Critical Thinking,"
p. 187, my emphasis.
113 Quoted above, emphasis.
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method, therefore, is not a method for teaching critical
thinking at all since critical thinking ability is required
for its proper use. It is more usefully seen as a means of
testing for, or exercising critical thinking, once the
student is "placed in the position" Gotesky mentions.
Simply confronting the student with subject matter for the
application of critical thinking is not a sufficient con-
dition for teaching critical thinking skills. The question
IS not Simply "How can teachers place students in a
situation where if they know how to engage in critical
thinking, they would?" The question is "How can teachers
teach students how to engage in critical thinking?" Gotesky
has answered the first question but has failed to answer the
second. Therefore, Gotesky has not provided a method for
teaching critical thinking.
Gotesky 's and similar attempts to teach critical thinking
simply by teaching according to some method like M.l or M.2
tail because they fail to specify what is to be taught by
the method. It appears that for any such method to be
effective, a curriculum is required in order to specify
what is to be taught by the method. The curriculum,
therefore, appears to need careful specification before any
specification of method. This can be seen intuitively by
seeing that one must know what to teach before one can ask
for some method for how to teach it.
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Given the specification of some curriculum, the specifi-
cation of some method will then be determined according to
the definition of teaching and the specific curriculum to
be taught. A concern for providing a method without a con
cern for providing a curriculum is like a concern for pro-
viding transportation without a concern for providing a
destination. We must, therefore
curricula designed, when taught,
for teaching critical thinking.
consider the alternative
to be sufficient conditions
Proposed Curricula: Group Two
Several educators have attempted to answer the question
'How can critical thinking be taught?" by providing
curricula designed for teaching critical thinking. The
concern here is to provide material that, when taught to
students, is sufficient to teach them critical thinking.
H. A. Anderson proposes that specific material in English
instruction be used to teach critical thinking. 114 He cites
114
. H. A. Anderson, "Critical Thinking Through
Instruction in English," The English Journal, No. 36 (Feh
1947 )
, pp. 73-80
.
161
"three aspects or phases of the English
curricula
. . . which contribute effectively tQ teaching
critical thinking. -U5 The firsfc aspect ^ caUs
situations for communication." According to Anderson,
in'Lngua^e co^^fcItfon^nrieveLp^rcri^Lar^'61106
speak ina
l
?
.Provision for abundant opportunities for
meaningful sltua^s !'
'
*nd Writin? « normal.
Such "meaningful situations" occur, according to Anderson,
"only when the student 1) has something to say, 2) has a
reason for saying it, 3) has someone to whom to say it, and
4) has the facility for saying it." 117 These opportunities
for speaking, listening, reading and writing then make up
what Anderson calls "normal situations for communication."
The second aspect Anderson calls "the nature of language."
According to Anderson, teachers of English
115
H.
Instruction
A.
in
Anderson
,
English ,
"
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Instruction
A. Anderson,
in English,"
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A. Anderson,
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"Critical Thinking Through
p. 74.
"Critical Thinking Through
p. 74.
"Critical Thinking Through
p. 75 .
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"Attempt to
instruction
standing of
psychological
develop critical thinking through Enqlishby giving children
. . . a bettlr unler-
P^ocIssthJs
300131 institution and as a
According to Anderson, teaching language as a social insti-
tution and a psychological process involves teaching "the
nature and function of language as an instrument of
communication
. . u
. vocabulary ... how words get meaning,
and how experiences are attached to printed and spoken
1 1 9
symbols."
The third aspect Anderson calls "instruction in grammar."
According to Anderson, "grammar, properly taught, will im-
prove written and oral discourse and the ability to read and
i • i_ ,.120listen. He claims that "understanding principles of
word order of sentences, the functional relationships among
words, principles of modification of ideas, of the coordi-
nation and subordination of ideas in sentences
. . . will do
much to clarify thinking and expression.
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The curriculum for teaching critical thinking proposed by
Anderson can be more clearly seen as follows:
C.l * is
n
en9aged in teaching y how to engage in criticthinking if x is engaged in teaching
(1)
by giving y opportunities for speaking, listening,
reading, and writing such that y has something to
say
,
hear or read, and y has a reason for saying,hearing, or reading it, and y has some z to speakto or listen to, and y has the facility for
saying, listening and reading, or
(2)
to better understand language as a social
institution and as a psychological process; how
words get meaning and how experiences are attached
to printed or spoken symbols, or
(3)
the principles of word order, the functional
relationships among words in a sentence and the
principles of the modification or subordination of
ideas
.
C.l is stated such that teaching (1), (2) or (3) (Anderson's
three aspects of the English curriculum) is a sufficient
condition for teaching critical thinking. There are, how-
ever, difficulties with C.l. Teaching any or all of the
three aspects of the English curriculum Anderson cites is
not a sufficient condition for teaching critical thinking.
Consider C.l (1) . Suppose that in an English course,
Richard Nixon is saying to the class that he was hounded from
office by the press, is listening to Rabbi Buruch Korff
agree, is reading early James J. Kilpatrick columns, and is
writing his memoirs to establish his role in history as a
great moral leader. However, the teacher in teaching Nixon
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by giving him these opportunities for speaking, listening,
reading, and writing is certainly not engaged in teaching
Nixon how to engage in critical thinking; at most he is
giving him the opportunity to exercise his delusions.
Therefore, c.l ( 1 ) is not a sufficient condition for
teaching critical thinking.
Consider C.l (2). Again, suppose that the English teacher
teaches Nixon to better understand language as a social
institution and as a psychological process, how words get
meaning and how experiences are attached to printed and
spoken symbols. Suppose that Nixon then provides an account
m his memoirs showing how the language used by his
enemies affected public opinion concerning his guilt,
showing how the language used by his enemies showed an
obsession with his impeachment, and that he provides an
etymology of 'crook' and argues that 'Nixon' and 'crook'
have different linguistic sources and functions and that
Nixon' is not 'crook'. The teacher engaged in teaching
Nixon to better understand language as a social institution
and as a psychological process, how words get meaning and
how experiences are attached to printed and spoken symbols,
is certainly not engaged in teaching Nixon how to engage in
critical thinking. Therefore, C.l (2) is not a sufficient
condition for teaching critical thinking.
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Consider C.l ( 3 ). Suppose that Rabbi Rorff ^
Nixon apply the principles of word order, the functional
relationships among words in a sentence and ^ principles
edification or subordination of ideas taught by the
glish teacher. Nixon applies these principles while
writing the section of his memoirs tracing his development
a great moral leader. The teacher engaged in teaching
Nixon these principles is certainly not engaged in teaching
Nixon how to engage in critical thinking. Therefore, C.l
(3) is not a sufficient condition for teaching critical
thinking. Therefore, Anderson has not cited aspects of an
English curriculum which, when taught, are sufficient for
teaching critical thinking.
Earl Murry proposes that specific material
matics curriculum be used to teach critical
flurry's concern is to use a basic geometry
critical thinking by teaching what he calls
assumptions." According to Murry,
from a mathe-
thinking
.
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Murry announced goal in teacMng criticai
^teaching what he calls
"conflicting assumptions" are first,
to teach students to select underlying assumptions, and
secondly
, to determine their consistency with a particular
conclusion.
Ke offers the study of parallel lines in geometry as an ex-
ample of "conflicting assumptions." Murry presents what he
calls "the assumptions" that Euclid, Riemann and Lobachevsky
made about parallel lines. He claims that Euclid assumed
that thr°U9h a giVen polnt
' line could be drawn parallel
to a given line, that Riemann assumed that through a given
point, no line could be drawn parallel to a given line,
and that Lobachevsky assumed that through a given point, two
lines could be drawn parallel to a given line. 125 Murry
then claims that from thesp "mnf icn e conflicting assumptions," one
derives contradictory concl n<;i nnc r>y conclus o s. For example, in Euclidean
g ometry, the sum of the angles of a triangle equals 180°,
while in Riemannian geometry, the sum of the angles is more
than 180°
, and in Lobachevskian geometry, the sum of the
angles is less than 180°. According to Murry,
124 ^E. Murry, "Conflicting Assumptions," p 61
125 ^E. Murry, "Conflicting Assumptions," p. 58.
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conflicting concisions
C°n“ 1Ctln9 assumptions lead to
the study is to notice that- Ahi
e
.
greatest outgrowth of
leads us to entirely diff^n^ ? °Ur assumPti°"a
no prrnr < „ • 1
aitte7ent conclusions even thouqh
conclusions are de" °f !;hinkill9- In other words, our
conclusion can h^
PS nt UP°n °Ur ass^ptions and no
upon which it is based
m
°126rellable than the assumption
Murry then considers the "use of assumptions in everyday
life." Students are asked to determine the assumptions
underlying their behavior of walking or running in the
halls, obeying or disobeying traffic laws, etc.
Given this discussion, Murry seems to mean by 'assumption*
anything from 'suppressed premise in an argument using
ordinary language’ to 'hypothesis or axiom in mathematics'.
Given this looseness and flexibility in the use of
'assumption', Murry seems to be making a fairly safe point;
that two deductively valid arguments can reach either
contrary or contradictory conclusions, and that this can be
explained by the choice of the premises, not by the rules
of valid inference.
The curriculum for teaching critical thinking proposed by
Murry can be more clearly seen as follows:
126 E. Murry "Conflicting Assumptions," p. 58.
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C.2 is stated such that teaching
( 1 ) or (2) is a sufficient
condition for teaching critical thinking. There are,
however, difficulties with C.2. Teaching (1) or (2) is not
a sufficient condition for teaching critical thinking.
Consider c.2 ( 1 ). The role of critioal thinking ig ^
simply to recognize and to state such underlying assumptions,
but to evaluate them, in hopes of determining, according to
(1) through (5) b) of D.10, if the statement or the
assumption is true. Again, we may recognize and state under-
lying assumptions by lucky guess, intuition, or some method
discovery. The application of critical thinking to
underlying assumptions, however, is not simply their dis-
covery or statement, but also their evaluation. C.2 (1),
therefore, seems to involve y in methods of discovery but
not necessarily in methods of evaluation. Therefore, C.2
(1) is not a sufficient condition for teaching critical
thinking
.
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Consider C.2
,2). A proposition is logically consistent
wrth a proposition or set of propositions iff their con-
junctron is not a contradiction. However, c.2 (2) simply
says that if x is engaged in teaching y to determine if a
given assumption is consistent with a given conclusion, then
X is engaged in teaching y how to engage in critical
thinking. This, like C.2 (1), win not do without
modification. For example, x will satisfy this condition
by teaching y that when a spinning Coke bottle points East,
the propositions under consideration are contradictory,
otherwise not. In this case, however, it cannot be said
that x is engaged in teaching y how to engage in critical
thinking. Therefore C.2 (2), as it stands, is not a
sufficient condition for teaching critical thinking.
Therefore, Murry has not cited aspects of a mathematics
curriculum which, when taught, are sufficient for teaching
critical thinking.
These and similar attempts to specify a curriculum which,
when taught, provides a sufficient condition for teaching
critical thinking fail because they fail to provide a
sufficient condition for teaching critical thinking.
However, (1), (2), (3), (4) and (5), or any combination of
(1 )
t
(2) , (3)
,
(4) and (5) of D.10 can be seen to provide a
curriculum which, when taught, is a sufficient condition
for teaching critical thinking. Since, given the disjuncts
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C.3 provides an answer to the question "How can critical
thinking be taught?" by providing sufficient conditions for
teaching critical thinking. However, c.3 has two serious
educational defects for educators interested in teaching
critical thinking. First, C.2 does not limit critical
thinking to correct critical thinking. Secondly, c.3 does
not limit teaching to successful teaching. The
educationally interesting form of the question "How can
critical thinking be taught?" is, therefore, "How can
—
rrect criti
-cal thinking be successfully taught?"
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The Answer
: a Curricula and the Question of Method
«e may begin edification of c. 3 to answer this education-
ally interesting for™ of the guestion by noting that given
we know what it is to engage correctly in critical
thinking to degree N. Furthermore, given the second dis-
Duncts of D . 20 and 0.21, we know what it rs to engage in
successfully teaching that, and know what it is to engage
in successfully teaching how. Gi ven 0.23, we know what it
is to engage successfully in teaching how to engage
correctly in critical thinking, and given D.24, we know this
in terms of the specific abilities necessary and sufficient
for having the ability to engage correctly in critical
thinking. I have argued that these specific abilities can
be taught because we, in fact, succeed in teaching them.
We may, therefore, simply cite D.24 as the curriculum for
successfully teaching correct critical thinking.
D.24 is not a complete answer to the question "How can
correct critical thinking be successfully taught?" a
recalcitrant educator may ask, given D.24, "How can (1),
(2), (3), (4) and (5) be successfully taught?" The answer
to this question can be given by listing what is to be
taught, according to the second disjunct of D.20 and the
second disjunct of D.21, in (1), (3), (3), (4) and (5).
The answer, then, is "by successfully teaching these
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specific propositions, and by successfully teaching these
specific skills." This can be 5een
,
in detaU
_
^ f
C.4 x is engaged in successfully teachinn v v,~TT .
correctly in critical thinking to degrL N atV??Tis engaged in successfully teaching y
t t if x
(1) that arguments consist of statements calledpremises and statements called conclusions thatstatements have a logical form; that logical
sit?o° °an be caPtured in PC by prooo-
.
etters and logical connectives; thatcapturing the logical form of statements is called
intS
S
a
a
fornal
h
l
Statement
.
f ordinary language
- m anguage, either PC or LPC
• that a
both" tha^
ement iS either true ^ and not
that' the i
prop°sltlon letters are used univocally-logical connectives are •
,
v % 3 = Yand are derivable from just % and •; that the
'
logical connectives can, in turn, be defined con-textually by truth tables; that truth tables canalso be used to define ’logical equivalence’,
contradiction’ and ’tautology’; and the logicalform of statements can be captured in LPC withpredicate constants, quantifiers successfully
representing all, some, and none, 126 the logical
rnnqf
Ct
f
VeS
' ^ relation constants; the predicateco stants replace predicates like red, old, bald,etc.; that universal quantifiers are defined interms of domain D and conjunction (•), and that
existential quantifiers are defined in terms ofdomain D and disjunction (v)
;
that relation con-
stants replace relations like between, to the left
of, is identical with, etc.; that relations may be
symmetrical, asymmetrical, transitive, intransitive
reflexive, irreflexive or totally reflexive; thatidentity is a special kind of relation; thatidentity is transitive, symmetrical, and totally
reflexive; that identity allows us to capture thelogical form of statements including "exceptive"
statements, "at most" statements, "no more than"
126 ManY logicians before Frege had unsuccessfully
attempted to represent all, some, and none. However, not
until Frege published the Begrif f s schr if
t
(Concept
Ideography) was an attempt provably successful.
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Universal and existential guanas
any (by teaching y) all other propositions
necessary to teach these propositions,
int0
h
pc £ t^n^nte ordinary language statementso PC or LPC, and how to perform deductive
operations according to PC and LPC rules- todegree n
,
or
'
that an inductive argument is not a deductive
argument or an enthymeme; that inductive argumentsare strong or weak; that a strong inductive argu-ment is an inductive argument in which the con-clusion follows from the premises such that it isnot probable that the conclusion is false and thepremises are true; that a weak inductive argumentis an inductive argument in which the conclusionfollows from the premises such that it is notprobable that the conclusion is true while thepremises are true; that the premises of a strong in-ductive
. argument provide inductive support for the
conclusion; that the elucidation of rules of in-ductive support is distinct from the justification
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? ?“6rnatiVe interpretations of
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classical hi
are interpretations called a), b) empirical, c) logical, d) sub-jectivist, and e) epistemological; that theprobability calculus can be developed to apply tostatements, arguments or properties; that the
Y
probability calculus states how the probability ofa comp! ex statement is related to the probabilityof its simple constituent statements, that theproblem of determining the probability of simplestatements is not solved by the probability
valn^nf' ^ problem of determining the truth
T pJ
e ° f
.
S1™ple statements is not solved by PC or
k
lf 3 statement is a tautology, then itsprobability = 1; that if a statement is a contra-diction, then its probability = 0, that if two
statements are logically equivalent, then they havethe same probability; that P p) = 1 - p (p) .that P (pvq) = P (p) + P (q) _ P (p . q); th^ t
'
con _ditional probability, P (q given p) = P (q • p) :P (p)
;
that the rules of inductive logic are the
rules that assign probabilities to conclusions
;
that the probability of a conclusion, given thepremises and all relevant available knowledge is a
conditional probability of the form P (conclusion
given premises • K) which may be calculated P(premises • k • conclusion) t p (premises • K)
;
that rules of inductive logic may be formulated to
assign statement probabilities, and then proba-
kility calculus rules may be used to calculate the
conditional probabilities of inductively reached
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178
statement
^s^n^no^occur^eferentially 1 ! “ ?statement formed by embedH
i
n c
' 1 ly a lon9er
context such as 'is aware ^hat' “he P
s ychol °9ical
;say s that ’
,
;
knows t£at
, "doubL tha^tc^ ’
'
s;;s ««
principle of charitv to r a
12™ lves applying the
valid where possible, to clarifv
e
the
tlVe arguments
extension rae 4- , ty meaning and
“:ruLV:frmL™s retren"ie 't to proviie
confusions, to eliminate the improper^agueness"
construal of a given statement or set of state-ments consistent with the author's expressed orimplied views must be provided before conceptually
v ded tH
nt
°P ticis” "ay occur; that once pro
Y
/ hls Plausible interpretation is open to
allv
e
sian!fY
significant criticism; that conceptu-y g i icant criticism involves arguing that a
c!frif!Id
ly
t
V
;
Ud arg“ is unsound and ?hatla ie statements are false; and
all other propositions necessary to teach these,
how to capture the logical form(s) of a statement-ow to recognize the
. extensions and intensions of'terms; how to recognize the equivocal uses ofterms; how to recognize use-mention confusions-how to recognize the improper vagueness or the'ambiguity of terms; how to recognize an author's
expressed or implied views; how to provideplausible interpretations by applying theprinciple of charity, how to provide conceptually
significant criticism; to degree n, or
(3)
^
hat to
. clarify statements using unclear terms,
e mitions, analyses, or explications can be pro-
viced for such terms; that definition is not
explication; that it is claimed that there are
many types of definitions such as lexical, stipu-
ative and contextual; that there are philosophical
problems about the nature of definition; that the
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clearly exhibits the logical form of the statement.
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C.4, then, exhaustively answers the question "How can
correct critical thinking be successfully taught?" by pro-
viding the specific propositions and the specific skills
which, when successfully taught to degree n, are sufficient
to teach correct critical thinking to degree N. The degree
N of critical thinking is, again, like in D.ll, a function
Of the degree n of each of m m m t a \
' u > ' (3) r (4 ) and (5)
,
or
any combinations.
However, suppose that the recalcitrant educator insists on
pursuing the first form of the question "How can critical
thinking be taught?" and demands to be provided with some
method for successfully teaching C.4 ( 1 ), (2)
, ( 3 )
,
( 4 ) and
(5) . To be provided with some such method is to be provided
185
wxth a method that satisfies the second disjunct of D.20,
the definition for engaging in successfully teaching that,
and that satisfies the second disjunct of D.21, the
definition for engaging in successfully teaching how.
First, consider the second disjunct of D.20. To satisfy
this disjunct, any M must- rro+- „y i* st get y to come to believe that x
believes that 0 at t; y to come to believe that 0 at t+1;
y to come to believe that x believes x is justified in
believing that 0 at t; and y to come to believe that y is
lustified in believing that 0 at t+1. Secondly, consider
the second disjunct of D.21. To satisfy this disjunct, any
ethod must allow x to provide a model for y to 0 between t-1
and t+1, where x provides a model for y to 0 iff x intends
or some z intends that x make evident the applications of
the rules according to which someone can do 0 , and the
hod must get y to 0 at t+1. Any method must satisfy
these disjuncts, otherwise it cannot be said to contribute
to successful teaching.
However, the choice of a method to satisfy these disjuncts
will depend on at least five contingent factors. The first
factor is the personality and individual strengths of the
teacher. For example, some teachers are patient, outgoing,
and good at asking leading questions, while other teachers
186
are more
-tolerant, reserved, gCod at lecturing and good
at answering questions. The second factor is the size and
length of the class. For example
, asking leading questions
may work well m a small class with sufficient time, but
work poorly in a filled lecture hall with insufficient time
The third factor is the background and ability of the
students. For example, lecturing and answering questions
may work well for a class with bright students with a
sufficient background who are unafraid to ask question,
however, it may not work well for slower students without
sufficient background who are afraid to ask questions.
The fourth factor is the degree n to which c.4 (1), (2),
(3), (4) and (5) are to be successfully taught. This
determines the degree N to which correct critical thinking
is to be successfully taught, and by D.12, determine the
degree N of critical intelligence to be taught. For
example, one may expect successfully to teach second
graders correct critical thinking by successfully teaching
some of C.4 (5) to degree n, yet this will be a very low
degree N of critical thinking. One may approach college
freshmen with the expectation of successfully teaching
all of C.4 to degree n, and this will be a much higher
degree N of critical thinking, and a correspondingly higher
degree N of critical intelligence. Of course, we may also
modi 1 y C.4 itself to add more advanced skills such as modal
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- the
— <* degree n of critical
" lng ln the SCOpe ° f the proposed curriculum
.
)
such alternative curricula also affect the
^gree N to which critical intelligence is taught.
The fifth factor is the particular combination of the firstfour factors that obtains 128 v
• For example, an intolerant
eacher good at lecturing with a large class of bright
students may adopt a different method than a patient teacher
asking leading questions with a small class of slow
students, even though both teachers are teaching the same
curriculum, for example, C.4. They may also be said to be
teaching
,1,
, ( 2 ) , (3)
, ,4) and <5, of c.4 to a different
9 n. Therefore, given these five contingent variable
factors
, it is unfruitful to provide a single method for
successfully teaching C.4 (1) (?) (?) ni\y 1 } '
' (3)
' (4) and (5): there
simply is no Single method. In the absence of a particular
set of these five factors, it must be sufficient to show
that to be successful, any such method must satisfy the
second disjunct of D.20 and the second disjunct of D.21.
combinations^of^hese^fac tors
aPP
Ho
r t0 be ^ possible
sub-factors under ^
.
°
*
.
wever / there are many
the combinations of
C
these sub
factors I mention, and
into account Lt nJ thro ^ ? rS mUSt also be taken
these sub-factors under t? n5 represent the number of
combinations of these fartnr°
rS through 5. The possible
n4 t n5 ) <5 + Si & + n J t n2 + " 3
• A large number!
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with the question "How can correct critical thinking be
successfully taught?" answered in terms of C.4 and the
second disjuncts of D.20 and D.21, „e have answered the
q tion How can critical intelligence be taught?" We are
now in a position to provide a model for successfully
teaching correct critical thinking, and thereby for success-
fully teaching critical intelligence, as an appendix.
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APPENDIX
a MODEL FOR TEACHING CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE
Applying D.21, x successfully engages in teaching y how to
teach critical intelligence by successfully engaging in
teaching y how to teach correct critical thinking. To do
this, according to the second disjunct of D.21, is
, among
other things, to provide a model for y successfully to teach
correct critical thinking. m this Appendix, I shall pro-
vide such a model designed to teach y how to teach correct
critical thinking in terms of C.4, the successful teaching
of which is a sufficient condition for the successful
teaching of critical thinking. As I have shown, this model
must not only satisfy the second disjunct of D.20 and D.21
but must also specify a specific context in terms of at
lease five contingent factors which in turn may help
determine a method for successfully teaching correct
critical thinking.
In Part I, I shall specify and discuss five particular con-
tingent factors to provide a specific context for this
model and to provide a method for teaching C.4. To do so
,
I
shall critically consider a model presented by Matthew
Lipman designed to teach y how to teach what Lipman calls
"philosophical thinking." i shall first consider the goals
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Of the curriculum Lipman provides and argue ttat
txPma„. s curriculum may
, Uke C 4; ^ sufficient tQ^
correct; critical thinking, there nQ
between engaging in philosophy and engaging in correct
critical thinking
. ! shall conclude that critical thinking
may m°re Pr°Perly be « - interdisciplinary
activity that need not be bound to any particular subject.
I Shall secondly consider the method Lipman provides tQ
teach what he calls
"philosophical thinking." i sha ll
argue that Lipman confuses the consequences of initiating
teaching from information or interests familiar to students
with the consequences of initiating teaching from a limited
point of view, and that initiating teaching from information
or interests familiar to a student is not a sufficient con-
dition for developing harmful pedagogical consequences.
I shall conclude that Lipman does not offer a convincing
pedagogical reason to reject the method of initiating
teaching from information or interests familiar to students.
I shall thirdly draw two consequences from this consider-
ation of Lipman 's model that are important for the specifi-
cation of the model I shall provide for teaching y how to
teach correct critical thinking. First, I shall argue that
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eachmg correct critical thinking as a ourriculum UkeC.4 need not be bound to one subject; its teaching can be
accompiished by considering aiternative subjects to fit
particular educational situations. ! shall specify such a
sublet and such an educational situation in terms of
factors 1, 2, and 3. Secondly, I shall argue that teaching
correct critical thinking, as defined in D.ll, need not be
tound by any one particular curriculum like Lipman
' s or
like c. 4 to any one particular range of degree N of correct
critical thinking. Given C 4 Ty 0. , I shall specify the range of
degree N and in turn specify factors 4 and 5
.
I shall fourthly point out that the model I shall provide
will satisfy the second disjuncts of D.20 and D.21; it will
satisfy D.20 by presenting and justifying material, and it
will satisfy D.21 by presenting models and student-involving
exercises
.
Given this particular educational context, specified in
Part I, I shall then clearly specify this model in Part
II. First I shall state a) the nature of the model, b) the
curriculum of the model, c) the method of initiating
teaching in the model, d) the subject for critical thinking
in the model, and e) the specific organization of the model.
Regarding a), I shall distinguish a textbook to be read by
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students from an instructional model to be followed by
teachers
. X shall note that the latter i s sufficient for
"y PUrPOS6S here
- Warding b)
, I shall refer to c 4 a
curriculum the teaching of which is suffrcient to teach
correct critical thinking. Heading c,
,
x shall point out
the benefits of adopting the method of initiating teaching
from information or interests familiar to students for this
instructional model. X shall explain the method in terms of
presenting the material, presenting models, and presenting
student-involving exercises. Regarding d)
, x shall provide
a bibliography of pseudo-scientific works offering
planations of various phenomena which are to be the
subjects for critical thinking in the model. Regarding e)
,
I shall explain the division of this instructional model
into five sections.
Secondly, i shall present the instructional model for the
development of critical intelligence outlined as follows:
Introduction: Arguments and Their Evaluation
Section One: Deductive Arguments and Their Evaluation
Section Two: Inductive Arguments and Their Evaluation
Section Three: Clarifying Arguments
Section Four: Providing Arguments
Section Five: Informal Fallacies In Arguments
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PART I
A CONTEXT FOR THE MODEL
“P“" “
•“»»»*« *»
“ t”'h *1“'“ " h“
Lipman
, the Director for 4-w_ T .xj_cuL r the Institute 3tor the Advancement
° f Phil°SOPhy f°r Chilare
"' has written a book, Harry
designed as a basic teachrng
resource to develop
•philosophical thinking- among 5th and
6th grade student q 129 Ta s. In a review, Gerald L. Gutek
describes HarryL_stott iemeier s Discovery as
ELrchaptL^eporC'a^IscuL^ttat^0^ Chaptersamong a groun of sion that takes place
character ^H^rfstotU^"9^ fhi? f .
never abstr^ot er * • • the book is
,
1 d^ ac and never pedantirbrings philosonh i na l +.W,- i • m: c * Each discussion
and ethical°concerns S^hSd^SV**
Montclair! S
r
!°ntclai t ^ate College (Upper
Marga^f P™‘>-
_scov|7^, same publisher, lgfe i^shall fHi'Re reference
130 Gerald L.
School
: A Growing
1976)
.
Gutek, "Philosophy in the Elementary
Movement?," Phi Delta Kappan (April
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Gutek also states its objective in the elementary school
curriculum and points to the nature of
"philosophical
thinking." He claims that
Ibout°h?V tternptS are made toa out history, mathematics scsubjects little in the child'
to the
"ature and Process
thinking of others
examining thinking andP ilosophical tools of ethics
teach children to thinklence, and many other
s education introduces
of his own thinking and
• the most efficacious
valuing is to use the
end logic. "131
Lipman's curriculum can be construed as attempting to teach
critical thinking by attempting to teach what he calls
"philosophical thinking."
That Lipman is concerned to provide a curriculum to teach
critical thinking can be seen by considering his discussion
°f "Philosophical thinking" in the Ins tructional Man „ a1
Critical thinking
IS a component of what he calls "philosophical thinking."
He states that
"A course in philosophical thinking, whether forchildren or for adults, can never be guilty of servinoas a means for implanting the teachers values in theuncritical minds of the children in the class-room
. . . when students have reached a point in the
School
:
1976)
.
Gerald L. Gutek,
A Growing Movemen
"Philosophy in the Elementary
t? '" Phi Delta Kappan
, (April
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development of their nvu, , , .they can deal objectively wihh^ 11^68 SUch thatwithout feeling coerced hv Jh the teacher's opinionsdesire to know what the teacher’/^' l£ the studen tsharm would likely result fro™ f opinion is, no greathe thinks. -132 Y “ m hls explaining just what
Furthermore, the development of critical reasoning
abilities, as a component of philosophical thinking, i
necessary component. According to Lipman,
s a
"Indeed, it is only by mastering .
explorati
°°nStitute the backbone°of
S
our
Stottlemeier^s Raptors of
th^r^phiiosopTn^mthiHking?h^! can master
This development of a critical mind through the development
Of critical reasoning abilities as the "backbone of
Philosophical thinking" is provided for in Lipman 's
curriculum by at least five of the six specific goals listed
for this course in philosophical thinking. He lists these
goals as
"The improvement of
perceptual influence
reasoning abilities, including
s, logical inference from evidence,
132 Gerald L.
School : A Growing
1976)
, pp. 3-4
.
Gutek, "Philosophy in the Elementary
Movement?," Phi Delta Kappan (April
Gerald L. Gutek, "Philosophy in
nn^??l : ^ Growing Movement?," Phi Delta1976), p. l.
the Elementary
Kappan (April
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the ability to di
consistency
, the feasibili^f
rn
?
tiVes
' lmPartiality
" “ '**"
“• of «... tl„ „ .these abilities is a suff< .
haV1" 9
abilt
condition for having theili y to engage corrpof! •9 meetly m critical thinking.
However, while critic 4. 1, • , .
Li ,
ln lng 1S a necessary component of
*— «**«-~ - ««« jl.
abllltleS are native thinking abilities
a llities to recognize distinctively philosophical
Problems. Lipman argues that
develop his logical^h^?*^ 1196 (the student ) to
development is certainly^ecessary alR
h
?
U
?
h SUCh(m philosophical thinkina) ^ c But hls growth
stimulating his invent-*, 9 1 dePends upon9 n inventiveness and creativity. "135
1
3
4
School: A Growing Movement in the EleI"entary19 ’6), pp. 4, 6. yhe (Aprilto 11. j shall grant that c, 1 T • provided from pages 6these abilities and being able io™
3 " describes them/having
is a sufficient condition for ha,H ln them c°rrectlycorrectly in cri?icarthLkSg!
,aVin9 the abilit1, to “gage
Gerald L.
School
: A Growing
1976)
, p. 5
Gutek
,
Movemen
"Philosophy in
t?
,
" Phi Delta
the Elementary
Kappan (April
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Lipman is also concerned to
distinctively philosophical
children's own concerns.
teach an ability
problems as they
to recognize
arise among the
nature of the mind and ideas^ the
1 problem of the
analysis in examining definitions
ds\ lan9uageactivities; they deal wi f ob 9 ects anddegree ; they disentangle fact ferences of kind and(moral) problems that arife from°th°?:lni0n by Piningpolitics, race, and civil h n? thair own idea a of
of inquiry. 136 ghts; they explore methods
Therefore, while
"philosophical thinking" as described by
lipman includes critical thinking as a necessary component
"philosophical thinking" is not the same as critical
thinking. Granting that teaching
"philosophical thinking"
is a sufficient condition for teaching critical thinking,
teaching critical thinking is not a sufficient condition
for teaching
"philosophical thinking" as described by
Lipman
.
Indeed, there is a pedagogical danger in confusing
"Philosophical thinking" with critical thinking. Both
136 Gerald L.
School
: A Growing
Guteck, "
Movement?
Philosophy in the Elementary
'
" phi Delta Kappan (April 1976).
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Lipman and Clyde Evans come dangerously close to teaching
that critical thinking is the unique province of
philosophy. 137 For example, Lipman talks about "philo-
sophical thinking" and Evans talks about "the philosophical
method," seemingly implying that critical thinking and
creative thinking as components of "philosophical thinking"
and "the philosophical method" are the unique province of
philosophy, and uniquely applied to philosophical problems.
The pedagogical danger is that students will fail to see
the relation of critical thinking, or creative thinking as
basic reasoning skills to other academic disciplines and
to problems that are not philosophical problems.
Critical thinking is not an activity that is unique to any
one academic discipline or professional field, but is an
activity that cuts across many academic disciplines,
professional fields and everyday concerns. There is no
necessary connection between engaging in philosophy and
engaging in correct critical thinking. Artists, physicists,
political scientists, sociologists, historians,
psychologists, mathematicians, clerks, physicians, and
philosophers each may be called upon to engage in some
137 See Clyde Evans, "Philosophy With Children: Some
Experiences and Some Reflections," Metaphilosophy, Vol . 7,
No. 1 (Jan. 1976)
, pp. 53-69.
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degree N of critical thinking^
arguments relevant to their respective fields
. Nor
critical thinking limited o, uy to such narrowly conceived
professional concerns. Consumers, advertisers
voters, politicians, pta members, boards of education
members
, husbands, wives and children each may also be
called upon to engage in some degree N of critical thinking
when evaluating particular arguments. xt is in this sense,
then, that critical thinking may be said to be an
interdisciplinary activity.
Lipman also provides a basis for his method to teach
Philosophical thinking that we may consider as a possible
basis for a method to teach critical thinking. Lipman
states that
We should begin with the large outlir
wS fK
gf
adually move towards specializecith large brushstrokes, and then pair
s of a subject,
areas
. Begin., _
in details.
"
1JJ
By subject he seems to mean "academic discipline". For
example, he mentions history, economics, and sociology.
138 n . . .
, .
Certainly the same could be said for creative
have^^i
*Iowever
' the concern here is limited to what Ive called critical thinking.
139
Ma t thew Lipman, Instruction Manual to AccomoanvHarry Stottlemeier 1 s Pisc^Tery
, p. 1=17
210
Furthermore, he argues that
We ve been told that we should start with what isfamiliar to the child and then work outwards to larqerframes of reference, from himself to his family, to'the community in which he lives, to his state, his
nation and the world. There is much to recommend inthis method - teaching should begin where the childis, the only question is, where the devil is he? Onthe other hand, what is chiefly wrong with the method
is that it gives him an egocentric perspective which
^ or reeducation may not be able to overcome. " -^-4 0
Lipman seems to argue, given that we know what is familiar
to, or of interest to a child, that if we begin our teaching
from this point, then it follows that this will develop in
the child a harmful egocentric perspective. Therefore, we
must not begin teaching from information or interests
familiar to a child, but instead, begin with the large out-
lines of a subject, and gradually move toward specialized
areas
.
Lipman argues that
"We stress American history, then European history,
then World history. Maybe not in that order, but
the emphasis is clear enough throughout in our point
of view. We seldom ask what the British point of view
is regarding the American Revolution, or the Japanese
point of view in World War II, etc. But every history
is a history from some perspective, and we cannot
Matthew Lipman, Instruction Manual to Accompany
Harry Stott lemeier 1 s Discovery, p. 1-1.
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true
r
and on^y^erspective^ithojf °UrS iS thehis growing up a bigot. " 141 ° runnmg the risk
However, Lipman seems to confuse the consequences of
initiating teaching from information or
to a child with the consequences of initiate t „ •-miniating eaching
r°m a limited Point of view. Clearly th, ese have distinct
consequences
.
initiating teaching from information or interests familiar
to a child is not a sufficient condition for developing
what Lipman calls a
.'harmful egocentric perspective.'. This
does not necessarily result in teaching from a limited point
of view.
Consider Lipman
' s example of teaching history, suppose that
we initiate the teaching of history by eliciting a child's
own family history. This is certainly familiar to the
child. We may then compare one child's family history
with another child's family history, and note relationships
among families; for example, that the two children are
friends. However, we may also immediately teach that a
history of a family is a history from a given point of view.
L
f
pman
' Instruction Manual to AccomoanvHarry Stottlemeier 1 s Discovery
, p. l-i. y
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For example, we might ask a child if h
friend- the „
6Ver f°Ught with his
the f 'h
^ hlS friSnd ' S br°ther ' S — tion to
eto
"
^ a" What WaS WS br°ther ' S action,c. We migh t thereby elicit it'ernative accounts of the
ZT'r- -* « ... ....
h .
y l09/
' t0 dlSCUSS Ameri«a. European, or World1T fr°m aUernatiTO— - yet we initiate our-hang frora information ^
^ ^^e ore, initiating our teaching from this point of view
°es not result in teaching frora a Uraited point Qf^
This approach may also introduce the child to other points
°f V1SW re93rding hiS personal history, and, therefore
wni not necessarily develop in the child what Lipman calls
"a harmful egocentric perspective,. Therefore, initiating
teaching from information or interests familiar to a student
rs neither the same as teaching from a limited point of
sufficient condition for developing this harmful
egocentric perspective. Therefore, Lipman does not provide
a convincing reason to reject the method of initiating
teaching from information or interests familiar to students
and to adopt the method in initiating teaching from the
large outlines of a subject.
This consideration of Lipman
• s model for teaching "philo-
sophical thinking" has shown first, that critical thinking
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is not the exclusive concern of „O any one subiectf°r th- reason, be said tQ ,
-tivity, and second, that th
fr°m information or interests
^ teachln9
—
- P-gogically obj t
^^ «“*
-n, allows us to draw tw imp ^
^ *»
x Portant consequences for *-umodel I ch^i • M s t theJ- snail provide fnr , .
The first consequence is that u-
thinkin
09 COrreCt ^tica!
sub .
9 " 3 CUrri°UlUm UkS C ' 4
— *»t be bound to one3 3SCt
' bUt C°Uld
-—- by considering
alternative sublets to fit a particular
is ITwT
" Way SUCCeS3fUUy t0 teaCh—
-king
.
.
Y that 91VeS the Student something to think
critically about mu,-y r . This way to teach critical v
j_i- _ thinking mav,0rS
' aPPeal t0 “">* Alternative subjects. There is
no need to limit the subject to philosophy since criticalhmking is not a uniauelv • n , .q y philosophical tool." The
second consequence is at we "Ay adopt the method of
initiating the teaching of critical thinking from infor-
mation or interests familiar to students and still avoid
pedagogically objectionable results and in e, , therefore, we may
C °°Se any SUbjeCt that Of interest or familiar to
students to initiate teaching correct critical thinking.
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or example
,
given these two consequences, c><^ ^taught by using the subject of the naturai sciences ^ a
subject that gives the students something to thin*
critically about, given a group of students interested in
” famUiar Wlth thS sciences
. Or c.4 should be
'
taught by using the subjects of philosophy, sociology,
psychology, history, or mathematics, as subjects that givethe students something to thin* critically about, given agroup of students interested in cin or familiar with philosophy,
sociology, psychology, history , or mathematics. Or c 4
could also be taught by using more general subject matter,
for e. .ample
, the subject of popular explanations of
UFO’s, ship and plane disappearances, and faith healers as
a subject that gives the students something to think
critically about, given a group of students intersted in
or familiar with such popular explanations. 142
These consequences also allow us to state grounds for the
selection of a subject for students to think critically
about, by stating grounds for selecting a subject that is
familiar or of interest to students who are to be taught
C.4. It is pedagogically desirable to select a subject
142
,
.
.
this period of historv, such pooular Pvnb-
Charles Berlftl’^heY0"^6"
'
5 Chariot gf the G^ds ?
Bgpnd Earth: _MajTT cg^ac? WithTo T^ulTer •TVS™
'
S
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that is familiar or of interest to students ^^
cnticaHy about because in teaching c.4, one must
teaching critical thinking, and not focus simply
on teaching a particular subject which students are to think
critically about. Por example, in using the subjects of
the natural sciences, philosophy, sociology, psychology,
history, mathematics or popular explanations as subjects
that give the students something to think critically
about, one is not focusing on teaching these subjects.
Students, then, will not be faced with difficult subject
matter that is either uninteresting to them or new to them
and will instead simply be faced with a curriculum like
C.4 and some familiar subject matter that they may begin
to think critically about.
Therefore, the choice of a subject to think critically
about and thereby to present C.4, depends upon the
students major fields of interest or familiarity. This is
often easier to determine at the college level than at the
elementary level. Therefore, for the purposes of this
model, I shall stipulate that the students are interested in
the natural sciences and at least vaguely familiar with
current popular pseudo-scientific explanations of various
phenomenon
.
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now m a position to stipulate the first
factor to further specifv th
contingent
y ® COntext for this model
: thePersonality and Aground of the teacher. The model issigned for college level students with some interest in
natural sciences. Therefore
. t
0
' the teacher must have thebackground and ability to «y 0 success fully teach them correct
critical thinking in terms of c.4, given the subject of
current popular pseudo-scientific explanations of various
phenomena to think
Y about, and given the student's
interest in the natural sciences For in. the purpose of this
model, it is desirable that- t-h^ 4- ,at the teacher know some natural
science, and have worked through (in terms of c 4) the
current popular pseudo-scientific explanations of various
Phenomena which are to be the subject for critical thinking
t urthermore
,
given C.4, it is desirable that the teacher
Know first order logic, have the ability to work in a
suitably specified first order object language with rules or
axioms, know that consistency, completeness and soundness
can be proved in a meta-language, and have a basic
familiarity with non-deductive inference, and the
associated problems with non-deductive inference. It is
desirable that the teacher also know how to engage in the
skills listed in D.ll, and be relatively comfortable
lecturing and answering questions.
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The second contingent factor is class size and length and
the third contingent factor is the background and ability of
the students. For the purposes of this model, the class
Will be limited to no more than 24 students meeting at least
3 hours per week for at least two full semesters. Also for
the purpose of this model, the students will be limited to
college students above average in both intelligence and
motivation, with some interest in the natural sciences and
some familiarity with current popular pseudo-scientific
explanations of various phenomena.
However, it is useful to point out that critical thinking
as defined by D.ll need not be bound by any one particular
curriculum like C.4 in any one particular context to what
we may call any one particular range of degree N of critical
thinking. Intuitively, the range of degree N can be raised
or lowered according to the needs of a particular academic
discipline, professional field, or to the particular needs
of dealing with everyday concerns in a particular
educational context. It can also be raised or lowered
according to the background and ability of the teacher, and
the age, background, interest and ability of the students.
Intuitively, we can see that the range of degree N may be
raised or lowered by proposing alternative curricula such
that successfully teaching some curriculum is sufficient
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successfully to teach correct critical thinking, but to a
higher degree N than C.4. Therefore, for educational
situations unlike the one specified for the purposes of
this model, alternative curricula may be provided to teach
correct critical thinking to a higher or lower degree N.
For example, C.4 is a curriculum suitable for bright college
level students, but not suitable for 5th and 6th grade
students. Similarily, Lipman's curriculum is suitable for
5th and 6th grade students, but not suitable for bright
college level students.
Given C.4, however, the fourth contingent factor to
stipulate is the degree to which (1), (2), (3), (4) and
(5) are to be taught successfully. 143 Intuitively, for the
purposes of this model, I shall require their successful
teaching to a medium degree n, which will in turn result in
successfully teaching a medium high degree N of critical
thinking or critical intelligence. For example, while
teaching (1) of C.4 involves teaching LPC
,
it does not in-
volve teaching mod4l logic. If it did, then the degree N
of critical thinking taught by C.4 may be higher, given the
successful teaching of (1) plus modal logic to a medium
degree n. Therefore, C.4 is designed to allow for increases
143
Or the degree n to which any component of any
a ternative curriculum which is designed successfully toteach correct critical thinking to a higher or lower degreeN
,
ls to be taught successfully.
2.19
1,1 thS dS9ree N ° f CritiCal by providing a frame _
work to incorporate additional skills, that fit into ( 1 ),
< 2 >- (3), (4) or ,5, that are learned in logic, science,
Philosophy, math, literature or religion courses.
In this sense, then, a curriculum like C.4 provides what
may be called an interdisciplinary framework to reject or
to evaluate and to incorporate basic reasoning skills
acquired in specific academic disciplines, where such
rejection maintains the degree N of critical thinking and
where such incorporation increases the degree N of critical
thinking. In this way, then, we may account for increasing
the degree N of critical thinking by so incorporating basic
reasoning skills acquired in specific academic disciplines.
I shall call this increasing of the degree N the development
of critical intelligence. Therefore, successfully teaching
correct critical thinking, thereby teaching critical
intelligence, provides the basic framework which, in turn,
allows for its further development through exposure to
various academic disciplines.
The fifth contingent factor serves to summarize the first
four contingent factors specifying the educational context
o_ this model for teaching y how successfully to teach
correct critical thinking. The teacher is required to
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have so»e background and interest in the natural sciences
and to have worked through the current popular pseudo-
scientific explanations of various phenomena which are to be
the subjects for critical thinking. The teacher is also
required to know both deductive and non-deductive logic, and
to know how to engage in the skills listed in D.ll.
The students, grouped in classes of no more than 25,
meeting at least three hours per week for two semesters, are
q ed to be college level students, above average in both
intelligence and motivation, with some interest in the
natural sciences and some familiarity with current popular
pseudo-scientific explanations of various phenomenon. The
omponents of C.4 are required to be taught successfully to
a medium degree n, which will in turn result in successfully
teaching critical thinking, or critical intelligence, to a
medium high degree N.
Given this educational context for this model, and given
this method to initiate teaching from information or
interests familiar to the students, we must see how the
second disjucnts of D.20 and D.21 are to be satisfied by the
model. First, the model must satisfy the second disjunct of
D.20 simply by presenting and justifying the propositions to
be taught. This may also be done by showing the student
the implications of these propositions for his own areas of
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interest and famil iarity and
that they are false f „ •
tl0„ S ° f a^uming
r i or his own areas of ; t
familiarity
,,,
interest and
econdly, the model may satisfy thedisjunct 0 f n n . y secondsimply by presenting models (as do
f
D
-21) and by presenting «. ,
efined by
student-involvi nrr „
student-involving
exercise
incises. These
g s provide evidence both to theacher and to the student that the student does or dokn°W h°W t0 in a particular activity b
""
student the chance actually to
Y 91Vln9 ^
this way, then thi „
Sn9a9e
aCtlVity
' In
-ne , s model will o = .
Of D* 20 and D.21.
Se°°nd disi™cts
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PART II
AN INSTRUCTIONAL MODEL FOR THF ™,UK E development
OF CRITICAL INTELLIGENCE
This model is not designed t- K
Xt is designed to be
“ ^ * -udent,
teacher ho
-^ructional raodel to show aW SOme°ne might successfully teach correctcritical thinking, in terms of c 4 in th d
context- 1
' e educationaltext stipulated in Part I This is suf f ic i pnf +-
u
teaphpy ^ e t to show aw someone might successfully teach correct
critical thinking.
r
“
tamiliar to students Th).i . is method has three related
Practical benefits for this model. First, presenting the
material in C.4 in terms of a familiar, or interesting
subject matter may help the students to learn c.4 without the
e unnecessary confusion of unrelated examples. Secondly,
t
- may help them to expose confusions and misconceptions
^ " earlY 51396 ^ th6ir ln»—t:ion since they supposedly
61 SOme COnfidenCe in with this topic. Thirdly,
this may help the students to become interested in the
student-involving exercises. interest in
. problem is a
necessary condition for active participation in its
solution. Likewise, interest in a particular sublet is
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necessary to involve students in a more hard-headed
intellectual approach to the subject. This method allQws
-e teacher to presuppose such interest while Providing theintellectual tools to direct it critically. As Albert
Einstein remark about such interest in a sublet, - lt is
a very grave mistake to think that the enjoyment of seeing
and searching can be promoted by means of coercion and sense
of duty."
In this way, the method in initiating teaching from infer-
mation or interests familiar to students uses student
interests practically to apply the content of c.4. This
-y ideally eliminate the need for teacher developed student
interest, but it does not eliminate the need for teacher
directed student interest. In this model, for example,
students interested in UFO's may, in fact, believe that
UFO's are best explained as an extraterrestrial visitors,
his, however, immediately allows the teacher to consider
the grounds for such a belief and the standards for an
acceptable explanation. This method then is designed to
save time and allow for the inmediate application of c.4 to
arguments in which the students have some interest.
As stipulated in Part I, the subject matter to be critically
thought about for the purposes of this model is to be
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current popular
phenomena
. The
pseudo-scientific explanations for various
annotated bibliography is as follows:
1 .
2
.
3
.
4.
7.
Avon Books
, New
8hi
-
in
* bS“,K
r
an
Ban££yBSS;
chronicle explaining indiviig 4 ' (A su9gestive
as encounters with extraterrestr^r^sUors!) UF°' S
Pocket' Book s? Knife ,
of the supposedly miraculous "he
sug9estive chronicle
Brazilian hillbilly?? aling power of a
Gardner
, Fads anrl poi i •
Science: The c.-err-rv-ssr- . 1 Cles i n the Name of
—
,inH - t . ^ .
curious Theories oTltodern Pseudo- ~
th'at Surround Them- pS2g.
Amusj
-ng and Alarming Cults
~--r n n" : T;.,. ^ L” Human
many different pseudo
'
(An e
i‘
dustl ve exposition of
different areas^I scllncl?r
exPlanati°- i" "any
York^igyi
K1
m
S
;b
tS^Exelained, Random House, New1974
• <A thoughtful collection
explanations for UFO's). of natural
Lawrenoe D. Kusche
, The Bermuda Trianqle MvstPrv-
coTTec^tion^f
r B°oksF"Ne« 7°rk, 1975
. S^thS^ihiful
and ships?)
natUral explanations for missing planes
Erich VonDdniken, Chariots of the Gods?: UnsolvedMzsteries^o^the PliT
,
Bantam^k^,
TT-suggestive chronicle purporting to explain variousarchitecturai and archeological data, supposedly un-
explainable, by appealing to the actions of extra-terrestrial visitors.)
Books 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7 may be assigned as books to be read
by the class, and are to provide the raw material for
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critical evaluation. Most students will have read, or read
about books 1, 2, 3 and 7.
The model will be organised into five sections. Each
section will be divided into subsections, and each sub-
section will be divided into a presentation of material, a
-del (as defined in D. 21
, and student-involving exercises
Each section will be followed by a bibliography of resource
material for the teacher relating to the aspect of C.4
covered in the section.
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Introduction: Argument s and Their Evaluat ion
The purpose of this model is to provide the teacher with a
asrc guideline for successfully teaching correct critical
thinking
. This involves teacMng
abilities and the ability to detect incorrect reasoning.
The way we, in fact, reason is often silly, fallacious,
unsound or incomprehensible. Such reasoning may be said tobe incorrect reasoning, our concern win be to show ho„ _
reasoning, as embodied in our use of language, can be
exposed and studied. For this purpose, we shall limit our
concern with language to combinations and relationships
among statements and their constituent parts.
uhe study of language, of course uj j- , is not exhausted by the
study of reasoning. Language has many functions; for
example to ask questions, to tell iok P q •j es, to issue commands,
to agitate or to arouse emotions, as well as to make
statements
.
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More specifically, our interest is limited
to the basic reasoning unit, the argument.
ssr;
are beyond the scope if however '
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"Argument" commonly describes the actions among persons with
opposing Views about the same subject. For example, among
parents and children over the use of the family car, or
among siblings over the use of the television set. Some-
times these actions involve crying and screaming, other
times they involve physical blows. One consequence of this
View is that it takes at least two people to have an
argument. However, we shall not use "argument" as it is
commonly described.
We shall mean by "argument" a bit of reasoning consisting
of statements called premises, and a statement called a
conclusion. In such a bit of reasoning, the conclusion is
said to "follow from" the premises. Presenting an argument
then, is to state premises from which a particular con-
clusion is said "to follow." One consequence of this view
is that it does not take at least two people to have an
argument. it simply takes a statement of premises and a
statement of conclusion said "to follow" from them.
Consider the following argument presented by Wilbur Glenn
Voliva designed to support his view that the Earth is
motionless and flat, with the North Pole in the center and
the South Pole distributed around the circumference
.
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First consider his argument designed to
is motionless.
show that the Earth
Can anyone who has considered this mp,+- 4- Q>-honestly say that he believes the earth
aerlc
"F
ly
at such an impossible speed’ T f .• +. • . raveling
which way is it goingv
?
it^ho^rt he g
° lng S° faSt
'
with it than aaainsti+-
ould b easier to travel
the opposite direction tn t-v,
6 Wlnd alwaYs should blow in
But where is tSe" ° h °b M .is the man who believes that he it does? Where
remaining off the Farth r
c ®n
^ umP irto the air,
the Earth 19? l ' l „
ne secorl1^/ and come down to3 ‘ 7 miles from where he jumped up?”« 6
Like many arguments we will be considering, this argument is
not presented as clearly as it might be. To present his
argument as clearly as possible, we may consider putting the
argument into the following form, and calling it A.l:
A . 1
1 .
2 .
If the Earth is traveling at 600,000 mph as
astronomers claim, then the wind always blows in
e opposite direction from which the astronomersclaim the Earth is traveling.
If the Earth is traveling at 600,000 mph as
astronomers claim, then if one jumps off theEarth's surface; for one second, then one will come
aown 193.7 miles from where one jumps off.
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.
Gardner, Martin, Fads and Fallacies in the Name of
s cience: The Curiou s Theories" of Modern Pseudo-Scientists
nd the Strange Amusing and Alarming Cults that Surroundidem
, pp. 16-19. —
Gardner, Martin, Fads and Fallacies in the Name ofscience
:
The Curious Theories of Modern Pseudo^Scientists
—
e Strange Amusing and Alarming Cults that SurroundThem, p. IT. —
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We know that it is not th~
always blows in the that the windthe astronomers claim ?he Fa
^rection from which
We know that it is not the 13 traveling,
off the Earth's sur?l that if j™P s
will come down 193 7 miles fr^ sfcond ' then oneoff. om where one jumps
the opposite direction^rom^h •
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£
nd always blows in
claim the Earth is traveling
h
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^
le astronomers
oase that the Earth is trave,' •
^ U is not the
as astronomers claim.
lng at 600
' 000 mph
EartVs%urLce eforone
h
secoL
0n
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j™PS °ff the
iHot^hl c^e^th^Tthe^E6 l? • ^^"then^t
"aim?
traVeUng ^
tr^vlung'at 600 SSo noh
0330 that the Earth
-y a b u 0 , 0 0
0
mp as astronomers claim.
Secondly, consider his argument desinged to show that the
Earth is flat. He presented a double-spread photograph
owing 12 miles of the shoreline of Lake Winnebago,
Wisconsin
.
camera. The^lns^as^xacu/a flet^bovrthe6"™ for them™sAaNy°cL°ar SdHa?SH £ith Sf
opposite
b
shore
la
provin T "!“ SSc^th.
surface of
enormous. 14 ^
S° lentlflC value of this picture is
Science-
Gatdner, Martin, Fads and Fallacies in the of
^TTTh ~
:urious TheoHes of Modern Iseudo-Soientf^
mso,^ pjfir
ge Amusin9 and Alarming Cults that Surround -"
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Again, this arqument ic «,...9 t 18 n0t Presented as clearly as it
mi9ht be
' T° PrSSent thiS ar9ument as clearly as possible,
we may consider petting the argument into the following form
and calling it A. 2.
A.
2
1 ,
2
.
3.
4 .
57
An eight by ten Eastman view camera f a iundistorted pictures. takes accurate,
three^eet^bove^he & Camera at distance d,
shoreline on a clear
ahowin9 12 miles of
shows the small objects °n Lake Winae bago
of shoreline.
°^ tha t are on the 12 miles
The picture shows that the surface of th^ •a plane or horizontal line. 8 lake lsThis procedure may be reDpat-pri a-i-
location on the Earth w!th'7 any sultable
Therefore
, flat .
Both arguments A1 and A2 have statements numbered as
premises and a statement as a conclusion that is said to
"follow from" the premises. Yet A.l and A. 2 appeal to two
different notions of "following from" the premises. A.l i s
called a deductive argument. In A.l, the conclusion 7 is
said to follow deductively from the premises. A. 2 is called
an inductive argument. In A. 2, the conclusion 5 is said to
follow inductively from the premises.
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In order to be able to construct and to evaluate arguments
Uke A.l and A. 2, „e must first consider a detailed dis _
cussion of both deductive arguments and inductive arguments
ihe question to raise regarding A.l and A. 2 is "Do the
premises entitle us to claim that the conclusion is true?"
To ask this question about an argument is to begin to
evaluate the argument.
First, however, we must become familiar with deductive and
inductive arguments.
_L iD
1 .
to
h
the°?ea
S
h
thr
?
UghOUt are desi9ned to provide suggestions
reading For
r
the
r
f
relf ing the material presented®" t£e
by the JLhertt
tranSf°med Active arguments
Go through Giirdner, Chapter 2, and point out the
conclusion
krch contam arguments to support a particular1
!!
Consider the rest of Gardner's book andpresent arguments of both types.
Clarify these arguments by putting them into the formof premises and conclusions. (No need to worry aboutinductive versus deductive at this point.)
Distinguish an argument from an explanation. Show how
arguments are used to support explanations. Show thatthe other books present explanations which are supportedby arguments
.
2
.
3.
Exercises
1. Have the students go through Gardner, Chapter 3, andfind an argument to support Donnelly's claim about thegiant comet (p. 35-37)
. Number the premises andindicate the conclusion. Have them find and record
other arguments in Gardner.
232
by
d
the
W
premises^
tl
Is the^ °°nclusion of A.l supportedy ." he conclusion true? Are the
^1 ,S ® S true? Construct your own argument to showthat the conclusion is not true.
bfthe'premises^
1
?^ th
^ C
?
nClUSi°n ° f A * 2 supportedy m ises? is e conclusion true? Are the
thaTthe cone?'
Construct y°ur own argument to showmat th nclusion is not true.
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tion One. Deductive Arguments and Their Evaluat ion
Subsec tion 1 The Logical Form of Statements
A-l is a deductive argument composed of statements called
premises
, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6
, and a statement called a
conclusion, 7. Statements have certainn properties that are
important for their use in arguments. For our purposes
here, every statement is either true or false, though we
often say in everyday language that some statement is
"nearly true," this is not strictly speaking correct. We
do not distinguish degrees of truth or falsehood. A state-
ment's truth or falsehood is called its truth value. The
ancient Greek philosopher Aristotle was the first to
recognize the systematic importance of treating every
statement as either true or false. Aristotle's statement
of this principle is often called the Law of Excluded
Middle because it excludes the possibility of any truth
value "m the middle" between true and false.
Another property of statements that is important for
statement use in arguments is that no statement is both
true and false. This is called the law of non-contra-
diction. To state, without qualification, that something
both is and is not the case is to say something logically
self-contradictory, or logically impossible. Logical
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impossibility is gust one kind of impossrbility
_ Tolar lfy the notlon of logical impossibUity ifc is h
We might say that some state of iff-,
•
8 ° a fairs is technologically
impossible if with our curr^ni u
,
CU Snt technology, we are unable tonng it about. For example, it is technologically im-
possible to perform a human brain transplant. Such surgery
oes not violate any known laws of science. However
,
given
our current technology, such surgery cannot be perform.
Therefore, we say that a huraan brain transplant is currently
technologically impossible.
We might say that sorae state of affairs is physically im -
possible if it violates any known natural laws (in the
broadest sense). For example, it is physically impossible
to travel faster than the speed of light. However, it is at
least conceivable that the universe could have been
different such that we could travel faster than the speed of
light
.
There are many other kinds of impossibility, but we need not
consider them all to see that anything that is technologi-
cally or physically impossible is not necessarily logically
impossible. some statement is logically impossible iff it
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violates the laws of logic, in particular the law of non-
contradiction. For example, it is logically impossible that
the Earth is traveling at 600,000 mph and it is not the case
that the Earth is traveling at 600,000 mph. The law of
contradiction states that all such statement must be
£^lse because of their logical form.
To clarify the notion of the logical form of a statement,
let us use the letter 'P' to stand for the statement 'the
Earth is traveling at 600,000 mph' and let the symbol '<v
stand for the phrase "it is not the case that', or 'not',
and let '•' stand for the English word 'and'. Thus, this
sentence can be represented as 'p • a, p'. Th i s repre-
sentation of the sentence captures its logical form.
No matter what statement we substitute for P, the resulting
statement with this logical form is logically impossible and
therefore must be false.
Therefore, we may distinguish statements which happen to
be false because of the way the world is and statements
which must be false because of their logical form. Con-
sider a statement from A.l. Statement 7 happens to be
false because of the way the world is: the Earth is
traveling around the Sun at approximately 600,000 mph.
To determine that 7 is false, we must refer to the way the
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world is. However, this is not necessary with statements
having the logical form 'P and not P'. To determine that
the statement ’the Earth is traveling at 600,000 mph and it
is not the case the the Earth is traveling at 600,000 mph'
is false, we need only examine its logical form. We need
not refer to the way the world is. The law of non-contra-
diction guarantees that any statement with that logical
form must be false.
Models
1. Go through Gardner, Chapter 4, to point outCharles Fort's views about the Earth, its motion,
etc., and formulate a list of statements. Showthat they are false because of the way the worldis, not because of their logical form. Do the
same thing for the other arguments you have
presented to them from Gardner.
2. Define consistency and relate it to explanations.
Show that Charles Fort's explanations are con-
sistent. Relate this to A.l, and show that
argument A.l is consistent. Provide an
explanation for lightning that is consistent but
obviously false. Ask the students to produce an
argument to show that it is false.
3. Present an explanation that is inconsistent (with
a non-blatant contradiction)
. Consider
VonDilnikeh ' s acceptance of Vellikof sky '
s
explanation of the creation of Venus 10,000 years
ago, and VonDSniken's assertion that ancient cave
drawings of the heavens over 100,000 years old
accurately show the position of Venus. Go through
any of the other books you choose and do the same
thing
.
237
Exercises
Read Gardner, Chapter 9.
Determine „hy the following statements are false:
Dowsing with a hazel twig will find oily r 011 every time.
h) The Earth is -p 1
in the middle, and the souf '
i
th the north pole
diameter. 1 P°ie spread around the
c) The Earth is fia+-
^ miles and a circumferenc^of diam®ter ofvolume of the Earth may be calculated
3
,;
and
-
the
formula to find the volume an^phere .^ 109 the
d)
e)
second?
6^ ° f ® flying saucer is 930,000 miles per
El^n rig^^ Lhretfrth iS flat '^ , uul one ha h is not flat.
Write up an argument to refute , .
explanation for lightning presented ^the Lf^r.
Subsection 2 -
^--Z^2£j^al_Form and Logical Conn^+- lves
All statements with the logical form 'P
. „ p
. must be
false. But statements can have other logical forms as well.
We may capture the logical form of statements by replacing a
sta cement at each of its accurrances with a letter called
a propositional constant, like P above, and connecting the
statements to other statements with what are called logical
connectives like 'and' and 'not' above. It should be
obvious that the other statements replaced by other propo-
sitional constants like 'Q
. * Q- have the same logical
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form as p ^ P
' . To express this insight, let us use
geometrical shapes such as 0 and A as variables which take
these propositional constants like P and Q as values. Thus,
the logical form of all these statements can be represented
by propositional variables as '0 • % o'.
Since we know, given the law of excluded middle, that every
statement is either true or false, and given the law of non
contradiction, that every statement is not both true and
false, we may use propositional variables like 0 and A and
this knowledge about statements to understand what are
called the logical connectives. In English, the logical
connectives are 'not', and 'and', 'or', 'if-then', 'if and
only if
'
.
Not Negation
.
v 0 is the negation of 0. Clearly if o
is true and if we deny 0, then that negation is false. if o
is false, and if we deny 0, then that negation is true.
Letting 't' stand for true and 'f ' for false, these in-
sights can be represented in what we call a truth table.
0 % 0
t f
f t
This is called a truth table for 'not'. The important point
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here that we will apply to complex statements like 1 in A.l.
can be seen by seeing that the truth or falsity of „ 0
varies with the truth or falsity of 0. We say that the
truth value of ^ o is a function of the truth value of o.
in general, we say that the truth value of a statement with
a complex logical form, where logical form is limited to
relations among statements, is a function of the truth
values of the simple statements composing the complex
statements. This is called truth functionality of state-
ments and forms the basis for what we call the propositional
,
or statement logic.
And - Conjunction
. Consider such a complex statement
Which ls a conjunction of two simple statements. This
statement will have the logical form 0 • a. There are four
possible combinations of truth values of the component
statements. We can determine the number of logically
possible combinations of truth values for a complex state-
ment by the formula 2n
,
where n equals the number of simple
statements used to form the complex statement. Thus, there
are four possible combinations of truth values for a state-
ment having the logical form 0 • A, and there are eight
possible combinations of truth values for a statement of
the logical form 0 • A • V.
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«
- . «««„ v.l«, „f this s„„M„ statement «. „c„of the four possible truth values of th„s t e component state-
ments satisfying
'o' and 'A'.
we see that a conjunction of statements
component statements are true.
is true iff all the
Consider a complex statement which is a
disjunction of two simple statements. Unfortunately the
glish word or is ambiguous. Consider the following:
(i)
(ii)
It is raining or it is blowing.
Either we shall
to Arizona.
go to the Bahamas or we shall go
Disjunct (i) is interpreted as stating that it is raining,
or blowing, or both, (ii) i s interpreted as stating that we
shall not go to the Bahamas and Arizona; we shall go only to
one of the two. These two senses of 'or' are called, for
(i), the inclusive sense, and for (ii)
,
the exclusive
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sense. lor the purposes nf ikqP o the propositional calculus, „e
only recognize the inclusive sense (i) w1 * We can always makethe exclusive sense explicit in
.
P ln the Propositional calculus
y rewriting the statement such that hnfhn bot component state-
ments cannot +-nn^true, using conjunction.
(iii) It i
Baha^dVArfzonf ^“ 9° to the
consider a statement of the logical form ,i,
. If we let
the propositional constants 'P' stand for 'it is raining'
and 'Q' stand for 'it is blowing', and let the wedge 'V
stand for the inclusive sense of 'or'- m ,
' U) has the logical
form ' P v 0
' Nnw » p tt n , .W * °W P V Q 13 true if any one of the
following are the case:
P is true and Q is false.
P is false and Q is true.
P is true and Q i s true.
' P V Q ' is false if both P an Q are false. Consider the
following truth table for disjuntions using propositional
variables 'O' and 'A':
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0 A OVA
t t t
f t t
t f t
f f f
We see that a disjunction of statements is
the component statements are false.
false iff both
If - Then Conditional
.
We may now consider a complex
statement used as premises 1, 2, 5
being one word like 'and', or 'or'
component statements, a conditional
and 6 in A.l Instead of
standing between two
statement is formed by
writing 'if' before the first component statement, and
en between the first and the second component statement.
This can be seen by considering premise 1 of A.l. The
logical form of A.l 1, can be seen by substituting the
propositional constant 'P' for 'the Earth is traveling at
600,000 mph as astronomers claim' and by substituting the
propositional constant 'Q' for 'the wind always blows in
the opposite direction from which the astronomers claim the
Earth is traveling' and letting the horseshoe
'r?' stand for
the conditional connective 'if
. . . then’. Thus, A.l 1
becomes 'PDq',
Three technical terms must now be introduced. The state-
ment following 'if' and preceding 'then', P above, is
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called the antecedent of the conditional. The stateraent
following
'then., Q above, is called the consequent Qf ^
conditional. Note th^+- fv,at the antecedent does not include 'if
n°r d°es the consequent include 'then' Theseo . in words are the
logical connective.
Letting "O' and 'A' be propositional variables to capture
the logical form of statements like A.l 1, we must now
consider the truth values of the complex statement 0 3 A
in relation to each of the four possible truth values of
the component statements satisfying o and A . To do so, we
must recall that such complex statements are truth
functional and that the law of excluded middle states that
every statement is either true or false, with no truth value
in between
.
The problem with applying
use of
' if
. . . then
. .
connective signifies many
For example, sometimes it
these principles to the English
.
' arises since the English
^ifferent types of connections,
is used to mean class inclusion;
If Spot is a dog, then Spot is an animal.
or to mean causal connection;
if Steve is late, then he will miss the bus.
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Or sometimes it is used with no apparent connection at all;
(iii) if voliiva was a scientist, then Nixon was a saint
The problem, then, is that there i s no ~easy way to capture
all these different senses of the conditional in our
symbolic system. However, we can solve this problem by
noticing that all these senses (i)
,
(ii) and (iii) have
common that each is false if the antecedent is true and the
consequent is false. Note that this is the same as saying
that 0 => A is false when 0 • v A is true, because when A
IS false, V A is true. Now ifObi is false when 0 • s, A
is true, then O A is true when 0 • a, A is false. This is
so because of the truth table for negation and because of
the law of excluded middle. This can be seen as follows:
-P ^ 0 • ^ A ^ (0 • % A ) 0 ID A
t t fft f
t f t
f f f
We see that a conditional statement is false iff the
antecedent is true and the consequent is false. This is
intuitively clear. However, the other assignments of truth
values to the conditional are not intuitively clear.
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KS mUSt
' therefo
-' provide some motivation for making
the assignments in these unclear cases.
No matter how we interpret the conditional, there are
certain logically complex statements that we want to have
certain truth value, given the assignment of truth values
to its component statements. By considering such a state-
ment and what assignments it requires us to make, we can
determine the assignments of truth value to conditionals
when the antecedent and the consequent are both true, when
the antecedent is false and the consequent is true, and when
the antecedent and consequent are both false.
Consider the logically complex statement "if 0 * A then 0."
First, consider the problem of assigning a truth value to a
conditional in which both antecedent and consequent are
true. Intuitively, given that 0 is true and A is true, we
want to be able to say that "if 0 • A then 0" is true (if
t * t, then t)
. Since given this true antecedent, a true
consequent follows. To capture this intuition, we must
assign a value of true to ' 0 A ' when both antecedent and
consequent are true. Assigning false to such a conditional
would violate this intuition. Therefore, we rule it out and
call such conditionals true.
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Secondly, consider the problem of assigning a truth value to
a conditional in which the antecedent is false and the
consequent is true. Intuitively, given 0 is false and W is
true, we want to be able to say that "if o -A then 0" is
true (if f . t
,
then t)
,
since given this false conjunction
as antecedent, this true consequent follows since 0 is true.
To capture this intuition, we must assign a value of true to
'0O A' when the antecedent is false and the consequent is
true
.
Thirdly, consider the problem of assigning a truth value to
a conditional in which the antecedent and the consequent are
both false. Intuitively, given 0 is false and A is false,
we want to be able to say that "if 0 • A then 0" is true
f then f) since given this false antecedent, a
false consequent truly follows, since 0 is false. To
capture this intuition, we must assign a value of true to
1 0 r> a
'
when both the antecedent and consequent are false.
We distinguish this conditional from the many other con-
ditionals used in English and we call it the material
conditional
.
If and Only If - Biconditional . A statement using the
biconditional as a logical connective is the conjunction of
a conditional and what we call its converse. If we switch
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the antecedent and the consequent of a given conditional
statement
, we get the converse of that conditional state-
ment. Thus the converse of the statement A.l 1
, sy„boIized
an terms of propositional constants as 'p dq' ( is , Q - , p ,
Note that we cannot automatically conclude from the truth
of a statement the truth of its converse.
A- 1 1 and its converse, then, can be represented in terms
Of propositional constants as
(i) p Z) Q, and
(ii) Q zd P
Another way to translate 'P =D Q- into English is ’P only if
°' ( i
*
e
•
/
the Earth is traveling at 600,000 mph as astrono-
mers claim only if the wind always blows in the opposite
direction from which astronomers claim the earth is
traveling). This is not the same as 'P if Q*. Another way
of saying ’P if q- is to say , Q then pI
,
Qr equivalently
^
Q only if P'. This is obviously not the same as 'P only
if Q'. This conjunction of (i) and (ii) is (iii) (P Q)
(Q T) P) . Another way to translate (P dq) • (Q zd P) into
English is 'P if and only if Q*
. Let triple bar ’s' stand
for the logical connective 'if and only if'. We can form
the truth table for this logical connective by considering
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the truth tables for conjunctions and conditionals. Again,
using 'O' and 'A as propositional variables.
9. A 0 •!> A A o Q 0 E A
t t
f t
t f
f f
t
t
f
t
t
f
t
t
t
f
f
t
Models
tne logical connectives in
considered
.
truth values. Point out
all the arguments you have
rite up truth tables showing the possible truth valueassignment to various negations, conjunctions,disjunctions, etc. Have the student pick out the
assignments that are, in fact, the case and show why.
3. Mix in with the above statements statements both truem/II interpretations and false in all interpretations
and ask them to pick out the assignments that are, infact, the case and show why.
1. Assemble a body of complex statements from Gardner
or any of the other books the students are reading. Ask
them to point out the logical connectives, and provide
truth tables for the complex statements.
2 . Ask the students to present an informal argument
refuting one or more of the explanations Gardner
considers. Ask them to use the symbols for logical
connectives we have provided.
Exercises
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Subsection 3
Form Qf CnTTip lQv
Statements: PC
Given the notion of a statement's logical form, propositional
constants which are chosen to stand for specific statements
un.Lvocally, and the logical connectives, we may capture the
logical form of simple statements and of complex statements
composed of simple statements joined by one or more of the
logical connectives. This we shall call translating
statements into the propositional calculus. However, before
discussing translating English statements into PC, we must
formally introduce another notational device informally used
above. Suppose we are trying to determine the truth value
of the statement 'P • Q v R'. We seem to be stuck because
our truth tables for conjunction and disjunction only tell
us how to deal with two symbols and one connective. However
we may use parenthesis in logic the way we use them in
mathematics to solve this problem. For example, in ENT,
the value of 27 + 3 will be 27 or 3 depending on how we
remove the ambiguity (i.e., (27 *3) x 3, or 27 * (3x3)).
Similarly in PC, 'P Q V R' is ambiguous between ' (P • q)
V R' and 'P • (Q V R) 1 .
However, once such complex statements are grouped by
parenthesis, we may determine its truth value given that we
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know the truth values of its component statements. For
example
, suppose that P is false, Q is true and R is true.
Given ' (P • Q) V R\ we can substitute (P • Q) for the 0 and
R for the A in our truth table for disjunction. We then
substitute P for 0 and Q for A in the truth table for con-
junction, and see that 'P • Q' is f, since P is f. Since
R is t, ' (P • Q) V R' will be t given the truth table for
disjunction. Writing truth values in place of propositional
constants to assist the computation, we see given these
truth values for P, Q and R:
(f • t) V t = f V t = t.
Applying the same principles to 'P • (Q V R) ' we see that
f * (t V f) = f • t = f
We can easily see that ' (P • Q) V R' is not logically
equivalent to ' P • (Q V R) ' since given the same truth
values for the same propositional constants, the truth
values of the complex statements are different.
It is important here to see that we may substitute complex
statements for the 0 and the A in truth tables for any of
the logical connectives. Therefore, we may use this method
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to calculate the truth values of statements
want, given that we know the truth values of
as complex as we
the component
statements
.
To translate such complex statements into PC, we need only
(1) recognize logical connectives, and (2) assign propo-
sitional constants univocally. Let's consider the premises
and conclusions of A.l, and translate the statements com-
posing this argument into PC.
Consider premise 1. We have translated this statement into
PC. Premise 1 becomes 'POQ'. Once deciding that 'P'
stands for 'the Earth is traveling at 600,000 mph as
astronomers claim; we must replace this statement with P
wherever it occurs in the argument, or in a complex state-
ment. This guarantees that we capture the logical form of
the particular statement of this sort and the logical form
of the argument, as we shall consider it in a minute. This
is what (2) means above.
Consider premise 2. Premise 2 is a logically more complex
statement than premise 1, and requires the correct use of
parenthesis. The logical form of the large complex state-
ment is a conditional. However, we see that the consequent
Of the conditional is simply another conditional. Following
the univocal assignment of propositional constants, we see
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that the antecedent of this premise is 'P'. The consequent
is yet another conditional. Let
'
R
' stand for 'one jumps
off the Earth's surface for one second’ and let 's' stand
for 'one will come down 193.7 miles from where one jumps
off. We may use parentheses to capture this consequent
which is also a conditional as follows:
'P (R S)
This is the translation of premise 2 into PC.
Consider premise 3. This is very simple. ' Q
' already
stands for ’the wind always blows in the opposite direction
from which the astronomers claim the earth is traveling'.
Premise 3 is the negation of ’Q\ so premise 3 is simply
translated as Q'. Likewise, premise 4 is simply the
negation of the consequent of premise 2, so premise 4 is
translated as (R s) ' .
Consider premise 5. Following the recognition of logical
connectives and the univocal use of propositional constants,
premise 5 is simply a conditional with the negation of Q as
the antecedent and the negation P as the consequent
. So
premise 5 is translated as Q3 % p'.
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consider premise 6. Premise 6 is simpiy
the negation of (R S ) as the antecedent
° f P as the consequent. So premise 6 is
P
^
^
' • ^he conclusion, 7
, i s
a conditional with
and the negation
translated as
simply translated
as the negation of p, p»
we may, therefore, present the translation of the
forming A.l as follows:
statements
A.l
1 . P Q
2. P (R
3 . % Q
4 . \ (R S)
5. % Q ^ P
6 . % (R S)
7. % P
Given Voliva s original statements, we see the difficulty
m clearly translating chunks of English prose (that are
claimed to be arguments) into our symbolic notation.
However, in summary, here are some suggestions.
1
. Locate the conclusion. It is often preceded by theword 'therefore' or the word 'thus'. However, it need
not be. Practice is a sure way to locate conclusions.
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Capturing the Logical Form of Arguments
Having captured the logical form
premises and the statement of the
of the statements used in
conclusion in an argument
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like A.l, we may now consider what we may call the logical
form of the argument itself. For (deductive) arguments
like A.l, to discover the logical form of the argument is
to discover whether or not the argument is valid. Validity
is a logical relation among statements. An argument with a
logical form that is valid is an argument whose conclusion
is true if its premise are true, and the premises are
said to logically imply the conclusion. Informally
speaking, we can say that the conclusion is, in some sense,
already "contained in" the premises.
For example, consider the following simple argument designed
to show a valid logical form:
4.1
1. If Columbus is right, then the Earth is
£j_ Columbus is right.
Therefore (here written
•• 3. The Earth is round.
round
.
The translation of the premises and conclusion of this
argument can be seen as follows using
'
T
' and 'U' as
propositional constants.
4.2
1 . T C? U
2 . T
: . 3 . U
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If we know that premises 1 and 2 are ,a . true, and that the
argument has a valid ^logical form, then we may determine
that the conclusion 3 is true wifhn 4.
' thout circumnavigating the
globe.
However, in fact, an argument with a valid logical form may
have a false conclusion, but only if at least one of the
premises is false. Consider the following argument:
4.3
1 .
2j_
. 3.
Voliva is right
, then the Earth is flatVoliva is right. ri
The Earth is flat.
translation of the premises and conclusion of this
argument can be seen as follows using 'T 1 ' and * u '
'
as
propositional constants:
4.4
1 .
. 3.
T ' ZD U '
T '
U'
This shows us clearly that 4.3 has the same valid logical
form as 4.1, since 4.2 and 4.4 have the identical form.
However, unlike 4.1, 4 3 pi t, .-5 nas a false conclusion: 'the
Earth is flat' is false. Yet also unlike 4.1, 4.3 has a
false premise: premise 2 in 4
. 3 is false. The only
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requirement that a valid argument with a false conclusion
must satisfy is that at least one of the premises must be
false
.
An argument with a valid logical form and with one or more
false premises may also have a true conclusion. Consider
the following argument:
4.5
If Voliva is a turkey,
Voliva is a turkey.
Voliva is mortal.
then he is mortal
.
4.5, like 4.1 and 4.3, has a valid logical form, and the
conclusion is true. Premise 2, however, is false. Premise
1 is true: as a fact of biology, if anything is a turkey,
then it is mortal.
It should be clear from these considerations then, that
arguments with valid logical form may have conclusions that
are true or false, but it is logically impossible for an
argument to have a valid logical form and true premises, and
a false conclusion.
To distinguish such arguments with valid logical forms and
true premises from arguments with valid logical forms but
one or more false premises, we introduce the notion of a
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,„a
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...... „„ .rTO.„,bUt 4 ‘ 3 ana 4.5 are unsound.
si
USSfUl ^ P° lnt °Ut an invalid ardent is
mP y an argument that does not Have a valid logical for,
alld
=- have any combination of truth values
premises and conclusions. Therefore, just because
an argument is invalid, we cannot assume that the conclusion
13 falSe; ^ may be the conclusion of another sound
argument, or it may be factually true anyway.
Many students confuse the notion of truth with the notion
of validity. Recall that truth is a property of certain
statements and validitv i = - i„ .r y s a logical relation between
certain statements. Therefore, strictly speaking, it makes
no sense to say that a statement is valid and an argument
true
. Validity and truth are quite different sorts of
thln9S
‘ In faCt
' in advanced logics, we can define validity
without any recourse whatsoever to the notion of truth.
* V_ JL O
1 .
Pro^^^^a^l^^oreach^orth" ^ S“eSS '
already dug out of Gardner- show
6
!^
9™611113 Y°U haVe
reconstructed that are valid VP h Y
°U haVe, yet unsound.
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2 .
3 .
4.
Expla in carefully what the importance of validity isfor arguments - to preserve truth. Anticipate more"complex arguments where the logical form is notobvious and use some examples from science.
wr i tina ^nd
import
J
nce of validity for organizing
•
.
mg a presenting original arguments. Show howit can be used to organize long as well as shortessays. Consider Charles Darwin's letter to Gray asan example of this use of valid logical form.
Emphasize the usefulness of valid arguments and theirimportance for presenting original arguments, criticalarguments, as well as evaluating given arguments.
Exercises
1. Have the students point out unsound arguments offered insupport of the explanations Gardner considers.
2. Have the students examine arguments with true con-
conclusions that are valid and unsound, with true con-
clusions that are invalid, and with true conclusionsthat are valid and sound. Ask them to explain the
relation of these concepts in the particular arguments
.
(You may take these from the logic texts, or make
them up yourself.)
Subsection 5 Testing the Validity of Arguments
Given the above, we can modify the definition of validity
to provide a test for validity. An argument is valid just
in case it is logically impossible for the premises to be
true and the conclusion false. That is, the argument can be
determined to be valid just in case you get a contradiction
by asserting the (conjunction of the premises) and the
denial of the conclusion. This, then, gives us the means
to test the validity of arguments; conjoin the premises with
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the denial of the conclusion. if a contradiction results,
then the argument has a valid logical form.
Recall that a contradiction is false in virtue of its
logical form alone. We can give a clear meaning to this by
a truth table. Consider a contradiction 'P • % p 1
. to
provide a truth table, we need only consider two cases -
case 1 where P is true and ^ P i s false, and case 2 where P
is false, and a, p 1S true. The law of non-contradiction
rules out the cases where P and ^ P are both true or both
false :
P ^ P p • ^ p
t f fft f
As expected, 'P • ^ P' is false under every possible
assignment of truth values to the propositional constant P.
The insight to see here is that any contradiction is false
under every possible assignment of truth values.
Consider an argument we said was valid above, 4.2, and let's
test it for validity by applying the test.
5.1
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1 . T U
2 . T
In order to test for validity, we take the conjunction of
the premises and conjoin that with the denial of the con-
clusion and test to see whether or not it is a contradiction.
Thus, to test 5.1, we shall test the statement
'
( (T 3 U) T) * ^ U'. We carry out this test by using a
truth table
. Since there are two predicate constants
,
there will oe four possible combination of truth values of
component statements.
T U ( (T 3 U) • T) • v U
t t (t * t) * f = t • f = f
f t (t * f) • f = f * f = f
t f (f * t) • t = f • t = f
f f (f * f) • t = f • t = f
Since this statement is false under every possible assign-
ment of truth values to the component propositional con-
stants, it is a contradiction. Therefore, 5.1 (and any
argument of the same form) is valid.
We shall call this method for testing arguments for validity
the method of truth tables. This method also allows us to
test and point out invalid arguments as well. Consider
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the following invalid arguments:
5.2
If Voliva is right.
The Earth is flat.
Voliva is right.
the the Earth is flat.
Again, substituting ' T" ' for 'Voliva is right' and 'u" for
'the Earth is flat,' 5.2 may be translated into PC as
follows
:
5.3
1. T ' .D U *
2
_^_
U
'
: . 3. T'
Again, to test for validity, we conjoin the conjunction of
the premises with the denial of the conclusion and see if we
get a contradiction. Thus, to test 5.3, we shall test the
statement 1 ( (
T
1 22 U 1 ) • U') • * T
' . Again, we carry out
this test by using a truth table.
T 1 U 1 ( (T 1 H? U 1 ) • U' ) . % T '
t t (t • t) * f = t • f = f
f t (t • t) • t = t * t = t
t f (f • f) * f = f • f = f
f f (t * f) * t = f • t = f
263
m only one case (where T' is false and U' is true) is the
statement under consideration true. But one case is
sufficient to show that this statement is not a contra-
diction; a contradiction is never true. Therefore, this
argument (and any other argument of the same logical form)
,
is invalid.
We, therefore, have a powerful method for testing an
argument for validity. Given a symbolic translation of any
such argument in English, we can test that argument by the
method of truth tables and prove that it is valid or prove
that it is invalid. However, longer and more complex
arguments, for example like A.l, make this process rather
cumbersome. One way to shorten this process is to name
certain recurring valid argument forms, allowing us to
recognize a particular argument, or step in a complex
argument, as an instance of one of these valid argument
forms. However, the problem with this method is that we
cannot be sure that every possible argument will be an
instance of one or more of these forms. For this reason,
we may simply state certain rules that apply the logical
connectives to relations among statements. We may then
simply cite these rules in what we shall call a proof of an
argument's validity.
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Subsection 6 - Rules of Valid Inference
The intuition here is simple. Given the logical connectives
and propositional variables, we need a rule that allows us
validly to introduce each logical connective and a rule that
allows us validly to eliminate each logical connective.
These rules are based on the law of non-contradiction and
the truth functionality of propositions.
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Consider negation. The rule applying negation has ^
^Mo^ad.Absur^, but we shall divi(Je ^ rule
lnt° tW° diStinCt PartS and st>ow why the move is logically
valid. Fi rst
, consider negation introduction, written v j.
This states that we may assume the negation of any
proposition in order to derive a contradiction. Having
derived a contradiction, we may then conclude the negation
of the introduced negation. We know that if i 0 ieads us
validly to a contradiction, then a, i 0 will
avoid the contradiction. * I requires what we shall call
sub proof, or a proof within a proof. We will indicate
this type of subproof by drawing an arrow to the first line
of the subproof, and boxing the subproof such that the con-
clusion proven by the subproof is just below the box. The
sunproof for 1 I requires that from an assumed negation, we
validly produce a contradiction. Once proving this contra-
diction, v i allows us validly to conclude the negation of
our assumption. We shall see how this works more clearly
m a moment. For now, it is sufficient to see that n, i
allows the following valid inference from a subproof:
1. ^ 0 assume
2 . ^ o leads validly to a contradiction
: . 3 . ^ 'Xi 0 I)
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Secondly, consider negation elimination, written t E . a, E
allows us to write o' as simply o since the negation of
a negation of any proposition is logically equivalent to
the proposition; they have the same truth value under the
same interpretation of 0 .
0 ^ 0 ^ ^ Q
t f tft f
Therefore
,
0 is logically equivalent to v v o. Whenever two
logically complex statements have exactly the same truth
values for all possible assignments of truth values, those
two statements are logically equivalent. However, this
does not mean that the two statements are equivalent in all
respects
.
Consider conjunction. (Refer to the truth table for
conjunction.) Conjunction introduction, written
.1, allows
the following valid inferences:
1 . 0
2j_ A
: • 3 . 0 * A ( . I)
Again, we may use the truth table method to prove this
inference valid.
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0 A ( (0 • A ) • % (Q . a) )
t t t * f = f
f t f • t = f
t f f • t = f
f f f • t = f
Conjunction elimination, written .E, allows the following
valid inference:
1
.
0 • A
: • 2 . 0 ( .E)
Again, using the truth table method:
0 A ( (0 • A) • % Q)
t t t • f = f
f t f • t = f
t f f * t = f
f f f ‘ t = f
Consider disjunction. (Refer to the truth table for dis-
junction.) Disjunction introduction, written VI, allows the
following valid inference:
1
.
0
: . 2 . OVA (VI)
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Again using the truth table method:
P A (Q • ^ (O V A) )
t t t • % (t) = f
f t f • ^ (t) = f
t f t • m (t) = f
f f f • m (f) = f
Disjunction elimination, written VE, allows the following
valid inference:
1. 0 V A
2 . ^ o
3. A (VE)
Again, using the truth table method:
0 A ( ( (0 V A) * % 0)
t t (t * f) . f = f
f t (t • t) • f = f
t f (t * f) • t = f
f f (f * t
)
• t = f
Consider the material conditional. (Refer to the truth
table for the material conditional.) Conditional
introduction, written 3 I, like m I
,
has its own name. This
has been called conditional proof. As we shall see, 31
like m I, requires that we shall call a subproof. ZD I
allows us to assume 0 and then if we can prove A using valid
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rules of inference and the other propositions available to
us, then we can conclude 0=4. allows the following
valid inference from a subproof:
1.
2
.
TT
0 Assume
vaSdly
h
toT
er Pr°p0sitions available to us lead
o A ( ZDl
)
Conditional elimination, written -p E
, includes two rules of
inference traditionally known as modus ponens and modus
toliens
. C2 E allows either of the following valid
inferences
:
OR
1
2
3
1
2
_
3
0 ^ A
0
A (t>E)
0 a
^ A
0 E)
Again using the truth table method:
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0 A
t t
f t
t f
f f
Li (O A ) - p) . % ai
(t • t) • f = f
(t • f) • f = f
(f • t) . t = f
(t • f) . t = f
( ( (O v A) • % A)
(t * f) • t = f
(t • f) • f = f
(f • t) • t = f
(t • t) • f = f
^ ^ 0 )
Consider the biconditional. (Refer to the truth table for
the material biconditional.) Biconditional introduction,
written E 1
, allows the following valid inference:
1. 0 ZD a
2 . A Z> 0
: • 3. 0 E A (E I)
Again using the truth table method:
-2 A (_( (0 3> A) « (A ZD 0) ) • ^ (0 E A) )
t t (t • t) • % (t) = f
f t (t • f) • % (f) = f
t f (f • t) • % (f) _ f
f f (t • t) • ^ (t) = f
Biconditional elimination, written e e, allows the following
valid inferences:
1 .
2
^
• • J •
0 E A
0
A (E E)
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OR
1. 0 E A
2
.
:
. 3 . ^ A (e E)
1. O E A
2
. A
: • 3- 0 (E E)
1. O E A
2 . % a
Again using the truth table:
P A ( (0 e a )
t t (t • t)
f t (f • f)
t f (f • t)
f f (t • f)
( (0 E A) ‘A) *
* 0) * ^ A
*
^ (t) = f
*
^ (t) = f
*
^ (f) = f
’
^ (f) = f
% Q ( (Q E A)
( (o = A) - % Q)
(t * f) • t = f
(f * t) • t = f
(f * f) ‘ f = f
(t * t) * f = f
• ^ A) ^ % 0
(t • t)
(f * t)
(f * f)
(t • f)
* f = f
’ t = f
‘ f = f
* t = f
(t * f)
(f • f)
(f • t)
(t " t)
• t = f
* f = f
• t = f
* f = f
% % A
In addition to these rules, allowing us validly to introduce
and validly eliminate these logical connectives, we may
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consider an
reiteration
inference
:
additional valid rule of inference>
written R. R allows the following
called
valid
1
. 0
2. o (R)
Again using the truth table method:
o (0 • % cn
t f
f f
Certain premises of arguments, which do not logically
follow from other premises by these rules, we shall call
assumptions. We shall use 'assumption’ as a term referring
to the logical status of a premise, just as the rules of
valid inference refer to the logical status of the moves
from one premise to another in an argument. Therefore, we
need a rule of assumptions, written A, to guarantee that
the conclusion is validly reached from those assumptions,
and no others, using the above valid rules of inference. We
may keep track of these assumptions by a simple proof
procedure. Consider A.l, as translated into PC. Premise 1,
2, 3, and 4 are all assumptions. They stand on their own;
they are logically independent. That is, they are not
derived from other premises by the above rules of valid
inference
.
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However, to test the validity of A.l, we must show that the
conclusion, 7, is validly derived from just these four
assumptions. We may not introduce other assumptions, unless
they are part of what we have called a subproof for % I
,
or
for 7^1. (Notice that these assumptions drop out of the
proof when the subproof is concluded.) Consider A.l as
translated into PC:
1 . P Q A
2 • P -O (R 3 S ) A
3 • ^ Q A
4. % (R s) A
5. Q and P Q allows us, by 3 E, to derive ^ P. So we
may, with Voliva, state:
% Q -3 % p. This follows from 1, 3 and E
.
6. Similarly, ^ (R 3S) and P (r jp S ) allows us againby c? E, to derive v p. So we may, with Voliva,
state :
% (R S) 3? v p . This follows from 2, 4 and 3 E.
7. % P, the conclusion, follows from 3, 5 and 4, 6 and
J E. Note that 3, 5, 4 and 6 are derived from 1, 2,
3 and 4. Therefore, 7 is derived from 1, 2, 3 and 4,
and this argument satisfies the rule of assumptions.
A.l can really be seen as two deductively valid arguments
joined together.
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A
-
1
(i)
1
- P ? Q
Ll 'V Q
: . 3 . % p
AND
A •
1
(ii)
1
. P 3? ( R -:=> s
)
2
- ^ (R z? S)
: . 3 . 'v p
Both are valid, and instances of -o E
SjJb££ct_ion
—7 - Logical EquivaJenr^
Given the above rules of valid inference, we are now in a
position both to evaluate given arguments like A .l, and
also, given premises as assumptions and a conclusion, to
attempt validly to deduce a conclusion from the assumptions
However, there are several other important logical tools to
consider before constructing such proofs in earnest.
The first is a notion we already mentioned, logical
equivalence. Given this notion, we may introduce what are
called Demorgan's laws and the concept of a tautology. We
stated that when two logically complex statements have
exactly the same truth values for all possible assignments
275
of truth values to
complex statements
their component statements,
are logically equivalent.
logical equivalence of two such statements,
the truth table method.
we
those two
To test for
simply use
Two sets of logical equivalences have such usefulness thatthey are called Demorgan's laws, after the 19th century
logician Augustus Demorgan. (However, they are also stated
by William of Ockham in the 14th century., These laws state
that
:
(i)
(ii)
% (0 * A)
and that
^ (OVA)
is logically equivalent to % o V v A ,
is logically equivalent to v o • % A
Consider ( 1 ) . Again, these can be proven logically
equivalent by the truth table method:
P A % ( 0 • A ) OVA
t t ^ (t) = f f v f = f
f t %(f)=t f v f = t
t f %(f) =t f v t = t
f f % (f) = t f V t = t
Consider (ii)
.
Again, these can be proven logically
equivalent by the truth table method:
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O
t
f
t
f
A ^ (0 V A) % o • % A
t ^ (t) = f f . f = f
t ^ (t) = f t • f = f
f ^ (t) = f f • t = f
f ^ (f) = t t • t = t
Demorgan s laws are useful because they allow us, in an
argument, to avoid the negation of complex conjunctions and
complex disjunctions. Therefore, „e need never apply
negation to a complex disjunction, or a complex conjunction.
Therefore, we may replace any statement in an argument with
a logically equivalent statement and preserve validity.
Therefore, we may justify such a move simply by citing
Demorgan
' s laws, written DM.
Inere are many other logical equivalences. For example,
%
J° P A ) is logically equivalent to 0 • ^ A
.
(° = A ) is logically equivalent to m 0 E A
and to 0 E % A
.
0 A is logically equivalent to % 0 E A.0 = A is logically equivalent to (0 * A) V
0 . ^ A) .
Again, in an argument, these may be justified simply by
writing DM even though strictly speaking they are not
(iii)
(iv)
(v)
(vi)
Demorgan
' s laws.
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It should be obvious that all contradictions are logically
equrvalent. Recall that contradictions are necessarily
false because of their logical form. Just as there are
necessarily false statements, there are necessarily true
statements. As we might expect, these statements are
necessarily true because of their logical form. Such
necessarily true statements are called tam-nin a utologies. Also,
then, it should be obvious that- i +. ,V at all tautologies are logically
equivalent.
Consider statements of the form 0 V ^ o
Q ^ 0 O v V o
t f t
f t t
Since statements of this form are true in all possible
interpretations of their components, such statements are
necessarily true. A tautology need not have the form
0 V v o. Just as with contradictions, there may be complex
statements not of this form that are tautologies.
Models
1 . Work logical equivalences using truth
carefully that 'logical equivalence'
the same meaning,' i.e.,
tables. Explain
does not mean 'has
a) Mary got pregnant, and she was married.
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b) Mary was married, and .
' she got pregnant.
I terns a ) and b) are lnninai
I
t
have the same truth table
, ^
eCaUSe the
^the same meaning. ' nd do n°t have
equ?vflLces/expLiniia°?haPhY “d Pr°Ve Sorae logical
so that students
P
can become faL
S
!?
nmentS ° f tr^h values
tables for the various^cl^^,^ trUth
Explain carefully the use of ir^rr-i i
arguments
; anticipate
Exercises
Have the students show whv forfor validity, the order nf\h the .PurPose of testingY/ ° o the Premises does not matter.
Have them prove using the truth table method, that
'' UV)
' (V) and (lv) d° express logical equivalents.
•*
V
l
t
o
h
rp?!
OVe that ,p '=’ Q ' is logically equivalent to
usefufhe^!
PraCtiCS 6XerCiseS in the texts
have them translate
stat®”ts .™a using Demorgan’s,
Then have them tes? tfTre^uhs
^ 1091031 eqUivalents
•
Subsection 8 - Proofs of Deductive Validity: pc
Given these rules of valid inference and the ability to
translate such arguments into PC symbols, we must now
establish what we shall call a proof procedure. Suppose
that we are given the assumptions and asked validly to
derive a specific conclusion from them. Our proof
procedure is as follows:
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FlrSt
' We Write and number the assumptions and o thside, indicate A as » i _ « •
rifht
justification
. We shallfor- . bn ii also use A
of t
SUmPtl°nS in SUb“-
-
-U lustify each line
. h
Pr° nUmbered consecut ively on the left to the
2 h ° f the Une and indiCate *** -ions lines and
concl
3UStlfY UnS
' Then
' WhSn WS reach theusion, we can check to see that • <- a
lines which we called
' °" the
inf
assumptions and on our rules of validerence
. Consider the following argument
:
148
Holmes wil 1 .-v
Mycroft. However, h| lufl “"h if he insults withand only if Watson has dlserlll^ With Mycrof t ifis on vacation. Lestrade is not 1S post ' or LestradeHolmes will solve the murfinr- !u°n vacation, anddeserted his post d Therefore, Watson has
The conclusion is obviously
All the other statements are
irrelevances. Let:
Watson has deserted his post
premises, since there are no
P - Holmes will solve the murder
Q - He (Holmes) consults with Mycroft
K - Lestrade is on vacation
S = Watson deserted his post
Thanks to N.
exercises prepared fo
N. Scott Arnold.
Scoff Arnold, from a brief set ofr Rhetoric 100E by Jon Nordby 'and
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The argument can be translated as follows
:
1
. P 3 Q
2. Q = (S V R)
3 . 'v R • p
4
. P
5. Q
6. S V R
7 . ^ R
8
. S
A
A
3, .E
1 / 3,JE
5, 2,3E
3, .E
7, 6, VE.
We see that 7 depends on 3,
that 6 in turn depends on 1
depends on 1, 2, and 3.
and 6 depends on 5 and 2, and
and 3, so the conclusion 8
Models
1 .
f
I
o
n
no°w
k
^l Pr° fS;. yOU mUSt explain the strategy you
backwards
1GSe proofs are sometimes best workedYou may now use the same arguments that
for, and Le the rules
• ( -
that the va lid ones are valid. Show why thenvalid ones cannot be proven, i.e., that reaching the
^
US1™ involves violating one or more of theserules Explain such violations clearly. You may ifthe class is more advanced, introduce alternative
' proofprocedures, such as the Montique and Kalish show lineboxing and canceling method.
2
. Use the complex argument that
in Subsection 5 and prove that
these rules, again explaining
you used as an exercise
it is valid using
the strategy to follow.
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3
.
4
.
5
.
SuK: for
nature of the rule of assuL?
bpr°° fS
' exP lain the
used to bring a previous l?ne ?V reiteration asthe restrictions. nto a subProof. Explain
using
fc
thele
a
riles ?
n
?xpl??n
S
t h
r°m the l0gi ° texts
them. Explain the virtue of^ strategy for provingthe conclusion to be' derived Tn ei "9 backward s fromi this particular method.
emphasize the n^pfninn c
arguments, organizing writing as
f°r Presen ting
evaluating arguments
9 b 9 ' wel1 as critically
Exercises
the^ules?
^he^o^rtlits^re^ T* them ' ^Wingexamples, or you mly formulate as we?? f°ryourself from Berlitz or VonnLtv P S prove themlate them as well as ?? “ haVe them trans-
in fact, valid. This^ofd them% Hake sure all are
to master the rules with th'
S <
r
onfus:|-ug their inability
proving an invaEra£^vSH?8lbllity ° f ™nrectiy
Present more complex arguments, same as 1 .
3 rafutation of some obviously false
form to organize tLi^writlng^ deductive argument
gi^secticm^ - Evaluating Aronmpnfc
: PC
We now have a simple procedure for testing an argument for
validity (the truth table method) and a proof procedure
not only for testing an argument for validity, but also for
proving that a conclusion validly follows from given
assumptions. We now, given the notions of validity and
soundness, have a means to evaluate deductive arguments like
A
. 1
.
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If the argument is valid and if it is sound, then „e know
that the conclusion must be true. However, if it is valid
and unsound, we do not have any guarantee that the con-
clusion is true, nor do we have any guarantee that the
conclusion is false. If the argument is invalid, then we
face a similar situation regarding the truth of the con-
clusion as when the argument is valid but unsound.
Therefore, to evaluate an argument like A.l, „e must
consider both its validity and soundness.
We have shown that A.l is valid. However, is it sound? The
answer is clearly no. Premise 1 is false and premise 2 is
false. We see that both 1 and 2 of A.l are assumptions
from which the conclusion is said to follow. Therefore,
since 1 and 2 are false, this valid argument does not
establish the truth of the conclusion. Therefore, we are
entitled to reject the argument as a failure.
From this we can see that valid arguments must have true
premises (that is, they must also be sound) before they
may be said successfully to establish the truth of the
conclusion. Therefore, to evaluate arguments like A.l in
which the conclusion is said to follow deductively from the
premises, we must consider the validity of the argument and
the soundness of the argument
.
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2
.
Models
them as deductivel^valid 1" 0111 ^ readin <?' formulate
evaluate them. if „
ld ar9u™ents in class fi!
a
U
ps°V ike V°n Ddni^en
C
or
S
Berli t
them °n behalf of anPseudo-scientist in CarHn
1 Z
' °r on behalf ofe valid argument. Prove that ''?
3*6 SUre you constructevaluate its soundness Thlt Valid ' then
C
ability to reconstruct^ * Wl11 anticipate theSection Three. arguments for evaluation in
Point out thp +. •
»ents, propositionsrand
a
t?C?h
Sta
?
eS ° f affa^s, state-advanced and cur iou ;, this ?s
™ 1 U
r-
F° r the mo^introduce theories of truth
a good opportunity toResrst the temptation unless S a , little metaphysics,early under control. cdass has the material
Jrgu^nts'lrofSgi^t^^r . if you usethey must translate. Also' von® S; 1” in ElUUsh sothe world is like" for the' y “ might tel1 them "Whatquestion, so they can evaluate sourness"* in
T® Pseu<^°“Scientificsound argument to orgL^e*
Logical Form ot
Quantification LPC
Statements With Tprmo
.
so far, we have considered the logical form of complex
nts tormed by relating simple statements with the
logical connectives. However, there are many simple
logically valid inferences for which the above tests of
:r
ty and Pr0°f P— «•—uate. consider thefollowing example:
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10.1
1 .
'Ll
. 3
.
No pseudo-scienH cfo
Some Americans are pse!ido
CaUtiOUS
‘
Some Americans are n^utio^ 1^
To translate 10.1 into PC will be of no help
10.2
1
. P
2
. Q
• 3
. R
What are logically related in in iY m 10.1 are not statements at
all, but what we shell j_a call terms, or predicates. So far,
we have considered the iorrin,ilogical structure of complex state-
ments composed of the lorri^ilogical connectives and simple
component statements. These simni^6 ple component statements
were the smallest logical unit. Now to determine the
validity and soundness of arguments like 10.1, „e must con-
sider breaking down these component statements in turn into
their components, namely terms.
Again, all valid arguments depend for their validity on
their logical form as defined by our rules of valid
inference. However, the arguments may be either composed
of the logical relations among complex statements composed
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Of simple statements, or compose, of the logical relations
among the terms composing the statements.
Statements are either true or false. Terms are true of
°bjeCtS
' »° object, an, false of all the
other objects. For example, the term •American' is true
of each American, and false of each Canadian. We shall call
the set of all the objects (in a broad sense, of which a
term is true the extension of the term. Thus, the
extension of the term 'American' is the set of all
Americans. Terms are said to have extensions, just as
statements are said to have truth values.
Consider 10.1.
'Pseudo-scientist' is a term that is true of
each pseudo-scientist.
'Cautious' is a term that is true
of each cautious thing, and as we have seen, 'American' is
a term true of each American. Let:
F - 'Pseudo-scientist'
G = ' Cautious
'
H = 1 American
'
We may then capture the logical form of 10.1:
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10
.
3
1 • No F are G
2
»
Some H are F
3. Some H are not G
We may use a method invented by a man named Venn (1880) to
Show the logical relation among the presses and conclusion
°f 10.3. Let three overlapping circles stand for the
extensions of the terms. Let shading stand for emptiness
and let 'X' stand for the presence of an object or objects.
Thus, we may picture premise 1 as:
and premise 2 as:
We may combine these circles and simply read the results
to see if 3 follows given 1 and 2:
re
' this pictures a
We see that the X
valid conclusion;
G H
is not in G
, thereto
some H are not G.
he Venn diagram method for deter™-; •
- termming the validity of
arguments like in l10.1, however, beco.es extremely cumbersome
W
d
We h3Ve “
—— We shall therefore simply
- °P the rules we have provided so far for PC and add four
-w rules to deal with such arguments composed of statements
which depend upon the logical9 relations among terms. The
result we shall call LPC ; PC standing for propositional
calculus, and LPC standing for the lower predicate calculus.
('Predicate' is another word for 'term'.)
1. Point out and explain why the rules of pc . . .corporated into LPC p.*-, a . PC are all m-
grammatical^
6
reading which employ 'all- '.nme' from thelogical re laf- ion P , . ' °o ' and terms in
arguments using simple staf
6 tllG1 r difference from
raents composed^ sLple staSments"^^""^^connectives. n is and the logical
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2 .
3 .
4 .
diagrams^o^hovf'thatThe c
sylj°9isms ' using Venn
some invalid a * « US1« « valid. include
that the conclusion is'no "l l"
51"9 Y
enn dia9ra„,s
especially.) " id y reached. (see Quine,
b*=~*
and
S
the notion offset as^kind ^ ?° tion of classesadvanced students. lna ° f class to the more
1 .
2 .
Exercises
have the students diagram a
arguments, showing that they
number of syllogistic
are valid or invalid.
Have them, in a specific reading
or Von Ddniken, reconstruct suchdiagram its validity.
assignment in Gardner,
an argument, and
Subsection 11 - Quantifer Rules
What we shall call the existential quantifier, written
’ UX) ’
' corresP°nds to the words 'there is something x such
that', where x is a variable referring to objects in a given
domain, or set of objects. For example, consider a
statement using the term 'American': 'There are Americans'.
This may be written ' (EJx) (Ax) '
,
where A is what we shall
call a predicate constant standing for 'American'. We know
that terms are true of objects; that 'American' is true of
each American and false of each non-American.
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Intuitively, this allows us some insight into the
existential quantifier. Existential quantifiers may be
understood in terms of what we may call a domain of objects
and disjunction. Hx) (Ax) then, can intuitively be seen
as a disjunction picking out each object in the world,
represented by natural numbers (0,1,2.
. . o; A1 v A2 V
' • v A“) • Recall that a disjunction is
case one of the disjuncts is true. Therefore
that (f?x) (Ax) will be true just in case there
one American in the world.
true, just in
we can see
is at least
What we shall call the universal quantifier, written ’ (Vx) '
,
corresponds to the words ’each thing x is such that', where
x is a variable referring to objects in a given domain. For
example, consider a statement using the terns 'American' and
'mortal'; 'All Americans are mortal'. This may be written
(Vx) (Ax Mx)
,
where A is a predicate constant standing for
American' and M is a predicate constant standing for
mortal'. Again, since we know that terms are true of
objects, we may gain some intuitive insight into the
universal quantifier.
For our purposes, universal quantifiers may be understood
in terms of a finite domain of objects and conjunction.
(Vx) (Ax '3> Mx)
,
then, can intuitively be seen in terms of
a conjunction; picking out each object in the finite domain.
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represented by letters a
,
b
,
c
, . . . etc
. : Aa o Ma
. Ab •
Mb Ac Me
. . . Az ? Mz
. Recall that conjunction is
true just in case all the conjuncts are true. Also recall
that a conditional is false just in case the antecedent is
true and the consequent is false.
We shall now consider 10.3 and see how we can use these
quantifiers to capture its logical form. Premise 1 may be
written ' (Vx) (Fx i Gx) '
, capturing the claim that 'each
thing x in the domain is such that if it is F, then it is
not G
.
Premise 2 can be written • (3x) (x
. Fx)', capturing the claim
that 'there is something x such that it is H and it is F.
The conclusion 3, may be written ' (3x) (Hx
.
v Gx)
'
capturing the claim that 'there is something x in the domain
such that it is H and not G. Therefore, 10.1 may be written
as follows
:
11.1
1. (Vx) (Fx 25 % Gx)
2
.
(3x) (Hx
. Fx)
: . 3 (3x) (Hx
.
'v Gx)
It is evident that we now need to add to our set of rules
some rules of valid inference for the existential and
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universal quantifier so we can determine the
11.1 given these rules.
validity of
Consider the
introduction
inference
:
existential quantifier,
written EQI
, allows the
Existential quantifier
following valid
1
.
Aa
2
• (3x) (Ax)
(Where there is an object, represented by 'a' here, in the
premise for every X in the conclusion.) This is a valid
move because if, for example, ’Joe is an American' is
translated 'Aa', where a is a constant referring to Joe,
then it is true that there is something that is an American,
namely Joe. Existential quantifier elimination, written
EQE, is slightly more complex and requires a special kind of
what we have called, in the case of * I and O I, a subproof.
Consider the following simple arguments:
11.2
A
- lj_ (3x) (Fx • Gx)
• • 2
. (3x) (Fx)
B
. 1.
: . 2 .
Fa • Ga
Fa (.E)
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In 11.2 A., we cannot simplv use f ^ uP Y US * E to breab up 1, as we do
H*2 ®
• ' since what we shall call11 the scope of the
quantifier ranges over both F an, G
. Therefore
, somehow wg
must eliminate the quantifier to allow us to apply
, E like
in 11.2 B. Clearly, if we can get Fa
, as in n>2 ^ ^
we can get 0x| (Fx, simply by EQI
. To get (gx) (px)
11.2 A., we shall use what we shall call a strict subproof.
The intuition here is that if 0x) (FX • Gx) is true, then
there must be some object in the domain that is both F and
G. Let us call that object ’a'. However, it may not be
I 9 / * •it may be b
,
or 'c'); so we do not want any-
thing in the argument to depend on its being 'a'. This
subproof is strict with respect to 'a' in that it must
contain no assumptions depending on a and must not contain
a in the last line of the subproof. This guarantees that
as no logical relations among any of the premises out-
side the strict subproof.
In this sense
,
then, a strict subproof is a model; nothing
m the proof depends on picking the correct object in the
domain; whatever the correct object is, we can show that the
logical relations hold. EQE allows the following valid
inference. One may eliminate an existential quantifier by
forming a strict subproof with respect to some constant,
such that the subproof does not contain that constant in
the last line of the subproof and such that the last line
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of the subproof
bring the last
is validly reached by our rules and one may
line of the strict subproof out of the strict
subproof. Consider the following simple proof of 11.2 A
involving EQE and a subproof strict with respect to
-a'.
11.2 '
1
. C3x) (Fx * Gx)
^ 2 . Fa • Ga
3 . Fa
- i- (--3x) (Fx)
5
. Bx) (Fx)
A
1, for EQE
2 , .E
3, EQI
2-4, 1, EQE
Consider the Universal Quantifier. Universal Quantifier
elimination, written UQE, is very simple, and allows the
following valid inference:
1- (Vx) (Fx Gx)
2 . Fa o Ga
(Where a is a constant referring to objects in the domain.)
This is a valid move because if, for example, everything, if
it is F then it is G, then some particular thing, call it a,
if it is F then it is G.
Universal quantifier introduction, written UQI
,
is, like EQE,
slightly more complex and requires another subproof, strict
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with respect to some constant,
simple arguments:
Consider the following
11.3
A * 1
• (Vx) (Fx ZD Gx)
2
- (Vx) (Bx ZD Hx)
: • 3 • (Vx) (Fx 3 Hx)
B
. 1 . Fa 3 Ga
2 . Ga ZD Ha
: • 3 • Fa ZD Ha 73 E and
ZD I
n 11.3 A., we cannot simply use ZD E and ZD I to reach the
conclusion (Vx) (Fx Hx) since the scope of the quantifiers
covers both Fx ZD Gx and Gx
conclude Fa ZDHa:
->3. Fa
!
4 . Fa ZD Ga
5 . Ga ZD Ha
6 . Ga
7 . Ha
8 . Fck Z> Ha
Hx. We can use UQE to validly
A
1, UQE
2, UQE
3 , 4, ZD E
5 , 6 , ZD E
3/ 7, 73 I
The problem remains going from one particular object a if
it has F then it has H, to every object in the domain, if
it has F, then it has H. The next line in our proof must
be
:
9. (Vx) (Fx ZD Hx)
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But how do we justify such a step?
First, we must notice that nothing in the proof depends on
our choosing 'a'; we might just as easily have chosen
-b'
or 'c ' . This series of steps, 3 through 8, is a model for
all the constants in the domain. Therefore, we may take
ourselves as having proven all substitution instances,
providing that we specify successful guidelines for such
a procedure. These guidelines involve introducing a sub-
proof
, strict with respect to some constant.
We can now see that UQI allows the following valid
inference: from a subproof containing no assumption about
a constant c, strict with respect to c, and not containing
c m the last line, one may validly infer the universal
quantification of the result of replacing every occurrence
of c by a variable. Consider the following simple proof of
11.3 A. involving UQI and a subproof strict with respect
to ' a ' :
11.3 '
1 . (Vx) (Fx ZD Gx) A
•
a
2 . (Vx) (Gx Hx) A
r>3. Fa A
4. Fa ZD Ga 1, UQE
5 . Ga o Ha 2, UQE
6 . Gel 3 , 4 , ZD E
7. Ha 5, 6, ZDE
8. Fa Ha 7 Z>I
9. (Vx) (Fx '3 Hx) 1, 2, UQI
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Finally
, it is important to note certain logical equiva-
lences between the existential and the universal quantifier.
Using 'Fx' to mean 'x is an F 1
, then <3x) (Fx) means: 'there
are F'
, 'some things are F-,
' F exists', and therefore, its
negation, •„ Ox) (Fx)
' means: 'there are no F', 'nothing
is an F', ' F do not exist'. But to say 'there are no F' is
the same as saying 'everything is non-F'. Thus „e have two
logically equivalent ways of saying 'there are no F'.
(i) a, (3x) (Fx) and
(ii) (Vx) ^ (Fx)
Similarly, (Vx) (Fx) means: 'all is F', 'each thing is an
F\ 'everything is an F', 'there is nothing but F', and,
therefore, its negation, w (Vx) (Fx) ' means: 'not everything
is an F
' , 'there are non-F', which is logically equivalent
to tax) v (Fx). Thus, -w (vx)' is logically equivalent to
< x > " and , 't ( x ) 1 is logically equivalent to ’ (Vx) v. 1
Therefore, we may translate universal quantifications of the
form 1 (Vx) (Fx)
’
into the logically equivalent existential
quantification 'w (3x) % (Fx) '
.
We may translate
existential quantifications of the form ' (Hx) (Fx) ' into the
logically equivalent universal quantification
(Vx) % (Fx) '
.
The decision can be based on convenience.
To justify such a step in a proof we may simply write 'DM'.
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3.
Models
use^hfrule^a^rthe^" !tat™ arguments into LPC,
validity! (Construct profdure to Prove their
use exiples prodded ”
C»frpSe^SS°Sl d"and working backward from the no s ^rate9Y of sub-proofsShow how tL conc^Ssionepe^ds o! r!°nth:ia the rUleSassumptions in a valid argument. given
Reemphasize the material covered in Subsection 4regarding validity, and relate it- -t-n -t-hPoint out the usefulness of these toalT^
Ss
r
o
e
r
1Uating the validiV of complex arguments and
critical
Presenting original arguments, especially
S s!bsec?!on”! • ^oemPhasize the material coveredm u ti 4 regarding soundness.
Exercises
Have the students translate any quantifier statement-
v!?“ lnt° LPC ' and USe tha "dies t^prove thSr
!h2^
trUCt
r?
ne S
V
Ch ar9ument from the reading, and have
them eval^e
rS Ss^un=. itS ^
^
an argument from the reading for the studentscritically to evaluate. Have them organize their
evaluation m terms of a quantifier statement argument.
Subsection 12 - Relations
Quantification will not only help us capture and evaluate
the logical form of terms in statements, but it will also
help us capture the logical form of statements such as
'Berlitz and VonDSniken are acquainted'. This is not a
conjunction or any other truth function of the statements:
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(il)
'Berlitz
k
is
13 ac<
?
uainted', and
acquainted
P""' “ « «.mu
inas acquainted'
'small' 'Kn.
' between
, 'loves',
'hates', etcare often called relative terms or rew' relations, because theydepend for their i n = +.
°n ln a Particular context on the
objects that are relate vated. Furthermore, relations may relate
more than two obipr+-<;jects
. For example,
'New Haven is between
New York and Hartford., However, for the most part, we
shall simply consider relations between two objects, called
dyadic relations.
Before discussing properties of relations, and their rolem arguments, we must see how to capture their logical form.
Once we see this, we shall be able to use our rules of valid
inference to construct and evaluate proofs containing
relations. we have seen that to symbolize 'Joe is an
American', we may use a constant, like a letter assigned to
Joe in the domain and write
-Aa- or "Aj
-
.
This is simply
what we call a substitution instance of 'x is an American',
written Ax
. Similarly, when we say that ’Berlitz is
acquainted with VonDSniken
, this can be regarded as a
substitution instance of "x is acquainted with y". we must
pick a relation constant that does not conflict with
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predicate constants in an argument. For example, if we
^ose 'A. to stand for 'is acquainted with- in an argument
where
-A- already stood for
-American-, confusion would
result. Thus, care must be taken in symbolizing statements,
terms and relations. Let's let 'B' stanri fb and or is acquianted
with-.
-x is acquainted with y-
, then, can be written
y . Similarity,
-Berlitz is acquainted with VonDflniken-
can be written
-BbV, where - b - is a constant referring to
Berlitz and v- is a constant referring to VonDSniken.
The order of replacement is very important. For example
it is true that Berlitz is, in fact, acquainted with
VonDSniken, then it may not be true that VonDSniken is
acquainted with Berlitz. This is so because of various
properties relations have, as we shall see in a moment.
So
-BbV may be true, but
-Bvb- may be false. These are
clearly not logically equivalent.
if
Consider some simple relations and their correct
translation
:
Everything attracts everything (Vx) (Vy) (Axy)Everything is attracted by everything (Vy) (Vx) (Ayx)Something attracts something (dx) (3y) (Axy)
Such relations have many interesting properties. First,
they may be characterized as symmetrical, asymmetrical, or
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non-symmetrical
. A symmetrical relation = def if one
individual has it to a second, then the second must have it
to the first. 'Rxy' designates a symmetrical relation if and
only if (Vx) (Vy) (Rxy3 Ryx)
, i.e., '’is next to," "is married
to." An asymmetrical relation = def if one individual has it
to a second, then the second cannot have it to the first.
'Rxy designates an asymmetrical relation if and only if
(Vx) (Vy) (Rxy 3 ^ Ryx)
,
i.e.
,
A non- symmetrical relation =
symmetrical or asymmetrical.
'is north of', 'is older than',
def a relation that is neither
Secondly, they may be characterized as transitive, in-
transitive, or non-transitive. A transitive relation = def
if one individual has it to a second, and the second to a
third, then the first must have it to the third. 'Rxy'
designates a transitive relation if and only if
(Vx) (Vy) (Az) [(Rxy
. Ryz) 3 Rxz], i.e., 'is the mother of
'
,
is the father of'. An intransitive relation = def if one
individual has it to a second, and the second to a third,
then the first cannot have it to the third. 'Rxy'
designates an intransitive relation if and only if
(Vx) (Vy) (Vz) [ (Rxy . Ryz) 3 ^ Rxz)
,
i.e.
,
'is the mother of'
,
or 'is the father of', etc. A non-transitive relation = def
a relation which is neither transitive nor intransitive,
i.e.,
' loves '
.
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Thirdly, they may be characterized as totally reflexive,
reflexive, irreflexive, or non-reflexive. A totally
reflexive relation = def every individual has it to himself.
' Rxy
' designates a totally reflexive relation iff (Vx) ,Rxx,
,
i-e., 'is identical with'. A reflexive relation = def one
individual
,
a, has that relation to itself if something, b,
is such that either Rab or Rba. 'Rxy' designates a
reflexive relation iff (Vx) (Vy) [ (Rxy v Ryx) 3 Rxx]
,
i.e.,
'is same age as', 'has same color hair as' (obviously all
totally reflexive relations are reflexive)
. An irreflexive
relation = def no individual has it to himself. 'Rxy'
designates an irreflexive relation iff (vx) v (Rxx), i.e.,
'is north of', 'is married to'. A non-reflexive relation =
def a relation that is neither totally reflexive, reflexive,
or irreflexive.
Clearly, relations may have various combinations of
properties described. For example, the relation of
'weighing more than' is symmetrical, transitive, and
irreflexive, while the relation of 'having the same weight
as' is symmetrical, transitive and reflexive. Relations
enter into arguments in many ways, as we shall see.
However, there is one relation, namely identity, which is
important enough to consider alone.
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Models
and their translaiLn°into
1
LPC°
nS
This
e
inTOl°
ar9uments
'
?^“n^?sTy ar9Uments usln* -^io^?
v
^onsult
G
Cons truet^using
f
rel at ions
'10ti0n
°f
o^a^relation “^o STS*-**
the reading° supplyin^the^implic itthe argument valid. This is a nnoa p^
emise to make
the principle of charity. 9 place to introduce
Exercises
1
. Have the students name
i»e., 'equals' - trans
the following dyadic relations,
symm, reflexive.
is not less than
is greater than or equal
is the successor of
is a predecessor of
is congruent with
is fond of
is the spouse of
defeats the brother of
is the uncle of
is the brother of
is the sibling of
is logically equivalent to
is the friend of
to is north of
is hungry for
loves the wife of
is next to
defeats
is on the right of
is the square root of
is sour as
is compatible with
logically implies
2. Have the students prove the following about relations:
totally reflexive reflexive
asymmetrical 3 irreflexive
intransitive 3? irreflexive
(transitive and irreflexive) 3> asymmetrical(transitive and symmetrical) 3? reflexive
(intransitive
. symmetrical) 3? irreflexive
reflexive e (Vx) (Vy) (Rxy 3? (Rxx
. Ryy)
% ( 'x) 0 y ) (Rxy) 33 (symmetrical
. asymmetrical)
3. Have them symbolize and deduce a contradiction from:
There are two different things each taller than any-
thing different from it. (Note - this is an enthymeme.)
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§afe5g^gLl3^Identity and Define. Descriptions
Many arguments depend for their valid logical form on the
identity of an object. For example, consider:
Sis Carroll S" aSaShoS”^6 D°dgS°n '
Charles Lutwidge Dodgson was an author.
The usual notation for identity is t+- . .ut -
. It is obvious that
Identity is transitive, symmetrical, and totally reflexive.
In our symbolic notation:
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
Transitive: (Vx) (Vy) (Vz) ( ( (x =
0
(x = z) )
Symmetrical: (Vx) (Vy) ( (x = y) 3>Total reflexivity: (Vx) (x = x)
y) • (y =
(y = x)
)
z) ) =>
We may, therefore, introduce a rule, for convenience, called
identity introduction, written = I. we can see that x = y
iff every property of x is a property of y, and every
property of y is a property of x. Given the second half of
this biconditional = I allows us validly to conclude that
x
- y, i.e., that x and y refer to one object. Identity
elimination, written = E, allows the following valid
inference, based upon the same biconditional:
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X = y
Fx
Fy ( = E)
Identity has other uses in arguments, it allows us both to
capture the logical form of certain exceptive statements and
what are called definite descriptions. Consider a statement
like "Bill is on the Green Bay Packers and can out-run any-
one else on it'. Using b for Bill, Gx for 'x is on the
Green Bay Packers' and 'Oxy' for 'x can out-run y', we cannot
capture this by Gb • (Vx) (Gx = Obx) because this entails Obb,
which is false because being able to outrun is an irreflexive
relation. Thus, this translates the false statement 'Bill
IS on the Green Bay Packers and can outrun anyone on it'.
The word 'else' is missing. The proper translation appeals
to identity: Gb * (Vx) ( (Gx • * (x = b) ) Obx)
.
Consider
statements containing 'at most’ and 'no more than'. For
example, 'there is at most one explanation'. This does
not say that there is an explanation, only that there is no
more than one. Again, the proper translation appeals to
identity: (Vx) (Vy) ((Ex • Ey) 3 x = y)
.
Similarly, the
statement 'there are not more than two explanations' leaves
open the question of there being any at all:
(Vx) (Vy) (Vz) ((Ex
. Ey ‘ Ez) 3 (x = z) V (y = z) V (x = y) ) .
Identity is also useful for capturing the logical form of
statements containing 'at least'. It is not needed for
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'at least one', since the existential quantifier alone
handles this case. However, consider the statement 'there
are at least two explanations', using identity, the proper
translation is: (dx) (3y) (Ex • Ey • v
(x = t
We may also combine the translations for 'at least one* and
at most one to develop a method for symbolizing definite
numerical propositions. Thus, the statement 'there is one
correct explanation', meaning exactly one, is translated:
Ox) (Vy) ( (Ey Cy) = y = x) )
.
The statement 'there are
two probable causes', meaning exactly two, is translated:
C3y) (3z) ((Cy . Cz . % (y = z) ) . (Vx) (CX 3> (X = y) V
x = z)
)
) .
We may also use identity to translate what have been called
definite descriptions. Consider the following statement:
'The author of De Motibus Stellae Martis is a genius'.
This statement seems to assert first, that there is some
individual who wrote De Motibus Stellae Martis
, second, that
at most, one individual wrote it, and third, that that
individual was a genius. Using 'm' to represent
' De Motibus Stallae Martis ', 'G' to represent 'genius', and
'W' for 'wrote', each of these may intuitively be translated
as follows
:
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( i ) Px) (Wxm) •
( i i ) (Vy )
(
Wym 3 y = x )(iii) Gx
Combining these, we get the correct translation of such a
definite description:
( x) (Wxm • (Wy)(Wym=> x - y) . Gx)
Models
1 . Point out that two objects are not identical, and
properties!*
Dlstln9uish identity and similarity via
2 . translate statements of the forms considerednere at least two, at most one, exactly one, etc -using identity. Such statements may come from the*reading (Gardner)
.
3. Consider and discuss the notion of the scope ofquantifiers.
4. Translate and discuss various define descriptions, usedm the various explanations mentioned by Gardner.Consider the problem of non-denoting definite
descriptions and Russell's proposed solution. Resist
t e temptation to present too many metaphysical
complications. However, this is a good point tointroduce the notion of an ontology.
5. Reemphasize the interpretations of the quantifiers in
terms of a domain and disjunction (fix) and a domain and
conjunction (Vx)
.
Exercises
1. Have the students translate statements like the
following, using identity:
a) There is at least one person, but everyone has at
most one father.
b) At most two robbers held up the store.
c) One and only one man issued the invitation to at
most two men.
d) No one but John or Bob has the keys.
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e) Distinct men have distinct wives.f) A function is one-ono if i . -
values is the value for a unique^ent ,° f ltS
lilt the^following! uTinlTalnlity?
1^ ° f
a)
b)
Hence
, some
Honolulu's mayor is a native of Hawaiimayor is a native of Hawaii.
*
Thus ^
orse in the race is a thoroughbredin
t if at least two horspq = y a;
some thoroughbred is faster
6 race
' then
The ugliest
g
mon:rch
S
was British" "gl 'are dead and all male monarlhs'are kinL ^huf9S
uglIe: t
U
Sn
1
:^
B
Is
t
de
S
ad
m°narCh W“ B *ale
' «“» th*
Find other exercises in the logic texts.
c)
Subsections
- Summary of the Rules of Valid Inference
We now have the logical tools to capture the logical form of
most ordinary deductive arguments, we shall now summarize
the rules of valid inference for convenience, and then work
some proofs to become familiar with their operation. The
rules we have are as follows
:
(1) ^ I
^ E
(6) R
(2) . I
(7) A
.E (8) UQI
(3) VI
UQE
vE (9) EQI
(4) ^ I
EQE
IDE (10) DM
(5) = I (11) = I
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Note that all the rules for PC apply to LPC
.
1
.
2
.
3.
Models
in SubsectLn
X
uf^'w^ntiati°nS P™fs signedother exercises thS^
proofs/the value°of translation ' ValUS ° f SUCh
notation, and the orarn! i ? ° °Ur symb°lic
terms of evaluating argument^Lr^r^nLL^^rujng
.
"-nsS^„s
r
LTe
ntS
'
or
arguments ?ike l?2.
^ Cann0t Capture the f°™s of
Exercises
re!ding
e
ortfke^%rom
k
lSgic llltl*™
'
aSSigned from the
Have the students evaluate the fnrm n
supported by valid dedSot^e "“re
Subsection 15 - Proofs of Deductive Validity; LPC
Given these rules and the ability to translate arguments
into LPC symbols, we must now apply our proof procedure
from Subsection 8. Consider the following argument:
The professor of Greek at
Therefore, all professors
very learned.
Siwash is very learned,
of Greek at Siwash are
Let^Px - x is a professor of Greek, SxLx - x is very learned.
x is at Siwash,
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The proof,
follows
:
translations and justifications, appears as
1. (Ax
a
? . la
>3. (Pb
b
4 . (Pa
5. Pa
6. b =
7. Lb
8. Lei
9. La
o
1
—
1
(Pa
Sx
11
Sa
Sb (Vy) (Py
(Vy) (py . Sy X
A
A
Sy ZZ> b = yl
Sa )
3
b = a
Sa
Sa) o La
(Vx) ( (Px . Sx)
-z> Lx)
1, for EQE
3, UQE
2, R
4
, 5 ,^E
3, .E
6
,
EOE
7, =E
2, 9
,
I
10, UQI
y) . Lx)
lb
The strategy here, as pointed out in preceding models, is
to work backwards from the conclusion, anticipating the rule
needed to derive what is required to get each line.
Models
1
.
2
.
1 .
2
.
Work more difficult translations and proofs, againclearly explaining the proof procedure as you proceed.This may take the form of a review.
from
n
quhS^
in
^
USS ° f thiS
'
USing the final exerciseSubsection 14 as a basis for discussion. Note thevalue of clarity in the process of evaluation.
Exercises
Provide a representative sample of proofs, ranging fromPC proofs to difficult LPC proofs. Have the students
work these proofs, making sure to justify each line
according to our proof procedure.
H
f
V
fu
the stadents evaluate the strengths and weaknesses
!t easv?
r
°whv?
r0
^
d
i
re
-v
"hat makeS i<: hard? what "lakes
the limits Of' -itf a
Xt usefu1
'
and why? what areo its use, and why? Point out other proof
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Tn°mn^
Ure
^
' an<^ ^iscuss their merits and defectsI ore advanced ^pp-h nnc- , , • u r
.
discuss completeness? ' a 5003 Place to
Subsection 16 - Evaluating Arguments- me
We now have a method for translating relatively complex
arguments into LPC and proving them valid. Again, given a
valid argument, we must check to see if it is also sound.
Note that the truth value of a quantified statement depends
on no more than the extension of the statement under the
quantifier: an extential quantification is true or false
according to whether its extension is not empty or empty,
and a universal quantification is true or false according
to whether its extension exhausts the universe or not.
Models
1* Discuss the assignments of truth values to quantified
statements, recalling our intuitive picture of thequantifiers
.
Discuss the soundness of various valid arguments for thepurposes of evaluation.
3. Review 'states of affairs' and 'truth' and a simple
view of theories of truth.
Exercises
1* Have the students evaluate the soundness of various
valid LPC arguments. (You might consider describing
a world for the purposes of providing a context for
the argument.) Have them come up with truth conditions
for various quantified statements and compare the
assignments with the stipulated world.
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2
. Have the students write a hri a fuses of this material and 1 i
essaY describing the
this material
. Have thS Use te* e° USe ° fdeductive argument to present tef ™ ° f a validbe used as discussion material to f Sa SaY - (These ^7consideration of inductive 1 lead lnto aa arguments.)
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Section Two: Inductive Arguments and Their Evaluateion
Subsection 1 -
2
“ h""
“• «o,. o, complex
statements composed of simniople component statements and thelogical connectives I7q11
of .
' 33 COmplex statements composed
terms, regions and . all . or . some . quantifiers
_ ^
capturing this iogicai form we aiso have a means for
capturing the iogicai form of deductive arguments and
evaluating them by determining their validity and soundness.
However, there are some arguments, like A. 2, for which the
above mentioned evaluating techniques are inadequate, while
we may capture the logical form of the statements composing
A. 2, the logical relations among such statements are not
truth- functional logical relations. Such arguments are
deductively valid because they are not deductive
arguments. Arguments like A. 2 rely on a totally different
sort of following from" when we say that "conclusions
follow from the premises" of such arguments. These are
called inductive arguments.
in deductive arguments we said that true premises in a valid
deductive argument form guarantee the truth of the
conclusion. Thus, valid sound deductive arguments provide
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the strongest possible support for their conclusion; they
guarantee that they are true. However, in arguments like
A- 2, the support provided by the premises for the con-
clusion, even if the premises are true, is not nearly so
strong; the support does not guarantee that the conclusion
13 trUS
‘ ThS PremiSSS raere1
^ ^ovide evidence to support
the conclusion. Intuitively we can see theey at sometimes the
Premises provide evidence that strongly supports the
conclusion, and that sometimes the premises provide evidence
that weakly supports the conclusion.
We can see that inductive arguments do not guarantee the
truth of their conclusions by considering the following
argument and supposing that the premises are true:
1.1
1 .
2
.
3 .
4
^
. 5 .
James Earl Ray confessed to killing Martin Luther
FBI is satisfed that Ray committed the murder
the^hots ^relir^." ^ ^om^Ich
Ray killef^ng^ f°U"d guUty ° f the
Although the premises seem to provide evidence that
supports the conclusion, the truth of the premises does
not guarantee the truth of the conclusion. This is to say
that it is logically possible that the conclusion is false
while the premises are true. For example, it is logically
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POSSible that COnf—d ^ reasons other than his
that the FBI was guxlty of some willful or inad-
vertent oversight, that the witnesses were lying or mis _
taken, and that relevant evidence was suppressed during the
trial. To determine that these logically possible
explanations are true, we need to nh<-„<a obtain more evidence to
support them.
Sometimes the premises provide evidence that strongly
supports the conclusion, and sometimes the premises provide
evidence that weakly supports the conclusion. Consider the
following argument:
1.2
1
.
Z-L
. 3 .
River.'
h°USS 1S thrSe feet from the Ra9 in9 Mud
Tnn^ gi
ng Mud River flooded its banks 12 feetJo es' basement is wet.
We can easily see, given that the premises are true, that the
premises of 1.2 provide evidence that is very weak support
for the conclusion. For example, from the premises we do
not even know if Jones' house has a basement. For all we
know, Jones may live in a mobile home, or a houseboat.
Furthermore, we do not know when the Raging Mud River flooded
its banks twelve feet; it could have been a hundred years
before Jones' house was located three feet from this river.
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we can see, then, that to provide evidence that is strong
support for the conclusion of an inductive argument like
1.2, „e must provide more evidence, and that evidence must
increase, not decrease, what we shall call the probability
that the conclusion is true.
Consider the following argument:
1.3
1
.
2
.
3.
4.
. 57
River'
hOUSS iS threS feSt fr°m the Ra<? in<? Mud
Jones' conventional house was built in 1965 withconventional methods, and has a conventionalbasement and is still standing.
The Raging Mud River flooded its banks twelvefeet yesterday at noon.
Jones
' famiiy escaped to high ground, and sawtheir house submerged in the muddy river.Jones' basement is wet.
We can easily see, given that the premises are true, that
the premises of 1.3 provide evidence that is very strong
support for the conclusion. We can see, therefore, that the
premises of inductive arguments can be said to provide
evidence in various degrees of strength when providing
evidence to support a particular conclusion. Indeed, such
strength may diminish to the point where the premises are
irrelevant to the conclusion. We may, therefore, begin to
evaluate such inductive arguments by considering the
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strength with which the premises are said to
evidence to support the conclusion.
provide
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.
1 .
reading and^sk th^students^Dl^ a£gUments from theconclusions. Then as 2 P?;ace bets on the
bet, what they want to know'h^f
they are reluctant to
Soon they will catch on * I s* placin9 the bet.
and a weak inductive araumeS
blstln^shes a strong
answers to their ;
Y°U may then Provide
ductive argument
.
qUeStl°nS ^ produce a ^ong in-
induc?ivelv
d
s^on
ely Valid and sound arguments and
ft,
Exercises
Have the students verify, using truth tables that 1 1
ld
ar
^
n0t deductively vai id arguments. Given1.3, have them provide logically possible situationswhere the premises are true and^he conc^ulion false.
Point out the role of evidence and the need forg
2nH
er
i
ng
/
aS mUCh evidence a s possible, have thetudents (or a group of them) gather information andttempt to construct a strong inductive argument from1.1 using either
-Ray killed King- or ’it is not thecase that Ray killed King’ as the conclusion. This”points out the role of research in inductiveargument and the need to appeal to all relevant
available evidence, not just selective facts.
Subsection 2 - Possibili ty Versus Probability: Inductive
Strength and the Probability Calculus
We must now more clearly define the notions of "providing
evidence which strongly supports a conclusion" and
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"providing evidence which weakly supports a conclusion." We
can see that in 1.2 we need more evidence
- more research to
provide relevant facts. Now this research may provide
relevant evidence that requires us to change the conclusion.
For example, we may discover that it is a fact that Jones'
house does not have a basement. A fact, for our purposes
here, is simply a statement that is true.
But suppose that our research uncovers the facts listed as
premises 1, 2, 3 and 4 in 1.3. since 1, 2, 3 and 4 are
facts, by definition we know they are true. We know that
the conclusion, 5, is a statement. Therefore, we know
that this statement has a truth value since having a truth
value is a property of all statements.
The problem, of course, is that knowing that five is either
true or false does not help us to decide which truth value
to assign to five. Furthermore, we know that 1.3 does not
guarantee the truth of the conclusion given true premises,
since it is logically possible for the premises to be true
and the conclusion to be false. (For example, Jones may have
his basement packed solidly with a water repellent chemical
which prevents the basement from getting wet.) It is also
physically possible for the premises to be true and the
conclusion to be false. (For example, packing his basement
solidly with such a water repellent chemical does not
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violate any laws of nature
fact about Jones' basement
) We may discover this
given further research.
relevant
and
change our decision about which truth value to assign to 5
What is of interest in argument 1.3 is not the logical or
Physical possibility of the premises being true and the
conclusion false, but the probability of the premises being
true and the conclusion false. We may now see that if „e
have evidence that supports the conclusion, the probability
Of the conclusion being true given this evidence is greater
than the probability of the conclusion being false, given
this evidence. That is, we are interested in determining
what we shall call the inductive strength of the argument.
We can say that the probability of the conclusion being
true given the premises is the degree of likelihood that
the conclusion is true, given the statement composed of the
conjunction of the premises. In the case of 1.3, this can
be expressed using the premise numbers as propositional
constants, as '5 given 1
, 2 , 3 and 4 ' . So we must somehow
determine the probability that this is true. If this is
more probably true than the denial of the conclusion, given
the premises, it is clear that the argument supports its
conclusion. If this statement is less probably true than
the denial of the conclusion given the premises, it is
clear that the argument fails to support its conclusion.
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However, we must consider this
precisely define what it is fo
a conclusion and the notion of
matter more carefully and
r premises to be evidence fo
inductive strength.
r
Ideally,
'probability ought to be more precisely
characterized. Indeed, there are competing alternative
interpretations of this term. Various philosophers have
provided alternative interpretations attempting to give a
precise meaning to and foundation for 'probability. Such
alternative interpretations have been described under
categories such as classical, empirical, logical,
subjectivist and epistemological. it is beyond the scope of
our interest here to consider this matter. We shall see
the importance of such interpretations when we discuss what
is called the problem of induction, but both providing such
an interpretation of 'probability and addressing what we
shall call the problem of induction are beyond the scope
of this course. We shall rely on this intuitive under-
standing of 'probability' and deem that understanding
sufficient for our purposes here.
Practically, we may use part of what is called the
probability calculus technically to define the notion of
evidence for a conclusion and inductive strength for the
purposes of intuitive determinations.
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The probability calculus states, in the form of certain
definitions
, how the probability of a complex statement
^ ' 5 9iVSn ^ 3, 4 . is related to the probability
of its simple constituent statements. Thus, „e can see
at least a general relation between the probability calculus
and the propositional calculus; both relate a property
of a complex statement to properties of its simple component
statements. However, the probability calculus deals with
tatement probabilities, while the propositional calculus
deals with truth values. Truth value and probability, as
we have seen, are very different notions. Yet both the
probability calculus and the predicate calculus face a
Similar problem regarding the assignment of statement
probabilities and truth values to the simple component
statements; the problem of determining the probability of
the simple component statement is not resolved by the
probability calculus, just like the problem of determining
the truth value of the simple component statement is not
resolved by the propositional calculus.
We can, however, begin the assignment of probabilities to
statements. 149 if a statement S is a tautology, 's s
'
See Brian Skyrms
Introduc tion to Inductive
pp. 130-149.
t Choice and Chance: An
Logic
,
Second Edition,
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or a logical equivalent, then the probability of S, written
P(S)
,
equals 1. if a statement S
'S • ^ S' or a logical equivalent,
statements S and S' are logically
the same probability, written P( s )
is a contradiction,
then P(S) = 0. if two
equivalent, then they have
= P(S') .
Given these assignments of probabilities to statements, „e
may define other assignments and relationships among
statements and their probabilities. 150 However, for our
practical purposes here, we shall simply define what we
shall call conditional probability as follows:
p (q/p) = P(p • q) f P(p)
In English, this says that the probability of q given p
equals the probability of p and q divided by the probability
150
T~l
•
or example
,
if p and q are mutually exclusive,that is, contrary where not both can be true, or contra-dictory, then, using a combination of our symbolic con-ventions for probability, arithmetic, and deductive logicwe shall write [P(pvq) = P (p) + P (q)
]
- P (p . q )
.
m
9 '
English this says that the probability of p or q equals theprobability of pplus the probability of q, the quantityt
-
S
i
Pr°b
^
bllltY of
.
p and q * We may also say that
? 7 . that is, that the probability of not pequals 1 minus the probability of p. The probability of pand q, written P (p . q) , equals P(p) x P(q/p). In Englishthis says that this equals the probability of p times the
Pf°
bab
i
litY of q qiven P- We shall define what we shallcall the independence of two statements, p and q, asoliows; p and q are independent iff P(q/p) = P (a) if Dand q are rndependent, then P (p . q) = p%f’ x p
'
I P
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of p. The probability of q given p
probability.
is called a conditional
Given this basic relationship among the assignments of
probability to statements, we are now in a position
rigorously to define evidence and inductive strength and to
consider the inductive strength of 1 . 3 .
We shall define what is to be evidence for a particular
conclusion in terms of the conditional probability of the
conclusion given the evidence, written P (c/0), where 'C
is a propositional variable standing for the conclusion and
'0' is the variable representing the conjunction of the
evidence as premises. Intuitively, if we have evidence 0
that supports the conclusion C, the probability of C being
true given 0 is greater than the probability of * c being
true given 0. Therefore, we can say that in an argument of
the form 0 :. C, 0 is evidence for C iff p (C/0) > P(^ C/0).
We shall now define inductive strength in terms of evidence.
Intuitively, if we have evidence that supports the con-
clusion, then the argument is inductively strong. If,
on the other hand, we cite premises that are not evidence
for the conclusion, then the argument is inductively weak.
Since 1 is the highest probability, intuitively
that for an argument to be inductively strong, a
we can see
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calculation of the conditional probability of the con-
clusion given the premises must be closer to 1 than to 0
since an argument is inductively strong iff it is probable
that its conclusion is true given the premises. But just
what value is that, This is the problem that now arises
for our system. For our purposes here, let us say that
an argument of the form 01 • nt 0 . . c is a strong inductive argu-
ment iff p (C/0) > pfn, o/ai , ./V) PC'- C 0). Let us also say that an
argument of the fnrm 01 r> is a weak inductive argument iff
P (C/0) 4= p (v c/pf)
.
We may now more precisely consider whether or not the
premises of 1.3 are evidence for the conclusion, and there-
by consider the inductive strength of 1.3. If the statement
5 given 1 . 2
. 3 . 4
' is more probably true than
5 given 1 . 2 . 3 . 4
' , the premises will be evidence for
the conclusion and 1.3 will be a strong inductive argument.
This is to say that if p (5/1 . 2
. 3 . 4) > p (-. 5/1 . 2
. 3
4) , then it will be strong, but if P (5/1 .2.3,4)^
P ( % 5/1 .2.3.4), then the premise do not be evidence
for the conclusion, and 1.3 will be a weak inductive
argument.
For our purposes here, on this intuitive level, we shall
avoid actual calculations and simply appeal to our
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intuitions to determine whether or not given premises are
in fact evidence for the conclusion. This, as we shall see,
involves exercising our intuitions for establishing the
best explanations relative to a particular set of premises.
in 1.3, the statement 5 given 1 • 2 • 3 • 4 can be seen
to have less probability than the statement '5 given 1 . 2 .
3 • 4 ; it is more likely true than ' v 5 given 1 . 2 .
3-4'. This is to say that P (5/1 • 2 . 3 . 4 ) >
(% 5//1 2 * 3 * 4) • Therefore, we can intuitively see
that the premises of 1.3 provide evidence for the conclusion
and that 1.3 is an inductively strong argument.
We can easily see that 1.2 is inductively weak, since,
again using the numbers of the premises as propositional
constants, '3 given 1 • 2
• is less likely true or has a
lower degree of probability than 3 given 1-2'. That
is, P (% 3/1 . 2) > p ( 3/1 . 2 ) or in our terms,
P (3/1 . 2) ^ P (v 3/1 . 2 ). Since it is more probable
that its conclusion is false given its premises than that
its conclusion is true given the premises, the premises of
1.2 are not evidence for the conclusion and 1.2 is a weak
inductive argument.
This determination of inductive strength is not affected
by the fact that some of the premises are not probable or
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are, in fact, false. Intuitively, therefore, we can view
the notion of inductive strength as a measure of the
evidential relation between the premises and the conclusion,
much like validity in deductive arguments is a measure of
the logical relation between the premises and the conclusion.
Therefore, just as valid deductive arguments do not
guarantee true conclusions (i.e., if one or more premises
are false)
,
so strong inductive arguments do not guarantee
highly probable conclusions. Consider the following
argument
:
2.1
There is intelligent life on
There is intelligent life on
There is intelligent life on
There is intelligent life on
There is intelligent life on
There is intelligent life on
There is intelligent life on
There is intelligent life on
There is intelligent life on
Mercury
.
Venus
.
Earth
Jupiter
Saturn
.
Uranus
Neptune
Plato
Marsel
Intuitively, the conclusion of 2.1 is not probable. However,
P (9/1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7 . 8 ) > P ('x* 9/1 .2.3.4.
5 • 6 • 7 • 8) . Therefore, the premises of 2.1 do provide
evidence for the conclusion, and 2.1 is an inductively
151 This argument is from Brian
Chance: An Introduction to Inductive(California: Dickinson Publishing Co
Skyrms, Choice and
/ Second Edition
•/ 1915 )
,
p. 9.
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strong argument. However, the conclusion is intuitively
not probable. We must ask, then, under what conditions are
the conclusions of inductively strong arguments highly
probable?
Models
1 . Construct a number of inductively strong argumentsusing VonDdniken's book Chariot of the Gods for
example, to support the conclusion the pyramids were
^i 11: r. bY Ylsltors from outerspace. Show that they areinductively strong, given the low probability of thestatement formed from the conjunction of the premises(assumed to be true) and the denial of the conclusion,
nciude as premises obviously false statements aboutthe stupidity of ancient people, etc. Point outthe improbable and false premises. Suggest that whilethe argument is strong, we still need to be able to saythat the argument is no good; it fails to support the
conclusion.
For comparison use the above material and construct
valid deductive arguments to support the same con-
clusions, for example, to support the conclusion 'thepyramids were built by visitors from outerspace
' . Provethat they are valid, and show that they are unsound.
Suggest that we need something like soundness forinductive arguments.
Critically consider VonDdniken's discussion of the
"possibility of life" on other planets. Point out theinteresting question is the probability of life, not
the possibility of life.
4. Stress an understanding of the probability calculus
on an intuitive
_ level ; "high" and "low" rather than
actual calculations. Use examples from Berlitz to
construct more inductively strong arguments, and
anticipate how we shall appeal to the notion of 'all
relevant facts ' to avoid the problem of a selective
approach to data.
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3.
statemen^probabilities^ut^oint^ut^hat6 ValUSS t0
make such decisions =0^011^!^!^ J?111
Exercises
us?ng
r
vonDLii^n's °b!ok
A°^oT^a^!“La^“ SStS^SSSi The
‘
aHvfden^ a“d
and which are improbable. Then ask ttem ?o evaluatethe support the premises, found in their research to
point^out :fU3lly giVS for the conclusions? Have ?hemU the improper selection of certain true
probabilit^of Vh^
en ad
?ed
.
to the argument, affect theD oiiity the conclusion.
Have them reformulate the above arguments intodeductively valid arguments. Have them evaluate theirsoundness, given their research into VonD&niken
'
s
cla 1ms
.
Have the students become familiar with these basic
problem!.
0f
Giv|nr°babilitY Calculus b* doi"9 some
P (p) - 1/2 P (q) = 1/2, p and q are independent,
a) What is P (p . q)
?
b) Are p and q mutually exclusive?
c) What is P (p v q)
?
(Consult Skyrms or Cox for other exercises.)
Subsection 3 - Inductive Strength, Inductive Inconsistency,
and the Epistemic Probability of Conclusions
We have seen that an inductive argument like 2.1 may be
strong, yet we cannot truly assert that the argument's
conclusion is highly probable. The conclusion of 2.1 is
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not probable. We might also know that premises 1, 2, 4, 5
,
6, 7 and 8 are not probable. We might think that given an’
inductively strong argument, we can truly assert that its
conclusion is highly probable given that we know the
premises to be true, or highly probable. While knowing
that the premises of an inductively strong argument are true
or highly probable is a necessary condition for establishing
the high probability of its conclusion, it is not a
sufficient condition. To see that this is so, we must
consider what we shall call inductive inconsistency.
Inductive inconsistency arises from what we shall call the
problem of the detachment of premises. In inductive logic,
we seek to provide premises which are evidence for a
conclusion. However, we may willfully or inadvertently
select evidence which supports a particular conclusion while
ignoring evidence which supports the denial of that
conclusion. Thus, the premises we select, even if true, may
be detached from the set of relevant evidence which must be
considered to arrive at a correct probability for the
conclusion.
This detachment of true premises from the set of all
relevant true premises gives rise to inductive inconsistency
as follows. Suppose in an inductively strong argument A,
330
in relation to true premises 0, the conclusion C is highly
probable. That is, P (C/pr, > p (* c/« . Furthermore,
suppose that, since the premises are true, P (0) > p („ 0)
However, in an inductively strong argument B, in relation
’
to true premises *, the conclusion * c is highly probable.
That is, P ('< C/i>) > p (c/*). Furthermore, suppose that,
since the premises are true, P(*> > p <„
. This is calle(J
inductive inconsistency because in relation to one set of
true premises 0, c is probable; in relation to another set
of true premises *, the conclusion „ c is probable. We are
not justified in asserting that a conclusion is highly
probable just given that the premises are true and that the
premises provide evidence for the conclusion.
To truly assert that a conclusion of an inductively strong
argument has a high probability of being true, we must,
therefore, not only require that the premises of the argument
be true, or highly probable, but also avoid this problem of
detachment. We must be assured that the premises have taken
into account all relevant available information. To do so
we must require that inductive arguments assign what we shall
call epistemic probabilities to their conclusions.
The epistemic probability of a given statement is the
conditional probability of the statement given all relevant
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available evidence. This is written 'P (c/all relevant
available evidence,'. We shall, for convenience, abbreviate
'all relevant available evidence' as 'K', thus, this is
written 'P(c/K, '. K
,
for our purposes, is the set of all
relevant available evidence such that each member of K is
more probable than its negation mi_ Qi . The epistemic probability
statement can vary from person to person and time to
time since different people have different evidence available
in different amounts at the same time, and the same person
has different amounts of evidence available at different
times. It follows, therefore, that the epistemic
probabilities of certain statements change, given additions
to human knowledge and probable truths. For example, the
epistemic probability of 'cancer is caused by a virus' is
very low, but through advances in cancer research, we may
increase our body of evidence about cancer and learn facts
that increase the epistemic probability of 'cancer is
caused by a virus'. This increase in our body of evidence
in turn provides additional premises which affect the
inductive strength of the inductive argument having 'cancer
is caused by a virus' as a conclusion and all relevant
available evidence as premises.
Here it is useful to distinguish the epistemic probability
of a statement from the truth value of a statement.
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Clearly, since it is a statement,
’cancer is caused by a
virus’ has a truth value; it is either true or false.
However, the problem is that we do not know at this time
Which truth value to assign to it, although we are inclined
to bet more toward false than toward true. We, therefore,
forced into a position in which we must deal with the
epistemic probability of the statement; the probability
that the statement is true given that the premises are
true or highly probable, where the premises are relevant
available evidence. In this position, we must remain
open to the introduction of new evidence which will affect
the epistemic probability of the statement under
consideration. We tust remain open to new evidence as it
becomes available.
Since the epistemic probability of a given statement S is a
conditional probability of the form P (S/K)
,
it may be
calculated as P (all relevant available evidence
. s) * p
all relevant available evidence)
,
or P (I< . S) t p (k)
probability calculus. To further clarify the notion of
epistemic probability, consider the epistemic probability of
a statement with a determined truth value. First consider a
statement that we know to be true. For example, 'Boston is
the capital of Massachusetts'. Let us call this statement
'p'. Using p as a propositional constant, according to our
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definitions
,
the epistemic probability of p i s a conditional
probability of the form P (p/K)
.
relevant available evidence K is
capital of Massachusetts. This
Clearly, among this
the fact that Boston is
conditional probability,
the
then, can be seen to have the form P (p . p . q . r
where
'P . q . r' represents other relevant available
facts. According to our calculations, P (p . q . r . p) *
p ( P • q . r) = 1 since the numerator and the denominator
of this fraction are identical. (For logical purposes,
recall that P . p is logically equivalent to p.) Statements
own to be true, therefore, have an epistemic probability
of 1, since given the calculation procedure and the
definition of epistemic probability, the resulting fractions
have identical numerators and denominators.
Secondly, consider a statement that we know to be false.
For example, 'New York is the capital of Massachusetts'.
Using 'U' as a propositional constant, let us call this
statement U. According to our definition, the epistemic
probability of U is a conditional probability of the form
P (U/K)
. Clearly, among this relevant available evidence
K is the fact that it is not the case that New York is the
capital of Massachusetts. This conditional probability,
then, can be seen to have the form P (U . v u
. p . q
r . .
. ) where ' p . q . r . . .
'
represents other
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relevant facts. According to our calculation( p y q
_
* r
•
.
. U)
-f P C TT
. ,
• P • q • r • • •) = o. Since theprobability of the numerator is 0 because the
probability of a contradiction
. 0
. Statements known to
e false, therefore, have an epistemic probability of 0
SlnCe giVSn thS °alCUlati0n
-»™. and the definition of
epistemic probability, the resulting fractions have
numerators equal to zero.
we may now see how this notion of epistemic probability
helps us to avoid the problem of the detachment of premises,
and thereby to avoid the problem of inductive inconsistency
and to assert that an inductive argument's conclusion is
highly probable, with the restriction that this assertion
is made given all relevant available evidence. We can
assert that C is highly probable if and only if c is the
conclusion of an inductively strong argument, and we know
the premises are true or highly probable, and the selection
of the premises takes into account all relevant available
evidence. This can be stated in our notation as follows:
if 0 C is an inductively strong argument where ' 0
•
represents a conjunction of premises and 'C represents a
conclusion, and P (0) > p (v 0 ) , and p (c/0
_ R) >
p ( ,,j C/0
. K)
, then P (C) > p c) .
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Subsection 4 - Th<= ~.c T ..Inductive Arguments: Tn
Establish a Deqree of Prnh^Mm.„ £~ ££Q^ability for a Conclusion
One might suppose, given 1>3 ^ 2>lf
sinpiy
conduct certain tests and make certain observations to
determine the truth value of their conclusions. Por
example, we might just go down Jones’ basement and conduct
some agreed upon test procedure sufficient to determine
whether ’Jones basement is wet' is true or false. „e might
send up a Viking satellite to conduct conclusive tests on
Mars to determine whether ’there is intelligent life on Mars'
is true or false. In fact, given recent technological
developments, this is now technologically possible and
having sent such a satellite we now know that 'there is
intelligent life on Mars' is false. Similarly, it is
obviously technologically possible to test Jones' basement
to determine whether it is wet or not. We may then assign
a truth value to a statement 'Jones basement is wet',
based on the results of this test.
However
,
the determination of the truth values of these
statements is independent of the inductive arguments under
consideration. When we know the truth value of a statement
forming the conclusion in an inductive argument, the
probability of the conclusion is 0 or 1, since the
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probability of the conclusion is based on all relevant
available evidence. However, when we do not know the truth
value of the conclusion, an inductive ardent is only able
to provide the probability of the conclusion given the
premises and all relevant available evidence. To ask any
-re of it is to overextend its logical function.
Therefore, inductive arguments never, in principle,
absolutely establish the truth value of the conclusion. If
this is to be done, it is not logically possible to do so
with inductive arguments. it may instead be done by
independent methods such as direct empirical tests, as in
the case of the conclusions of 1.3 and 2
. 1 .
The fact that inductive arguments never in principle
absolutely establish the truth value of the conclusion give
us some intuitive insight into the use of inductive
arguments. For example, inductive arguments like 1.3 and
2.1, are useful under conditions such that direct empirical
tests to determine the truth value of a statement are not
Physically or technologically possible. We must, therefore,
rely on statements as evidence to support the given
statement.
Inductive arguments are also useful in supporting claims
for non recurring events that it is not physically possible
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to test directly
. Consider, for example, the statement
LeS HarVSY °SWald dld ** and till JFK 1
. Clearly
»e cannot conduct a direct empirical test to determine the
truth value of this statement. It is not physically
possible to ash him, since he is dead. lt is not physically
to go back in time and observe Lee Harvey Oswald
on November 22, 1963. All we have are statements by
witnesses; statements about doctored photographs, and
statements about a lack of physical evidence connecting
Oswald with the murder. We may conduct indirect empirical
tests to determine the physical possibility of his firing
three shots in 5.6 seconds, test the weapon to determine
the technological possibility of its firing quickly and
accurately, do forensic pathology, study the Zapruder film,
etc. This is only useful regarding this statement if „e put
it in the form of evidence which is inductively strong
support for the conclusion 'Lee Harvey Oswald did not shoot
and kill JFK'.
To do so, we must consider all relevant available evidence.
We may then determine the probability of the conclusion.
It is important to notice that since the conclusion is based
on all relevant available evidence, we must allow for new
discoveries; we must allow for the disclosure of new facts
which might change the probability of the conclusion.
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indeed, this is characteristic of all inductive arguments
.
The probabilities assigned to their conclusions depend on
relevant available evidence. As we add to the store of
knowledge and change the probabilities of certain statements
given new information, we may affect the probability of
inductively reached conclusions. Consider the following
argument as an example of such an inductive argument
dependent on all relevant available evidence:
4.1
1 ,
2
.
3 .
4 .
5 .
^
e
.w
SW
S
ld was seen witnesses on the first floorof the Texas school book depository seconds afterthe President was shot and killed
S oncl
The photograph of Oswald holding the alleqedmurder weapon was faked. g
Oswaid had no trace of nitrates on his cheeks orhands when arrested. s
Sr^rTne rT P°int aWay from bein9 released from
The MannV® £ Pc
because of P°°r marksmanship.
Oswald a
er Carcano Rife
' allegedly used by, is dangerous to the marksman andinaccurate
.
Oswald did not shoot and kill JFK.
Inductive arguments are also useful in supporting claims
that it is not yet technologically possible to test
directly. Consider, for example, the statement 'successful
human brain transplants cure Parkinson's disease'. Clearly
we cannot as yet conduct a direct empirical test to
determine the truth value of the statement. However, we may
assemble evidence and put it in the form of inductively
strong argents to support the conclusion
'successful human
brarn transplants cure Parkinson’s disease'. We may then
calculate the probability of the conclusion, given this
and all relevant available evidence.
However, generally, and most importantly, inductive
arguments are useful in supporting statements for which
conclusive evidence is not yet or never will be available.
These arguments are based on all relevant available
evidence, given the impossibility of obtaining more
evidence. Consider, for example, the statement 'the three
TBM Avengers in flight 19 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean,
and sank
'
.
Clearly, in investigating the crash we can find no direct
proof that this statement is true. No wreckage was ever
found. However, we can gather information about their
flight path, the experience of the pilots, the weather
conditions, the range of the planes, their fuel capacity,
the time they left and the time a search for them began.
This information is useful regarding this statement if we
put it in the form of evidence for the conclusion 'the TMB
Avengers in flight 19 crashed into the Atlantic Ocean and
sank
. We may then determine the inductive strength of the
argument and calculate the probability of the conclusion.
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Such an argument might look like the following:
4.2
1
.
2
.
3.
4.
5.
6 .
7.
8 .
9.
10 .
:. TIT
Eight of the nine crewmen were student traineesonly one pilot was an instructor '
From radio communications, the instructor appeareddisoriented, and had no watch or clock.
withThe
r
area!
W3S neWlY transferred and unfamiliar
instructor failed to switch hisradio to the emergency frequency and contact was
«as the last flight of the day, and thew®ather turned bad and it was dark.
tiTT 1' discdPline kept the flight together evenhough several students knew they were off courseflying north over the Atlantic.
The planes flew north long enough to run out offuel.
There was a long delay in sending out rescue craftTBM avengers sink in 90 seconds.
Storms at sea quickly dissipate wreckage and oil
slicks.
The three TBM avengers crashed into the AtlanticOcean and sank
.
While inductive arguments do not allow us to assign a
specific truth value to their conclusions, they do allow us
to calculate the probability of the conclusion. We must
now consider how one might begin to perform such
calculations
.
Models
1. Consider several of the "mysterious disappearances"
discussed by Berlitz. Use the information provided in
Kusche's book to construct strong inductive arguments
to explain these disappearances.
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Subsection 5 - Statement Probabilities and
jlnductive Arguments
Evaluating
We have seen that in order to get an inductive logic off
the ground, we need some way to assign probabilities to the
premises. Unfortunately, this must remain on an intuitive
level. We shall assume that we can intuitively recognize
what we have called evidence, thereby intuitively
recognizing inductive strength by applying the above
definition of a strong inductive argument in terms of
evidence. However, we shall first consider this problem
of assigning statement probabilities.
There is no general agreement among authorities about how
to assign these statement probabilities. For our purposes
here, „e may define the statement probability of statement
s as the epistemic probability of S. Thus, if a statement
S is known to be true, its epistemic probability, as we have
seen, equals 1; therefore, its statement probability equals
1. If a statement S is known to be false, its epistemic
probability, as we have seen, equals 0; therefore, its
statement probability equals 0. Unfortunately for state-
ments that we do not know to be true or know to be false,
the problem we experienced earlier with the calculation for
inductive strength reappears. Therefore, here, too, we
must rely on intuitions
.
Consider a statement, S, that we do not know to be true
and that we do not know to be false. The epistemic, and
therefore, the statement probability of S, P (S/K)
,
is
calculated P (S . K) t p (k)
.
The problem is to assign a
numerical value to the numerator and to the denominator.
We can check to see if S and this relevant available
evidence are independent. However, intuitively, we must
check to see if it is more likely that S, given all relevant
available evidence, is more probably true than a, s given all
relevant available evidence. Consider, for example, the
statement 'Lee Harvey Oswald, acting alone, shot and killed
JFK'. Intuitively, P (S/K) > P S/K). We might work out
a system to assign numerical values to the numerator and
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the denominator resulting in a value of say 1/9 or 1/19 orV100 for P ( S/K, However, for our purposes Here, it is
sufficient to stick with our intuitively arrived at
comparison. When P (S/K) > P <„ S/K,
, it is obvious that
P <S/K> 13 l0W
' ThlS intuitively be determined by con-
sidering how much money you would be willing to bet that
it is false or that it is true.
we now have an intuitive method for evaluating inductive
arguments. First, we must intuitively determine whether the
premises of the argument are evidence for the conclusion,
that is, determine the inductive strength of the argument
by determing if p (c/0) > P( „ c/0)
. Secondly/ wg^
determine the truth value or the probability of the
P mises. thirdly, we must determine the probability of the
conclusion not only in relation to the premises but also in
relation to all relevant available evidence to determine
if the premises are relevantly selected.
Let us now consider a simple application of this material
to an inductive argument. Consider 1 . 1
. We must first
determine if the premises of this argument are evidence
for the conclusion, thereby determining if the argument is
inductively strong, or is inductively weak. To do so, we
must ask whether P(5/l
. 2 . 3 . 4) > P (a, 5/1 . 2 . 3 . 4
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or P (5/1 . 2
. 3 . 4) £. p ( 5/1 ? ^ .
.
~ 1 VI . 2
. 3
. 4) . If p ( 5/1
_
3
.
' 4> > P ^ 5/1 • 2 • 3.4), then the premises
of 1.1 provide evidence for 5, and 1.1 is inductively
strong. if P (5/1 . 2 . 3 . 4 ) - P (* 5/l
. 2
. 3 . 4 ) ,
then the premises of 1.1 do not provide evidence for the
conclusion and 1.1 is inductively weak. On an intuitive
level, we might proceed as follows. We are concerned with
assuming that (1) through (4) are true, and then determining
whether, given these premises, the conclusion is the best
explanation for them. Consider (1). if true, this is
evidence for Ray's guilt. Intuitively, p (5/1) > p (m 5/ 1 ).
Therefore, (1) is evidence for (5). Consider (2). if
true, this might be considered to be evidence for (5).
Intuitively, P (5/2) > P (m 5/2). Therefore, (2) is
evidence for (5).
Consider (3)
.
if it is true that witnesses saw him at the
scene, then this is evidence for (5). Intuitively,
P (5/3) > P (^ 5/3). Therefore, (3) is evidence for (5).
Consider (4)
.
if it is true, then this too is evidence for
(5). Intuitively, P (5/4) > P (a, 5/4). Therefore, (4) is
evidence for (5)
.
Consider intuitively the results? (1) is evidence for (5),
(2) is evidence for (5), (3) is evidence for (5), and (4)
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is evidence for ( 5 ) ri,,on , . .
' Glve thl s, we can see that
p (5/1 . 2
. 3 . 4) > p 5/i ? p1 V1 * 2 * 3
. 4) . Therefore,
this shows by our def ini finn • ,t o of inductive strength, that la
is a strong inductive argument.
The next step in evaluating an inductive argument is to
consider the statement probabilities of the premises ( 1 )
,
(2), (3), (4), and all relevant available evidence, since
the premises are true, their probabilities are each 1 .
Note, however, that saying that they are true does not, as
with valid deductive arguments, allow us to conclude that
the conclusion is true. We must now construct an intuitive
determination of the probability of the conclusion ( 5 ) of
1.1. To do so, we must consider whether P (5/1 . 2 . 3
K) > p (% 5/1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . K)
. if so, then P (5) >
P 5) . If P (5/1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . K) p ('•v, 5/1 .2.3
4 • K)
,
P (5) £: P (% 5 ) , and this shows that the argument
even though it may be inductively strong, fails to support
the conclusion.
We must be satisfied to show why P (5/1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . k) ^
P (^ 5/1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . K) on an intuitive level. Consider
(1) . Even if true, when we appeal to all relevant available
evidence, we learn that Ray was coerced into confessing.
Consider (2). Even if true, when we appeal to all relevant
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available evidence, we learn that it is more probable than
not that the FBI is covering up their own involvement.
Consider (3). Even if true, when we appeal to all relevant
available evidence, we learn that it is more probable than
not that he had other reasons for being there. Consider (4)
Even if true, when we appeal to all relevant available
evidence, we learn that it is more probable than not that
the trial was unfair and that Ray was found guilty just to
satisfy public pressure for swift "justice." Therefore, we
can intuitively see that the premises of 1.1 are not
relevantly selected, and that P (5/1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . k) <
P 5/1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . K)
. Therefore, P (5) ^ p (v 5 ), and
the argument does not support the conclusion. Therefore,
1.1 is not a good inductive argument.
Consider an argument that we said earlier is an inductively
strong argument. Consider 1.3. Let us use the numbers of
the premises as propositional constants to determine if the
premises are evidence for the conclusion, thereby
determining the inductive strength of the argument. Again,
if P (5/1 . 2 . 3 . 4) > P 5/1 . 2 . 3 . 4) , then 1.3 is
an inductively weak argument. On an intuitive level, we
might proceed as follows. Remember, we are concerned with
assuming that (1) through (4) are true. Consider (1) . if
true, this alone is not evidence for (5). However,
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considering (2), ( 3 , and ,4, with
,1,
, we can intuitively
see that the conjunction of these premises is evidence for
the conclusion. Given this, p (5/1
. 2 . 3
. 4) >
/ . 3 . 4 ). Therefore, this shows that the
premises of 1.3 are evidence for the conclusion and that
1-3 is a strong inductive argument.
We must now consider the statement probabilities of the
premises (1), ( 2 ), (3) and ( 4 ) and all relevant available
evidence. since the premises are, in fact, true, their
statement probabilities are each 1. Consider the intuitive
calculation of the probability of 1 . 3 's conclusion. If
P <V1 ' 2 ' 3
’ 4 ' K > > p 5/1
. 2 . 3 . 4 . K)
, then
P ( 5 ) > p (1 5). Again, we must be satisfied to show why
P (5/1 • 2
. 3 . 4 . K) > P (-v 5/1 . 2
. 3
. 4 . K) on an
intuitive level. Clearly (1), (2), ( 3 ) and ( 4 ), along with
all relevant available evidence, is evidence for (5). The
premises are not irrelevantly selected. Therefore, P (5) >
P (^ 5 ), and the argument does support the conclusion. 1.3
is, therefore, a good inductive argument.
Let us consider an argument that we said was inductively
strong, yet also has a conclusion that is more probably
false than true, namely 2.1. Again, we shall use the
numbers of the premises as propositional constants to stand
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for the respective statements and then determine whether
the premises are evidence for the conclusion, thereby
calculating the inductive strength of the argument.
” P (VI •2-3.4.5.6.7.8)>p
( „ 9/1
. 2
_ 3
_
' 5 ' 6
' 7 ' 8)
' then 2 * 1 is an inductively strong
argument. Again, assuming that the premises are true, ( 1 )
alone is not evidence for (9). Intuitively P ( 9/1) ^
(- 9/1). However, considering that (2) through (8) state
that all other planets in our solar system have intelligent
life, we can intuitively see that the conjunction of these
premises is evidence for the conclusion, (9). Intuitively,
given this, we can see that P (9/1 . 2 . 3 4 5 6
7 . 8 ) > p (% 9/1 o 1 A n r
* 5 * ^ . 7
. 8) . Therefore,
this intuitive calculation shows that 2.1 i s a strong
inductive argument. It is useful to see why this argument
does not have a highly probable conclusion.
To determine the probability of 9 of 2.1, we must first
consider the statement probabilities of premises (1) through
(8) and all relevant available evidence. Only (3), ’there
is intelligent life on Earth’, is, in fact, true.
Scientists have concluded that there is no life on Mercury,
and while they do not know that the rest of the premises are
false, they have an extremely minute probability, given all
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the relevant available evidence about physlcal conditions
necessary to support intelligent life and the physical
conditions on these planets. Thus, P ,1, ^ P ( „ 1( f p (2)
“ P 2)
'
P (3) = 1
> p P 4), P (5 ) ^p ( „ 5)j
p < 6 ) P 6 ) , P (7) ^ p (t, 7)
,
and p (8) ^ p (-, 8 ) .
If P (9/1 . 2
. 3 . 4
. 5
3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. K),
we must be satisfied to show
6 • 7 . 8
. K) P (% 9/1
6
. 7 . 8
. K) ^ p ( 9/1.2.
then P (9) £ P (* 9) . Again,
that P (9/1 . 2
. 3
. 4 . 5 .
2 * 3 * 4 * 5
-6.7.8.K)
on an intuitive level. Since the probability of each of the
premises except (3) is less than or equal to the probability
Of its denial, the probability of 9 given their conjunction
is less than or equal to the probability of its denial when
we consider all relevant available evidence. Therefore,
P (9) ± P (% 9) and the argument, even though it is in-
ductively strong, does not support the conclusion.
Finally, let us consider A. 2, the argument that we said in
the introduction was an example of an inductive argument.
Again, referring to A. 2, we shall use the numbers of the
premises and the conclusion as propositional constants and
begin to determine whether the premises are evidence for
the conclusion, thereby determining the inductive strength
of A. 2. If p (5/1 . 2 . 3 . 4) ^ P (~ 5/1 . 2 . 3 . 4)
,
then A. 2 is an inductively weak argument. Assuming that the
premises are true, ( 1 ), even if true, taken alone or in
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conjunction with the other presses, that B x 10 Eastman view
cameras take accurate undistorted pictures is not evidence
for (5); intuitively P (5/1) ^ P („ 5/1). Even if true> (2)
also easily and clearly seen not to be evidence for (5),
since the objects were in the camera’s range and d is not
’
great enough to show any curvature of the earth,
intuitively, P (5/2, ^ P ( „ 5/2). Even if true,
,3, is also
not evidence for (5)
,
since the distance covered by the
entire surface of Lake Winnebago is not great enough to show
y curve in the earth's surface. Intuitively, p ( 5/3 ) ^
P (- 5/3). Even if true, (4) is not evidence for (5) since
this does not show anything about the curvature of the
Earth’s surface; such cameras at such distances do not have
a long enough focal length to show any curve on the Earth's
surface. Intuitively, P (5/4) ^ P (v 5/4). Therefore,
none of the premises are evidence for the conclusion.
Given this, P (5/1 . 2 . 3 . 4) ^ P (,, 5/l
. 2 . 3 . 4) .
Therefore, this shows that A. 2 is a weak inductive argument.
We need to go no further to judge that A. 2 is not a good
argument
,
since the premises are not evidence for the con-
clusion, A. 2 does not support the conclusion that the Earth
is not a sphere, but is flat.
We, therefore, have a clear intuitive basis for evaluating
various inductive arguments. First, we determine whether
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the premises of the argument are evidence for the
conclusion, thereby determining the inductive strength of
the argument. If p (c/flT) > P (* c/0>
, then 0 is evidence
for C, and 0 : . c is a strong inductive argument. If
P (C/0) ^ P(v C/0)
, then d is not evidence for c, and 0 : . c
is a weak inductive arqument Tfg
. i the argument is weak, then
we are justified in rejecting the argument as support for
the conclusion. if the argument is strong, then we must
determine the truth value or the probability of the premises
by determining if P (0) > P („ 0) . „e may tten determine
the probability of the conclusion. If p (c/0
. k) >
P (t C/0
. K)
, then P (C) > P (n, C ) . If p (c/0 . K ) t
P C/0
. K ), then P (C) «LP (-v C), and the argument fails
to support the conclusion.
Models
1 .
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hS ar9aments th^t have been presented on behalff VonD&niken and clearly evaluate them. Point out
?u
S
?
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K
° f 1
^
ductlvelY strong arguments with conclusionsthat have low probability. Mote the problems ofdetachment and inductive inconsistency.
2. Consider student arguments and evaluate them, using thisintuitive procedure. Carefully explain and make as
explicit as possible the considerations that are in-
volved in forming these intuitive views.
Exercises
1. Have the students write an evaluation of 4.1 and 4.2.
Have the students evaluate the arguments that thevpresented on behalf of Berlitz.
2
.
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Subsection 6 - A Brief Glance a f the Problem of TnHnc^
The problem of induction was pointed out, in its classical
form, by the 18th century philosopher, David Hume. We can
see that one way of looking at induction is to see inductive
arguments as shaping our expectations of the unknown on the
basis of what is known. For example, the anticipation of
the future based on our knowledge of the past. The problem
of induction is simply: why this method of relating
premises and conclusions rather than some other method?
The problem, then, takes the form of a request for the
justification of this method of inductive argument.
Intuitively, we could rationally justify induction if we
could prove that it reliably predicts the future, based on
our knowledge of the past
. Certainly we could not require
that true premises yield true conclusions all the time in
inductively strong arguments with a high inductive
probability. This would be to require that inductive argu-
ments guarantee true conclusions, which we saw only valid,
sound deductive arguments can do. However, intuitively, we
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do want an inductive loqic that- a0 fc *.g C ftat gets true conclusions most
Of the time, given that this logic determines that the
argument in question is inductively strong and that the
conclusion has high probability. We might, therefore,
justify induction by showing that such inductive arguments
yield true conclusions from true premises most of the time.
However, Hume asks by what sort of reasoning could we
establish that inductively strong arguments with high in-
ductive probability yield true conclusions from true
premises most of the time? The answer, of course, is
either by deductively valid reasoning, or by inductively
strong reasoning. It is claimed that Hume then shows that
neither will successfully reach the desired result.
Suppose, argues Hume, that we attempt to use a de-
ductively valid argument to justify induction. Since we
want the argument to be sound, we can only use as premises
things that we know. However, we do not know what the
future will be like. If we did, there would be no need for
an inductive logic upon which to base our predictions. We
only know things about the past and present. If the
argument is deductively valid, then the conclusion can make
no factual claim about the future. (After all, "most of
the time" does not mean most of the time in the past and
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present, it neans most of the time in the past, present
future.) Since the conclusion cannot tell us how
successful inductive arguments will be in the future, it
cannot prove that inductively strong arguments with a high
inductive probability give us true conclusions "most of the
time." Therefore, argues Hume, a deductively valid argu-
ment cannot be used to rationally justify induction.
Suppose, Hume is said to argue, that we attempt to use an in.
uctively strong argument to justify induction. But how
do we determine that this argument is inductively strong?
The answer, of course, is that we test it according to the
standards of inductive strength defined in inductive logic.
The problem here, of course, is obvious. If we attempt to
justify induction in this way, we must assume that induction
is reliable in order to prove that it is reliable. This,
as we shall see later, is an instance of the fallacy known
as begging the question.
Therefore, Hume has shown that there is a problem in
attempting to justify induction by showing that providing
both deductive and inductive arguments fails to justify it.
These are clearly the only alternatives.
Many other proposals for justifying induction, either by
deductive or inductive arguments, can be shown to suffer
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the same consequences, one such attempt worth noting
here is based on the claim that the future resembles the
past because it is true that nature is uniform. However,
as Bertrand Russell pointed out, nature is not uniform in
all respects:
The chicken on slaughter day micrht reason 4-u a+. t ,
e past
,
hut he was dead wrong."
Therefore, clearly the future does not resemble the past in
all respects. Therefore, this principle will not do to
justify induction.
In our discussion of inductive logic, we have avoided this
problem by keeping on an intuitive level. The problem
arises, however, in that there appears as yet to be no
clearly acceptable solution to the problem of assigning
actual values to the probabilities of statements with un-
known truth values. One might raise the problem, given
some assignment of numerical value, by asking us to justify
this numerical value and not some other.
Many philosophers of science have attempted to solve or
dissolve this problem raised by Hume. For example, this has
been attempted by some of those philosophers offering an
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account of 'probability. (The problem of induction
remains one of the important philosophical problems
demanding solution.) However, for our purposes here, it is
clear that inductive logic, justified or not, is here to
stay, and that it is a useful and important argumentative
tool
.
nuutilb
1. In advanced classes, explain the various interpretationsof probability and especially how the subjectivistview avoids the problem of induction. Stress thatis problem, while philosophically very important,does not prevent us from intuitively considering rulesof inductive support. ^
2 . Go through several other attempted solutions, andthe problems with them. This anticipates furtherfor the critical skills considered in this course
show
uses
Subsection 7 - Evidence and Causes
Many non-deductive arguments do not involve the notion of
probability at all. Some of these arguments involve the
notion of cause 1
,
and are designed to establish, as a
conclusion, the cause of a particular event. Some of these
arguments involve the notion of 'symptom' and are designed
to establish as conclusions, the symptoms for particular
events. Such arguments involve particular kinds of
evidential relations between premises and conclusions;
casual relations and symptomatic relations. Although in the
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preceding subsections we were forced to rely on our
intuitions in accounting for inductive evidential strength
and inductive probability, we need not rely completely on
our intuitions in accounting for casual evidential relations
or symtomatic evidential
conclusions. The word '
many different concepts.
relations between premises and
cause' as used in English captures
In fact, ever since Hume
published this Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding
, the
concept of what may be called empirical cause has been under
a cloud of controversy. Similarly, the word 'symptom' as
used in English captures many different concepts. For this
reason, in considering such non-deductive arguments it is
clearer and more useful to abandon talk of causes and
symptoms and, instead, to adopt talk of what we shall call
necessary conditions and sufficient conditions.
From our consideration of deductive logic, these notions
should be familiar. To state, using 'O' and 'A' as propo-
sitional variables, 0 I3A, is to state that 0 is a
sufficient condition for A. For example, to state that 'if
I am shot in the head with a bazooka, then I shall die' is
to state that being shot in the head with a bazooka is a
sufficient condition for death. However, in this statement,
being shot in the head with a bazooka is not a necessary
condition for death, since one might die in other ways.
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For example, one
being decapitated
'I shall die if i
say that death is
might die by being run over by a train, by
' or by succumbing to swine flu. Saying
am shot in the head with a bazooka' is to
a necessary condition of being shot in the
head with a bazooka. This is not to say that death is a
sufficient condition for being shot in the head with a
bazooka, because one might die in other ways. Therefore, we
can see that to say that 0 is a sufficient condition for A is
also to say that A is a necessary condition of o. Recall
that to state 0 s A is to state that 0 is both necessary
and sufficient for A. It follows, of course, from this that
A is both necessary and sufficient for 0. (As a review
exercise, verify these logical equivalences using truth
tables
.
)
When we use 'cause' in English, we sometimes refer to a
sufficient condition, as when we say that being shot in the
head with a bazooka caused his death. However, we sometimes
refer to a necessary condition. For example, being exposed
to the common cold virus is a necessary condition for
catching a cold, but is not sufficient, since many who are
exposed to the common cold virus do not catch a cold.
Therefore, we refer to this necessary condition when we say
that catching a cold is caused by being exposed to the
common cold virus. On the other hand, when we refer to
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necessary and sufficient conditions, we sometimes do not
refer to causes at all but rather refer to symptoms. For
example, we might say that a burning candle is a sufficient
condition for the presence of oxygen, but this is not to
say that a burning candle causes the presence of oxygen; it
is only to say that the burning candle is a symptom of its
presence. Or we might say that a fever is a necessary con-
dition for an infection, but this is not to say that a fever
causes an infection; it is only to say that the fever is a
symptom of the infection.
Many non-deductive arguments use both this notion of cause
and this notion of symptom in a very confusing way.
However, we shall avoid many complex terminological and
conceptual difficulties by rejecting both the notions of
cause and symptom in favor of the simple and rigorously
defined notions of necessary conditions and sufficient
conditions, since these notions capture all that we need to
capture for such non-deductive arguments.
Models
1. Point out the role of logical equivalences in the
discussion of necessary and sufficient conditions.
Together with the class, apply DeMorgan's laws and
list the logical equivalences of 'Pr? O' and of
'P = Q'
.
2. Show how avoiding questions about causes and symptoms
can lead to more clarity. Consider teleological
causes, etc.
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Subsection 8 - Terms, Properties. and Presence Tables
We must now see how the notion of necessary conditions and
sufficient conditions can be used to provide an account of
the evidential relations in non-deductive
do not involve a notion of probability,
complex statements were constructed from
arguments that
In PC we saw that
simple statements
and the logical connectives. We may similarly construct
complex terms from simple terms and the logical connectives
Thus, the term 'bald' may be conjoined with the term 'fat'
to form the complex term 'bald and fat'. For clarity,
let us say that terms name what we shall call properties.
For example, 'bald' names the property we identify on men
having no hair. since terms are true of things or events,
whether a complex term is true of a given thing or event
depends upon whether what we shall call the corresponding
complex property composed of constituent simple properties
IS present or absent in the given thing or event. Thus, for
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clarity, „e may say that a term is true of a thing or event
if and only if the corresponding property named by the term
is, in fact, present in that thing or event; otherwise it
is false of that thing or event.
We shall use a method to examine complex properties similar
to the method of truth tables, and we shall call this
method the method of presence tables, when the logical
connectives are used to form complex terms naming complex
properties, we can let 'F\ 'G',
'
H
1 stand for simple terms
and 'P' stand for 'present' and 'A' stand for absent. Thus,
the present table for 1 % f
'
is:
F ^ F
P A
A P
and the presence table for F
. G is
:
F G F
. G
P P PPA A
A P A
A A A
and the presence table for ' F V G' is:
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F G F V G
P P P
A ' P pPA P
A A A
Note that these tables are the same as the truth tables for
the logical connectives with 'present' substituted for
'true' and 'absent' substituted for 'false'. Thus, presence
tables for properties may be constructed for all the logical
connectives, just as truth tables for propositions were
constructed for the logical connectives. (As an exercise,
construct a presence table for 'FDG', 'G 3G', and
'F e G'
.
)
We may now define necessary conditions and sufficient con-
ditions in terms of properties:
(i) A property F is a sufficient condition for a
property G iff whenever F is present, G is
present
.
(ii) A property H is a necessary condition for a
property I iff whenever I is present, H is present.
Given these definitions and using the notions of logical
equivalence, the logical connectives, and the presence
tables, we may prove the following principle:
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If whenever F is present,
G is absent, F is absent.
G is present. then whenever
(As an exercise,
principle.
)
construct a presence table to prove this
2 .
Models
The discussion of terms rrmnovi- ; j
present for 'true', and 'absent' for 'false'.
Exercises
Have the students write presense tables for all the1 co
J|
nectlve s. Then present complex propertiesand have them construct presence tables for^themFor example, F 3 ( G . (H V I) )
.
® tud
J
nts prove the principle stated at the endsubsection,
.
and have them deduce anything thatollows from it, given our notions of necessary andsufficient conditions.
3. Prove that the following are correct:
a) If % G is a sufficient condition for ^ F, then Fis a sufficient condition for G.
b) If v d is a necessary condition for ^ G, then Gis a necessary condition for D, etc.
3 6 5
Given the presence table method for determining the presence
or absence of complex properties based on the presence or
absence of simple component properties, and given our dis-
cussion of necessary and sufficient conditions, we are now
ready to consider the method for finding the necessary or
the sufficient conditions of a given property. We shall
call this method inductive elimination. The method is very
simple and is based on testing alternative properties to
determine if they are necessary or sufficient conditions for
a given property. Inductive elimination allows us to
evaluate arguments designed to show that certain properties
are necessary or sufficient for certain other properties.
It does so by allowing us to evaluate the selection of
certain properties that are claimed to be the causes or to
be the symptoms of certain other properties by providing a
mechanical test for the proposed properties.
We shall call properties whose necessary or sufficient con-
ditions are being sought the conditioned property
. We
shall call the properties suspected of being necessary or
sufficient conditions for a given conditioned property
poss ible conditioning properties
. We may select the
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necessary or sufficient conditioning property for the
conditioned property from among the possible conditioning
properties by one of five test methods: 1) the direct
method of agreement, 2) the inverse method of agreement,
3) the method of difference, 4) the double method of
agreement, and 5) the joint method of agreement and
difference. Furthermore, if the examined possible con-
ditioning properties include the actual conditioning
property (either necessary, sufficient, or necessary and
sufficient conditioning property)
, then these test methods
of inductive elimination lead to it with certainty. That
is, successful applications of inductive elimination allow
us to conclude that a statement of the form 'if the actual
conditioning property is among the considered possible
conditioning properties, then this it is'. It is important
to recognize that everything we shall say about inductive
elimination, and everything that we shall exclude concerning
more complex properties, is based upon two simple
elimination principles:
A necessary condition for a conditioned property
cannot be absent when the conditioned property
is present.
A sufficient condition for a conditioned property
cannot be present when the conditioned property
is absent.
(ii)
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The Direct Method of Agreement
Suppose that we are asked to evaluate the statement 'a fever
is a necessary condition for an infection'. Infection, here,
is the conditioned property, K, and among the alternative
conditioning properties we find fever, C. The direct method
of agreement allows the discovery of necessary conditions
for a given conditioned property by the elimination of
possible necessary conditions by what we shall call "counter-
examples." Given our definition of 'necessary condition',
we know that possible necessary conditioning property c is
eliminated as an actual necessary conditioning property for
conditioned property H iff conditioned property H is present
and C is absent. A counterexample, in this test, therefore,
is a specific case that is an example of the presence of H
and the absence of C. To find a counterexample to this
statement 'a fever is a necessary condition for an
infection
' ,
we must find a case in which an infection is
present and a fever is absent. Finding such a case entitles
us to conclude that 'a fever is a necessary condition for
an infection' is false.
Suppose that the possible conditioning properties E, F, G,
H and I are to be tested to determine which are necessary
conditions for conditioned property J. By our definition,
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any such property that is absent when t <J is present cannot bea necessary condition for J. clearlv eC y, experimental
“ °th" observations are «g„l„ato datereine tt. Fr,„n=. 0r absent, o, the,.
.a„aitlo„ im
,properties in occurrences where the conditioned property
as present. Thus, the determination of a counterexample
wall depend on tests and corresponding observations.
Consider the following presence table:
test
occurrence 1
test
occurrence 2
test
occurrence 3
Possible Conditioning Conditioned
A
A
Properties
A A
A
H
A
A
Properties
J
Occurrence 1 shows us that E is not a necessary condition
for J. Therefore, this occurrence counts as a counter-
example to the statement 'E is a necessary condition for
J'. Therefore, we know that this statement is false.
Occurrence 1 also shows us that I is not a necessary con-
dition for J. Occurrence 2 has the same results for G and
again for E and occurrence 3 has the same results for F and
again for E.
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The only candidate left is H. However, this does not, as
yet, show that H is a necessary condition for j. it i s
important to note that it only shows a conditional of the
torm 'If one of the possible conditioning properties E,
P- G, H, I is a necessary condition for J, then H is that
necessary condition'.
However, we might consider the claim that while E is not a
necessary condition for J
,
m e is. Remember that, according
to the presence table for negation, m E is present when E
is absent. Therefore, we might consider adding such complex
properties
.
test
occurrence 1
test
occurrence 2
test
occurrence 3
Possible Conditioning Properties
Simple Complex
E F G H I ^ E ^ F ^ G H % I
apppa P a A A P
APAPP p a p a a
aappa p p a a p
Conditioned Property
J
test
occurrence 1 P
test
occurrence 2 P
test
occurrence 3 p
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Occurrence 1 shows that E, I
'
% F, % g and ^ h are not
necessary conditions for J. Occurrence 2 shows that E, G,
^ F, -v H, and a. I are not necessary conditions for J.
Occurrence 3 shows that E, F, I, a G
, and a, H are not
necessary conditions for J. Therefore, all have been
eliminated as necessary conditions except H and a, E .
Therefore, if one or more of the possible conditioning
properties, E, F, G, H, I, a E
,
a, F, a G
,
a, H
, and a I are
necessary conditions for J, then H and a E are those
necessary conditions
.
Since we can determine the presence or absence of a complex
property like 'E V F' in a given occurrence by knowing the
presence or absence of its simple component properties, we
may assign values to complex properties simply by appeal to
the presence tables for their logical connectives, and by
appeal to the actual values of their simple component
properties in a given occurrence
. Any such property that
is absent when J is present cannot be a necessary condition
for J.
This method can be compared to a method by which Sherlock
Holmes eliminates suspects in a murder case, one by one.
Holmes does not know beforehand that he will be able to
eliminate all but one suspect, since there may have been
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a conspiracy or since the list
the real murderer. Likewise,
of suspects may not includ
in this method we must real
e
i z e
that a conditioned property may have more than one necessary
condition and that our list of possible conditioning
properties may not include the necessary conditions.
1 .
2
.
3.
1 .
Models
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nation principles and explain howp t i application is, given test procedures.
to
9
?est c^imf USS thS direCt method of agreementt la s about necessary conditions fordisappearances in the Bermuda Triangle.
Exercises
In the first example, which of the following complexproperties are eliminated as necessary conditions forJ by test occurrences 1, 2 and 3?
a) % F
b) ^ G
c) ^ H
d) % I
e) F v I
f) G v H
2. Consider Berlitz' suggestions about the causes of
various disappearances in the Bermuda Triangle.
Construct a series of tests to determine the necessary
conditions for such disappearances. Consider the ships
Rosalie
,
the Mary Celeste
,
and the Cyclops
.
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§Hbgg£^AO^nduc^e^llmination : The Inv.r..
of Agreement
Suppose that we are asked to evaluate the statement 'being
shot m the head with a bazooka is a sufficient condition
for death 1
. Death here is the conditioned property H, and
among the alternative conditioning properties we find being
shot in the head with a bazooka, C. The inverse method of
agreement allows the discovery of sufficient conditions for
a given conditioned property by the elimination of possible
sufficient conditions by counterexample. Given our
definition of 'sufficient condition 1
,
we know that possible
sufficient conditioning property C is eliminated as an
actual sufficient conditioning property for conditioned
property II iff C is present and conditioned property H is
absent. A counterexample in this test, therefore, is a
specific case that is an example of the presence of C and
the absence of H. To find a counterexample to the state-
ment being shot in the head with a bazooka is a sufficient
condition for death 1
,
we must find a case in which someone
is shot in the head with a bazooka and does not die.
Finding such a case entitles us to conclude that 'being
shot in the head with a bazooka is a sufficient condition
for death 1 is false.
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Suppose that the possible conditioning properties E
,
F, G,
H and I are to be tested to determine which are sufficient
conditions for conditioned property J. By our definition,
any such property that is present when J is absent cannot
be a sufficient condition for J. Again, the determination
of counterexamples will depend on tests and corresponding
observations. Consider the following presence table:
Possible Conditioning Conditioned
Properties Property
F G H I J
test
occurrence 1 P A A A a
test
occurrence 2 A P a A a
test
occurrence 3 P A P a a
Occurrence 1 shows us that F is not a sufficient condition
for J. Therefore, this occurrence counts as a counter-
example to the statement 'F is a sufficient condition for
J'. Therefore, we know that this statement is false.
Occurrence 2 has the same result for G, and occurrence 3
has the same results for H and again for F.
The only candidate left is I. However, this does not, as
yet, show that I is a sufficient condition for J. It is
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important to note that it only shows a conditional of the
form 'if one of the possible conditioning properties P, G,
H 3nd 1 iS suffic ient condition for J, then 1 i s that
sufficient condition'.
We may use the same method when dealing with complex
properties; a complex property that is present when a
conditioned property is absent cannot be a sufficient con-
dition for that property.
This method also can be compared to a method by which
Sherlock Holmes eliminates suspects in a murder case, one
by one. Like Holmes in regard to his suspects, in this
method, we must realize that a conditioned property may have
more than one sufficient condition and that our list of
possible conditioning properties may not yet include the
sufficient conditions.
Models
1. Suggest how one might use the inverse method of
agreement to test claims about sufficient conditions
for disappearances in the Bermuda Triangle.
2. Begin a consideration of Arigo and point out the
possible use of such test procedures to determine
causes for phenomena cited by Fuller.
Exercises
1. Prove that the inverse method of agreement is logically
equivalent to the direct method of agreement applied to
negative properties.
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2
. Construct a series of test occurrences designed todetermine the sufficient condition for a conditionedproperty J given complex properties (F V % G) (H cm
and (I r? F) in addition to the properties listed in theexample and their negations.
3. Propose tests that could be used to point out the
sufficient conditions for Arigo's meaningless scrolltranslated" by a typist into prescriptions. (Focus
on the relation between the scroll and the typist.)
Subsection 11 - Inductive Elimination: The Method of
Difference
Suppose that we find a man dead, with no evidence of physical
violence, and are asked to evaluate the statement 'this man
disd of cancer
' . It is clear that we seek a sufficient
condition for death, but we are not seeking just any
sufficient condition; we seek a sufficient condition for
death among the properties present in this particular
occurrence. This question limited to a particular context
cannot arise for necessary conditions, since it follows from
the definition of 'necessary condition' that whenever the
conditioned property occurs, all necessary conditioning
properties automatically occur. Therefore, we can see that
the question "What are the necessary conditons for death?"
and "What are the necessary conditions for this man's death?"
have the same answer. However, such is not the case for
sufficient conditions. When a given conditioned property
such as death is present, some of its sufficient
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conditioning properties may be absent. Thus, the list of
conditioning properties to be considered in this particular
occurrence will be shorter than if we are considering a list
of possible conditioning properties simply sufficient for
death.
We might proceed as follows. Since we know that there is
no evidence of physical violence, we may rule out as
possible conditioning properties all properties having to do
with physically violent death (bazookas, trains, knives,
etc.). We may, therefore, consider poisons, disease, heart
attack
,
etc.
,
and rule them in or out on the basis of the
other properties that are present. For example, being
emaciated, or being muscular, etc. The actual method is
the same as the inverse method of agreement. A property
that is present when the conditioned property is absent
cannot be a sufficient condition for the conditioned
property
.
Let us define such an actual occurrence as follows:
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Narrowed Down
Possible Conditioning
Properties
F G H I
actual
occurrence P A P p
test
occurrence 1 P A A A
test
occurrence 2 A A A P
Conditioned
Properties
J
P
A
A
Test occurrences 1 and 2 eliminate F and I as sufficient
conditions for J by our principle, since F is present and J
is absent in occurrence 1 , and I is present and J is absent
in occurrence 2. Only H is left from among the possible
conditioning properties present in the actual occurrence.
Therefore, we may conclude that if one of the possible
conditioning properties F, G, H, or I, which were present in
the actual occurrence is a sufficient condition for J, then
H is that sufficient condition. Mote that G might also be a
sufficient condition for J
,
but it is not of interest to us
for the method of difference because it was absent in the
actual occurrence.
Again, we may use the same method when dealing with complex
properties. Again, we are limited to the properties involved
in the actual occurrence. Otherwise the method is the same
as for the inverse method of agreement. For example:
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Narrowed Down Possible Conditioning Properties
actual
occurrence
Simple Complex
F G H I ^ F ^ G 'V H ^ I
P A P p A
test
occurrence 1 P A A P
test
occurrence 2 A A A p
Conditioned Property
J
actual
occurrence p
test
occurrence 1 a
test
occurrence 2 A
Clearly, given the actual occurrence, if both simple
properties and their negations are allowed as possible
conditioning properties, exactly half will be candidates
for being the sufficient condition since exactly half will
be present in any occurrences. Therefore, given the actual
occurrence F, H, I, ^ G
,
are candidates for being sufficient
conditions for J. Test occurrence 1 eliminates I and G, and
test occurrence 2 eliminates G. Therefore, if one of the
possible conditioning properties present in the actual
occurrence is a sufficient condition for J, then H is that
sufficient condition.
379
Models
Explain that the method of difference iq moct- i • 1 nbe applied to what we have referred fn L 1 llkely to
events
,
in which we seek the oartirinL non-recurring
condition for the event in case Use f^
1^
surqerv"
t
with
f
t
h" Fuller ' s book
-
such as Arigo ’s "eyeg y he rusty knive Tt W3 q u y
anyone but Arigo placed a knife t£“yXi?““ormuiate a set of possible conditioning propertiesex?la in several test occurrences to discover thesufficient condition for this phenomenon.
Discuss the use of complex conditioning properties otherthan negative properties. Consider conjunctive
of
S
stth nrooett
•
COn
^
itional Properties
. Give examples
p
2 ^
les fr° ra Fuller 1 s book on Arigo. UseT ° ° rfference to discover from among a set ofcompiex properties a complex property that is a“Clent condrtion for the property of 'appearingto have an operation.' y
Exercises
1 * the students apply the method of difference to thefollowing situation:
Possible Conditioning Properties
Simple Complex
FGHI
actual
occurrences PAAP A P p a
Conditioned Property
J
actual
occurrences P
a) Describe a
candidates
test
but i
result
one
.
that would eliminate all the
b) Describe a
candidates
.
test result that would eliminate all the
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c) mat are the conclusions to be drawn, given theactual occurrences and the results you^escribe?
2 .
PnT?
t
V
e rodents Pick an occurrence described inuiier s book and formulate a test procedure to findthe sufficient condition for this particular occurrence
Subsection 12 - Inductive Elimination: The Double Method
of Agreement
Suppose that we are asked to evaluate a statement of the
form F is a necessary and a sufficient condition for J'.
We have already considered a method for finding necessary
conditions, namely the direct method agreement, and two
methods for finding sufficient conditions, namely the
inverse method of agreement and the method of difference.
We may combine the direct and inverse methods of agreement
form what we shall call the double method of agreement.
This will allow us to apply our principles of elimination
to determine necessary and sufficient conditions.
Consider the following example:
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test
occurrence 1
test
occurrence 2
test
occurrence 3
test
occurrence 4
Possible Conditioning Properties
—
lmPle Complex
— £ £
PAp A A PA P
APPP p AAA
Ap A P P AP A
p AAA A PPP
Conditioned Property
J_
test
occurrence 1 p
test
occurrence 2 p
test
occurrence 3 A
test
occurrence 4 a
First, applying the direct method of agreement, test
occurrence 1 eliminates G, I, % f, and
,
and test
occurrence 2 eliminates F, ^ G, ^ H, and ^ I as necessary
conditions for J, since they are absent when J is present.
Given test occurrences 1 and 2
,
by applying the direct
method of agreement, we can conclude that if one of the
possible conditioning properties is a necessary condition
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for J, then H is that necessary condition. Secondly,
applying the inverse method of agreement, test occurrence
3 eliminates G, I
,
% F, and % H, and test occurrence 4
eliminates F, % G, % H
,
and % I as sufficient conditions
for J since they are present when J is absent. Given test
occurrences 3 and 4
,
by applying the inverse method of
agreement, we can conclude that if one of the possible con-
ditioning properties is a sufficient condition for J, then
H is that sufficient condition. We may then combine these
test results obtained by the direct method of agreement and
the inverse method of agreement and conclude that if one of
the possible conditioning properties is both a necessary
and a sufficient condition for J, then H is that property.
Models
1. Introduce the notion of an expectation influenced
observation. (Rely on a magic trick to explain this
concept.) Consider a simple rope trick; tie a knot
in a rope while "holding" the ends in each hand, and
ask students to record their observations, and produce
a condition that is both necessary and sufficient to
explain the trick, by using the double method of
agreement. Point out that the difficulty will be
selecting the possible conditioning properties.
2. Provide more examples from Fuller's book on Arigo to
show how the double method of agreement can be used
to find necessary and sufficient conditions.
Exercises
1 . Have the students use the double method of agreement to
provide a possible necessary and a sufficient condition
°r Ango's supposed ability to stop the flow of blood
P° int to them thety and the importance of selecting possible
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influence^observation^nd
11 *
abou? the complex properties^? ^ (|“ ~g‘“YI • - F), given the presence table as ‘desclibld?
a) Test occurrence 1?
b) Test occurrence 2?
c) Test occurrence 3?
d) Test occurrence 4?
e) What can we conclude about these properties inrelation to J? x
Subsection 13 Inductive Elimination: The Joint Method of
Agreement and Difference
Suppose that we are asked to evaluate a statement of the
form F is a necessary and a sufficient condition for J',
limited to a particular actual occurrence of possible
conditioning properties. This, as we can see, combines the
direct method of agreement and the method of difference.
Consider the following example:
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actual
occurrence
test
occurrence 1
test
occurrence 2
actual
occurrence
test
occurrence 1
test
occurrence 2
First, applying the method of difference to the actual
occurrence provides us with the candidates for the
sufficient condition for J: F, H, % g, and % I. Test
occurrence 1, however, eliminates F, ^ G, and ^ I as
sufficient conditions for J
,
since they are all present
when J is absent. This leaves only H. Therefore, given the
actual occurrence and test occurrence 1, if one of the
possible conditioning properties present in the actual
occurrence is a sufficient condition for J, then H is that
sufficient condition. Secondly, applying the direct method
Possible Conditioning Propert
Simple
F G H I
Papa
les
Complex
% F % Q ^ H % I
A
p A A A A
A P p p
Conditioned Properties
J
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Of agreement again to the actual occurrence provides us
with the candidates for the necessary condition for j, F
,
H, «. G, and v i. Test occurrence 2, however, eliminates F,
-v G, and - I. Test occurrence 2, however, eliminates F,
G
, and v as necessary conditions for J since they are
absent in an occurrence where J is present. This leaves
only H. Therefore, given the actual occurrence and test
occurrence 2, if one of the possible conditioning properties
present in the actual occurrence is a necessary condition
for J, then H is that necessary condition. We may then
combine these test results obtained by the method of
difference and the direct method of agreement and conclude
that if one of the possible conditioning properties present
in the actual occurrence is a sufficient condition for J
and if one of the possible conditioning properties is a
necessary condition for J, then the possible conditioning
property H is both a necessary and sufficient condition
for J.
Models
1. Fuller describes the investigation of Arigo as a full
scale, complete scientific investigation. Suppose
that this is a particular conditioned phenomena. First
use the double method of agreement to arrive at a
necessary and sufficient condition for such an in-
vestigation. Then use the joint method of agreement
and difference (given the investigation of Arigo that
Fuller presents) to determine the necessary and
sufficient condition appealed to by Fuller for such aninvestigation. Point out that the problem of course.
386
2 .
1 .
complete
t
scientific
g
investigation?
W3S n0t 3 fuU scale
menf^ufthe'abov^r^ufj?11"“ deductive «gu-
Exercises
Suppose you observe the following:
Test 1
Test 2
Test 3
Test 1
Test 2
Test 3
_F
P
P
A
Possible Conditioning Properties
S-imP le Complex
—
-
H 1
%
F v G v h % i
p A A A A
A A A A p
p P P p A
Conditioned Property
_jJ
P
A
P
P P
P P
A A
a) Which could be a necessary condition for J? why?
b) Which could be sufficient for J? Why?
c) Which could be both necessary and sufficient?
Why?
2. Have the students write a short essay in which they:
a) State sufficient conditions for using inductive
elimination
.
b) State necessary conditions for using inductive
elimination
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Subsection 14 - The Applications of Inductive Elimination
Inductive elimination is useful, as we have seen, when we
are evaluating statements for which we can devise some sort
of empirical test procedure. For example, suppose that we
are asked to evaluate the statement 'Norbu Chen's psychic
power is a sufficient condition for restoring health to his
patients'. Clearly we shall use the inverse method of
agreement. However, this method depends for its usefulness
on the selection of possible conditioning properties likely
to include the actual sufficient condition for restoring
health to his patients. Furthermore, it assumes for the
purpose of the test, that his patients are indeed healthy
after this psychic treatment. This, unfortunately, is not
mechanical decision procedure, like inductive elimination.
based again on what we have referred to as inductive
intuitions. In providing possible conditioning properties
to test using inductive elimination we must use our in-
ductive intuitions to distinguish relevant conditioning
properties from irrelevant, yet still possible, conditioning
properties
.
For example, in determining sufficient conditions for the
conditioned property, we might include as possible con-
ditioning properties: already healthy, psychic power.
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Placebo effect, earlier drugs, simultaneous medical treat-
ment, spontaneous remission, psychosomatic illness, and
certain properties formed by negation, or the other logical
connectives, and these simple properties. We might exclude
as irrelevant possible conditioning properties: dormancy
of disease, since the case described assumes that his
patients are indeed healthy after his psychic treatment.
We may then observe test occurrences to note the presence
or the absence of the possible conditioning properties and
and the corresponding presence or absence of the conditioned
property.
However, the method of inductive elimination also depends
for its usefulness on the ability to gather such data and
perform such tests in numerous test occurrences to eliminate
one by one the possible conditioning properties. When it
is not physically or technologically possible to gather such
data or to perform such tests (as when Norbu will not, in
fact, permit such tests or when there are no records to
serve as data)
,
we must again rely on constructing
inductively strong arguments with a high inductive
probability. Therefore, the application of inductive
elimination depends upon the selection of possible con-
ditioning properties and the ability to gather data and
perform such tests.
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1 .
2
.
3 .
Models
K
?*/S“;,2ras”rf;hx°sr ?.elimination. n tQundation of inductive
Arigo'r"operations°“
S
Su
CCOU
?
tS Fuller Provi <tes of
vide sufficient, ne®ssa?f
S
a„S
eSt occurrences to pro-
conditions for the conlitLn^fp-rertro^^L^f
conditionin^properties for^Unf" P°ssible
ss.ass.-ST£asSs^ g ?*
examples from the natural sciences.
* 1VS S°me
Exercises
oatipntq
6 lnability to determine if many of Ariqo
'
s
evidence* to ^port^is*^ tS
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Section Three: Clarifying Arguments
Subsection 1 - Clarifying^ Logical Form of .
The Principles of Charity
We have now seen how we can evaluate both inductive and
deductive arguments. We have also seen that when such
arguments are used in an attempt to support certain con-
clusions, they are often not presented as clearly as they
might be. For example, both A. 1 and A. 2 were formulated on
Voliva's behalf, given less clear statements of each
argument. We have also considered various arguments un-
cleanly presented by various authors and found that in order
to evaluate these arguments, we must first attempt to
present them in deductively valid or inductively strong
logical form. If this is not possible, then we may argue
that they are invalid, or inductively weak. Therefore, an
argument composed of a statement or set of statements as
premises and a statement of a conclusion said to follow
from them deductively or inductively may be unclear because
the logical form of the statement or set of statements is
unclear
.
We may use PC
,
LPC or inductive logic in the attempt to
capture the logical form of such unclear arguments. First
392
we must decide if the argument can be most plausibly and
Clearly formulated as a deductive or as an inductive
argument. For example, reading over the paragraph from
which A.i was formulated, we can see the logical relation-
ships of statements in a conditional form and the negation
of the consequent in the premises leading to the negation
of the antecedent as the conclusion. We immediately
recognize this as a deductively valid logical relation.
However, reading over the paragraph from which A. 2 was
formulated, we can see no such logical relationship between
the premises and the conclusion. Rather, the premises are
intended as evidence to support the conclusion. Therefore,
we immediately recognize this as an attempt to provide an
inductive relation between the premises and the conclusion.
Sometimes authors presenting such arguments present
obviously invalid deductive arguments. In clarifying such
arguments, it is important to capture this invalid logical
form if and only if the conclusion reached by the argument
depends for its support completely on this invalid logical
move. We may, therefore, clarify the argument by capturing
this logical form, and evaluate the argument by showing
that the argument fails to support the conclusion because
the conclusion depends for its support completely on an in-
valid logical move. For example, an author may present
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an argument of the form:
1 • A 3 0
2
. O
We may then just capture its logical form and point out that
deductive
elusions
,
arguments of this form do not support their
even if the premises are true.
con-
Sometimes authors like Voliva, in presenting such arguments,
present what are invalid deductive arguments when rigorously
interpreted. However, in clarifying such arguments, it is
important to capture a valid logical form if the conclusion
reached by the argument does not at all depend for its
support on this invalid logical move. We may, therefore,
clarify the argument by presenting it in a valid deductive
logical form and evaluate the argument by showing that the
argument is or is not sound. In clarifying Voliva
• s first
argument, we put it into deductively valid logical form in
terms of A.l and then showed that while valid, A.l failed to
support its conclusion because it was unsound.
sometimes authors presenting such arguments present
obviously inductively weak arguments. In clarifying such
arguments, it is important to capture this inductive
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weakness if and only if the concluslon reache(J by ^
argument is supportable by no other relevant, known
evidence. We may, therefore, clarify the argument by
capturing this inductive weakness and evaluate the argument
by showing that since the argument is weak, the probability
of the conclusion is low, and that, therefore, the argument
fails to support the conclusion. For example, in clarifying
Voliva's second argument, we put it into an inductive
logical form in terms of A. 2 and then showed that A. 2 was
inductively weak and that, therefore, A. 2 failed to support
its conclusion.
Sometimes authors presenting such arguments present what are
inductively weak arguments that may be strengthened on the
basis of other relevant known evidence. m clarifying such
arguments it is important to capture an inductively strong
argument if the conclusion reached by the argument is
supported by other relevant known evidence. We may,
therefore, clarify the argument by providing the additional
premises required to present an inductively strong argument,
and evaluate the argument by calculating the probability of
the conclusion.
In supplying such missing premises and putting arguments
into deductively valid logical form, or inductively strong
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logical form, given the necessary and sufficient conditions
for doing so stated above, or deciding that argents
depend upon invalid deductive form or inductively weak
logical form, we are applying what we call the principle of
charity. The principle of charity states that the clearest
and most plausible construal possible of a given argument
that is consistent with its author's expressed or implied
views must be provided before a conceptually significant
critical evaluation of the argument can take place. This
prniciple was applied to all four cases considered above.
To preserve conceptually significant criticism, we shall
require the principle of charity be applied when evaluating
arguments presented by various authors.
However, we often must apply the principle of charity to
more than simply the logical form of arguments in order to
clarify such arguments before evaluating them. This
principle may also be applied to unclear expressions as
well
.
1 .
Models
Present several examples of arguments with unclearlogical form. Consider arguments presented by
VonDSniken, Berlitz, Fuller, or Blum. While repairing
t eir logical form, explain the principle of charityby intuitively considering the notion of conceptuallysignificant criticism. Point out that conceptually
r
p“'* "*• “*detects of a given argument - in this case
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BT"-- '°he^- s
evaluation is to be^on^pILTlfs^nTfU^.^
defects ^t^eir^™?^ ? f arguraents that depend on
Point ou^that these arau^en?
t0 SUPP°rt the c°>^sion
^ rn g m ts may not be repair^
“
- ss:; s =•“
Exercises
on
V
Qom
hS studei
?
ts distinguish arguments which dependme error m logical form to support the conclusionfrom arguments that have repairable logical forms
Have the students repair these repairable arguments bvapplying the principle of charity. ^
Subsection 2 - Clarifying the Intensions and Extensions of
Expressions
To see when and how we might apply the principle of charity
to an author's use of a predicate or a term or a statement,
we must first understand how a predicate, term, or state-
ment can be used unclear ly, and how their unclear uses are
to be evaluated. We may, therefore, by appeal to the
principle of charity, reconstrue arguments using such
unclear predicates, terms or statements, or show that such
arguments fail to support their conclusions because of such
unclear predicates, terms or statements.
We have seen that predicate terms are true of certain things.
We have also seen that the set of things that a predicate
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is true of is called the extension
Thus, for example, the extension of
of the predicate term,
'red' is all red things.
Predicate terms also have what are called intensions. The
intension of a predicate term is its meaning, which is the
property or concept it expresses
intension of the predicate 'red'
redness
.
For example, the
is the property or concept
Individual terms such as ’dog' also have extensions and
intensions. The extension of an individual term is the set
of things it refers to. For example, the extension of 'dog
is the thing that the individual term refers to; namely all
dogs. The intension of an individual term is its meaning,
which is the concept it expresses. For example, the
intension of 'dog' is the concept of dog.
Statements also have extensions and intensions. The
extension of a statement is the truth value of the state-
ment. For example, the extension of ' (p q) 3>
p
' i s
'true'. The intension of a statement also is its meaning,
which in turn is what we shall call the proposition it
expresses. For example, consider the statement 'Miss
Jones and Miss Smith walked to Woolco to buy a box of candy
and an umbrella', and the statement 'Miss Smith and
Miss Jones walked to Woolco to buy an umbrella and a box of
candy'. Both statements have the same intension.
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Therefore, we say that the two statements are
that is, they express the same proposition.
cointentional
,
This consideration of the extension and the intension of
predicates, individual terms, and statements leads to the
following definitions:
D. (1)
D. (2)
sa?d to
1I
?
dlvdua l term, or statement isi be coextensional with a given predicateterm, individual term or statement iff bothpredicate terms, individual terms, or statements havethe same extension.
A predicate term, individual term, or statement issaad pomtensional with a given predicate termindividual term, or statement iff both predicateterms, individual terms, or statements have the
same intension.
These two definitions, in turn, lead to two principles which
are important for the evaluation of certain arguments:
P.(l) The substitution of coextensional predicates,
individual terms, or statements for corresponding
predicates, individual terms, or statements
preserves extension.
P
• (2
)
The substitution of cointensional predicates,
individual terms, or statements for corresponding
predicates, individual terms, or statements
preserves intension.
Consider P. (1) . Suppose we know that 'the morning star' and
'the evening star' are both expressions that refer to the
planet Venus; that is, that they are coextensional.
399
before, P.,1, allows us to substitute
f°r ' thS SVening Star ' ln the following statement and
preserve extension; that is, be assured of making the
statement about the same object, namely Venus: 'the evening
Star is further from Earth than Mars'.
Consider P. (2)
.
Suppose we know that 'brother' and 'male
sibling' both have the same meaning; that is, that they are
cointensional. Therefore, P. (2) allows us to substitute
'brother' for 'male sibling- in the following statement
and preserve intension; that is, be assured of making a
statement with the same meaning: 'Joe is Henry's male
sibling
. These principles are, therefore, useful in
arguments for assuring the preservation of extension or
intension
.
However
,
often authors of arguments confuse these two
principles and the result may be seen as an appeal to a
false principle: the substitution of coextensional
expressions preserves intension. This can easily be seen
to be false. Suppose we have a statement in the logical form
of a tautology
,
'the morning star is identical to the morning
star'. This statement is necessarily true since everything
is self-identical. The assignment of 'true' to this
statement is based on the intension of 'the morning star'.
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Now suppose we substitute 'the evening star' into this
statement as follows: 'the morning star is identical to the
evening star'. This also turns out to be true, but for
quite different reasons. The substitution has not preserved
intension. We must learn some astronomy to determine that
this statement is true; we must learn that, as a matter of
fact, 'the morning star' and 'the evening star' refer to the
same object. We needed no astronomy to determine that the
tautology was true; we know that everything is
self-identical. Therefore, if two expressions are
coextensional
,
their substitution one for the other does
not preserve intension.
It follows from our consideration of extensions and
intensions that a statement in an argument may be unclear
because the extension or the intension of a term or terms in
that statement is unclear. For example, consider the
following statements:
There is rational and viable evidence that many cases
of psychosis, from schizophrenia to dementia praecox,
could be ascribed to the phenomenon of "possession" by an
alleged spirit that refuses to accept the fact that he
or she is dead 1
,
and
'The spirit, whether good or bad, is said to be
incorporated" in the living body of a receptive person.
'
(Fuller, p. 7)
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There are several unclear terms in these two statements
which must be clarified as much as possible before they are
used in statements of evidence in inductive arguments, or in
statements involving logical relations in deductive
arguments. This uncertainty can be seen by asking questions
like "What is the extension of 'rational and viable
evidence'?" "Does it include the claims of mediums?" "what
is its intension?" "what is the intension of 'spirit'?"
"What is the extension?" "Do spirits refuse to accept
facts?" "What is the intension of 'refuses to accept a
fact'?" "What is the intension of 'receptive person'?"
Does its extension include members of the traveler's aid
society?" These questions and the absence of clear answers
to them, given the passage, show that we do not understand
the argument well enough to evaluate it. Often, however,
our evaluation may simply be that the terms have no clear
intension, and that, therefore, arguments using these
unclear terms are simply no good.
Such no good arguments are said to contain improperly vague
or ambiguous terms. Properly vague terms like 'bald' can be
used clearly without being able clearly to specify its
extension. However, improperly vague terms have no clear
intension. For example, 'spirit' considered above is an
improperly vague term. A term, in a given context, is said
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to be ambiguous when we are unable clearly to determine
which of the possible extensions or which of the possible
intensions of the term is being used. For example,
'incorporated' as used above is an ambiguous term.
The notions of extensionality and intensionality help us
understand other confusions which must be recognized or
clarified before we can proceed with conceptually
significant criticism of conceptually significant arguments
Often, however, we must be content to point out that the
extensions and intensions of terms and statement used in
some arguments cannot be determined and that, therefore,
the arguments are not conceptually significant and can be
relegated to the rubbish.
Models
Clearly distinguish vagueness from abmiguity. Provideexamples of arguments with improperly vague and ambituousterms (anticipate our discussion of fallacies inSection 5) . Point out that many are so unclear as to beconceptually insignificant, but that others, while
unclear, may be clarified somehow (anticipate ourdiscussion of definition and explication in Subsections
5 and 6)
.
Exercises
1. Given D. (1) and D. (2) , P. (1) and P. (2)
,
provide all the
true principles you can about intensionality and
extensionality.
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2
' ^
ve the students a list of statements and ask them to
terms ““L^th™116 ' |mProP®rly vague, and ambiguous. Have t em explain why each is vamio -im^v- i
vague, or ambiguous in terms of extensions
^- improperly
intensions.
Subsection 3 - Equivocal Uses of Terms
As well as being unclear because its terms are unclear,
statements in arguments may also be unclear because of what
we shall call the equivocal use of a term or terms in the
statements. The equivocal use of a term involves confusing
different intensions or extensions of the same term.
For example, consider the following argument:
3.1
1. The end of a thing is its perfection.
2
.
Death is the end of life.
:. 3. Death is the perfection of life.
In premise 1, end 1 is used to mean 'good 1
,
but in premise
2, 'end' is used to mean 'termination'. In this case,
different intensions of the same term are confused.
Therefore, if we were capturing the logical form of this
argument, we could not correctly translate both occurrences
of 'end' using the same predicate constant 'E'; we instead
distinguish the non-cointensional senses of 'end' by using,
for example, 'G' for 'end' in premise 1 and 'T' for 'end'
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in premise 2 in accordance with our rule that predicate
constants be used univocally. Therefore, when correctly
capturing the logical form of this argument by recognizing
the equivocal use of ’ end •
,
we can see that the argument
is not deductively valid.
Models
1 . Review briefly our requirement that propositional
constants and predicate constants be used univocally.Point out why we specified this as a requirement fortransition of an argument's logical form into PC and
J-J£ •
2. Provide examples from the reading of equivocation(anticipate our discussion of informal fallacies inSection 5)
.
3. Point out that an argument that depends on an equivocal
use of a term to support the conclusion is intuitively
not conceptually significant. Explain why this is so
and consider examples from Fuller. Consider 'surgery'.
Exercises
1. Present a series of arguments involving the equivocal
use of terms, either from the reading or from logic
texts. Have the students correctly capture their
logical form and point out the equivocal use of a term
or terms.
2 . Have the students write a paper in which they argue that
'cure* is used equivocally by faith healers (this will
anticipate our discussion of definition and explication)
Subsection 4 - Psychological Contexts
Arguments are sometimes unclear because of errors resulting
from the failure to notice the presence of what we shall
405
call psychological contexts. By
'psychological contexts'
we shall mean statements containing the expressions
'is
aware that',
'believes that', 'is so called ,, , says^
nows that
, doubts that', or others containing what we
might intuitively call psychological expressions. Many
uses of such psychological contexts are clear and
unproblematic. For example.
4.1
1 .
:. 27
luTanT?7at the ?arth travels around the
the farth.
a”are 3t the Moon Navels around
I am aware that the Moon travels around the Earth
However, the failure to understand and correctly deal with
psychological contexts can lead to the construction of
deductively invlaid arguments. Consider the following
example of a deductively invalid argument:
4.2
1. Bigfoot is so called because he wears size 15shoes
.
2 • Bigfoot is Jim Wilson.
. 3. Jim Wilson is so called because he wears size 15
shoes.
The problem with this argument involves premise one.
Premise one, for the purpose of a deductive argument, should
be translated as "'Bigfoot' is used to refer to Jim Wilson
because he wears size 15 shoes." Thus, correctly translated,
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the conclusion 3 does not follow deductively from 1 and 2 .
However, other deductive arguments using psychological con-
texts are more difficult and demand more attention.
Suppose that we are attempting to translate and evaluate the
validity of an argument containing as a premise, the
statement
(i)
(ii)
(iii)
s believes a = the President of the United States
p f i
S a
,
person and a is another person. Let'P stand for President of the United State'Given our discussion of translating definite
°Ur logical symbols, we cantranslate ( 1 ) in two ways, which we shall callsmall scope and large scope.
( x) [(Vy) (Py
— y = x) . s believes a = x]
, or
s believes ( x) [ (Vy) (Py e y = x) . a = x]
Here (ii) is called small scope since the scope of the
belief is limited to a = x. A statement with this logical
form is false either if there is no x that is P, or if
there is more than one of them.
Here (iii) is called large scope since the scope of the
belief covers the entire statement. A statement with this
logical form may be true even if there is no x that is P,
or even if there is more than one of them. The implications
of this psychological context for an argument can be seen
as follows.
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Suppose that:
(iv) b = President of the United States.
Here (iv) is translated in our symbols as
(v) ( lx) [ (Vy) (Py e y = X ) . 2 = b)
Suppose that we use (ii) and (v) as premises in a deductive
argument as follows:
4.3
1. (~!x) ( (Vy) (Py = y = x)
2^ (J3X) ( (Vy) (Py E y = x )
: • 3 . s believes a = b
s believes a = x)
b = x)
Also suppose that we use (iii) and (v) as premises in a
deductive argument as follows:
4.4
1. s believes Cd-x) ( (Vy) (Py e y = x ) . a = x)
2 • (3x) ( (Vy) (Py = y = x) . b = x)
:. 3. S believes a = b
Neither 4.3 nor 4.4 are valid deductive arguments, and both
represent a logical error that results from failing to
notice the presence of a psychological context.
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onsider 4.3. The first premise is a small scope trans-
lation of the statement 's believes that a is identical
the President of the United States'. The second premise
a translation of the statement 'b is identical with the
with
is
President of the United State
no claims about s's beliefs.
s ' . The second premise makes
Therefore, we can see that
it is logically possible for the premises to be true and the
conclusion, the statement 's believes that a is identical
with b', to be false; b may, in fact, be identical to a, but
s may not, in fact, believe it. Therefore, 4.3 is an in-
valid argument which ignores "s believes." The problem here
is that believing is not a truth functional relation. That
is, the truth value of statements involving 'believes' and
other statements is not always determined by considering the
truth values of the component statements.
The same problem arises with 4.4 that arises with 4.3. The
first premise is a large scope translation of the statement
s believes that a is identical with the President of the
United States'. The second premise again, is a translation
of the statement 'b is identical with the President of the
United States'
. The second premise makes no claims about
s s beliefs. Again, we see that it is logically possible for
the premises to be true and the conclusion to be false; b
may, in fact, be identical to a, but s may not, in fact,
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believe it. Therefore, 4.4, like 4
. 3
,
argument ignoring "s believes."
is an invalid
Both 4.3 and 4.4 may be confused with the following valid
argument
:
4.5
1. Px) (Vy) ( (Py e y = X )
fL (3 X ) (Vy) ( (Py e y = X )
: . 3. a = b
a = x) )
b = x))
Argument 4.5 is a valid deductive argument which can be
proved so by using our rules of inference. The context here
is clear, and there is no logical problem with 4.5:
1. Ox) (Vy) (Py = y = x) . a = x) aiven A
2 .
-JMX.) (Vy) (Py = y = x) . b = x) given A
(
C
,
3 ' (Vy) (Py = y = c) . a = c 1, for EQE
4 . (Vy) (Py = y = d) . b = d 2
,
for EQEd 5 . (Vy) (Py E y = c ) . a = c 3, R
6. (Vy) (Py E y = d) 4
,
,E
7. (Vy) (Py E y = c ) 5, .E
8. Pa E a = d 6, UQE
9
.
Pa E a = c 7, UQE
10 . a = c 5, .E
11. Pa 9, 10
,
E E
12. a = d 8, 11, E E
13. b = d 4 , .E
14. a = b 12
, 13, =
15 . a = b 4, 14, EQE
16 . a = b 3, 15, EQE
Other deductive arguments that involve psychological con-
texts may be deductively valid, but evaluated as unsound
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because of the psychological context For example:
4.6
If I believe in God,
I believe in God.
God exists.
then God exists.
1. BP o Q
2
. BP
Let 'BP' stand for 'I believe in God' and let 'Q'
'God exists'. Therefore, 4.6 is a valid argument
instance of Z7E. However, it is unsound; premise
since nothing follows about God's existence from
beliefs. in this case, the psychological context
problem for soundness, not for validity.
stand for
,
a simple
1 is false,
one 1 s
causes a
It is useful to note the difference between 4.6 and the
following argument which is invalid because of the presence
of a psychological context:
4.6’
1. I believe if I believe in God, then God exists.
2
•
I believe in God.
3. God exists
1 .
: . 3 .
B (BP Q)
BP
Q
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Therefore, 4.6' is not a valid argument since
the entire conditional is what is believed.
in premise 1
This failure to recognize the presence of psychological
contexts can also lead to the construction of inductively
weak arguments. Consider the following inductively weak
argument
:
4 .
7
1
.
2
.
3.
: . 4 .
On an intuitive level, we might procede as follows.
Consider (1). Even if this is true, he could be mistaken,
deliberately lying, drunk for his experience, mentally ill,
or seeking publicity. Therefore, (1) is not evidence for
(4); P (4/1)4^ P 4/1). Consider (2). Even if this is
true, he too could be mistaken, deliberately lying, drunk
for his experience, mentally ill, or in collusion with
Hickson. Therefore, (2) is not evidence for (4). Consider
(3) . Even if this is true, these people could be fooled by
hoaxes, under the influence of drugs, deliberately lying,
Charles Hickson claims he was taken aboard aflying saucer from another galaxyCalvin Parker believes he was tak^n aboard aflying saucer from another galaxy.
Hundreds of other people claim to have been incontact with beings from another galaxy who flym flying saucers. J Y
Beings from another galaxy have visited Earthm flying saucers.
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or attempting to gain publicity. Therefore,
( 3 ) is not
evidence for ( 4 ). Consider intuitively the results:
( 1 ) ,(2), and (3) are all not evidence for (4), so P (4/1 . 2
. 3 )
rcP (t 4/1
. 2
. 3 ). Therefore, this shows that 4.7 is a
weak inductive argument.
The reason that 4.7 is such a weak inductive argument is
that each of the premises involve a statement of a belief
that a person has, or a statement of a claim that a person
makes. From such true statements, nothing follows about the
existence of the objects of belief, or about the existence of
the referents that the claims concern. From the stated
belief or claim, we cannot infer that the objects of belief
have existing referents, or that the claims are claims about
existing referents. Thus, it may be true that Hickson and
hundreds of people make those claims, and it may be true that
Parker believes that he was taken aboard a flying saucer
from another galaxy. However, it may at the same time be
false that flying saucers from another galaxy exist, since
we have determined that 4.7 is inductively weak, we know
that 4.7 is a no good argument.
Psychological contexts, therefore, must be recognized when
used in both deductive and inductive arguments. Failure
to do so often results in a failure to recognize invalid or
unsound deductive, and inductively weak inductive arguments.
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Have the students capture the logical form of inductivearguments involving psychological contexts (Considerexamples from Blum.) Have them show that ihey reinductively strong or inductively weak
Subsection 5 - Clarifying Unclear Terms by Definition
We have seen that an author's inattention to the logical
form of arguments, the unclear intensions or extensions of
terms or statements, the equivocal uses of terms, and the
inattention to psychological contexts can result in unclear
arguments, which must, where possible, be clarified in
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accord with the principle of charity before conceptually
significant criticism can occur. Of course, many such
arguments cannot be clarified, and it is sufficient to
evaluate these conceptually insignificant arguments by
pointing out the above errors
.
Having considered methods for clarifying the logical form
of logically unclear arguments, we shall now consider
methods for clarifying unclear terms and for the evaluation
of such proposed clarifications.
One way to clarify an unclear term is to provide a
definition of the term. Intuitively, however, simply pro-
viding a definition for a term does not necessarily mean
that we have successfully clarified the term. The
definition may simply be no good, or may simply reflect the
unclarity of the term. Therefore, we must also understand
how to evaluate proposed definitions, and we must under-
stand the limitations and serious problems involved with
providing and evaluating definitions. Providing and
evaluating definitions of a term involves providing and
evaluating specific claims about the term's extension or
the term's intension. We shall begin by proposing what we
shall call definition by extensional equivalence, and showing
that definition by extensional equivalence does not succeed
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m defining a term. In attempting to fix this defect, we
shall show that while there are many different accounts of
the function and evaluation of many different kinds of
there are serious limitations and philosophical
problems with providing an account of definition.
What may be called definition by extensional equivalence
relies on one of the logical connections, the biconditional
(=). The biconditional connects a statement of term or
Phrase to be defined, called the definiendum, with a state-
ment defining the term or phrase, called the definiens.
Providing this biconditional connective between the
definiendum and the definiens can be called definition by
extensional equivalence because the biconditional can be
viewed as asserting that the definiens and the definiendum
are coextensional
. Consider the following example:
f
x aPPear s to be an aerial phenomenonfor which we have no specific, certain explanation
Definition 5.1 asserts that appearing to be an aerial
phenomenon for which we have no specific, certain expla-
nation is both a necessary and a sufficient condition for
being a UFO. In other words, all and only those objects
that are in the extension of the definiens are in the
extension of the definiendum.
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To evaluate a definition like 5.1, we must simply consider
whether, in fact, all and only those objects that are in the
extension of the definiens are in the extension of the
definiendum. That is, we attempt to find an object that is
either clearly in the extension of the definiens and clearly
not in the extension of the definiendum, or clearly in the
extension of the definiendum and clearly not in the extension
of the definiens. Finding such an object is called providing
a counterexample to the proposed definition. We can see
that this process is similar to the process of inductive
elimination
.
Consider the following example of a proposed definition and
its evaluation by counterexample:
5.2 x is an automobile = x is a four-wheeled,
motorized vehicle.
To evaluate 5.2, we must consider whether, in fact, all and
only those objects that are in the extension of the
definiendum are in the extension of the definiens. For 5.2,
we can easily find an object that is clearly in the
extension of the definiens that is clearly not in the
extension of the definiendum. For example, consider a fork-
lift, or a farm tractor, or a garden tractor, or a riding
lawnmower
. These objects are four wheeled motorized
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vehicles, yet they are not automobiles. These objects are
all counterexamples to the proposed definition. One
counterexample, however, is sufficient to show that it is not
the case that all and only those objects that are in the
extension of the definition are in the extension of the
definiens. Therefore, by providing such a counterexample,
we have show that 5.2 is not a good definition by extensional
equivalence of 'automobile'. The definiendum and the
definiens are not coextensional
.
This means of evaluating given definitions by extensional
equivalence also gives us a means for providing such
definitions. We attempt, in initially providing the
definition, to provide a definiens that is coextensional
with the definiendum. We then reflect on this initial
definition and search for counterexamples. Finding counter-
examples, we then modify the definiens to eliminate the
counterexamples, thus building a definition in which the
definiens is coextensional with the definiendum.
Consider the following example of this procedure. Suppose
that we are attempting to provide a definition by extensional
equivalence for the term 'brother'. We may propose the
following
:
5.3 x is a brother x is a male relative.
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g a male relative is certainly a necessary condition of
being a brother, but it is not a sufficient condition. For
example, an uncle, a father or a grandfather, are all
clearly male relatives, yet not all are brothers. These are
counterexamples to 5 . 3 which we must rule out. Thus we may
consider revising 5.3 as follows:
5.3' x is a brother
- x is a male relative that
a father or a grandfather.
is not
Yet 5.3' also has counterexamples. Consider a male cousin,
a nephew, a grandson, a son, or a great uncle. Therefore,
5.3 also fails as a definition. We can see from these
counterexamples that to rule out each male relative that is
not a brother will be a long process indeed. We must rule
great-great-great-grandfathers
, great-great-great-uncles
,
etc. Therefore, we might consider the uniqueness of being a
brother, and revise 5.3' as follows:
5.3" x is a brother = x is a male sibling.
Definition 5.3" does not have counterexamples, and clearly
the definiens and definiendum are extensionally equivalent.
Therefore, according to the procedure for evaluating such
definitions, 5.3" is a good definition.
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However, this procedure points
this account of definition. By
can see that there are problems
lo a serious problem with
reflecting carefully, we
with this procedure for
evaluating definitions by extensions equivalence that lead
us to conclude that what has been called definition by
extensional equivalence is not a workable form of
definition, while 5.3" is a good definition, it is not a
good definition simply because tiic deliniens and definiendum
are extensionally equivalent (coextensional ) . Consider the
following biconditional to clarify the nature of this
problem
:
5,4 x
.f®
a creature with a heart x is a creature
with a kidney.
Clearly, upon sufficient reflection, we can see that the
definiens and the definiendum are coextensional. However,
>.4 js designed to show that simply requiring
coextensionality is not sufficient to guarantee a good
definition. Tn fact, we don't want to say that 5.4 is a
del inition at all
.
The problem, then, is to rule out
biconditionals like 5.4 as definitions and rule in
biconditionals like 5.1 and 5.3" as definitions.
W( may consider introducing an appeal to intensions here,
and argue that what we have called a good definition by
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extensional equivalence provides a definiens that is both
coextensional and cointensional with the def iniendum. Thus,
we might attempt to solve this problem by abandoning the
attempt to provide definitions by extensional equivalence
and instead, adopt the attempt to provide definitions by
intensional equivalence. This automatically accounts for
extensional equivalence because of the following principle:
P.< 3) If a term A is cointensional with a term B, thenA is coextensional with B.
Thus, we might argue, 5.1 is a good definition by
intensional equivalence because the definiens and the
defmiendum are cointensional, just like 5.3" is a good
definition by intensional equivalence because the definiens
and definiendum are cointensional.
However, by reflecting carefully, we can see that there are
problems with this procedure for evaluating definitions by
intensional equivalence. The first and most obvious
problem is how to determine whether or not a proposed
definiens is, in fact, cointensional with a given
definiendum. However, there is a more serious problem.
Consider the following biconditional to clarify this more
serious problem:
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5.3 x is a brother e x is a brother.
Clearly
, the definiens and the definiendum of 5.5 are
comtensional. Therefore, by our principle P. (3) , they are
coextensional. So 5.5 is a good definition by intensional
equivalence. However, we do not want to say that 5.5 is a
good definition. The problem we now face is to rule out
biconditionals like 5.5 as definitions and to rule in
biconditional s like 5.1 and 5.3" as definitions.
We may consider introducing an appeal to some notion of
informativeness, and argue that what we have called a good
definition by intensional equivalence provides a definiens
that is both cointensional with the definiendum and
informative. In fact, many philosophers such as G. E. Moore
have attempted to provide specific conditions for
informativeness. However, these are deep and murky problems
for philosophers to solve, well beyond the boundaries of our
present purpose. It is sufficient for our purposes to
notice that these problems arise in attempting to explain
how to provide and how to evaluate such definitions.
We must, for our purposes, avoid these problems by carefully
considering and screening candidates for definiendums
. We
are relatively safe with definiendums that have a clear
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extension and a clear intension. However, the price of
this safety is often conceptual in significance. Often,
the unclear terms in the argument that need clarification by
definition do not have clear extensions, or intensions, and
this is why they need clarification. For example, the
extension of 'dead' is all dead things, yet the problem is
that it is not always clear which objects fit this extension
and which do not.
Often the best we can do, while avoiding the above problems
with definitions, is to provide what are called dictionary
definitions
.
5.6 x is a dictionary definition of y e
reflects current usage of y and x is
with y.
x correctly
cointensional
Such definitions are easily evaluated. Where current usage
clearly applies a term to some object, a good dictionary
definition may not withhold it; where current usage clearly
withholds a term from some object, a good dictionary
definition may not apply it.
Yet while dictionary definitions may be helpful as reports
of linguistic usage, often they simply capture the unclarity
that we are attempting to avoid by providing the definition.
423
Therefore, such definitions are not helpful completely to
clarify terms which must be clarified to proceed with
evaluations of conceptually significant arguments. To pro
vide the necessary clarification of such terms, we must
abandon definition altogether and adopt what we shall call
explication.
moaeis
1 .
^
m
^
at\ SeVeral definitions by extensional equivalence
?he problems
^ formulated * Reemphasiz^
infie? 1 th 1 } d US tc lntro<^uce definition bymtensional equivalence, and show that extensional Y
equivalence fails to provide a workable account ofdefinition.
2 . Discuss 'informativeness' and
ditions of informativeness in
groups, you might discuss the
attempt to formulate con-
class. In more advanced
problem of analysis.
3 . Consider discussing other commonly used "definitions"like stimulative definitions and operational definitions
stipulative definitions can be show to be eitherformulated and evaluated for systematic clarity, or tobe what we shall call explications. Operationaldefinitions can be shown not to be definitions, muchlike what have been called definitions by extensional
equivalence can be shown not to be definitions.
Consider dictionary definitions and explain how
dictionaries are written.
4 . Consider proposing and evaluating dictionary definitions
and point to their limitations in clarifying unclear
terms
.
Exercises
1. Have the students formulate counterexamples to
proposed definitions by extensional equivalence. (This
may be made up from terms in the reading.)
the students formulate
descriptive definitions.
counterexamples to proposed
2
.
424
3 .
to^xplain^wh^descriptive^def init '
W^ich they are asked
useful in clarifying uncSar terme^n
3 alWayS
Have them provide an example.
an ar9ument -
Subsection 6 - Clarifying Unclear Terms by ExoT i <- a t i „„
of the Unclear Property or Concept
As we shall see, explications avoid the problems we con-
sidered that face definitions. We may, therefore, appeal
to explications to clarify unclear terms, and thereby, to
allow us to proceed with evaluations of conceptually
significant arguments. We must, therefore, consider how
to propose and how to evaluate explications.
In providing an explication, we provide an explication of
a property, or concept, not an explication of a term. it
is the nature of properties or concepts that they cannot be
changed; that is, they are objective. Intuitively, we can
see this by seeing that the same property or concept can be
apprehended as the same by different people. Recall that
properties are the intensions of predicates and that
concepts are intensions of individual terms. To explicate
a property or concept, we replace this original property
or concept called the explicandum with another property or
concept called the explicatum. While, as we have seen in
a definition, the definiendum and the definiens are
coextensional or cointensional
,
in an explication, the
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explicandum and explicate are neither coextensional nor
cointensional. Clearly then, the process of explication is
distinguished from the process of definition. We shall also
see that explications are proposed and evaluated differently
from definitions.
We can begin our consideration of explication by intuitively
understanding the purpose for replacing one property or
concept with another. We often use explication to replace
one property or concept (the explicandum) with another
property or concept (the explicatum) when the explicandum
does not usefully serve some conceptual purpose as the
explicatum. We can intuitively see this by considering an
analogy offered by Rudolf Carnap, in which the explicandum
is compared to a pocket knife and the explicatum is compared
to a scalpel. While the pocket knife is a handy instrument,
useful for many pruposes, it is not as well suited to open
heart surgery as the scalpel. Consequently, we lay down
the pocket knife and pick up the scalpel when we do open
heart surgery, since we can accomplish our purpose better
with a scalpel than with the pocket knife. By analogy,
while the explicandum may be a handy property or concept,
useful for many conceptual purposes, it is not as well
specific conceptual task as the explicatum.
Consequently, we adopt the explicatum for this specific
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conceptual task, and cast aside the explicandum since we
can accomplish our purpose better with the explicatum than
with the explicandum.
With this in mind, we can consider the steps involved in
providing an explication of a property or concept. Consider,
for example, the concept expressed by 'fish' as a candidate
for explication. The first step in providing an explication
is to determine if the concept to be explicated is, in fact,
an explicandum; that is, to determine if the concept is
sufficiently clear to be suitable for explication. To do
so, we must provide an informal clarification of the concept
by informal explanations and examples. For example, an
informal clarification of the property expressed by 'fish'
might include an informal explanation like "lives in the
water; spends most of its time in fresh or salt water,"
etc., and an example of something that clearly has the
property like "Charlie the Tuna." since the property
expressed by 'fish' can be informally clarified, we can
conclude that the property expressed by 'fish' is an
explicandum.
Once we have determined that we have an explicandum, the
next step is to provide the explication of the explicandum
in light of the specific conceptual purpose at hand. For
example, the explicandum of 'fish' serves certain clearly
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recognizable purposes (like the pocket knife). For example,
it serves to distinguish creatures that live in water from
creatures that live on land. Yet if our purpose is to
classify and order groups of living things clearly, in
ways that may allow us to investigate how various groups
of living things evolved, then the explicandum fails to
serve this purpose well. Therefore, to serve this purpose
better, we introduce a new property, the explicatum, that
serves similar purposes as the old property, the
explicandum, but that also serves this new purpose.
Providing the explicatum is, to some extent, simply a matter
of ingenuity. Strictly sepaking, there is no correct or
incorrect explicatum. However, not all explicata are
equally justified for a given conceptual purpose, as we
shall see. For the explicatum of 'fish', in light of the
above conceptual purpose, consider 'member of the class
Pisces'. This explicatum of 'fish' does allow us to classify
and order groups of living things clearly, in ways that
allow us to investigate how various groups of living things
evolved, while the explicandum does not allow us to do this.
For example, the explicandum of 'fish' includes whales and
porpoises. However, the explicatum of 'fish' does not
include whales and porpoises.
428
However, substituting the explicatum for the explicandum
in certain statements does preserve truth value in certain,
intuitively desirable extensional contexts. For example,
consider the statement 'Charlie the Tuna is a fish'. This
statement is true for both the explicandum of 'fish' and
the explictum of 'fish'. However, consider the statement
'Moby Dick is a fish'. This statement is true given the
explicandum of 'fish', but false given the explicatum of
'fish'. This is certainly not a defect of the explicatum;
the explicatum serves to introduce a certain precision and
care for the purpose of classifying and ordering groups of
living things clearly. Therefore, we are entitled to say,
given the explicatum, that 'Moby Dick is a fish' is simply
false
.
We can see, therefore, that while the explicatum must
preserve some extensional overlap with the explicatum,
there is no requirement that the explicatum be
coextensional with the explicandum. As we have seen, the
explicatum of 'fish' and the explicandum of 'fish' are not
coextensional. We must also note that often in a given
context, for a given purpose, the explicatum need not be
the one with the most extensional overlap. For example,
'swims with appendigial fins' as a proposed explicatum of
'fish' has far more extensional overlap with the explicandum
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Of 'fish' than 'member of the class Pisces'. However, it
fails as an explicate, given the purpose of classifying
and ordering groups of living things clearly, since it fails
fruitfully to advance this purpose. Therefore, while
strictly speaking, there are no correct or incorrect
explicate, we are certainly in a clear position to evaluate
and discard proposed explicate given their failure fruit-
fully to advance a given purpose.
We have similarly understood recognizing the need for an
explication. In providing 'member of the class Pisces' as
an explicatum of 'fish' in this context, we are not avoiding
the problem of the correct descriptive definition of 'fish'
(which has since changed)
. In not using a pocket knife and
using a scalpel, we are not avoiding the problem of the
correct use of a pocket knife; we are simply in a position
to say that a pocket knife is not useful for open heart
surgery, and a scalpel is useful for this purpose.
Analogously, in not using a descriptive definition, or an
explicandum, and using an explicatum, we are not avoiding
the problem of the correct use of a definition or an
explicandum; we are simply in a position to say that a
definition, or an explicandum is not useful for this
specific conceptual purpose, and that an explicatum is more
useful for this purpose.
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We shall now consider several
evaluating explications. Fir
examples of providing and
^ decision procedure.
1.
Determine if the property or concept to be explicated
is sufficiently clear to be an explicandum by: a)
providing an informal clarification of the property
or concept and by b) providing informal examples.
Failure clearly to do a) or b) and showing that a)
or b) cannot be done is sufficient to show that the
property or concept to be explicated is too unclear for
2. Determine the specific conceptual purpose at hand by
asking and answering the question "Why is the explicandum
not as useful in this context as a different concept?"
3. Choose or evaluate the explicatum in reference to this
specific conceptual purpose by: a) determining that
there is at least some extensional overlap between the
explicandum and the explicatum, by b) determining that
the substitution of the explicatum for the explicandum
explication, and is, therefore, without cognative
significance.
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in certain statements preserves truth value in desirable
extensional contexts, and by c) determining that the
explicatum fruitfully advances the specific conceptual
purposes at hand.
We shall now work through two examples. Consider, in the
context of John G. Fuller’s explanation of Arigo's healing
powers, the statements:
SDir?t
S
o?
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a
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Arig° claimed he incorporated the
instantaneous S&2&!* ^
Suppose that we are attempting to understand what it is for
a "spirit to be incorporated" into a living person.
Therefore, we proposed to explicate 'spirit' to enable us to
understand and then evaluate Arigo's alleged claim. First,
however, we must determine if the concept expressed by
spirit' is sufficiently clear to serve as an explicandum.
To do so, we attempt to provide an informal clarification of
the concept and informal examples. Suppose that spirit is a
concept of the mind of a human being. This does not help
because it seems that a mind is able to function only in
conjunction with its body. There is nothing to indicate that
minds can move from body to body. This concept, therefore.
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does not help us to clarify the concept of spirit as used
here. Suppose that the concept is a concept of the
influence of one human mind on another. This does not help
because for one mind to influence another, there must be
some form of contact. For
mind for teaching, writing.
example, one person using
or speaking, and another
his
person
correspondingly using his mind for learning, reading, or
listening, since Fritz died in 1918 and Arigo was born in
1923, the contact would have to be written. However,
Fritz wrote nothing and Arigo was illiterate, so this does
not help to clarify this concept.
We can begin to see that spirit' is not a good candidate
for explication, since we are unable to provide an
explicandum by informally clarifying the concept. Therefore,
we are entitled to conclude that the concept in this context
is too unclear for explication, and is, therefore, without
cognitive significance.
Explication is, however, useful when an author's use of a
term expressing a explicandum is not as well suited to
the author's apparent purpose as some other concept. In the
context of Charles Berlitz 's fifth chapter entitled "Is
There a Logical Explanation?", consider the following
statement
:
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\hl C otter a theory or combination of theoriesthat the phenomenon may be essentially caused bv sMllfunctioning man-made power complexes belonging to a
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Consider logical explanation' in this context. Berlitz'
s
use of 'logical explanation' does not allow us clearly and
precisely to specifiy which explanations count as logical
explanations and which explanations do not count as logical
explanations and why they do or do not. Clearly, Berlitz
does not simply mean to distinguish explanations which
violate the laws of deductive logic or inductive logic from
explanations which do not. We might, therefore, consider
logical explanation' in this context as a candidate for
explication
.
First, we must determine if the concept expressed by 'logical
explanation' is sufficiently clear to be an explicandum.
The concept seems to be a concept of a good explanation, or
an explanation that is commonsensical
. Consider, for
example, the statement 'there is a logical explanation for
my missing car keys'. We, therefore, have a clear case of
an explicandum.
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NOW we must determine the specific conceptual purpose at
hand, we may do so by asking why the explicandum is not as
useful in this context as some other concept. The answer is
that the explicandum does not allow us to determine on what
grounds we determine that an explanation is a good
explanation and on what grounds we determine that an
explanation is a no-good explanation. Therefore, the
purpose for replacing the explicandum with an explicatum is
to allow us to better classify explanations as good or
no-good on precise grounds.
We must now consider the selection of an explicatum, given
this specific conceptual purpose in this context. Let's
consider first our earlier rejected proposal, the concept
expressed by 'an explanation that does not violate the laws
of deductive or inductive logic'. This clearly allows us to
classify good and no-good explanations on precise grounds.
However, it does not allow us to distinguish good and no-good
explanations in a way that is useful in this context. For
example, we can inuitively see that an explanation that is
not logical, in the sense that is expressed by the concept of
the negation of the explicandum, may at the same time not
violate the laws of deductive or inductive logic. That is,
we can have explanations that are not ' logical explanations
'
in Berlitz' sense, yet are explanations that do not violate
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the laws of deductive or inductive logic. Therefore, this
proposed explicatum is not useful for this purpose.
TO arrive at an explicatum for 'logical explanation', let's
consider what may be classified as not logical explanations
m Berlitz' sense. These can be found in the selection from
Chapter 5, quoted above, and presented as sufficient con-
ditions for not logical explanations which we shall simply
illogical explanations:
6.1 given x is an explanation:
a) if x entails that the world is such that thelaws of nature may not hold, then x is anillogical explanation.
b) if x entails that the world is such that there
are holes in the sky," then x is an illogical
explanation
.
c) if x entails that the world is such that
creatures living in inner space from Atlantis
exist, then x is an illogical explanation.
d) if x entails that the world is such that
creatures living in outer space exist, then x
is an illogical explanation.
e) if x entails that the world is such that
ancient, advanced technology's power sources
exist, then x is an illogical explanation.
We can see that 6.1 classifies as illogical any explanation
which entails the existence of things that are not known to
exist. Berlitz, therefore. seems to provide an ontological
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basis to determine that an explanation is illogical.
Applying the appropriate negations, then, we can see that a
likely explication of 'logical explanation' will he a concept
of an explanation that does not entail the existence of
things not known to exist.
We can see that adopting this explicatum will allow us
successfully to classify explanations in this context as
good or no-good on precise grounds consistent with Berlitz'
view. For example, an explanation proposed to explain the
disappearance of my car keys that entails that elves exist
is not a logical explanation, but one that does not entail
the existence of things not known to exist is a logical
explanation. The explicatum seems to preserve truth value
in contexts provided by Berlitz, and seems fruitfully to
advance the purpose of allowing us clearly to distinguish,
according to Berlitz' view, logical from illogical
explanations. Therefore, this explicatum is successful.
It is important to note that in the above example, we have
provided an explicatum to clarify a concept on Berlitz'
behalf. We may now, of course, having explicated his
concept of a 'logical explanation', evaluate his use of
the explicated concept and even argue that such a concept
is not useful enough for evaluating all the explanations
we must consider. This indeed involves conceptually
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significant criticism. The explicate provided on Berlitz'
behalf can be seen as an instance of the principle of
charity. We must, therefore, briefly consider the role of
definition and explication in evaluating arguments.
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Exercises
Have the students provide an explication of the concentexpressed by conceptually significant argument', as wehave used it m this course. '
2
. Have the students provide and evaluate
on behalf of Berlitz, Fuller, Blum, andConsider explicating:
explications
VonDSnigan
.
a) Mystery - for Berlitz
b) Disappearance - for Berlitz
c) Space-time warp - for Berlitz
d) Prescription - for Fuller
e) Established fact - for Fuller
f) Possession - for Fuller
g) Signal - for Blum
h) Legend - for VonDUnigen
Subsection 7 - The Reconstruction and Evaluation of Arguments
This discussion of definition and explication has two obvious
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applications to the evaluation of arguments. The first
obvious application of our brief consideration of definition
and explication to the evaluation of arguments is to
evaluate an argument as no good because a definition of a
term has a counterexample, or an unclear term cannot be
explicated and, therefore, is not cognitively significant.
(This is often straight forward, but sometimes it is more
difficult to detect.) The second obvious application of our
brief consideration of definition and explication to the
evaluation of arguments is to evaluate definitions or
explications given in arguments, according to the procedures
briefly outlined above. However, this discussion of
definition and explication has a less obvious and more
f t application to the evaluation of arguments.
We mentioned this less obvious application of explication
to the evaluation of arguments when we explicated Berlitz'
concept of a 'logical explanation'
. This application of
explication to Berlitz' arguments is an example of a step
in what we shall call the reconstruction of an argument.
The reconstruction of an argument can be understood in
terms of the principle of charity; a reconstruction of
an argument that is consistent with the author's expressed
or implied views. Given a reconstructed argument, we are
in a position to provide that we have intuitively referred
to as a conceptually significant critical evaluation.
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The reconstruction of an author's argument involves
clarifying the argument by clarifying its logical form, by
clarifying the intensions or extensions of terms by
eliminating improper vagueness or ambiguity where possible,
by Clarifying equivocations where possible, or clarifying
psychological contexts where possible, by clarifying terms
by providing definitions where possible, or by clarifying
an author's concept by providing explications where possible
We may evaluate such reconstructions by asking if the
proposed reconstruction is consistent with the author's
expressed or implied views. We may thereby apply the
material we have considered in this section to provide
reconstructions of given arguments and then critically
evaluate the reconstruction according to the rules of
deductive or inductive support to determine if the premises
support the conclusion.
Consider the following example of such a reconstruction and
its evaluation. E. J. Ruppelt, in his book The Report on
Unidentified Flying Objects
,
in arguing for the existence
of UFO's, states:
7.1 "What constitutes proof? Does a UFO have to land
at the River Entrance to the Pentagon, near the
Chief's of Staff offices? Or is it proof when a
ground radar system detects a UFO, sends a jet
to intercept it, the jet pilot sees it and locks
on with his radar, only to have the UFO streak, away
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at phenomeMl speedT- Is it proof when a jetpilot fires at a UFO, and sticks to his storv
p. 131K
er threat of court-martial?" (Berlitz,
In providing a reconstruction of this argument, we must
first explicate two unclear concepts; the concept expressed
by proof and the concept expressed by 'UFO'
. First con-
sider ’proof, we may clarify the explicandum as
"supporting a conclusion with various steps, or
information," and give as examples "Euclid's proof of the
Pythagorean theorem," or "the proof that convicted Bruno
Hauptman. Therefore, this is an explicandum, and we may
proceed with explication. The explicandum is not well suited
for the author's purpose here because given the explicandum
it is not clear what sort of conclusion is to be established
by a proof. However, he seems to claim that we may con-
clusively establish the truth of a conclusion by "proof"
that is less dramatic than a landing at the River Entrance
to the Pentagon. Therefore, we may propose, as an
explicatum of 'proof', the concept expressed by 'evidence
that is sufficient to conclusively establish the truth of a
conclusion
'
.
Secondly, consider 'UFO'. We may clarify the explicandum as
"an aerial phenomena that we cannot explain," or "a
mysterious moving object that appears to be from outer space
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and give
weather
Therefor
as examples "the UFO later learned to be a large
balloon" or the "UFO Calvin Parker believes he saw
e, this is an explicandum, and we may proceed with
If
explication. The explicandum is not well suited for the
author's purpose here because given the explicandum, it is
not clear what is at stake in providing proof that UFO’s
exist. Given the explicandum, it is unclear what he is
seeking to prove. Therefore, we may propose, as an
explication of UFO, the concept expressed by ’extra-
terrestrial spacecraft piloted by intelligent extra-
terrestrial astronauts'.
In providing these two explications on the author's behalf,
we now see that in reconstructing his argument we must
provide a valid deductive, rather than a strong inductive
argument. This is because his claim, given the explicatum
of 'proof', and the explicatum of 'UFO', is that he is
providing evidence that conclusively establishes the truth
of the conclusion that extraterrestrial spacecraft piloted
by intelligent extraterrestrial astronauts exist. Clearly,
an inductive argument will not do; an inductive argument
establishes some degree of probability, not truth.
Given these explications, we may, therefore, propose to re-
construct the argument as follows:
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Pil0t locked his radarfire at the UFO, and the UFOflew away at phenomonal speed.
This is proof that UFO's exist
Argument 7.2 is clearly a valid deductive argument. Its
logical form may be captured as follows:
7.3
1
• HP
. Q . R . (SvT)
. U)OV]
2 • [P
. Q . R . S . T
. U]
: . 3 . V
Conclusion 3 clearly follows from 1 and 2 by DE. However,
7.2 is only a proposed reconstruction of 7.1 We are not in
a position to evaluate 7.2 as it stands; both premise 1 and
premise 2 involve what we have called psychological
contexts. Therefore, our reconstruction is not finished.
Consider premise 1 of 7.2. Intuitively, if a ground radar
operator knew by observing his radar scope that he had
detected a UFO, then one would not need to send up a jet to
verify his observation. However, we can see that he
detects what he believes to be a UFO, since it may be an
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enemy missile, a radar anomaly or a misplaced weather
balloon. Similarly, the jet's pilot sees what he believes
to be the UFO in question, since it may be some other
Phenomenon. (To see this, consider that it may be a
different UFO.) Therefore, both premise 1 and premise 2
require the introduction of a psychological context.
7.2
1 If a ground radar operator believes that hedetected a UFO, and a jet is sent to interceptit, and the jet's pilot believes he sees theUFO and the jet's pilot locks his radar on whathe believes to be the UFO, or fires at what hebelieves to be the UFO, and what he believes tobe the UFO flies away at phenomenal speed, thenthis is proof that UFO's exist.
A ground radar operator believed that he detected
a UFO, and a jet was sent to intercept it, andthe
^
jet |
s
pilot believed he saw the UFO, and thejet's pilot locked his radar on what he believed
to be the UFO, and fired at what he believed to
the UFO, and what was believed to be the UFOflew away at phenomenal speed.
This is proof that UFO's exist.
The logical form of 7.2' may be captured as follows:
7.2'
1. [BP
. Q . BR . (BS V BT) . BU] O V
2 . [BP
. Q . BR . BS . BT . BU]
: . 3 . V
'B' is used to prefix statements containing 'believes'. We
can see that 7.3' is also a valid deductive argument; 3
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clearly follows from 1 and 2 by 3 E. We can see that 7.2'
xs the clearest possible construal of 7.1 that is consistent
ith the author s expressed and implied views. Therefore,
7.2' is a reconstruction of 7.1. We are now in a position
to evaluate 7.2'.
While 7.2' is a valid deductive argument, it is not a sound
deductive argument. Premise 1 is clearly false. Given the
explicatum of 'proof' and the explicatum of 'UFO', this
can be seen even more clearly. if a radar operator and a
jet pilot believe that they detected or saw an extra-
terrestrial spacecraft piloted by extraterrestrial astro-
nauts, it does not follow that these beliefs conclusively
established the truth of the statement 'UFO's exist'. To
claim that it does is to invalidly conclude (3x) (Px) from
' B t(3x)(Px)]', where 'B' is used to prefix statements con-
taining 'believes'. We may conclude our evaluation of 7.2'
by stating that the premises do not support the truth of the
conclusion, and that, therefore, 7.2' is not a good argument.
However, this is not to say that 7.2' is not a good recon-
struction of 7.1; it is the clearest possible construal of
the author's views; it just so happens that the author's
views are mistaken.
Such reconstruction may also be provided in the form of
inductive arguments. This may be done whenever conclusions
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are stated and we note that evidence is presented that the
author claims supports these conclusions. Reconstruction
of such arguments proceeds in a similar manner, except
that we capture the logical form of an inductive, rather
than a deductive argument, and appeal to all relevant
available evidence. Reconstructions, therefore, can be
seen to involve all the material we have considered so far.
jyioae l s
1 . pr°vide an example of a reconstruction that involvesproviding an inductive argument. (Consider one from
.
e fading . ) Point out that providing conceptuallysignificant criticism first involves reconstructing7
arguments such that they avoid obvious errors and areconsistent with the author's expressed or implied
views, and secondly, involves evaluating the
reconstruction
.
2 ‘ Pr°vlde several reconstructions, both deductive andinductive arguments, involving all the clarifications
we have considered and explain how they are provided
and evaluated.
3. Point out the importance of providing reconstructions.Consider the advancement of knowledge in science
,
the
solution of philosophical problems, and the solution
of crimes, etc. Consider, for example, the recon-
struction of arguments about the assassination of J.F.K.
Point out the advantage of knowing that certain con-
clusions are not supported by the evidence for pro-
viding alternative conclusions.
Exercises
1. Have the students carefully consider the conclusions
Fuller draws about Arigo from the evidence he presents
book, Arigo: Surgeon of the Rusty Knife
. Thenhave them each provide a reconstruction of an argument
on Fuller's behalf designed to establish one of these
conclusions. Then ask them to show that it is indeed
a reconstruction, according to the principle of
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ence he presents in his book Chariots oft e Gods
,
and for the conclusions Berlitz suggestsabout a mystery in the Bermuda Triange from the
m^?SnCe he Presents in his book The Bermuda TrianalP.hese reconstructions are very useful for instructionalpurposes when the students present them orally to thegroup. y Llit:
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Section Four: Providing Arguments
Subsection 1 - Providing Versus Reconstructing Arguments
We have seen, given certain reconstructions of arguments,
that when we evaluate the reconstructions, some fail to
support their conclusions, and we have considered ways that
both inductive and deductive arguments can be shown to fail
to support their conclusions. Now suppose we find that a
given conclusion C is not supported by deductively sound, or
inductively strong arguments. This may lead us to suppose
that ^ C may be supported by deductively sound, or in-
dudictively strong arguments. Note that in pointing out
that C is not supported by deductively sound or inductively
strong arguments, we are not entitled to claim, simply
on these grounds alone, that C is false. To make and
support such a claim, we must give a deductively sound or
an inductively strong argument with ^ C as the conclusion.
Giving such an argument to support any statement, whether
or not the statement is the negation of a conclusion that
we have shown not to be supported by arguments, we shall
call providing an argument to support a given conclusion.
Providing an argument to support a given conclusion C
involves, among other things, gathering our own information
to form the premises to support the conclusion. Gathering
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this information may mean gathering evidence in providing
inductively strong arguments, or may mean providing
certain logical relationships among premises known to
be true and the conclusion in providing deductively sound
arguments. Clearly, in gathering such information, we are
not limited by the principle of charity to select infor-
mation consistent with a given author's expressed or implied
Views, since we are giving our own argument in an original
form. We are the authors of the argument. Therefore,
providing an argument is not the same as reconstructing an
argument
.
However, in the process of providing an argument we may
employ the methods of reconstruction discussed above. For
example, once we have proposed an argument, we must evaluate
it, and perhaps engage in reconstructing our own argument,
given that we find errors which do not provide the only
support for the conclusion. Of course, we may find in our
evaluation that the argument is not conceptually signifi-
cant, and that, therefore, we must provide a different
argument to support the conclusion. Providing an argument,
therefore, also involves all the techniques we have
considered for evaluating arguments.
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Subsection 2 - Providing Deductive Argument
Providing deductive support for a given statement s may be
as simple as providing what we call the suppressed premise
or premises of an enthymeme with the given statement S as
the conclusion. This could be interpreted as the simplest
form of the reconstruction of a given argument, but pro-
viding such suppressed premises is also useful in providing
deductive support for a given statement. Consider the
following example:
2.1
1* Stonehenge is older than the pyramids.
2_^_ The pyramids are older than the Piri Reis Map.
:. 3. Stonehenge is older than the Piri Reis Map.
Statement 2.1 is translated into our symbols, using 's'
as a constant to stand for 'Stonehenge', 'p' as a constant
to stand for 'pyramids' and 'r' as a constant to stand for
'the Piri Reis Map', and 'O' as the relation 'older than'
as follows:
2.2
1 . Osp
2
.
Opr
: . 3 . Osr
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argument 2.1, as represented by 2.2, is obviously a valid
argument. However, strictly speaking, given just premises
1 and 2, 3 does not follow deductively. Ordinarily, in
presenting such an argument, one might present only these
two premises and the conclusion on the grounds that
everyone knows that 'being older than' is a transitive
relation
.
Relational arguments are very common ways of providing
deductive support for given statements, and many of them
depend on the relations we discussed earlier. But the
relation itself is seldom, if ever, explicitly stated as
a premise because it is generally assumed to be among the
body of common knowledge presupposed in the context in
which the argument appears. Such incompletely expressed
arguments, with one or more of the premises implicitly
understood, are called enthymemes.
We may supply the missing premise for 2.1 by simply stating
that being 'older than' is a transitive relation as an
additional premise. This can be captured in rewriting 2.2
as follows:
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2.3
1 • Osp
2-. Opr
-Ll (Vx) (Vy) (Vz) [Oxy
. Oyz) ZZ> Oxz 1
: . 4 . Osr
We may now prove that, written as 2.3, 2.1 is a valid
deductive argument. When such arguments are provided by
others, we are obviously bound by the principle of charity
to include such missing premises in a reconstruction of
such arguments for conceptually significant evaluation.
However, a consideration of enthymemes can more importantly
provide some insight into the process of providing deductive
support for particular statements.
The insight provided by this consideration of enthymemes is
that we must often appeal to the body of common knowledge
presupposed in a given context to provide premises to support
a given conclusion. Consider the following example.
Suppose that we are attempting to provide deductive support
for the statement "Pluto is further from the Earth than the
Moon." By inspecting the relation 'is further from the Earth
than', we can determine that this relation is transitive,
asymmetrical and irreflexive. Consider the transitive
property of the relation. We know that if Pluto is further
from the Earth than Mars, and if Mars if further from the
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Earth than the Moon, then it follows that Pluto is further
from the Earth than the Moon, given transitivity. This can
be seen in our symbols as follows, letting 'F' stand for the
relation 'is further from the Earth than', and 'p' stand for
'Pluto', 'm' stand for the 'Moon', and 'a' stand for 'Mars'.
2.4
1 . Fpm
2 . Fma
~L. (Vx) (Vy ) (Vz) [ (Fxy . Fxz) zz> Fxzl
: . 4
. Fpa
Argument 2.4, therefore, appeals to the transitive nature
of the relation and our common knowledge about the planets
to provide deductive support for the given statement. We
may do so by considering the other properties of the
relation
.
Consider the asymmetrical property of the relation. We know
that Pluto and the Moon are not the same distance from the
Earth. Given the asymmetrical property of 'is further from,
the Earth than'
,
we know that it is not the case that Pluto
is further from the Earth than the Moon and that the Moon is
further from the Earth than Pluto, so either the Moon is
further from the Earth than Pluto or Pluto is further from
the Earth than the Moon. This leads us to see that our
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argument can begin with: if it is not the case that Pluto
is further from the Earth than the Moon, then the Moon is
further from the Earth than Pluto. Secondly, we Know that
it is not the case that the Moon is further from the Earth
than Pluto. Therefore, Pluto is further from the Earth
than the Moon. We are thus able to consider the asymmetrical
property of this relation to produce simple deductive support
for the given statement. This can be seen in our symbols as
follows
:
2.5
1 . ^ Fpm Fmp
2
.
^ Fmp
: . 3 . % % Fpm
Argument 2.5, therefore, appeals to the asymmetrical nature
of the relation and our common knowledge about the planets
to provide deductive support for the given statement. (We
may also consider the irreflexivity of the relation.)
From the consideration of these simple properties of
relations, we may provide deductive support for state-
ments involving relations. However, enthymemes do not only
involve relations. For example, consider the following
argument
:
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2.6
Any ocean-dwelling mammal can outswim any land-dwelling mammal. y
Some humans can outswim any cat.
Any dolphin can outswim any cat.
There are several unstated premises in 2.6 which we must
provide to prove that 2.6 is a valid argument. Obviously
a premise stating the transitivity of 'can outswim' must
be stated, but also the following non-relational premises
must be stated:
a) All humans are land-dwelling mammals.
b) All dolphins are ocean
-dwelling mammals.
These non-relational premises are also assumed to be among
the body of common knowledge. We may, therefore, capture
the logical form of 2.6, letting 'O' stand for 'ocean-
dwelling mammal', 'L' for ' land -dwelling mammal', 'S'
for 'can outswim', 'H' for 'human', 'C' for 'cat', and 'D'
for 'dolphin' as follows:
2.7
1. (Vx) ( Vy ) [(Ox . Ly) D Sxy]
2
.
(Vx) (Hx D Lx)
3. ( z) (Hz . [ ( w) (Cw ZD Szw) ) ]
4. (Vx) (Vy) (Vz) [(Sxy
. Syz) ZD Sxz]
5 . (Vx) (Dx ZD Ox)
:. 6
. (Vx) (Vy) [ (Dx . Cy) 3 Sxy]
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Consider the following example, again appealing to the body
of common knowledge presupposed in a given context to
provide deductive support for a given statement. Suppose
that we are attempting to provide deductive support for
the statement 'it is not the case that Arigo prevents germ-
caused infections in unclean wounds without using anti-
septics or other sterilization'.
We may begin our attempt to provide deductive support for
this statement by considering what we know to be true about
killing germs, about infections, and about antiseptics.
First, we know that only killing germs prevents germ-caused
infections and that only antiseptic or other sterilization
can kill germs. Given this knowledge, we might proceed as
follows. Since we want the conclusion of the argument to be
of the form ^ 0, where 0 is the proposition expressed by the
statement 'Arigo prevents germ caused infections without
using germ-killing antiseptics or other sterilization', we
might assume 0 , and then attempt to present an argument
which derives a contradiction from assuming 0 . This, of
course, allows us to conclude ^ 0 . Such an argument,
therefore, if valid and sound, will deductively support ^ 0 .
Consider formulating the following argument:
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2.8
1 .
2 .
3.
4.
5.
6 .
Only killing germs
in unclean wounds.
Only antiseptic or
germs
.
prevents germ-caused infections
other sterilization can kill
Only antiseptic or other sterilization can preventgerm-caused infection in unclean wounds.Ango does prevent germ caused infections in
unclean wounds without germ-killing antiseptics
or other sterilization.
It is not the case that only antiseptic or other
sterilization can prevent germ-caused infectionsm unclean wounds.
Only antiseptic or other sterilization can preventgerm caused infections in unclean wounds.
[Contradiction]
It is not the case that Arigo prevents germ causedinfections in unclean wounds without antiseptics
or other sterilization.
Premise 1 and Premise 2 are given knowlege about germs,
infections and antiseptics. Premise 3 follows from 1 and 2,
as we shall see shortly. So the strategy is to assume the
negation of the conclusion that we want to prove as we do in
premise 4 and given this assumption, to derive a contra-
diction as we do in deriving 5, which contradicts 2. This
allows us to conclude that the given assumption 4 is false.
This, of course, is logically equivalent to concluding that
the negation of the assumption is true, which we do in
7. However, given this intuitive view of the argument pro-
vided deductively to support the given statement, we must
clarify the argument, translate it into LPC, and prove that
it is valid.
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Consider the translation of 2.8 into LPC
. As we can see,
the English wording is slightly difficult to translate
easily into LPC. For this reason, we must consider the
proposition expressed by each statement and express the
proposition in clearer English statements which we may then
easily translate into LPC. In this case, it is helpful
to think of the quantifiers as ranging over persons. We
may, therefore, translate 2.8 into logically equivalent
English statements and also into LPC as follows:
2.9
1. Anyone who prevents germ-caused infections in
unclean wounds kills germs. (Let 'Px' stand for
'x prevents germ-caused infections in unclean
wounds' and
' Gx 1 stand for 'x kills germs')
(Vx) (Px ' (Gx) Given Assumption
2. Anyone who kills germs uses antiseptic or other
sterilization. (Let ' Ux ' stand for 'x uses anti-
septic or other sterilization')
(Vx) (Gx 'D Ux) Given Assumption
3. Anyone who prevents germ-caused infection in
unclean wounds uses antiseptic or other
sterilization
.
(Vx) (Px Ux) 1, 2
4. Arigo succeeds in preventing germ-caused infections
in unclean wounds and yet does not use antiseptic
or other sterilization. (Let 'a' stand for
'Arigo
'
)
Pa . % Ua A
5. It is false that anyone who prevents germ-caused
infections in unclean wounds uses antiseptic or
other sterilization.
^ (Vx) (Px O Ux) 4
6. But anyone who prevents germ-caused infections in
unclean wounds uses antiseptic or other
sterilization
(Vx)(PxG>Ux) 3, Reit.
:. 7. It is false that Arigo succeeds in preventing
germ-caused infections in unclean wounds and yet
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^°1pa
n
°Vua) ant ^
SePtic or other sterilization.
We must now prove that 2.9 is a deductively valid argument
This is quite easy to do, given our proof procedure:
2.10
1 . (Vx) (Px O Gx) Given Assumption
b
-Z.
[>3.
(Vx) (Gx CP Ux)
Pb
Given Assumption
A
4. Pb O Gb l, UQE
5. Gb 3 , 4 , ZD E
6. Gb CP Ub 2, UQE
7. Ub 5 , 6 , ZD E
8. Pb CP Ub 7
,
ZD I
.
9. (Vx) (Px O Ux) 3, UOI
^lO. Pa
.
^ Ua A
11. ^ (Vx) (Px ~C? Ux) 10, DM
12. (Vx) (Px zp- Ux) 9, Reit.
13. ^ (Pa
.
^ Ua) 11, 12, % I
The conclusion, of course, is logically equivalent to Pa 3>
Ua, or in English, if Arigo prevents germ-caused infections
then he uses antiseptic or other sterilization. The argu-
ment is deductively valid, we must now evaluate the
argument's soundness.
Clearly 2.9 is a sound argument. According to our proof
of its validity, 2.10, the conclusion depends only on the
given premises 1 and 2. If these are true, then the argu-
ment is sound. Clearly 1 and 2 are true; there are no
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obvious counterexamples to either 1 or 2. Therefore, 2.9
is a sound argument.
Therefore, we can see that we have indeed provided deductive
support for the given statement in providing this sound
deductive argument. To do so, we simply appealed to
relevant common knowledge, much like we do when we supply
the implicit premises in an enthymeme
. We then formulate
the argument, perhaps reformulate it, then translate it into
our symbols, prove that it is valid, and then evaluate its
soundness
.
Models
1. Since this is the most difficult material so far,
present many statements and provide deductive support
for them in class, as a group. Point out how and why,
for example, you avoid the word 'can' or relations that
are not specifically related to objects in a specified
domain. (You might consider introducing Modal Logic
rigorously at this point, since there will be many
English statements for which we cannot provide
deductive support without Modal Logic.)
2. Attempt to provide deductive support for a given state-
ment that, in fact, fails to support the statement,
because the statement is false. Show that while the
argument is valid, at least one premise must be false
if the conclusion is false.
Exercises
1. Have the students prove that 2.3, 2.4, 2.5, and 2.7 are
valid
.
2 . Have the students provide deductive support for the
statement 'Pluto is further from the Earth than the
Moon' by considering irreflexivity
.
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3
' ST?
3
e stadants Provide deductive support for thefollowing statements
:
a >
' The Pyramids were not built by men from outerspace .
'
b) 'Arigo does not stop the flow of blood from deepwounds with verbal commands.' P
4. Have them present their arguments and then evaluate them
as a group
, reconstructing them when necessary.
Subsection 3 - Providing Inductive Arguments
From our study of inductive logic, we can see that providing
inductive arguments to support a given statement S may
involve providing statements of evidence E for S such that
the statements composing E are all true or have high
probability, and such that P (S/E . K) > P (v s/E . K)
.
Or, if S is a statement about the relation of a conditioning
property to a conditioned property
,
then providing inductive
support for S involves providing possible conditioning
properties and supporting the relation of the conditioning
property to the conditioned property stated in S. This
relation, as we have seen, will be that the conditioning
property is either a necessary, a sufficient, or a necessary
and sufficient condition for the conditioned property.
This, of course, involves applying what we have called
inductive elimination.
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Subsection 3A - Statements of Evidence
We shall first consider providing statements of evidence
for a given statement. To provide such an inductive
argument, we may, like in providing deductive support for a
given statement, appeal to relevant common knowledge.
However, we are more likely to function as "detectives,"
and appeal to investigations and research. Of course, in
doing such investigations and conducting such research, we
must remain open to the possiblity that we may fail to
support the given statement, and, perhaps, support its
negation. Obviously, we must follow the facts where they
lead us rather than fit the facts to our desired end.
Consider providing inductive support for the statement 'the
crew of the Mary Celeste abandoned ship and were lost at
sea'. The first step, of course, is to function like a
detective and to research the disappearance of the Mary
15 2Celeste 1 s crew. Our research shows that the Mary Celeste
was a 103-foot brigantine found abandoned at sea by the
Dei Gratia on December 4, 1872. The crew of the Dei Gratia
received a small salvage fee. The Mary Celeste left New York
152 The following account is from Lawrence David Kusche,
The Bermuda Triangle Mystery: Solved
,
New York, Warner
Books, 1975.
463
in early November, 1872, bound for Genoa, Italy. When she
was found. Captain Griggs, his wife, daughter and crew of
eight were gone; the ship was completely deserted. The
lifeboat was gone; launched but not ripped away by accident.
The ship carried 1,700 barrels of alcohol, which was intact.
However, there was 3-1/2 feet of water in the hold. The
ship s papers, except the Captain's log, were missing
along with the navigation instruments. When found, the
Nary Celeste's sails were set, but some were torn. The
forehatch was found ripped open, and a line was trailing
the ship, but there was no serious damage.
Given this basic information and all relevant available
evidence, we shall initiate our investigation by formulating
what we shall call hypotheses. An hypothesis, for our
purpose here, is simply a suggestive and physically possible
explanation, which given what we already know, allows us to
gather other specific relevant facts to guide our investi-
gation and our attempt to formulate probabilities based on
these facts. For example, consider as an hypothesis that
the crew mutinied, killed the captain and his family, and
delivered the ship to the captain of the Dei Gratia for the
salvage fee. Proposing this hypothesis warrants our
investigating the size of the salvage fee, the financial
interests of the crew members, the character of the captain,
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the financial interests of the owners, the character of the
crews of both ships and the financial interests and
character of the captain of the Dei Gratia
.
Suppose that our investigation reveals that the salvage
fee was very small, that the crew members had little to
gain financially, that the Captain was well liked, that the
owners had nothing to gain by insurance claims and that the
Captain of the Dei Gratia was friendly with the Captain of
the Mary Celeste
,
well liked and had no potential for
financial gain given the situation, and that the crew
members of the Mary Celeste were never seen again. This
information shows that the hypothesis is not highly
probable; it is not evidence for this hypothesis. If we
formulate an inductive argument with the hypothesis as the
conclusion and this information as premises, the resulting
argument will be judged to be weak. However, note that
proposing this hypothesis has been far from worthless; we
have discovered evidence that rules out conclusions that may
be incompatible with the statement 'the crew members of the
Mary Celeste abandoned ship and were lost at sea'. For
example, proposing and evaluating this hypothesis rules out
the statement 'the crew members of the Mary Celeste jumped
ship for the salvage money' or the statement 'the crew
members of the Mary Celeste sailed home on the Dei Gratia .
'
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We formulated this hypothesis to gather information to
discover evidence to support the statement 'the crew
members of the Mary Celeste abandoned ship and were lost at
sea'. Once we discover relevant evidence, we shall put it
m the form of an inductive argument, test its inductive
strength, and then determine the probability of the
conclusion. Since we have ruled out that the crew jumped
ship for financial gain, and that the crew sailed home on
the Dei Gratia
,
we must consider proposing another
hypothesis to discover further evidence. For example,
consider as an hypothesis that some natural disaster with
bad weather caused the crew to abandon ship. Proposing
this hypothesis warrants our investigating the weather
patterns in the area where the Mary Celeste was found, and
the physical evidence of any such natural disaster aboard
ship. It also warrants our investigating the standard
procedures the crew followed in the event of such natural
disasters aboard ship, or experience with bad weather.
We already know that we may rule out an actual fire since
the only damage found was the torn sails and the ripped-open
forehatch. We might suppose that the sails were torn
because the ship sailed without a crew for some time in
bad weather. We know that the ship carried 1,700 barrels
of alcohol, and we know that alcohol is extremely volatile,
466
that is, it gives off fumes. We also know that the Mary
Celeste was a wooden ship, illuminated by kerosene lamps.
Therefore, we might suppose that alcohol fumes from a
poorly vented hold illuminated by kerosene lamps blew open
the forehatch. Vapor resembling smoke would then billow
out of the forehatch. Fearing a fire, the Captain and crew
may then have simply followed the standard procedure in the
event of a fire on a ship with a flammable cargo. We
discover, upon investigation, that this standard procedure
is to abandon ship; to remove the ship's papers, the
navigation equipment, attach a line to the ship, launch
the lifeboat and secure the line from the ship to the life-
boat containing the crew. That this occurred is supported
by the discovery that the ship's papers, navigation
instruments, and lifeboat were missing, and that a line was
trailing the ship. We also discover, upon investigation,
that this area of the Atlantic is noted for its sudden,
violent storms, which may account for the separation of the
line trailing the Mary Celeste from the lifeboat containing
the crew. Further evidence that there was bad weather is
that the hold had 3-1/2 feet of water in it, which, in the
absence of structural damage, had to come from the open
forehatch, and that the sails were torn.
Therefore, we can see that by formulating and evaluating
such hypotheses in an attempt to gather and evaluate
467
evidence, we may discover evidence for constructing in-
ductively strong arguments to provide inductive support for
the statement 'the crew members of the Mary Celeste
abandoned ship and were lost at sea
'
However, we may also see that given our detective work,
providing such inductive support for this statement involves
providing more than one simple inductive argument.
Intuitively, we can see that we must, in this case, provide
inductive arguments inductively to support conclusions, in
turn, to be used as premises in our argument inductively to
support the statement. While it is desirable to use premises
known to be true in providing inductive support for given
statements, often the best we can do is to use premises that
have high probability. This is why our appeal to all
relevant available evidence is not restricted to knowledge.
We must first establish that they had some reason to abandon
ship, consistent with the physical evidence, and secondly,
establish that there is some reason that they were lost at
sea consistent with the physical evidence. To do so is to
provide inductive support for the statement 'the crew members
of the Mary Celeste abandoned ship and were lost at sea '
.
Given our detective work and the evidence gained by forming
the hypotheses, consider the following argument:
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1. When found abandoned, the Mary Celeste was
structurally sound except the forehatch to the
hold was blown off.
2. She carried 1,700 barrels of alcohol in the hold.
3. Alcohol gives off fumes, which, when ignited,
explode and produce vapor resembling smoke.
4. The hold was poorly vented and illuminated by
kerosene lamps.
• • 5 . Alcohol fumes ignited and blew open the forehatch
producing vapor resembling smoke.
Given 5 of 3.1, we must now attmept to establish that they
abandoned ship. Consider the following argument, given 3.1:
3.2
1. The Mary Celeste's lifeboat was gone and a line
trailed the ship when she was found abandoned at
sea
.
2. The lifeboat held 12 people and the Mary Celeste
carried 11 people: the Captain, his wife, his
daughter, and a crew of eight.
3. The ship's papers, the navigation equipment and
the crew were gone when she was found abandoned
at sea.
4 . Standard procedure in the event of a suspected
fire on a wooden ship containing flammable material
was to launch the lifeboat containing the ship's
papers and navigation equipment and crew, and
attach a line to the ship and to the lifeboat
saving the crew in the event the ship exploded.
5. (5 from 3.1) Alcohol fumes ignited and blew
open the forehatch producing vapor resembling
smoke
.
:. 6. The crew of the Mary Celeste abandoned ship in the
lifeboat secured to the Mary Celeste by a trailing
line
.
Given 3.1 and 3.2, we must now attempt to establish that
they were lost at sea. Consider the following argument:
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3.3
1. The Mary Celeste had 3-1/2 feet of water in thehold some sails were torn, and a line trailedthe ship when she was found abandoned at sea.
2
. . The area of the Atlantic where she was found andthrough which she sailed is noted for its sudden
violent storms and heavy seas. '
3. Lifeboats are structurally weak and unable to with-
stand heavy seas, especially when fully loaded.Lifeboats are easily separated from lines securinqthem during heavy seas.
5. Abandoned ships under full sail in violent storms
and heavy seas take water through open hatches
,
tear sails, and pull hard on trailing lines
securing launched, loaded lifeboats.
6. Abandoned ships under full sail in violent storms
and heavy seas sail randomly, quickly changing
direction
.
7. (6 from 3.2) The crew of the Mary Celeste
abandoned ship in a lifeboat secured to the Mary
Celeste by a trailing line.
. . 8. The crew of the Mary Celeste were lost at sea.
Combining 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, therefore, we have provided
inductive support for the given statement. We must now, in
turn, evaluate 3.1, 3.2, and 3.3 to determine that they are
inductively strong and that their conclusions are highly
probable. This will allow us to determine whether or not
P (S/E
. K) > P s/E
. K) where 'S’ is 'the crew was lost
at sea and 'E' stands for all the evidence we have provided
through our detective work to inductively support 'S'.
Consider 3.1. Again, let the numbers of the premises and
conclusion be propositional constants. The premises of 3.1
are evidence for the conclusion provided that P (5/1 .2
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3 . 4) > P (% 5/1 .2.3.4). Consider 1. Even if true,
1 alone is not evidence for 5. Intuitively, P (5/1)
P 5/1). However, when 1 is conjoined with 2, 3 and 4
,
we
we can see that 5 is the best explanation, given these
premises. Intuitively, P (5/1 . 2 . 3 . 4 ) > P (% 5/1
2 • 3 * 4 ) • Therefore, the premises of 3.1 provide evidence
for the conclusion, and 3.1 is a strong inductive argument.
We must now consider the probability of the conclusion.
Since the premises of 3.1 are all true and they are not
detached, P (1 . 2 . 3 . 4 ) > P (^ (1 . 2 . 3.4)).
Since this is the case, P (5/1 .2.3.4 . K) > P ('v 5/1 .
2 . 3 . 4 . K) . Therefore, P (5) > P (% 5), and 3.1 is a
good inductive argument that inductively supports its
conclusion
.
Consider 3.2. The premises of 3.2 are evidence for the
conclusion provided that P (6/1 . 2. 3. 4. 5) >P (^6/1
. 2 . 3 . 4 . 5)
.
Consider 1. If true, 1 is evidence for
6 ; there may, of course, be other explanations for 1 , but
6 intuitively seems to be the best explanation so we can
see that P (6/1) > P (^ 6/1) . Consider 2. Even if true,
2 alone does not seem to be evidence for 6 , P (6/2)
P (% 6/2)
.
However, when conjoined with 3, 4 and 5, 23
can intuitively see that the conjunction is evidence for 6 ;
P (6/1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 5) > P (^ 6/1. 2 . 3 . 4 . 5) .
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Therefore, the premises of 3.2 provide evidence for the
conclusion, and 3.2 is a strong inductive argument.
We must now consider the probability of the conclusion.
Premises 1, 2, 3 and 4 of 3.2 are all true. Premise 5 of
3.2 is the conclusion of 3.1, which we have shown to be more
probable than its denial
. Since these premises are not
detached, P (1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . K) > P (v (l . 2 . 3 . 4
5 . K) . Since this is the case, P (6/1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . K)
> P 6/1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . K) . Therefore, P (6) > P 6)
,
and given 3.1, 3.2 is a good inductive argument that in-
ductively supports its conclusion.
Consider 3.3. The premises of 3.3 are evidence for the
conclusion provided that P (8/1 . 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7) >
P (^ 8/1 .2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7). Consider 1. Even if
true, 1 alone is not evidence for 8; P (8/1) p (^ 8/1) .
However, when conjoined with 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7, we can
intuitively see that the conjunction is evidence for 8;
P (8/1 . 2 . 3 . 4 . 5 . 6 . 7) > P (v 8/1 . 2 . 3 . 4 .
5.6.7). Therefore, the premises of 3.3 provide evidence
for the conclusion, and 3.3 is a strong inductive argument.
We must now consider the probability of the conclusion.
Premises 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 of 3.3 are all true.
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Premise 7 of 3.3 is the conclusion of 3.2, which we have
shown to be more probable than its denial. Since these
premises are not detached, P (1.2. 3 . 4 . 5 .
g
7 j
> P (1
. 2 . 3 . 4 .5 .6 .7
. K)
. Since this is the
case, P (8/1 .2 .3.4 .5 .6 .7.K) >P (^8/1.2.
3. 4. 5. 6 . 7. K). Therefore, P ( 8 ) > P (v 8 ) , and
3.1 and 3.2, 3.3 is a good inductive argument that
inductively supports its conclusion.
Given 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, and our evaluation of them we can
see that the probability of 'the crew of the Mary Celeste
abandoned ship and were lost at sea', given the evidence
we have gathered to provide inductive arguments to support
the statement, is greater than the probability of the
statement without such inductive support. Therefore, we
have successfully provided inductive arguments to support
the statement ' the crew of the Mary Celeste abandoned ship
and was lost at sea'
.
Subsection 3B- Inductive Elimination
We shall now consider providing inductive support for a given
statement S by applying inductive elimination. Note that
we may apply inductive elimination only to statements about
the relation of a conditioning property to a conditioned
property. Providing inductive support for such a statement
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S by applying inductive elimination, then, involves pro-
viding possible conditioning properties and supporting the
relation of the conditioning property to the conditioned
property stated in S.
Consider providing inductive support for the statement 'the
epileptic convulsions of a 9-year old American boy treated
by Arigo subsided because of the doses of the drugs
Phenobarbi tal and Dilantin, given by the boy's physician,
and not because of Arigo 's treatments'. Let S be a propo-
sitional constant standing for this statement. S makes a
claim about a particular sufficient condition for a specific
case. The claim is that the conditioning property, namely
the dose of the drugs Phenobarbital and Dilantin
given by the boy's physician is the sufficient condition
for the conditioned property, namely the absence of
epileptic convulsions in this particular 9-year old boy.
Let J stand for the conditioned property and let H stand for
this conditioning property. Clearly providing inductive
support for S involves an application of what we have
called the method of difference. Recall that in practice
the actual method is the same as the inverse method of
agreement; a property that is present when the conditioned
property is absent cannot be a sufficient condition for the
conditioned property. First, let us clearly specify this
case as described by Fuller.
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According to Fuller, the 9-year old American boy treated by
Arigo had Jacksonian Epilepsy. He had been treated by his
physician with Phenobarbital and Dilantin. (This we know to
be a normal treatment for epilepsy.) The boy's mother
brought him to see Arigo who prescribed eight different
drugs (none of these drugs are identifiable in any drug
index)
. Two months later, the boy went to summer camp. A
year later, the boy was free of epileptic convulsions.
Fuller, of course, concludes that the conditoned property S
was caused by Arigo
' s treatments. Let I stand for the
conditioned property of Arigo' s treatment. Fuller's claim
then, is that in this case, I is the sufficient condition
for J . The statement we are attempting to support is that
in this case, H is the sufficient condition for J.
Note that in providing inductive support for S, we must con-
sider complex conditioning properties as well, besides the
simple conditioning properties H and I. For example, the
conjunctive property (H
.
I)
.
We might also consider the
complex properties of the absence of certain properties such
as the property of the absence of an inferiority complex,
since through research we discover that an inferiority
complex may contribute to epileptic convulsions. Let G
stand for the property of having an inferiority complex.
Of course, ^ G, then, is the complex property of the
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absence of an inferiority complex. Given ^ G, H, I, and
(H
. I) as possible conditioning properties, and J as the
conditioned property in the actual occurrence, the actual
occurrence one year after the events described can be
represented as follows:
Narrowed Down
Possible Conditioning Conditioned
Properties Property
^ G H I (H . I) j
Actual occurrence
one year later P P P p P
We must now apply the method of difference by constructing
test occurrences to determine the particular sufficient
conditions in operation here. In the inverse method of
agreement, these test occurrences simply involve empirically
providing the properties in various combinations and
determining which is sufficient for J by ruling out
properties which are present when J is absent. In this
case, however, applying the method of difference, we must
provide test occurrences from research of the specific case
at hand since we are looking for a particular sufficient
condition. In this case, then, we may also rule out
conditioning properties which are absent when J is present,
because while they may be sufficient conditions for J, they
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are not the sufficient conditions of interest in this
specific case.
Suppose that our research in this case first reveals that
the boy, in fact, had an inferiority complex until he was
free from epileptic convulsions. This allows us to rule
out ^ G. Secondly, we learn that Dilantin takes a long
period of time to have any effect, and that the 8 "drugs"
prescribed by Arigo cannot be identified in any drug index
and are, in fact, fictional names for harmless substances
that are completely excreted by the body in the urine
shortly after they are taken. This allows us to rule out I,
and thereby rule out (H
. I) . The results of this
research are as follows:
Narrowed Down
Possible Conditioning
Properties
Conditioned
Property
^ G H I (H . I) J
actual occurrence P
Test-Research 1 A
Test-Research 2 A
P P P P
P P P P
P A A P
Simply applying the method of difference to the results of
this research summarized above allows us to conclude that H
is the sufficient condition for J. This, in turn, supports
S by supporting the relation of the conditioning property to
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the conditoned property stated in S . In this way, then,
inducitve elimination can be used to provide inductive
support for statements about the relation of a conditioning
property to a conditioned property.
Models
1* This is a good opportunity to introduce students to
research techniques and the use of the library. Point
out the crucial role of research in providing inductive
support for a statement. This is a good opportunity to
review both inductive probability and inductive
elimination in conjunction with a discussion of the
importance of research.
2. Present many statements and provide inductive support
for them in class as a group by providing statements
of evidence and inductive arguments. Appeal to
research already done earlier. For example, research
done on Von DSnigan's claims, or research done on Blum's
or Berlitz' claims.
3. Present many statements of a relation between a con-
ditioning property and a conditioned property and
provide inductive support for them in class as a group
by applying inductive elimination. Be sure to apply
the direct method of agreement, the inverse method of
agreement, the method of difference, the double method
of agreement and the joint method of agreement and
difference. Again, point out the importance of test
procedures as well as research.
4. Provide inductive support for a given statement that,
in fact, fails inductively to support the given state-
ment because research shows that the evidence is
against the statement. Use statements that involve
providing inductive arguments involving probability,
and use statements that involve applying inductive
elimination
.
Exercises
1. Have the students provide inductive evidential support
for the following statements: (Note: this involves
specific research)
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a) Ar ig° did not cure Belk's back condition
such back conditions)
.
(research
-b)
^
r
i
g
°u
d1
^
n
?
t °Ure the American women's migraine-like headaches (research such migraine-likeheadaches)
.
c)
d)
Arigo did not cure acute leukemia in the 6-year ogirl (research acute leukemia in children)
The UFO that seemed to follow a police officer
change colors from red to yellow to white, and' hoverin the sky to the west over his house all night wasthe planet Venus (research appearances of Venus
when it is close to the Earth)
.
e) The UFO's reported to "take off very quickly" from
specific points are not extraterrestrial spacecrafts(research the laws of physics; thrust, properties of
chemical rockets, nuclear rockets, etc.
,
and what
was found at these specific points)
.
2. Have the students provide inductive elimination supportfor the following statements: (Note: this may involve
research and test procedures)
.
a) Leukemia is not cured by Potassium Chloride (KCL)
(research medicinal effects of Potassium Chloride)
.
b) Back pain is not eliminated only by Vitamin B12
(research medicinal effects of Vitamin B12)
.
c) Faith in the healer is not a necessary condition
for being healed (research to provide test
procedures)
.
d) Appearing to be an aerial phenomenon for which we
have no specific, certain explanation is a
necessary and a sufficient condition for being a
UFO.
3 . Have the students present their arguments and then
evaluate them as a group, reconstructing them when
necessary
.
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Section Five: Informal Fallacies in Arguments
Subsection 1 - The Goal of Arguments: Persuasion Ver.n.
Truth or High Probability
Thus far, we have considered the evaluation, reconstruction
and provision of arguments designed to support a particular
conclusion. Such arguments are usually presented to
establish the truth or the high probability of a particular
conclusion: the goal of these arguments is rationally to
support a particular conclusion. when such deductive argu-
ments are evaluated and found to be deductively valid and
sound, we know that the conclusion is true. When such in-
ductive arguments are evaluated and found to be inductively
strong and to have a highly probable conclusion, we know
that the conclusion is more likely true than false. In
either case, we know that the argument in question
rationally supports the conclusion. If we know how to
evaluate such arguments correctly, and we find by evaluation
that a deductive argument is valid and sound, or that an
inductive argument is inductively strong and has a highly
probable conclusion, then we are rationally persuaded to
accept the conclusion. In this way, then, such arguments
may be said to persuade us to accept the conclusion.
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However, given such valid and sound deductive arguments, or
such inductively strong inductive arguments, there may, in
fact, be unreasonable people who refuse to accept the con-
clusion; people who are not, in fact, rationally persuaded
to accept the rationally supported conclusion. This, of
course, should not trouble us, since our interest in argu-
ments is to establish the truth or the probability of the
conclusion, and not simply to influence people's beliefs.
A valid, sound deductive argument has a true conclusion
whether or not anyone believes that the conclusion is true.
Truth, as we have seen, is independent of people's beliefs.
For example, to determine the truth value of the statement
the Earth moves around the Sun
' ,
Nicholas Copernicus did
not formulate a questionnaire asking people if they believed
that it was true or false, and then assign the most popularly
believed truth value to be the proposition expressed by the
statement. In fact, at that time most all people believed
that the statement was false.
Perhaps after our evaluation of Voliva's arguments, Voliva
may still believe that it is not the case that the Earth is
travelling at 600,000 miles per hour as astronomers claim,
and believe that the Earth is not a sphere but is flat.
This fact should not trouble us, since the matter has been
rationally resolved by research and by argument. There is
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no need to conduct further research or to provide or re-
construct other arguments to support the above conclusions
since we know that the above conclusions are false.
Voliva's irrational belief in the truth of these conclusions
is not of any importance to the rational resolution of the
question. We may simply dismiss his failure to be
rationally persuaded by the research and arguments as his
own shortcoming and not a shortcoming of the research or
arguments
.
Sometimes, however, the goal of arguments used by people in
various situations is not rationally to support a particular
conclusion. Often the goal of an argument is simply to
persuade opponents or an audience to accept a conclusion.
In many such situations, valid and sound deductive argu-
ments, or inductive arguments that are inductively strong
with a high inductive probability are used rationally to
persuade an opponent or an audience to accept a conclusion.
However, sometimes arguments are designed simply to persuade
opponents or an audience to accept a conclusion, yet fail
rationally to support the conclusion. Such arguments are
said to be psychologically persuasive, yet are neither valid
nor sound deductive, nor strong inductive arguments with
highly probable conclusions. The psychological
persuasiveness of such arguments comes from errors in
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reasoning that are psychologically persuasive. We shall
call such errors in reasoning that are psychologically
persuasive fallacies. Arguments containing fallacies we
shall call fallacious arguments. Recognizing such
psychologically persuasive fallacious arguments and exposing
the psychologically persuasive error in reasoning is
sufficient to evaluate the argument and to show that it
fails rationally to support its conclusion and is,
therefore, of no cognitive significance.
We may understand a psychologically persuasive reason in a
very broad and general sense for our purposes here. Clearly
the notion must be broad enough to capture rationally
persuasive valid and sound deductive arguments and
rationally persuasive strong inductive arguments with
highly probably conclusions, as well as persuasive errors in
reasoning. Therefore, we may simply say that r is a
psychologically persuasive reason for conclusion c if and
only if there is some person x who is persuaded by r to
accept c. This obviously includes many kinds of reasons.
However, our interest in psychologically persuasive reasons
in this section is limited to what we have called fallacies.
The interesting and important feature of fallacies is that
they are errors in reasoning that are also psychologically
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persuasive. For this reason, it is important to distinguish
what we have called rationally persuasive deductive and in-
deductive arguments from fallacious arguments which may be
psychologically persuasive even though they fail rationally
to support their conclusions. Our interest, of course, is
to insure that conclusions are rationally justified and that
we are able rationally to justify our acceptance of a
particular conclusion. Fallacies simply attempt to persuade
without justifications.
Models
1* Discuss and give examples of arguments designed simplyto persuade opponents to accept a conclusion, without
rationally supporting the conclusion. You might con-
sider advertising as a common example. Suggest that
we might, given persuasion as the only goal, evaluatethe success or failure of such arguments by counting
the number of people who were persuaded by them.
Point out how this differs from the evaluation of
arguments that we have considered.
2. Discuss rational resolution and the role of people's
beliefs in the evaluation of arguments. Point out that
universal agreement is not common even though a
particular question has been rationally resolved.
Underline the fact that universal agreement has no
bearing on the evaluation of arguments.
Exercises
1. Have the students find examples of arguments presented
by scientists which rationally resolved a particular
question, even though the majority of people refused to
believe the conclusion. Have them consider Copernicus,
Kepler, Harvey, Semmelweis, Pasteur, and other figures
from the history of science. Ask them to draw
parallels to other disciplines as well.
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2. Have the students find examples of arguments designedsimply to persuade us to accept a conclusion and not
rationally to support the conclusion. Consider argu-ments in collective bargaining. Are such arguments
esigned simply to persuade us to accept a conclusion
and not rationally to support the conclusion?
Subsection 2 - Formal Fallacies
Fallacies may be divided into three groups: formal
fallacies, fallacies of ambiguity, and fallacies of
relevance. We shall first consider formal fallacies.
Formal fallacies involve violation of PC or LPC rules.
Intuitively, we can see that not all violations of PC or
LPC rules may be psychologically persuasive. For example,
often blatant contradictions are psychologically persuasive
even though they are a violation of PC and LPC rules.
However, recall that our account of psychologically
persuasive reasons is broad enough to include such blatant
contradictions if one person is persuaded by the contra-
diction to accept an invalidly reached conclusion. Again,
our interest in exposing these fallacies is to show that
one has no reason to be persuaded; that the argument
employing the fallacy does not support the conclusion. Often
contradictions buried in a complex argument are not
blatant, and may more clearly be psychologically persuasive.
In either case, it is sufficient for our purposes here to
say that a formal fallacy is any psychologically persuasive
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Violation of PC or LPC rules. Some such
persuasive violations of PC and LPC rules
in arguments to be given specific names,
fallacy is called denying the antecedent,
error of the following form:
psychologically
are common enough
One such formal
and involves an
1
. 0
2
.
% A
: . 3 . ^ 0
1. If we unionize
2 . It is not the
: . 3 . It is not the
,
then our troubles are
case that we unionize,
case that our troubles
over
.
are over.
From our study of logic and our discussion of necessary and
sufficient conditions in inductive elimination, we know that
the absence of one particular conditioning property
sufficient for a particular conditioned property does not
guarantee the absence of the conditioned property; there may
be another conditioning property present that is sufficient
for the conditioned property. For statements, we may prove
that 2.1 is invalid by using the truth table method.
A 0 [ ( (
A
0) • ^ A
)
•% rbQ ]
t t t • f • t = f
f t t • t * t = t
t f f • f • f = f
f f t * t • f = f
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Recall that one case (here, the case where A is false and 0
is true) in which the conjunction is true is sufficient to
show that it is not a contradiction, since a contradiction
is never true. Therefore, this argument form is invalid.
Another such formal fallacy is called affirming the conse-
quent, and involves an error of the following form:
2.2
1. A 0
2^ 0
: . 3 . A
1. If Oswald shot JFK in the head, then JFK is
assassinated
.
2
.
JFK is assassinated
:. 3. Oswald shot JFK in the head
From our study of logic and our discussion of necessary
and sufficient conditons in inductive elimination, we know
that the presence of some conditioned property does not
guarantee the presence of any one particular conditioning
property sufficient for the conditioned property. For
statements, we may prove that 2.2 is invalid by using the
truth table method.
A 0 [((A D 0) .0) .^A]
t t t . t . f = f
f t t . t . t = t
t f f . f . f = f
f f t . f . t = f
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Again, in the case where A is false and 0 is true, the con
junction is true. Therefore, the conjunction is not a
contradiction so the argument form is invalid.
Another such formal fallacy is called the fallacy of
conjunction, and involves an error of the following form:
1. 'V' (A . 0)
% A
: . 3 . ^ 0
1. It is not the case that both the Secret Service and
the CIA conspired to kill JFK.
2 . It is not the case that the Secret Service
conspired to kill JFK.
:. 3. It is not the case that the CIA conspired to kill
Again, from our study of logic, we may prove that 2.3 is
invalid by using the truth table method:
A 0 [ (^ ( A . 0) . ^ A) . ^ ^ 0]
Again, in the case where A is false and 0 is true, the
2.3
JFK
t t
f t
t f
f f
f . f . t = f
t . t . t = t
t . f . f = f
t . t . f = f
conjunction is true. Therefore, the conjunction is not a
contradiction, so the argument form is invalid.
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We can see then, that any formal fallacy can be exposed by
capturing the logical form of the statement composing the
argument containing the formal fallacy. We may then simply
appiy PC or LPC rules to point out the error in reasoning
involved which allows us to show that such fallacious
arguments offer no reason to persuade one to accept their
conclusions since we have shown that the argument employing
the fallacy fails to support the conclusion.
Models
1. This provides an opportunity to present invalid argu-
ments or valid arguments that are unsound for
evaluation. Point out that valid but unsound arguments
do not commit formal fallacies, since they do not in-
volve errors in formal reasoning.
2. Consider the invalid arguments you have previously
presented from Gardner. This is a good opportunity
briefly to discuss the psychology of persuasion. Point
out and underscore that our interest in persuasion is
to be persuaded by arguments which successfully support
their conclusions, and not to be persuaded by arguments
which fail to support their conclusions.
3. This is also a good opportunity to relate our con-
sideration of arguments to a consideration of reasonable
beliefs. Consider Ullian's and Quine's discussions in
The Web of Belief .
Exercises
1. Have the students bring in examples of formal fallacies
from the reading, or from advertising. Have them
evaluate them as a group.
2. Have the students write a short paper in which they are
asked to persuade a wealthy individual to fund a par-
ticular project by any means they desire. Have them
exchange papers and evaluate the arguments.
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Subsection 3 - Fallacies of Ambiguity
Besides formal logical errors in reasoning resulting from
violations of PC or LPC rules, there are also what we shall
call informal errors in reasoning that, when exposed, also
allow us to show that arguments containing them fail
rationally to support their conclusions.
Some philosophers, however, have argued that there are no
informal fallacies; what have been called informal fallacies
are not errors in reasoning, but simply enthymemes.
Consider the following example.
E.
1
.
Event A precedes event B in time
:. 2. Event A causes event B.
Such philosophers claim that E does not involve an error in
reasoning, since E is already an enthymeme.
E.l
1. Event A precedes event B in time.
2. If event A precedes event B in time, then event A
causes event B.
:. 3. Event A causes event B.
E.l is a valid deductive argument. Where, they ask, is the
informal fallacy?
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We know from our study of deductive logic that any argument
such as E can be made deductively valid by supplying a
conditional with the conjunction of the premises as
antecedent and the conclusion as consequent. However, this
just leads us to find an error in reasoning involved in
formulating such a conditional. For example, we may account
for the unsoundness of E.l by arguing that 2 is false. It
is false because to reason that if event A precedes event B
time
,
then event A causes event B is to commit a specific
error in reasoning which we shall call the false cause
fallacy
.
Such errors are not formal errors in reasoning, but usually
involve providing evidence of some kind which fails to
support the truth of a particular conclusion. This
evidence, while failing to support the truth of a particular
conclusion, may be psychologically persuasive. Therefore,
it seems that there are informal fallacies, and we ought to
consider them.
One group of such informal errors in reasoning are called
fallacies of ambiguity. Fallacies of ambiguity involve
errors in reasoning resulting from ignoring the ambiguities
of ordinary language like ambiguous words, phrases, or
sentences. From our consideration of clarifying arguments,
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we may now clearly recognize the specific fallacies of
ambiguity, which include equivocation, amphiboly, accent,
composition, and division. We shall now briefly consider
each fallacy of ambiguity.
^ c3u -^-vocation . We have already considered the equivocal use
of terms in our discussion of clarifying arguments in
Section Three, Subsection 3. As we have seen, the
equivocal use of a term involves confusing different
intensions or extensions of the same term. In many argu-
ments, relative terms like (non-moral) 'good', 'small',
'between', etc. lend themselves to equivocal uses. Consider
the following example
:
3.1
1. Mike is a small man.
2
.
A small man is a small animal.
:. 3. Mike is an small animal.
Like in Section Three, Subsection 3, 3.1, this argument 3.1
involves the equivocal use of a term. However, here the
relative term 'small' is used equivocally in premise 2. Of
course, we know that in relation to other men, Mike may be
small, however, in relation to mice, for example, Mike may
not be small at all. 'Small' is, therefore, used
equivocally since it is used to relate two different things;
Mike to other men and Mike to all animals. 'Small' is
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equivocal not because it has different intensions, but
because a sentence like 2 or 3 of 3.1 can express different
propositons depending on what the extension of 'small' is
taken to be
.
Amphiboly
. The fallacy of ambiguity known as amphiboly
involves the ambiguity of grammatical constructions rather
than the ambiguity of terms. The fallacy of amphiboly is
committed when a conclusion is invalidly inferred from a
premise because of the premises' ambiguous grammatical
structure
. Consider the following argument:
3.2
1. The teacher assigned term papers.
2. The teacher asked the students to think about a
topic for the term papers
.
3. The teacher said "leave a note saying what you
will do with me."
:. 4. The teacher requested a note describing physical
assaults on her person.
The fallacy of amphiboly is committed in this case, given
the teacher's admittedly ambiguous statement, when one
infers that the teacher was requesting a note describing
physical assaults on his or her person, such as "I am going
to twist your arm off." This is a fallacy because the
conclusion inferred is not supported by the context in
which the gramatically ambiguous statement occurs. The
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statement does not provide evidence to support the
conclusion. Obviously, the principle of charity requires
one to translate the ambiguous statement as "Leave me a note
in which you state the topic you have chosen for your term
paper .
"
Accent
. The fallacy of ambiguity known as accent also in-
volves the ambiguity of gramatical constructions. The
fallacy of accent is committed when a conclusion is in-
validly inferred from a premise because of placing
unwarranted emphasis on certain words in a premise cited as
evidence for a conclusion. Consider the following argument:
3.3
1. The Biju Theater sells popcorn, candy, and soft
drinks
.
2. There is a cigarette machine in the lobby of the
Bi ju
.
3. There is a sign on the door which reads "smoking
is permitted in the last four rows."
:. 4. One may only smoke in the last four rows, one may
not eat popcorn, candy, or drink soft drinks.
The fallacy of accent is also commmitted in this case,
given the sign in the theater if one puts equal emphasis on
all words and cites the sign as evidence to support the
conclusion that it is a simple fact that one may smoke in
the last four rows, although one may also smoke in any
other row. It is also committed if one puts emphasis on
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permitted' and cites the sign as evidence that the
theater management disapproves of smoking but allows for it
in the last four rows. These are fallacies of accent
because the conclusions inferred by putting emphasis on
different words or groups or words are not supported by the
context in which the grammatically ambiguous statement
occurrs
.
Compositon and Division . The fallacies of ambiguity known
as composition and division both involve inattention to
language attributing properties to a part or to a member in
a class, and properties to a whole or to class. The fallacy
of composition is committed when one argues that if the
parts of a complex object or the members of a class have
a property, then the complex object or the class has this
property. Consider the following argument:
3.4
This
1. I can lift a piston for a Cadillac.
2. I can lift a door for a Cadillac.
3. I can lift the wheels for a Cadillac.
4. I can lift the crank shaft for a Cadillac.
5. I can lift the transmission case for a Cadillac.
6. I can lift the block casting for a Cadillac.
7. I can lift the front seat of a Cadillac
(and so on for each individual part)
8. I can lift a Cadillac.
is an example of the fallacy of composition because
the fact that I can lift each individual part of a Cadillac
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does not provide evidence that I can lift the car.
Obviously, when the car parts are assembled, their cumula-
tive weight will be too much for me to lift. Thus, from the
fact that the individual parts of a complex object like a
Cadillac each have a property, it does not follow from this
that the complex object as a whole has the property.
Similarly, the fallacy of division is committed when one
argues that if a complex object or class has a property, then
the parts of the complex object or the members of the class
have this property. Consider the following argument:
3.5
1. No one can lift a Cadillac.
2. No one can lift a Chrysler Imperial.
3. No one can lift a Lincoln Continental.
4. A Cadillac, a Chrysler Imperial and a Lincoln
Continental all have steering wheels the same size
and shape
.
:. 5. No one can lift the steering wheel of a Cadillac,
or a Chrysler Imperial, or a Lincoln Continental.
This is an example of the fallacy of division because the
fact that no one can lift any one of these cars does not
support the conclusion that no one can lift the steering
wheel from any one of these cars. Thus, from the fact that
the complex object as a whole has the property, it does not
follow that the individual parts of a complex object, like a
car, each have the property.
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Such fallacies of ambiguity involve errors in reasoning
which fail to provide support for a given conclusion. In
the absence of further argument and the reconstruction of
such fallacious arguments, we are entitled to say that such
arguments are simply no good.
Models
1. Present examples of each of these fallacies of ambiguityfrom situations in which one is required to interpret
an ambiguous word or phrase. Point out how to recognize
which interpretations are fallacious and which are not,
and how to tell the difference.
2. Review the principle of charity as discussed in
clarifying arguments and as applied to reconstructing
arguments. Point out how applying the principle of
charity often allows one to reconstruct an ambiguous
statement and thereby to avoid drawing a conclusion
from the statement fallaciously.
3. This is a good opportunity to discuss the notion of a
class, and to distinguish it from the notion of a set
as a more specialized kind of class.
Exerdises
1. Have the students classify and explain various fallacies
of ambiguity: (you can consult the logic texts for
other examples)
.
a) "Each person's happiness is a good to that person,
and the general happiness, therefore, a good the
aggregate of all persons." (J. S. Mill)
b) Fords are expensive cars, so each part must be
very expensive.
c) Chevrolets are numerous. A 1920 Chevrolet is a
Chevrolet. Therefore, 1920 Chevrolets are numerous.
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d) A spark plug for a 1932 Dusenberg is only 50C,
so the car must be very inexpensive.
2. .Have the students draw as many fallacious inferences asthey can from the following. Have them explain why thethey are fallacious, and then have them provide a
clarification of the ambiguous statemement
:
a) In the context of a TV news program: "Good evening.
I am Mike Wallace for Sixty Minutes."
k) In the context of an advertisement for a particularbrand of soft-drink: "Every serving that you pour
costs a nickel not a penny more."
Subsection 4 - Fallacies of Relevance
While in all the fallacies we have considered so far, an
argument involving an error in reasoning fails rationally
to support the conclusion, there is a group of fallacies
in which this failure is particularly obvious. What we
shall call fallacies of relevance involve errors in
reasoning resulting from no rational connection between
premises and conclusions such that the evidence stated in
the premises is totally irrelevant to the truth or
probability of the conclusion. Particularly common specific
fallacies of relevance that have been given names are
ad baculum
,
ad misericordiam
,
ad hominiim
,
ad vercundiam
,
ad populum
,
ad ignorantium
,
false cause, ignoring the
question, complex question and begging the question. It is
useful to note that these are the common ones which have
been given names but this, by no means, exhausts such
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errors in reasoning. With this in mind, we shall now
briefly consider each of these common fallacies of relevance.
Ad^Baculum. Ad baculum is a Latin phrase which literally
means "to the stick." Consequently, this fallacy is often
referred to as the appeal to force. The ad baculum fallacy
involves the most blatant examples of offering reasons that
do nothing to support the truth or probability of a
conclusion. The ad baculum fallacy involves offering
threats as premises, perhaps intended to coerce one to
accept the conclusion, but which fail to offer support for
the truth of the conclusion. Consider the following
argument
:
4.1
1. Mr. Big likes his friends to be generous.
2. Mr. Big takes care of his generous friends by
letting them live.
3. Mr. Big kills friends who are not generous.
4
.
You want Mr. Big to like you.
:. 5. It is financially sound to sell Mr. Big your
Polaroid stock at $.50 per share.
The ad baculum fallacy is committed in this case since
premises 2, 3 and 4 contain threats which do not support
the financial wisdom of selling your Polaroid stock at
$.50 per share. This is a fallacy because it is not
relevant to the issue at hand; the premises have no rational
connection with and offer no rational support for the truth
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of the conclusion. The connection is merely a psychological
one, which although practically important to consider, fails
rationally to support the conclusion. Since our interest
here is limited to rational support for given conclusions
by arguments, we can simply refer such threatening
situations as the above, or threats of force or physical
violence to practical moral problem solvers.
Ad miser icordiam.
. Ad misericordiam is a Latin phrase which
literally means "toward mercy or pity." Consequently, this
fallacy is often referred to as the appeal to pity.
The ad misericordiam fallacy involves offering claims
that harmful consequences or unhappiness for others will
result, as premises, to support the truth of a given
conclusion. Consider the following argument:
4.2
1. My father worked overtime to earn money to send me
to college.
2. My mother took in wash to earn money to sent me
to college.
3. My parents' only chance for happiness is that I get
good grades in college.
:. 4. I deserve an 'A' in Physics.
The ad miser icofdiam fallacy is committed in this case since
the chance of parental unhappiness is cited as support for
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the conclusion. This is a fallacy because such a harmful
consequence is not relevant to the awarding of grades;
making one's parents unhappy has no rational connection to
the awarding of grades in the grading system. Therefore,
such a claim offers no rational support for the truth of
the conclusion.
Ad hominum
. Ad hornin urn is a Latin phrase which literally
means "to the human." Consequently, this fallacy is often
referred to as the personal attack. The ad hominum
fallacy involves offering claims about some person as
premises in an argument against a conclusion that he
supports. The ad hominum fallacy has two forms; first the
abusive form, and secondly, the circumstantial form.
The abusive form of the ad hominum fallacy involves
attacking the claim that a person makes by directly
attacking the person. Consider the following argument:
4.3
1. Lars claims that abortion is wrong.
2. Lars is a stupid Norwegian.
3. Lar '
s
mother's brother is Lars’ father.
4. Lars is so ugly that Trolls drop dead when they
see him.
:. 5. It is not the case that abortion is wrong.
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The abusive form of the ad hominum fallacy is committed in
this case, since the man making the claim is personally
attacked without any specific critical evaluation of the
man's claim. This is a fallacy because such a personal
attack is not relevant to the truth or falsity of his claim;
even stupid Norwegians can utter true propositions.
Therefore, in the absence of more specific criticism of the
claim itself, the statement that the man making the claim is
a stupid Norwegian offers no rational support for the
conclusion that his claim is not true.
The circumstantial form of the ad hominum fallacy involves
offering as premises reasons why, by virtue of certain
personal circumstances, one should, accept or reject a
particular conclusion. Consider the following argument:
4.4
1. Shawn claims that abortion is wrong.
2
.
Shawn is a devout Irish Catholic.
:. TT It is not the case that abortion is wrong.
The circumstantial form of the ad hominum fallacy is
committed in this case since that Shawn is a devout Irish
Catholic is offered as evidence to support the denial of his
claim that abortion is wrong. In this form, an appeal
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appeal is made to the personal circumstances of the man
r^^hincf the claim and this is cited as evidence to support
the truth of the conclusion. This is a fallacy again
because the man's personal circumstances are not relevant
to the truth or falsity of his claim. The fact that he is a
devout Catholic and that the Catholic Church is officially
against abortion does not imply that abortion is wrong, nor
does it imply that abortion is not wrong. Therefore, in
the absence of more specific criticism of the claim itself,
the fact that the man making the claim is a Catholic offers
no rational support for the truth of the conclusion that
his claim is false.
Ad vercundiam . Ad vercundiam is a Latin phrase which
literally means "toward diffidence, or lack of trust."
Consequently, this fallacy is often referred to as the
illegitimate appeal to authority. The ad vercundiam
fallacy involves appeal to an unsuitable authority as
premises to support a given conclusion. It is useful to
note that not all the appeals to authority are fallacious.
For example, appeals to the claims of an expert forensic
pathologist about a murder victim's cause of death count
as evidence for a conclusion as to the cause of death since
the expert is making claims in his field of expertise. On
the other hand, the ad vercundiam fallacy involves an
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appeal to a given authority in a field to support a claim
about something in an unrelated field. Consider the
following argument:
4.5
1. The retired English Teachers Association of New
York passed the statement that nuclear power plants
are safe.
2. The senior class at West High School passed the
statement that nuclear power plants are safe.
3. AFL-CIO Local 404 of the United Garbage Collectors
voted to pass the statement that nuclear power
plants are safe.
:. 4. Nuclear power plants are technologiclaly and
environmentally safe.
The ad vercundiam fallacy is committed in this case since
the authorities appealed to in support of the claim that
nuclear power plants are safe are not authorities on nuclear
power. This is a fallacy because these claims about the
safety of nuclear power plants are irrelevant to determining
that they are safe. The claims have no rational
connection to the resolution of the question. Therefore,
such claims offer no rational support for the conclusion
that nuclear power plants are safe.
Ad oopulum. Ad populum is a Latin phrase which literally
means "to the people." Consequently, this fallacy is often
2^gfQ]f]f0d to as the popular, or the band wagon fallacy.
The ad populum fallacy involves an appeal to generally
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accepted beliefs or majority opinion as premises to support
a given conclusion that is not about generally accepted
beliefs or majority opinion. In this sense, then, the
ad populum fallacy involves an appeal to majority opinion
as an authority to be used as evidence for or against a
particular claim. Consider the following argument:
4.6
1. 51% of the people interviewed in the U.S. believe
that UFO's are flown by intelligent visitors from
outerspace
.
2. 60% of the people interviewed in England believe
this
.
3. 90% of the people interviewed world-wide believe
this
:. 4. There are intelligent life forms able to contact
our Earth from outerspace.
The ad populum fallacy is committed in this case since
majority opinion is cited as evidence to support the claim
that there are intelligent life forms able to contact
Earth. This is a fallacy because such majority opinion
is not relevant to the claim at issue; that intelligent
visitors from outerspace are believed in by a majority of
those individuals interviewed has no rational connection
to the claim that there are intelligent life forms in
outerspace able to contact our Earth. Many children
believe in Santa Clause, yet that is hardly taken as
serious evidence to support a serious claim that
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Santa Clause exists. Therefore, such an appeal offers no
rational support for the truth of the claim that there are
intelligent life forms in outerspace able to contact our
Earth
.
Ad ignorant iam . Ad ignorantiam is a Latin phrase which
literally means "toward ignorance." Consequently, this
fallacy is often referred to as the appeal to ignorance.
The ad ignorantiam fallacy involves offering appeals to
ignorance as premises to support a given conclusion. This
involves arguing that a certain conclusion is true or highly
probable because either it has not been disproven (i.e., we
do not know that it is false) or one does not know how it
could be disproven. Consider the following argument:
4.7
1 .
2 .
3 .
: . 47
The Air Force has explained various UFO sitings
as natural phenomena
Scientists have explained various UFO sitings as
natural phenomena.
Neither the Air Force, nor scientists, nor anyone
else have proven that extraterrestrial flying
saucers do not exist.
Extraterrestrial flying saucers do exist.
The ad ignorantiam fallacy is committed in this case since
the evidence appealed to in support of the claim that extra
terrestrial flying saucers exist is the fact that no one
has been able to prove that they do not exist . This is a
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fallacy because the fact that no one has been able to dis-
prove that extraterrestrial flying saucers exist is
irrelevant as support for the claim that they do exist.
While we may show that all phenomena claimed to be evidence
for their existence are natural terrestrial phenomena, and
that, therefore, there is no evidence to support the claim
that they do exist, the claim that no one has been able to
disprove that they exist has no rational connection to the
resolution of the question. Note that this is not the
same claim as that no one has been able successfully to
refute evidence claimed to support that they exist, which is
false. Therefore, such a claim offers no rational support
for the conclusion that extraterrestrial flying saucers
exist
.
False cause. The false cause fallacy involves an appeal to
premises stating simply that event A came before result C
in time to support the conclusion that A caused C. While
many causes do, in fact, precede the result in time, it is
not simply the fact that the cause precedes the result
in
time that determines the cause. Consider the following
argument
:
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4.8
1. Every morning Sidney puts on brown socks while
dressing, and drives safely to work.
2. Sidney does everything the same way every day.
3. Today, Sidney put on blue socks for the first time
while dressing and had an auto accident on the way
to work.
:. 4. Sidney's putting on blue socks caused him to have
an auto accident.
The false cause fallacy is committed in this case since the
fact that Sidney's putting on blue socks precedes the
accident in time is used to support the conclusion that
Sidney's putting on blue socks caused the accident. This
is a fallacy because the fact that putting on blue socks
precedes the accident in time is not relevant to the
determination of the cause of the accident. An infinite
number of events precede the accident in time. For example,
the sacking of Rome, the invasion of Normandy, and the
resignation of Richard Nixon as President, yet none of these
can be said to cause the accident simply because they
precede the accident in time. Therefore, such a claim
offers no rational support for the conclusion that
putting
on blue socks caused the accident.
ignoring the question . The fallacy of ignoring the
question
involves offering an argument in support of some
conclusion
that is totally irrelevant to the question
at hand.
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Consider the following argument:
4.9
1. Murdering an innocent person violates the laws of
God and the laws of men.
2 . All violations of the laws of God and the laws of
men deserve strict punishment.
:. TT Peter is guilty of murdering his mother.
The fallacy of ignoring the question is committed in this
case since the argument presented supports a conclusion that
is totally irrelevant to the actual guilt or innocence of
the defendant. This is obviously a fallacy. The truth
or falsity of the conclusion actually supported by the
premises provides no rational support for the conclusion in
question
.
Complex question . The fallacy of complex question involves
supposing that a simple yes or no answer, or another simple
short answer to a question containing another hidden
question is appropriate to support a particular conclusion.
Thus, in answering a complex question, one is required
to
presuppose an answer to the hidden question that one may
not wish to presuppose. Thus, one may ask such
complex
questions in order to trick someone into giving an
answer
that implies support for a particular conclusion
that is
not supported by other evidence. Consider the
following
argument
:
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4.10
1. The principal asked Joe if he still hated school.
.
2. Joe answered "no."
3. Joe flunked chemistry six months ago.
4. Since Joe does not still hate school, he must have
hated it six months ago.
:. 5. Joe flunked chemistry because he hated school.
The fallacy of complex question is committed in this case
since both "yes" and "no" answers to this question imply
that the student did at some time hate school, and this may
not be the case at all. Thus, the question is really two
questions. First, "Did you ever hate school?", and second,
"If you ever did hate school, do you still hate it now?"
This is a fallacy since if the student answers no, the
principal may fallaciously conclude that the student
at one time did hate school. Yet a "no" answer to this
complex question is not good evidence for the claim that the
student once hated school. Therefore, answers to such
complex questions do not offer rational support for con-
clusions concerning the hidden question.
Begging the question . The fallacy of begging the question
involves assuming as a premise the conclusion to be proved
by the argument. This fallacy is sometimes called
circularity, or arguing in a circle. Often in arguments
which involve the fallacy of begging the question, the
premise often simply says in different words what the
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conclusion affirms. Consider the following argument:
4.11
1. The unrestrained expression of one's opinions is
for the public welfare.
:. 2. Freedom of speech is good.
The fallacy of begging the question is committed in this
case since the conclusion simply says in other words what
the premise affirms. This is a fallacy because there is no
support offered for the conclusion at all since we must
assume that the conclusion is true to prove that the con-
clusion is true. Therefore, such a claim offers no rational
support for the claim that freedom of speech is good.
We have seen that each of these formal and informal
fallacies involve errors in reasoning which result in a
failure rationally to support a conclusion. Upon
recognizing such errors, we are, therefore, entitled to
claim that arguments employing them are no good.
Models
1. Present examples of each of these fallacies of
relevance. Consider Blum's book as a source for many
fallacies of relevance.
Point out that while all fallacious arguments fail to
support their conclusions, that is, that the premises
are in some sense irrelevant to the conclusion,
fallacies may be more precisely classified by
2.
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considering the exact nature of this irrelevance.
Review the formal fallacies, and the fallacies of
ambiguity by providing examples of these fallacies and
by providing examples of fallacies of relevance.
3. Review the nature of psychological persuasion. Consider
obvious examples such as torture. In more advance
sections, you might raise the question as to whether
this may be said to involve rational persuasion. Have
the students offer explications of 'rational
persuasion'. Consider ethical and aesthetic arguments,
and raise the question "Do such arguments involve
rational persuasion?" Point out that this is a
philosophical problem which many philosophers have
prolifically addressed.
Exercises
1. Have the students classify and explain various fallacies
of relevance: (You can consult the logic texts for
other examples)
a. There is intelligent life on other planets because
John Young, a former astronaut, believes that there
is
.
b. Charlie Hixon and Calvin Parker are good old country
boys so their story of being studied by extra-
terrestrial spacemen must be true.
c. I deserve to be paid more for my work because the
cost of living has gone up, my wife is sick, and
I can't make my car payments.
d. More cigarettes have been smoked in America than
anywhere else for years and during these years,
America has become the strongest nation in the
world, so help strengthen America: smoke
cigarettes
.
e. He is a rich man so we need not listen to his argu-
ments opposing welfare.
f. I will not contribute to the college alumni fund
unless my kid is passing Chemistry.
g. Most people believe in God, so God exists.
h. No one has been able to prove that reincarnation
does not occur, so reincarnation does occur.
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i. The defendant is accused of running a red light.
A stop light is not necessary at that intersection.
j . When did you stop beating your dog?
k. One ought not to commit fallacies because one
ought not to commit psychologically persuasive
errors in reasoning.
2. Have the students write a paper in which they discuss
practical consequences of ignoring fallacies in argu-
ments and adopting conclusions for which there is no
rational support. Have them consider, for example,
politics, education, and business.
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